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PREFACE
Covering an ocean area of three million square miles,
approximately the size of the continental United States,
there are some 2,100 islands and islets in the Pacific Ocean
which are presently administered by the United States under
1
a United Nations Strategic Trusteeship Agreement.
These islands and islets comprise three large groups:
the Marianas (less Guam) to the north, the Carolines to the
2
south, and the Marshal Is to the east. The total land area
is only 687 square miles, about two-thirds the size of Rhode
Island, Only two islands, Bebelthaup and Ponape, are larger
than one hundred square miles.
The indigenous population is basically of Micronesian
stock, one of the three main cultural and racial divisions
of Pacific Oceania. However, there is "racial confusion" in
3
the Trust Territory, Variances in physical characteristics,
customs and languages abound. While collectively called
Micronesians, the peoples are locally called Marshallese,
1, See Appendix A for a chronology of the major events
concerning this thesis,
2, See Appendix B for maps showing these islands in
relation to each other and to the Pacific basin.
3, Stephen H, Roberts, Population Problems of the Pacific
(Londoni George Routledge and Sons, Ltd., 19277"i p] 15. The
term "Micronesia" has recently come into use as a synonym for
the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. This use should
not be taken to imply that all the inhabitants of the Trust
Territory are Micronesians (for example, some inhabitants are
Polynesians) nor that the Trust Territory is coterminous with
Micronesia (the inhabitants of the British-ruled Gilbert
Islands are also Micronesians),
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Palauans, Trukese, Yapese, Chamorros , Carolinians and so
forth. Nine major languages and many variations of dialect
are spoken. In November 1947, the peoples of the Carolines
numbered 33,148, the Marshallese 9,718 and the Chamarros
(less Guam) 5,431 for a total of only 48,297. Total
population on June 30, 1968, was 94,469.
This thesis is a historical study of the decision-making
process within the United States Government that led to the
placing of these islands under a United Nations strategic trustee-
ship with the United States as the administering authority and
to the selection of the governmental agency responsible for
their administration.
From December 17, 1920, until the Second World War, the
islands were governed by Japan, as a League of Nations Class
"C" Mandate. American forces captured them during the Second
World War, and a decision had to be reached as to their postwar
disposition. Because of the level of social, economic, and
political development of the islanders, self-government or
independence was not a feasible solution at the end of the war.
The various alternatives for the postwar status of the
islands covered a wide spectrum. Many proposals, some feasible
and some not, were made during the war for the administration
of dependent territories. These proposals contained varying
degrees of international supervision. Some proposals called
for a powerful international organization directly administer-
ing various dependent areas. For example, President Roosevelt
at one time thought in terms of a string of strategic bases
encircling the globe under direct United Nations administration.
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Other proposals called for the administration of dependent
territories by an agency of the international oi ganization
or by a regional council. Some individuals advocated that
the administration of all of the dependent territories of
the colonial powers be placed under strong international
supervision. Others felt that political realities dictated
only territories taken from the enemy and former League of
Nations mandates could be expected to come within inter-
national supervision.
All of the proposed ideas were studied, debated and
refined within various governments. The final product, based
largely on the United States draft proposal, was included in
Chapter XII of the United Nations Charter (international
Trusteeship System). Territories placed within this trustee-
ship system could be administered by one or more states or by
the United Nations itself (Article 81), Additionally, stra-
tegic areas, which might include part or all of a trust terri-
tory, could be designated (Article 82). These strategic areas
would come under the supervision of the Security Council,
whereas regular trust territories would be under the super-
vision of the Trusteeship Council (Articles 83 and 85).
The former Japanese mandated islands could be placed under
one of the alternatives mentioned above, or they could be annexed
by the conquering power, i.e., the United States, or by another
power. If annexed, the islands would then be governed as a
dependent territory of the annexing power. The annexing




The only feasible alternatives for the postwar dis-
position of the former Japanese mandated islands proved to
be either annexation or their placement under either a reg-
ular or strategic United Nations trusteeship. Some decision
had to be reached; and the United States, as the conqueror
of the islands and as the primary power of the victorious
partners, had the responsibility to make it.
If the United States were to be the administering authority,
whether under some form of international trusteeship or by right
of annexation, then a governmental agency had to be selected
to be responsible for the islands 1 administration. Thus, the
entire question of the postwar disposition of the former Japan-
ese mandated islands divides into two main rounds of decision-
making.
First, the decision had to be reached whether the islands
should be annexed or included in some form of trusteeship sys-
tem. This round subdivides into two questions. The first ques-
tion started in 1942 and concerned the drafting of the trustee-
ship provisions in the United Nations Charter, This question
was not resolved until the San Francisco Conference in 1945,
The other question was whether or not to actually include the
islands within the trusteeship system which had been written
into the United Nations Charter. This question also started
in 1942 but was not resolved until October 1946.
This first round of decision-making was a clear case of
conflicting concepts about the correct way to promote world
peace and security. The "internationalists," whether Presi-
dent Roosevelt with his internationally administered bases

or Cordell Hull, Sumner Welles and Harold Ickes with their
advocacy of rapid independence for all dependent people under
the aid of a powerful world organization, felt the only way
to achieve world peace after the Second World War would be
by great- power collaboration and the development of a strong
international organization. They were strong Wilsonians and
strong proponents of the League of Nations and the mandates
system. They were anti-colonial and determined that the war
would bring no territorial spoils. They desired to set an
example for the rest of the world by gaining no territorial
advantage as a result of the war and by placing the former
Japanese mandated islands under some form of internationally
supervised trusteeship.
The "pragmatists," consisting of some State Department
officials as well as the military services and their civilian
leaders, such as James V. Forrestal and Henry L, Stimson, had,
on the other hand, quite a different concept of the means for
promoting world peace and security. With American national
security involved, they could not bring themselves to rely on
an untested international organization. They were schooled in
the thinking that Japan had fortified the Pacific Islands con-
trary to the mandate agreement, they had seen the failure of
the League of Nations, and they could see the weakness of
relying completely on such a fragile thing as great-power
collaboration in the maintenance of international peace and
security. They would be willing to give an international
organization a chance but not at the cost of any impairment
to American national security.
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If the United States was expected to maintain interna-
tional peace and security in the Pacific Ocean I rea after the
war, the military services and their politically-appointed
civilian leaders believed it should have the means with which
to exercise its authority- -namely, exclusive control of the
strategically located islands. If an effective international
organization should develop someday in the future and proved
effective, then some American security responsibilities could
be gradually shifted over to the shoulders of the organization.
These "pragmatists" believed they were taking a realistic view
of international politics. To them, the "internationalists"
were idealists and dreamers.
The clash of the two concepts occurred most clearly over
the question of the postwar disposition of the former Japanese
mandated islands, although it permeated other contemporaneous
issues. The final product of the conflict over the islands*
disposition bore little resemblance to either side's original
position. It could be said that the best possible compromise
was reached at the time by meeting two almost irreconcilable
points of view. Perhaps so, but as a long-range solution, it
has proved unfortunate, as the question of the future political
status of these islands is once again in contention. The
ultimate disposition of the islands was, in fact, only delayed.
By its very nature, trusteeship is a provisional arrange-
ment. However, according to the thinking in 1942-1947, it
would endure for an indefinite period, particularly in the
case of a former Class "C" mandate. When any estimate was
given of the time required for the Micronesians to become
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prepared for self-government, the phrase "not in the fore-
seeable future" was utilized. It is not unremarkable that
the matter of permanent status was delayed at that time in
the case of a former Class "C" mandate. What is remarkable
is that the due date for terminating the Trusteeship should
have developed so rapidly.
In the meantime, mainly as a result of the conflict
between the "pragmatists" and the "internationalists" over
the disposition of these particular islands, the trusteeship
system embodied in the United Nations Charter is weak in
respect to international supervision of trust territories.
On the other hand, the United States did not annex the
islands. If it had, American security would have been
clearly established in the islands and their development
more strictly inside the American orbit.
On the credit side, two almost irreconcilable points of
view on an issue requiring a decision were considered, debated
and finally brought to a compromise that proved satisfactory
for almost twenty-five years.
The second main phase of decision-making on the question
of the postwar disposition of the conquered Japanese mandated
islands concerned the selection of the governmental agency to
be responsible for their administration. This policy debate
started within each agency during December 1944 but did not
reach the inter-agency level until late in 1945. It was a
controversial question immediately following the war. The
Interior Department, Navy Department, and the War Department
were all interested in administering the islands. This policy
debate was settled in Interior's favor in 1951, although

viii
the question was reopened In 1953 when some of the islands
were returned to naval administration and again in 1962
when those islands were once more placed under Interior
administration.
The problem of the disposition of the islands formerly
mandated to Japan helped to develop an awareness of the need
for better coordination between the State Department and the
military agencies. Other issues, many of which were more
important than the issue of the disposition of the islands,
competed for the attention of the officials and also helped
to create the awareness of the need for better inter- agency
coordination.
The problem of the disposition of the islands was under
active and controversial consideration during the period
which saw the development, from necessity, of the basic ground-
work and principles underlying current politico-military rela-
tions. For example, the first permanent inter-departmental
machinery, the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCCJ,
using an agenda and secretariat support, was created during
this time. This committee was established to consider
many inter-departmental policy issues, the question of the
islands' disposition being among them. It proved so suc-
cessful that the National Security Council, created in 1947,
was modeled after it. Additionally, the Joint Chiefs of
Staff organization, for coordination within the military
establishment, was organized during this time. The Joint
Chiefs of Staff played a leading role in the discussions




The field of American politico-military relations has
never been adequately defined or differentiated from that of
civil-military relations. The terms "politico-military" and
"civil-military" are seen as synonymous and used inter-
changeably by many scholars. Precise definitions have rarely
been given for these terms.
American politico-military relations involve the handling
of problems which have both military and political aspects,
American politico-military relations can be defined as the
intra-governraental, intra-agency as well as inter-agency,
coordination of policies which contain both military and
political aspects.
This field was not adequately recognized in terras of
United States Government organization and policy making prior
to the Second World War. While some ad hoc coordination took
place between the State Department and the military establish-
ment, the widely held conception was that "military policy"
and "foreign policy" were separate, isolated entities. Only
with the pressures and issues, both political and techno-
logical, faced during and since the war has it been adequately
recognized that many issues have both military and foreign
policy implications. The assumption is now accepted that
military aspects and consequences of foreign policy options
should be considered along with the political, economic
and other aspects, domestic and foreign, in the formulation
of any foreign policy. The reverse is also recognized, i.e.,
foreign policy aspects and consequences should be considered

along with the other aspects in the formulation of any
military policy. In fact, since so many problems are
presently a melding of of political and military considera-
tions, the terms "military policy" and "foreign policy"
are now difficult to isolate and define precisely.
Differentiated from this field of politico-military
relations is the broader one of civil-military relations.
The field of civil-military relations concerns the total
relationship between the civil and military segments of
a society. Constitutional, legislative, cultural, socio-
logical, and other factors enter into the picture. In recent
decades, ideas in this regard have changed markedly as millions
of American civilians have entered the military services at
all levels for short periods to meet emergencies.
The question next arises as to how these fields relate
to the large field of bureaucratic politics, defined here as
the area of politics concerning the manner in which the
government bureaucracy is organized and functions in making
decisions on policy issues. All three fields overlap. The
mutual relationships can be visually described as follows:
Bureaucratic





Utilizing these conceptions, some order can be brought
to a diverse area of study. This thesis falls within the
smaller circle of American politico-military relations.
Other works, such as those by Morris Janowitz and Marcus
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Cunliffe, fall solely within the civil-military field
with little attention paid to the politico-military aspects
of civil-military relations. By these definitions the works
of Samuel P. Huntington, Walter Mi His and Harold Stein
would be categorized within the smaller circle of politico-
military relations. The various works of these authors are
listed in the bibliography.
Dr. Robert B. Stewart, of the Fletcher School of Law
and Diplomacy, Tufts University, has been of great assistance
as the Author's adviser and thesis director. Dr. Robert R.
Robbins, of the Political Science Department and the Fletcher
School of Law and Diplomacy of Tufts University, provided the
suggestion for this topic and has also been of great assistance.
Most of the original research was done at the U. S. Naval
Classified Archives Office, Naval History Division, Navy
Department, Washington, D.C.j and a special word of appre-
ciation must be given to the unsung staff of that office for
their professional assistance.
The opportunity to spend two weeks during the summer of
1970 actually working in the field of politico-military
relations was given to the Author by the Director of the
Politico-Military Policy Division of the Office of the
Chief of Naval Operations. This work experience provided
the Author with access to the files of that Division, which.
is the Navy's office for dealing with the Trust Territory
of the Pacific Islands (Micronesia). This work experience
also provided the Author an opportunity to get the "feel and




of politico-military relations in particular.
While the Author has had access to classified materials,
he has used in this thesis only materials that are unclassi-
fied or those specifically declassified for the purpose. This
avoids the necessity of official clearance of this research
product. Many State Department documents were officially
closed to researchers and many of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
documents remain classified. However, materials covering
the same subject were sometimes found in other sources such
as the personal papers of various individuals. The analysis
presented by this thesis would not be changed by the contents
of the documents that remain classified.
Because of the Author's security clearance, it was possi-
ble to do research in the classified files and then arrange
with the proper authorities to have photocopies or notes of
selected documents declassified. Unfortunately, the procedure
followed is that the original documents are returned to the
files with no notation made on them that their contents have
been declassified. Any future researcher of the topic would
need to meet similar conditions and follow similar procedures.
Since these recently declassified documents are believed to
be of special interest and relevance to the study of this
subject, and since they are not generally available, they
have been included as extensive appendices.
Finally, it must be said that any views and opinions
expressed in this thesis ore the Author's own and can in no
v/ay be attributed to the United States Government or to any
of its aggencies,

I am a firm believer in the old adage,
"it's a man's world." When a man decides
to write a book, everyone in the family falls
in line. The children tiptoe through the
house and an understanding wife muffles the
phone and fends off all relatives and friends
who may disturb his brilliant train of thought.
He can take long solitary walks while he
"thinks things out,"' and is blessed with
someone who will bring him an occasional cup
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Both the Trukese and the Paulauans impressed
me as a happy but bewildered people. They
do not look upon us with enthusiasm, but
only as the successors to the Spaniards,
Germans, and Japanese -- all of whom have






The Trust Territory has been specifi-
cally designated as a 'strategic trusteeship*
by the United Nations, The administration
of the area was undertaken by the United
States, after careful consideration by the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, because strategic and
security control of Xhe area is considered
vital to the defense of the United States of
America, I feel that it is only upon the
basis of defense of the United States, that
the considerable cost of the administration
of islands so far from the United States, can
be charged to the American people. It is my
opinion that the strategic and security
responsibility for the Pacific Far Eastern
areas is an indivisible whole since the in-
stallations established and planned in these
areas form an integrated system whose purpose
is to facilitate the common mission of the
Army, Navy, and Air Force,,,, These were the
strategic considerations which required that
the islands of the Trust Territory.be placed
under the exclusive control of the United
States, It is, therefore, apparant that the
primary interest of the United States in the
area is military security,
Francis P. Matthews






The decision-making process that led to the United States
Government submitting the Japanese mandated islands to a United
Nations strategic trusteeship began in 1942. The years 1942-
1944 can be described as a period of departmental juggling
for position on the question of the postwar disposition of
the Japanese mandated islands. The various positions were
developed and put forward, factional lines were tentatively
formed on the issue, potential allies were sought, and the
opposing positions were attacked.
President Roosevelt and Secretary of State Cordell Hull
were in agreement on two areas^ concerning dependent areas.
First, they were determined that the United States would seek
no territorial advantage or aggrandizement from the war be-
cause, in part, of their desire to set an example for the
— 1
rest of the world, particularly the Soviet Union. Second,
they believed that after the war, nationalism and anti-
colonialism would be major forces and that all dependent
peoples who were ready for the responsibility of indepen-
dence and who wanted it should be aided in achieving their
aim. In this regard, they felt that the old mandate system
was unsatisfactory for developing the people since "the
nation irtiich is given the mandate soon comes to believe that
1. Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull (2 vols,,
New York: Macmillian Co., 1948), Vol. 2, pp. 1466-1467.
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it carries sovereignty with it."
Even before the United States entered the war, the
principle of non-aggrandizement was proclaimed. President
Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston Churchill issued, in
August 1941, the Atlantic Charter which began, "first, their
3
countries seek no aggrandizement, territorial or other."
On January 1 and 2, 1942, the United Nations Declaration,
which subscribed to the principles of the Atlantic Charter,
was signed by representatives of twenty- six nations, includ-
ing the United States.
The British were rushed into both of these declarations
without sufficient time to study them. The President pre-
sented Prime Minister Churchill with the requests without
prior, lower-level consultations; and the declarations were
4
marked by "haste and informality." In fact, there is no
signed copy of the Atlantic Charter in the British Archives;
and Roosevelt told Churchill at Yalta that the Prime Minister's
5
signature on Roosevelt's copy was in Roosevelt's handwriting.
2. Elliott Roosevelt, ed., F.D.R. His Personal Letters
1928-1945 (2 vols., New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1950),
Vol. 2, pp. 1371-1372, letter to Jan Christiaan Smuts, Vic-
toria, South Africa, dated November 24, 1942. See also: Hull,
Memoirs . Vol. 2, pp. 1478, 1484 and 1496.
3. Ruhl J. Bartlett, ed., The Record of American Diplomacy
i
Documents and Readings in the History of American Foreign Rela-
tions (4th ed.. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 1964), p. 624.
4. Sir Llewellyn Woodward, British Foreign Policy in the
Second World War (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office,
1962), p. 430.
5. Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War. Vol. 6:
Triumph and Tragedy (6 vols., Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company,
1948-1953), p. 392.

As for the United Nations Declaration, the War Cabinet
cabled Churchill on December 31, 1941, asking "why the urgency
was 'so great as to oblige us to accept a declaration with
6
these defects.'" Mr. Churchill's reply, that the President
desired immediate approval and that the Russian Ambassador
couldn't agree to any changes x^ithout receiving new instruc-
tions from Moscow [he evidently had had more warning than
Churchill"!, did not reach London until January 2, 1942, the
7
day of the signing. It soon became evident that a sharp
difference of interpretation existed between Churchill and
Roosevelt over the principles enunciated in the declarations.
Their differences were particularly over those principles
covering civil rights and self-government. Roosevelt con-
sidered the principles to have" universal application, while
Churchill told Parliament that the Atlantic Charter in no way
affected British policy in the British possessions such as
8
India and Burma. In fact, the proddings of Roosevelt over
India during Churchill's visit to Washington after Pearl
Harbor raised Churchill's anger so much that he "reacted so
strongly and at such length that he [Roosevelt"] never raised
9
it again verbally." The question of India, and colonialism
6. Woodward, British Foreign Policy
, p. 432.
7. Ibid. , p. 433.
8. Foster Rhea Dulles and Gerald E. Ridinger, "The
Anti-Colonial Policies of Franklin D. Roosevelt," Political
Science Quarterly
. LXX (March, 1955), p. 6.
9. Churchill, The Second World War, Vol. 4: The Hinge
of Fate
, p. 209. Also: James F. Green, letter and interview,
September 8, 1970.

in general, was to continue as a sore point in official dis-
cussions between the British and the Americans,
Historian Gaddis Smith has emphasized the point that
throughout most of the war, until the closing months of the
war when Russian intentions in Europe were recognized as the
greater threat to permanent peace, President Roosevelt and
his advisers worried less about the possibility of conflict
with Russia than about the continued existence of western,
particularly British, imperialism. The President, Gaddis
Smith states, "believed that a refusal by the imperial powers
to grant independence to colonial peoples was far more likely
to produce a third world war than anything Russia might do.
Thus, he embarked on a crusade against imperialism in the
10
Allied camp." Gaddis Smith Jias also described another
war-related motive for the strong ant i- imperialist attitude
held by the President and many of his advisers, as follows:
After Pearl Harbor, as the Japanese
— _ wave of conquest swept over Southeast Asia
and threatened India, ant i- imperialism
became a military necessity as well as an
ideal for the United States. 'Asia for the
Asians, 1 said Japan in an effort to exploit
the hatred of dependent peoples for their
European masters. At the same time Nazi
propaganda was telling the Arab peoples
that German victory would bring them genu-
ine independence. In Washington it seemed
that the Allies could lose the war if the
colonial peoples believed these arguments
and cooperated with the Axis. From the
American point of view, the Allies had no
choice « it was imperative to promise inde-
pendence for all colonies. Considering
imperialism morally wrong, economically
wasteful, and a breeding ground for war,
10. Gaddis Smith, American Diplomacy During the Second
World War 1941-1945 (New Yorkt John Wiley and Sons, Inc.,
1965), p. 81.

Americans also believed that independence
would mean a happy, stable, and prosperous
postwar world. American tradition, moral-
ity, military necessity, and future interest
all conve rged . 1
1
Harold Macmillan, Under-Secretary of the British Colonial
Office from February to December, 1942, has commented on Presi-
dent Roosevelt's anti- imperialist attitude and his resultant
actions from the British point of view:
The British Empire was a bugbear to
him [President Roosevelt], Without any
precise knowledge, he would lay down the
law about Indian and Colonial affairs; and
the liquidation of the British Empire was,
whether consciously or unconsciously, one
of his aims.... the President was no friend
of the British Empire, Nor did he under-
stand the clearly defined and steadily
pursued procedures by which we had long
planned to bestow, by gradual means, first
political education and then political inde-
pendence upon those races for whom we held
responsibility. In almost every joint
declaration of policy, the Cabinet had to
watch, and if possible eliminate, some dan-
gerous phrases, 12
The anti-imperialist attitude of President Roosevelt and
many of his advisers not only exacerbated relations with the
British and other colonial powers, but also played a critical
role in the debate within the American Government over the
postwar disposition of the Japanese mandated islands. This
anti- imperialist attitude manifested itself in a strong "no
territorial aggrandizement" position in respect to American
war aims.
11. Ibid. , p. 82.
12. Harold Macmillan, The Blast of War, 1939-1945
(London: Macmillan, 1967), pp. 158-159.

State Department officers began to think of postwar
policies in regard to dependent territories early in 1942,
Soon *fter Pearl Harbor, the President established within
the State Department an Advisory Committee on Postwar Foreign
Policy under Secretary of State Cordell Hull, as chairman, and
Sumner Welles, as vice-chairman. This committee included a
number of senior officers of the State Department and, because
of President Roosevelt's and Secretary Hull's determination
to avoid Wilson's mistakes, Congressional leaders from both
13
parties. Additionally, several non-governmental personages
were included. Among them were Norman H. Davis, president of
the Council of Foreign Relations; Hamilton Fish Armstrong,
editor of Foreign Affairs ; Isaiah Bowman, president of Johns
Hopkins University; Benjamin V. Cohen, general counsel, Na-
tional Power Policy Committee; and Anne O'Hara McCormick, of
the editorial staff of The New York Times
.
Tills committee worked out the framework for studies of
the various postwar problems by July 1942. Its Subcommittee
on Political Problems under Sumner Welles appointed in June
1942 its own Special Subcommittee on International Organiza-
tion, which was also headed by Welles, to work in conjunction
with the State Department's Division of Special Research under
Leo Pasvolsky, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State
for International Organization and Security Affairs, in develop-
ing plans for international trusteeship for dependent areas
and for a general international organization.
13. Harley A. Notter, Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation.
1939-1945 (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1949),
p. 74.

8Dr. Pasvolsky was Chief of the "Research Staff," the
officer personnel of the Division of Special Research and its
succeeding (after January 1943) Divisions of Political Studies
and Economic Studies. He was "incredibly ingenious" and the
14
mastermind of most of the postwar planning. He was a
strong supporter of the placing of all mandated territories
under a new form of international trusteeship.
Dr. Pasvolsky' s right-hand man was Harley A. Notter, who
headed the Division of Political Studies. He was "a Wilson-
15
ian at heart and a strong advocate of the trusteeship system."
Under him, Durward V. Sand ifer and Benjamin Gerig worked on
planning for an international organization. Benjamin Gerig
had been one of the two Americans in the League Secretariat
serving with the Mandate Commi'ssion. Included in the State
Department planners on the issue of trusteeships were Ralph J.
Bunche and James F. Green. Mr. Bunche had specialized in
colonial affairs in the Government Department at Howard Uni-
versity and was strongly in favor of the right of self-deter-
16
ruination. Mr. Green had specialized in the British Common-
wealth and Empire for four years in the Foreign Policy Associa-
tion and was anti-colonial, though not anti-British in outlook.
In January 1944, the Division of Political Studies was
replaced by the Office of Special Political Affairs? and the
Division of Economic Studies was abolished. James C. Dunn
headed the Office of Special Political Affairs; and Dr. Pasvolsky,




still in overall charge, became Executive Director of a new
Committee on Post-War Programs.
These State Department officers concerned with depen-
dent areas and the trusteeship issue held in common a belief
in the right of self-determination. As Mr. Green has phrased
it*
To the British, we were no doubt a
bunch of do-gooders who had never run a
colony.... Most of the initial drafting
and re-drafting of position papters, trustee-
ship agreements, memoranda, speeches, and
the like was thus done by a group of anti-
colonialists. .. . Thus it can be assumed,
I think, that 'the officers directly con-
cerned' in State were all more or less
strongly opposed to annexation of the
Pacific islands. Through Secretary Hull,
Charles Taussig, Charles Taft, and other
top officials, they were able to press the
no-annexation position at every point. 17
By November 1942, a radical plan had been formulated
within the State Department to include all dependent terri-
tories under a powerful International Trusteeship Agency
exercising its supervisory and administrative functions
18
through regional councils. The regional concept reflected
19
Sumner Welles* own ideas. The Japanese mandated islands,
as a dependent territory, would be included within this
system. This plan also reflected the ideas of Professor
17. Ibid.
18. Notter, Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation
, pp. 109-
110 and George Thullen, Problems of the Trusteeship System:
A Studv of Political Behavior in the United Nations (,Geneva:
Droz, 1964;, p. Z3.
19. Sumner Welles, The Time for Decision (New York:
Harper and Brothers, 1944), pp. J83-J84.
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Arthur N. Holcombe, Chairman of the Government Department
20
at Harvard University.
Secretary Hull restricted the concept to only those
dependent territories taken from the Axis and the mandates
of the League of Nations, including the Japanese mandated
21
islands, because of "obvious reasons of political feasibility."
Therefore, the dependent territories belonging to the United
Kingdom, the Netherlands, France, Portugal and Belgium would
not be included. The President approved the tentative plans
as restricted by Secretary Hull.
President Roosevelt was an "anti-colonialist" and
believed in the political development of dependent peoples.
However, he saw the trusteeship concept, itself, more in terms
of providing for international- peace and security than in
22
terms of promoting self-government or independence. He
believed that internationally administered "trusteeships"
would avoid the necessity for annexation of any strategic
points, deny these points to potential aggressors, avoid rival
territorial claims, and enable the international organization
23
to police the world.
20, Arthur N. Holcombe, Dependent Areas in the Post-War
World (Bostoni World Peace Foundation, 1941), pp. 94-97.
21. Hull, Memoirs
. Vol. 2, p. 1638.
22, Thullen, Problems o f the Trusteeship System
, pp. 25-
26 and Hull, Memoirs , Vol. 2. pp. 1304-1305, 1996.
23. Hull, Memoirs , Vol. 2, pp. 1595-I600j also, John C.
Campbell and others, The United States in World Affairs 1945-
1947 (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1947), p. 427

11
President Roosevelt had even gone further than applying
the trusteeship system only to mandates and Axi; territory.
He had proposed to the Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov in
June 1942 a form of trusteeship for the island holdings and
24
other colonial possessions of the "weak nations." In this,
he specifically referred to Indo-China, Siam, the Malay States
and the Dutch East Indies.
Meanwhile, the military services had also started to
think about the postwar problems. They went through a period
of rapid organizational change, both to prosecute the war
and to plan for the postwar problems.
To provide an American side to the Combined Chiefs of
Staff (an Anglo-American committee to direct Anglo-American
strategy) , the old Army-Navy Joint Board was replaced by a
new organization, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) , in Febru-
ary 1942. The main difference between the old Joint Board
and the new Joint Chiefs of Staff was the "closed staff"
system under the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Joint Chiefs of
Staff, therefore, had the services of its own staff. Another
difference was the full representation of the Army Air Corps.
The members were General George C. Marshall (Array), General
Henry H. Arnold (Army Air Corps), and Admiral Ernest J, King
(Navy). Additionally, it had a Chairman, Admiral William D.
Leahy, former Chief of Naval Operations and former Ambassador
to the French government at Vichy. The President appointed
Admiral Leahy on July 20, 1942, as the Chief of Staff to the
24, Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins
t
An
Intimate History (New Yorkt Harper and Brothers, 1948J7 p. 572.
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Commander in Chief and thought of him more as a personal
assistant than Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Admiral
Leahy became a close politico-military adviser to the Presi-
dent and usually, but not always, kept the Chiefs of Staff
25
informed of the political happenings
.
Although the Joint Chiefs of Staff "just came into being
like Topsy -- it Must growed,'" its wartime influence can
26
hardly be exaggerated. Professor Huntington states that,
next to the President, the Joint Chiefs were the "single
most important force in the overall conduct of the war, the
level and the scope of their activities far transcending
27
those of a purely professional body." They had been chosen,
in part, because they possessed the "sense of statesmanship
that enabled them to consider the political as well as purely
28
military aspects of the global situation."
The Joint Chiefs of Staff quickly gained the President's
confidence and
extended their activities and interests
far beyond the normal miLitary confines
and into the areas of diplomacy, politics,
and economics. From the initial great
decision to defeat Germany first to the
last complex series of decisions on the
25. Forrest C. Pogue, George C. Marshall: Ordeal and
Hone. 1939-1942 (New York: The Viking Press, 1966), p. 300.
26. U. S. Naval Classified Archives Office, Speech at
the National War College by Admiral Ernest J. King, April 29,
1947. Declassified 1970, King Papers.
27. Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and The State:
The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge
,
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1959), p. 318.




end of the war with Japan, the major stra-
tegic and policy issues of the war were
resolved by the President, the Chiefs, and
Harry Hopkins. The absence of a formal
charter for the JCS facilitated the expan-
sion of its functions since it was impos-
sible for any rival agency to argue that
it was exceeding its authority. Tied in
close to the President, the interests and
power of the Chiefs tended to expand and
become coextensive with his. 29
A committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Joint
Strategic Survey Committee (JSSC) , was established in Novem-
ber 1942 to advise the Joint Chiefs on matters relating to
military and strategic policy, postwar military policy, Army
and Navy coordination problems, and liaison with the State
Department. The members of this committee were delegates
to the Dumbarton Oaks Conference and served as advisers to
the American delegation at the San Francisco Conference for
the drafting of the United Nations Charter, They played a
large part in formulating the Joint Chiefs of Staff position
on the postwar disposition of the Japanese mandated islands.
The members throughout the war were: Lieut, General S. D.
Embick, USA (Ret.), Vice Admiral Russell Willson, USN (Ret,),
and Major General M. S. Fairchild, USAAC.
As the war progressed, the lower-ranking military staffs
also became involved in political matters. For the Army,
the Operations Division of the General Staff (OPD) became
29. Huntington, The Soldier and The State
, p. 323.
The JCS did not have any charter or other formal definition
of functions until the National Security Act of 1947. One
was drawn up in 1943, but the President did not approve it.
See also j RADM Julius Augustus Furer, U.S.N. (Ret.;, Admin-
istration of the Navy Department in World War II (Washington*
U. S. Government Printing Office, 1959), pp. 663-664.
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"enmeshed" in matters other than military operations out
30
of necessity. This Division was General Mars! all's "Command
Post" throughout the war. It contained no less than four
Rhodes Scholars. It provided the Army's contact with the
Joint Chiefs of Staff and the State Department.
The Navy Department's Occupied Areas Section (OP-50E)
became the Military Government Section of the Central Division
(OP-13-2; under Captain L. S. Sabin on August 1, 1944. Other
Navy offices became involved in political matters, but these
sections were the ones that dealt with dependent areas and
plans for military government of the Japanese mandated islands.
These Naval offices reported to the Chief of Naval Opera-
tions via Vice Admiral Russell Willson (who was also on the
JSSC) in his capacity as Vice -Chief of Naval Operations or
via Rear Admiral R. S. Edwards, originally Chief of Staff to
Admiral King and, after October 1, 1944, Deputy Chief of Naval
Operations, Admiral Edwards' responsibilities after October 1,
1944, in Admiral King's words, were "to attend to matters of
military policy for me, whether derived from the business of
the Navy Department, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the State
Department or the several war boards, including postwar matters,
31
demobilization, organization, etc." This broad conception
of the duties of Admiral Edwards exemplifies the degree to
which the uniformed services expanded their field of activity
during the war.
30, Huntington, The Soldier and The State
, p. 324.
31. Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King, U.S.N, and Walter M.





The American military services, in Professor Huntington's
analysis, did not "reach out after power -- Marshall was no
Ludendorff . Instead, power was unavoidably thrust upon them.
They were given no choice but to accept it, and with it, the
32
implicit conditions upon which it was granted," The Joint
Chiefs of Staff, in particular, were thrust into the decision-
making arena by President Roosevelt and not by any particular
desire of their own.
After Pearl Harbor, President Roosevelt relied almost
exclusively on his close advisers, Byrnes, Rosenman, Hopkins,
and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, for war-time and military deci-
sions. The policy coordination machinery that existed prior
to the war, i.e., the Standing Liaison Committee, the Three
Secretaries* (State, War, Navy) meetings, and the War Council,
33
"withered on the vine," The Secretaries of State, War, and
Navy were excluded from matters of grand strategy by the Presi-
dent and did not even, with a few exceptions, attend the war-
time allied conferences. The Service Secretaries were not on
the routine distribution list for Joint Chiefs of Staff papers
and were essentially limited by the President to administrative
functions. The Joint Chiefs of Staff answered only to the
34
President,
32. Ibid. , p. 316.
33. Ibid,
. p, 320, See alsoi Harold Stein, ed,, American
Civil-Military Decisions! A Book of Case Studies (University,
Alabama* University of Alabama Press, 1963), p. 6,
34. Stein, ed., American Civil-Military Decisions
, p. 462.
Editor comment on article j Paul Y. Hammond, "Directives For the
Occupation of Germany, The Washington Controversy," pp. 313-464.
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Of course, there were many other reasons for the expanded
role of the military services other than President Roosevelt's
personal proclivities. The mere fact that between 1941 and
1945 the size of the American military services increased from
about one million to fifteen million men and women in uniform
had a critical role in altering the power balance between the
military and civilian components of the Government.
The sheer job of administering this huge military estab-
,
lishment and directing trie procurement of vast amounts of war
machinery worth hundreds of billions of dollars radically
altered the whole nature of civil-military relations.
Emotionally, the entire nation was concentrating on the
war effort. The prestige of the military uniformed leaders
was never higher. The goal of' all branches and agencies of
the Government was to support the military services in the
prosecution of the war. Congress played a minor role in war-
time diplomacy and strategy. No opposition to President
Roosevelt developed within Congress to compare with the Com-
mittee on the Conduct of the War that confronted President
Wilson. There was a large measure of public debate over the
Vichy policy and the acceptance of Darlan in North Africa;
but Congress played "no significant part in this prolonged
35
and quite public debate." The Truman Committee was the
only real effort of Congress to "oversee" the war. Even
there, the Committee accepted the huge funding of the secret
"Manhattan" project without knowing its purpose.
35. Stein, ed. , American Civil-Military Decisions, p. 16.
See alsoi Huntington, The SoLdior and The State , pp. 324-335.
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Another reason for the shift in the relative increase
in power of the military services was the contra ction of the
State Departments field of activity as a result of internal
conditions. The State Department
played a minor role in the direction of the
war for political, personal, and organiza-
tional reasons. Ideologically, the State
Department was peculiarly ill-equipped to
deal with the problems of either the war
or the immediate postwar periods.... During
the war, the State Department continued to
believe that its function was diplomacy and
that diplomacy was distinct from force. As
a result, it devoted itself to relations
with neutrals and minor allies and to the
development of plans for the United Nations
organization. The bitter antagonism be-
tween Secretary Hull and Under Secretary
Welles also weakened the Department . 36
The belief that diplomacy was distinct from force had
been implicitly stated by Secretary Hull on November 27, 1941,
the day after the "ultimatum" note had been sent to Japan.
On that occasion, Secretary Hull had informed Secretary of
War Stimsoni "I have washed my hands of it and it is now in
37
the hands of you and Knox -- the Army and the Navy."
Throughout the war, the conception changed in regard to
the role that the military services should play in the deter-
mination of governmental policies. It changed because of the
expansion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff into areas of political
36. Huntington, The Soldier and The State
, p. 321, See
alsoi Albion and Cormery, Forrestal and the Navy
, pp. 163-164,
and Millis, Mansfield, and Stein, Arms and the State
, pp. 94-96.
37, Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On Active




significance for the reasons stated above. It also changed
because the fact that diplomacy was not distind from force
came to be realized | first, by the military services and
later, toward the end of 1944, by the State Department.
The fact that many problems and issues had overlapping
and intertwining military and foreign policy aspects became
clearly recognized and acknowledged. The old concept of
"military policy** and "foreign policy** being separate,
isolated entities fell by the wayside. As always, there
was confusion among the various definitions, or lack of
definitions, in regard to foreign policy, military policy,
national security policy, and national policy. No attempt
will be made here to define these terms. The main point is
the concept developed during the war that foreign and mili-
tary policies are interwoven and, therefore, must be co-
ordinated in order for each to be effective. Political
aspects of military policy must be considered in order to
produce effective military policy and vice versa.
The awareness developed that both military and foreign
policies--as well as domestic policies (which are also inter
woven with military and foreign policies) --are designed, or
should be, to carry out the national policies.
Admiral King described his conception of the national
policies in a speech that he delivered on December 6, 1946,
This speech outlines the national policies (they might be
defined as the national security policies) perceived during
the time that the issue of the postwar disposition of the
former Japanese mandated islands was under consideration.
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It is interesting to note that the national policies that
he outlined are still valid today, although a jew more have
probably been added with the increased commitments made to
other nations since 1946, Admiral King stated;
It is to be remembered that the Navy
does not formulate national policies; the
business of the Navy is to support national
policies. Under our democratic form of
government, national policies are, in fact,
the expression of the will of the people,
as formulated in the Congress and effectu-
ated by the President. The basic purpose
for maintaining United States armed forces
is to provide for our security and to up-
hold and advance our national foreign
policies.
The major national foreign policies,
from which our military policies derive,
appear to be, as nearly as we can now
determine; (a) Maintenance of the terri-
torial integrity and security of the
United States, its territories, posses-
sions, leased areas,- and trustee terri-
tories, (b) Maintenance of the territo-
rial integrity and the sovereignty or poli-
tical independence of other American states,
and regional collaboration with them in the
maintenance of international peace and
security in the Western Hemisphere. (c)
Maintenance of the territorial integrity,
security and the political independence of
the Philippine Islands, (d) Participation
in, and full support of, the United Nations,
(e) Enforcement, in collaboration with our
Allies, of terms imposed upon the defeated
enemy states, (f) Maintenance of the United
States in the best possible relative posi-
tion with respect to potential enemy powers,
ready when necessary to take military action
abroad to maintain the security and integ-
rity of the United States at home.
These policies in the aggregate are
directed toward the maintenance of world
peace, under conditions which insure the
security, well-being and advancement of
our country - and so of the entire world.
The tasks of the Navy, both in war
and peace, stem from the national policies.
My overriding concern is that the United

20
States will have, and henceforth, a Navy
competent to carry out these tasks. 38
Professor Huntington strongly criticizes the "poli-
ticalization" of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He feels that
their concentration on political objectives led them to for-
sake their primary role as military advisers to the govern-
ment. Thus, an effective civil-military relationship broke
down. He cites the example of their shifting from a pre-war
position of recommending the attainment of a balance-of-
power system to the concept of the solidarity of the three
great powers. However, according to Professor Huntington,
the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not completely abandon the
military viewpoint in their thinking. In this respect, he
states their desire to "acquire full ownership of the Japanese
mandated islands was a typically military approach which
brought them into sharp conflict with civilian agencies of
39
the government." Additionally, lower-ranking officers,
both within the Joint Chiefs of Staff organization and
without, retained the traditional military viewpoints. They
urged the "desirability of formulating postwar goals before
the conflict ended, maintaining strong forces after victory,
and directing policy toward the achievement of a world-wide
40
balance of power."
In light of the expanding role of the uniformed services
38. U. S. Naval Classified Archives Office, King Papers,
Speech to Aircraft Club, Detroit, Michigan, December 6, 1946.
39. Huntington, The Soldier and The State
, p. 334.
40. Ibid. , 335.
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and the new conceptions of the military's role in the formu-
lation of governmental policies, it was inevitable that
military officers would soon become interested in the post-
war disposition of the Japanese mandated islands.
The first recorded mention of their interest in the post-
war disposition of the Pacific Island Mandate is a letter
from the Joint Chiefs of Staff dated September 15, 1942, and
signed by Admiral Leahy. It was addressed to Mr. Norman H.
Davis, Chairman of the Sub-Committee on Security Problems of
the State Department's Advisory Committee on Postwar Foreign
Policy. In it, the Joint Chiefs of Staff stressed the neces-
sity of depriving Japan of the Marshall, Caroline, and Mariana
41
Islands (the Mandate).
A few months later the President, himself, directed the
military services to initiate several studies on postwar
security forces, Pacific island problems, postwar commercial
42
air routes, and postwar naval and air base requirements.
These questions necessarily had foreign policy implications.
As Professor Huntington has pointed out, the military services
were not only encouraged but "thrust" into dealing with ques-
tions having political implications.
41, U. S, Department of State, Foreign Relations of the
United States: Diplomatic Papers 1944 (7 vols.. Washington*
U. S. Government Printing Office, 1965), Vol. 5, p. 1201
footnote.
42. U. S. Naval Classified Archives Office, Naval
Aide to President, memorandum to Admiral Leahy, December 28,
1942; Presidential memorandum to the Secretary of the Navy,
June 30, 1943; Report of Investigation by Special Mission
of Certain Pacific Islands (RADM Richard E. Byrd mission),
5 vols., all declassified 1969, CNO (SC) A14-7EF files.
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On March 27, 1943, the Navy Department's hrgh- level
General Board headed by Admiral Thomas C. Hart, who later
became a Senator and carried his conclusions to the Senate,
reported to the Secretary of the Navyt
It is scarcely conceivable that the
terms imposed upon Japan as a result of the
present war will permit her to remain estab-
lished in any capacity in the Pacific islands
mandated to her after the last war. Her fla-
grant and deliberate violations of the pro-
visions of Article 4 of the mandate [no forti-
fications^ would seem definitely to require
that an administration other than Japanese be
established. For reasons of our own security,
and because we are likely to be committed to
the protection of the Philippines after they
have become independent, the United States is
vitally interested in the form which a re-
adjustment in control of these islands may
take.,.. Guam belongs to us and again will be
administered by us when it has been wrested
from enemy hands. The island is one of the
Marianas and, as has been demonstrated in the
past, is potentially menaced by the other
islands of that group unless the same power
controls them all. It follows naturally that
the United States should control the entire
Marianas group.... Because of their geograph-
ical position with relation to the Marianas,
the Philippines and Hawaii, the same military
principle applies in the case of all the is-
lands mandated to Japan; the control of the
whole properly belongs to the United States
.... None of the islands in question pos-
sesses natural features of value from other
than the military standpoint. Both from the
economic and the political standpoints they
are a liability to the nation charged with
their control and administration. The trans-
fer to the United States of any or all of
those islands with all that is implied there-
in cannot constitute territorial aggrandize-
ment. Japan has frankly referred to them as
"unsinkable aircraft carriers" and their
severance from her control will be part of
her disarmament.... In connection with
future sovereignty over the Japanese islands
discussed above, the General Board recommends
that planning for postwar conditions provide
for the United States possesion of: (a) All
of the former German islands mandated to
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Japan by the League of Nations, i.e. the
Marsha lis, Carolines and Marianas (exceot
Guam). 43
President Roosevelt referred to international trustee-
ship and, in particular, the Pacific islands during his March
1943 conference with British Foreign Secretary Eden. The
President went beyond the State Department's trusteeship plan
by suggesting that Indo-China and Korea be placed under
trusteeship. He then indicated that the Japanese mandated
44
islands should be internationalized. Hull writes that Eden
45
"indicated he was favorably impressed with this proposal."
Hov/ever, Harry Hopkins, who was present at the meeting, wrote
that in keeping with British dislike for internationalization
of colonial areas, Eden said it would be better to turn the
islands over to the United States, "preferably in outright
46
ownership."
Eden cabled home his notes on his most formal conference
with the President which was held on March 27, 1943. He
reported!
in the Far East the policy is to be 'Japan
for the Japanese.' Manchuria and Formosa
would be returned to China and southern
Sakhalin to Russia. The Japanese mandated
islands in the Pacific would pass under the
trusteeship of the United Nations.... The
French Marquesas and Tuamotu Islands would
43. U. S., Naval Classified Archives Office, General
Board, Post-war sovereignty over certain islands in the North
Pacific
.
Report No. 450, Serial No. 240, March 27, 1943,
Declassified June 22, 1969, General Board files.
44. Hull, Memoirs
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pass to the United Nations, for use respec-
tively as stages on the northern and south-
ern air routes across the Pacific from
Caribbean area to Australia and New Zealand,
Korea and French Indo-China would pass under
international trusteeship; for the former
the trustees might be the United States, the
Soviet Union, and China..., [The President]
suggested in passing that places like Dakar
and Bizerta were of the greatest importance
for the defense respectively of the United
States and Mediterranean. His idea was that
the United States should act as policeman
for the United Nations at Dakar and Great
Britain at Bizerta. 47
President Roosevelt gave his approval a few weeks after
Eden's visit to a State Department draft proposal for a policy
statement on dependent peoples which was to be presented for
discussion at the Quebec Conference with the British in August,
One of the major points of the draft was that peoples liberated
from Japanese rule and unprepa'red for autonomy should be placed
under some form of international trusteeship representing
48
the United Nations. The draft proposal also included the
goal of independent national status for all colonies.
.
The President was clearly interested in postwar security
matters. In April 1943, Admiral King reported to the Secre-
tary of the Navy the President's interest in these matters.
Since the King report, classified until now, clearly demon-
strates the President's interest in these matters, his method
of administration, and his close personal contact with the
military services, it is worthy of being quoted at lengthi
47. Anthony Eden, The Reckoning (Boston* Houghton Mifflin
Company, 1965), p. 438.
48. Notter, Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation , pp. 471-
472 and Hull, Memoirs
. Vol. 2, pp. 1234-1235.
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Yesterday while at Luncheon with the
President, he brought up the subject of
postwar security force and expressed certain
views in regard thereto - chiefly that he
inclined to "regional" responsibilities on
the part of the great powers, the "regions"
correspond generally to the current "thea-
ters of strategic responsibility" in which
the United States is responsible for the
conduct of the war effort in the Pacific
Theater (generally east of the Longitude
of Singapore)
.
He made mention of the number of agen-
cies, committees, etc., that are now occupy-
ing themselves with postwar problems and
said that he wanted the views of the mili-
tary high command in regard to postwar se-
curity set-up, I reminded him that, at his
direction, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were
having the Joint Strategic Survey Committee
look into this matter and that, at your
direction, the General Board was conduct-
ing a similar study.
The President said that, upon his re-
turn to Washington, he would like to talk
with the Chairman of the General Board
along these lines, which matter I leave
in your hands. He further said that he
wished to talk with one of the members of
the Joint Strategic Survey Committee on
this subject, which desire I will duly
convey to the Joint Chiefs of Staff 49
" When the State Department's draft of a policy statement
on dependent peoples was presented to the British at the
Quebec Conference in August 1943, it was ill received.
Foreign Secretary Eden took special exception to the word
50
"independence." Prime Minister Churchill "made no comment
51
on it," a rare occurrence for him.
49, U. S., Naval Classified Archives Office, Memorandum
for the Secretary of the Navy from Admiral King, April 13,
1943, declassified 1969, CNO (SC) A14-7/EF files.
50, Notter, Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation , p. 254
and Hull, Memoirs
. Vol. 2, p. 1238.




The President next instructed Secretary Hull to bring
the proposal up at the Foreign Ministers' conference at Moscow
in October. At a briefing on October 5, 1943, the President
once again set forth his position, emphasizing the idea of
an international trusteeship system for non-self-governing
peoples, such as Indo-China and Korea, as well as for certain
other places in order to provide the United Nations an inter-
nationalized string of bases encircling the globe. In this
latter category, he mentioned the Pacific mandated islands,
Hong Kong, the Bonin Islands, the Kuriles, Ascension Island,
52
Dakar, and a point in Liberia. Even Secretary Hull had
to admit that Roosevelt wanted to apply the trusteeship idea
53
"widely to all sorts of situations."
Military opposition to Roosevelt's ideas on trusteeship
quickly arose. Admiral Leahy, who was probably closer to
Roosevelt than anyone else except Harry Hopkins, firmly dis-
agreed with the President on this issue. In his memoirs,
he states
i
One of Roosevelt's pet ideas, which
he had discussed with me on many occasions,
was a plan for a series of strategic bases
all over the world to be controlled by the
United Nations, I could never agree with
him on this proposal and always felt that
any bases considered essential for the se-
curity of our own country should be under
the sovereignty of the United States.
His argument, particularly in regard
to strategic areas in the Japanese mandated
groups which we had captured at a high cost
in American lives, was that the United States
52. Hull, Memoirs , Vol. 2, pp. 1305 and 1596.
53. Ibid., p. 1305.

27
did not wish to acquire any territorial gains
as a result of the war. That was a fixed
principle with him. Roosevelt believed that
we would get the same protection if the man-
dated territory was under the United Nations.
I thought he was wrong then, and have not




The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Navy Department strongly
felt that permanent and exclusive control over the islands by
the United States was a military necessity for national secur-
ity and international peace in the postwar world. The pro-
posed international organization was untested with no guarantee
that it would be able to maintain international peace and
security, whereas traditional sovereignty would be clear-cut,
with rights and duties universally accepted. Since the islands
would not be an economic asset, there could be no question of
"imperialism!" and the welfare of the islanders, few in number,
would be adequately guaranteed by American sovereignty.
Furthermore, if the islands were to become a trust territory
run by the international organization, who would "watch the
watchers?" Quis custodiet Ipsos custodes ? If the organiza-
tion were to later break down, the status of the islands would
be in doubt producing an unstable situation.
These islands were intended by the President and the
State Department to be included in the trusteeship; and, there-
fore, for that reason alone , the military began demanding
changes in the trusteeship plan itself while still fighting
for annexation of the islands.
54. Fleet Admiral William Leahy, U.S.N. , I Was There;
The Personal Story of the Chief of Staff to Presidents Roose-
velt and Truman Based on His Notes and Diaries Made at the
Time (New York» McGraw-Hill. 1950), p. 314.
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At the Moscow Foreign Ministers' Conference of October
1943, Hull circulated the United States* proposed plan for
trusteeship, still in general terms; but the topic was not
55
placed on the agenda. Secretary Hull wrote that "we had
definite ideas with respect to the future of the British
56
colonial empire on which we differed with the British."
He claimed that the United States Government had the right
to discuss matters concerning the British Empire since fail-
ure to make provisions for the ultimate self-government of
the possessions could produce possible future conflicts in-
volving the United States; and that the "right of self-
determination" declarations applied, not only to the occupied
57
countries of Europe, but to peoples everywhere, Eden
remarked that he was not prepared to discuss the American
58
proposed text, and Molotov only said that he would study it.
At this same time, the American military services were
conducting the studies of postwar air bases in which the
United States would have an interest. In October, the Presi-
dent told the Navy to expedite these studies. In response,
Admiral King wrote to Admiral Willson (JSSC) and to Admiral
Hepburn (General Board) "to neglect considerations of sover-
eignty and to premise the study solely on geographical -
55. Notter, Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation
, pp. 197-
198.
56. Hull, Memoirs . Vol. 2, pp. 1477-1478.
57. Ibid. , p. 1478.







While enroute to the allied conferences at Cairo and
Tehran, the President elaborated on his conception of the
postwar disposition of the Japanese mandated islands. During
a meeting of the President, Harry Hopkins and the four members
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Leahy, Marshall, King and
Arnold) aboard the U.S.S. IOWA on November 19, 1943, the
proposed agenda for the Tehran Conference was discussed.
When item 2c(3), "military and naval bases for mutual assis-
tance," was reached, the President said
it was contemplated that the Mandated
Islands would be under the composite sover-
eignty of the United Nations. The Chinese
want Formosa and the Bonins, The military
bases required in the Mandated Islands
would be occupied by the United States.
There might be an over-all civilian con-
trol of the entire group and civilian
control of the smaller islands. Cer-
tainly we would not want to occupy the
smaller islands in the Mandates. °0
This is the first mention of President Roosevelt's con-
templating American occupancy of the military bases in the
islands. Unfortunately, this statement is the only mention
of the mandated islands in the minutes of the meeting.
Evidently, the President neither elaborated on his statement,
nor did the other participants at the meeting address the
subject. The President left unanswered the question of the
59. U. S., Naval Classified Archives Office, Memorandum
from Admiral King to Admiral Hepburn and Vice Admiral Willson,
October 21, 1943, Declassified, 1970, King papers.
60. U. S. , Department of State, Foreign Relations of the
United States i Diplomatic Papers i The Conferences at Cairo and
Tehran. 1943 (Washington! U, S. Government Printing Office,
1961), Minutes of President's meeting with the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, November 19, 1943, p. 258.
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degree of control that he contemplated the United Nations
would have over the military bases. Also, he did not indi-
cate his thoughts in regard to the degree of control of the
United Nations over the islands, less the military bases. In
light of the President's last sentence, it would appear that
he contemplated direct "civilian control" by the international
organization rather than by an agency of the United States
Government.
In March 1943, the President had told Eden that these is-
lands should be "internationalized." In October, just a month
before the meeting on the IOWA, President Roosevelt had talked
in terms of the islands becoming part of an internationalized
string of bases encircling the globe. Now in November, the
President indicated that, while the islands would be under the
composite sovereignty of and evidently administered by the
United Nations, the military bases located in the mandated is-
lands would be occupied by the United States. Perhaps the
President's comment on November 19, 1943, indicated a shift
in his thinking on the subject. More likely, he was merely
elaborating on his earlier comments.
Only four days later, on November 23, the President
approved the policy that "the Bonins and all Japanese Mandated
Islands lie in the 'Blue Area' described as 'Required for the
61
direct defense of the United States ...'" Thus, there is
61, U. S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the
United States; Diplomatic Papers 1945 (T vols
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a discrepancy between the President's comment on the 19th
and his approval of a policy paper on the 23rd. He had
earlier stated that "certainly we would not want to occupy
the smaller islands in the Mandates." Nov/, the policy was
that all of the mandated islands were required for the direct
defense of the United States
.
This ambiguity was not resolved by the President's
actions only a week later, on November 29, at the Tehran
Conference. At the afternoon meeting on that date, the
President favorably mentioned the concept of international
62
trusteeship as Hull had outlined it at Moscow in October.
As earlier stated, this proposal included the point that
"peoples liberated from Japanese rule and unprepared for
autonomy should be placed under some form of international
trusteeship representing the United Nations."
Admiral Leahy was still trying to convince the Presi-
dent not to apply the trusteeship concept to the mandated
islands. In his memoirs, based on his notes at the time,
Admiral Leahy made the following comment on the Tehran
Conference
«
The problem of trusteeships came up
during the United Nations discussion.
Roosevelt was convinced that his proposed
world organization could exercise the neces-
sary sovereignty over such areas as the man-
dated Japanese islands which Tokyo had ex-
ploited so fully while ostensibly these
islands still were under the control of the
League of Nations. In our conversations,
I had argued vigorously that the United
States, for its own future security, should





keep and exercise sovereignty over any of
the Japanese mandated islands that we
captured. °3
It, therefore, appears that Admiral Leahy was not satis-
fied with the President's indicating that the United States
would occupy the military bases or that all of the islands
would be considered as required for the direct defense of
the United States, The Admiral was concerned about the idea
of the United Nations having "composite sovereignty" over
the islands. The Admiral desired full United States sover-
eignty over the mandated islands.
The Cairo Declaration of December 1, 1943, must have
disturbed Admiral Leahy, The Declaration stated that the
United States, United Kingdom, and China "covet no gain for
themselves and have no thought' of territorial expansion. It
is their purpose that Japan shall be stripped of all the
islands in the Pacific which she has seized or occupied since
64
the beginning of the first World War in 1914,... H With
this public statement, the policy was officially announced
that the mandated islands would be taken from Japani but the
old formula of "no territorial aggrandizement" was reaffirmed.
The Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral King, was as
deeply concerned over the question of the postwar sover-
eignty of the mandated islands as was Admiral Leahy. Admiral
King's concern was demonstrated in the "Central Pacific Islands"
incident. In January 1944, Admiral Nimitz in Honolulu referred
63. Leahy, I Was There
, p. 210,
64. U. S., Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 9,
No. 232, (December 4, 1943), Cairo Declaration, p. 393.
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in one of his directives concerning the establirhment of
civil-government in occupied islands to "the Br tish Resi-
dent Commissioners of Central Pacific Islands to be occupied."
This wording, in an American directive, was intended to refer
to the Gilbert Islands and other Central Pacific Islands
that Britain owned prior to the war. Admiral King noticed
this wording and sent a quick message to Nimitz with a follow-
up letter telling Nimitz that the wording could be construed
to include the Japanese mandated islands; and, therefore,
the directive should be changed to avoid the possibility of
giving any nation, other than the United States, any basis
for obtaining sovereignty or other territorial rights in
65
the mandated islands.
At the same time, January 1944, the Joint Chiefs of Staff
recommended to the Secretary of State that "no action should
be taken which directly or indirectly would prejudice the
66
ultimate disposition of these islands." Some writers have
mentioned that this recommendation to the Secretary of State
was a result of British activity in the islands. However,
the recently declassified communications from King to Nimitz
show that the recommendation was clearly a result of Admiral
Nimitz' directive and intended as a precautionary measure.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff were obviously concerned with pro-
tecting their preferred solution.
65. U. S., Naval Classified Archives Office, CinCUS and
CNO letter to CinCPAC and CinCPOA, serial 00178, January 18,
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Early in 1944, the State Department's committees pro-
duced a revised plan for trusteeship which woul( include
dependent areas voluntarily placed under the system as well
as the mandates and former enemy territory. The new plan
called for the system to operate under the international
organization's General Assembly rather than through regional
councils. Actual supervisory authority would be exercised
by a subsidiary Trusteeship Commission. Of major importance,
it contained a provision giving the international organiza-
tion's Executive Council authority over any trust territories
where fortifications were to be established under the appli-
67
cation of international security measures. This was the
beginning of the subsequent strategic -areas concept in the
United Nations Charter. Historian George Thullen believes
that this provision reflected "the tendency towards increased
realism regarding the necessity of mechanisms to ensure inter-
national security and, in particular, Roosevelt's determina-
tion to place all strategic bases under United Nations control
since it was an abandonment of the former principle of non-
68
militarization of mandated areas."
On March 9, 1944, Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox
publicly spoke out in favor of annexing the mandated islands
when he stated to the House Foreign Affairs Committee, "those
mandated islands have become Japanese territory and as we
67, Ruth Russell and Jeanette Muther, A History of the
United Nations Charter; The Role of the United States 1*940-
.1945 (Washington! The Brookings Institution, October, 1958),
pp. 341-343.




capture them they are ours." He went on to explain that
the islands were not of much use, except for military purposes;
and that no one in the Government opposed his view that such
of them as were necessary as bases should be allotted to the
United States.
Where Secretary Knox got the impression that no one in
the Government opposed his view is hard to imagine. His
statement contridicted the M no territorial aggrandizement"
policy enunciated in the Atlantic Charter and the Cairo Decla-
ration. His statement indicates a lack of knowledge of the
work and goals of the State Department officers concerned with
formulating a trusteeship system. Unfortunately, Knox always
relied on his "newspaperman's memory" and never dictated notes
of conferences. His official ^and private papers have been
checked, but they contain no mention of the mandated islands.
His statement probably is just indicative of his being left
out of strategic and postwar planning discussions. Admiral
King's papers seem to indicate there was little personal con-
tact or friendship between Knox and himself. Admiral King did
not keep Knox as well informed of Joint Chiefs of Staff activ-
ities as did General Marshall for Secretary of War Stimson.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff continued to stress their
position that the United States should annex the mandated
islands. They wanted full American sovereignty over the
69. U. S., Congress, House of Representatives, Committee
on Foreign Affairs, Hearings on H.R. 4254 [Extension of Lend-
Lease Act], March 1-9, 1944, 78th Cong., 2nd sess,, 1944,




entire area. On March 11, 1944, the Joint Chiefs of Staff
wrote to the Secretary of State detailing their firm posi-
i
tion on the disposition of the mandated islands:
As evidenced in the present war, the
Japanese Mandated Islands bear a vital re-
lation to the defense of the United States.
Their assured possession and control by the
United States are essential to our security.
Together they constitute a single military
entity, no element of which can be left to
even the partial control of another nation
without hazard to our control of that entity
.... The Japanese Mandated Islands should be
placed under the sole sovereignty of the
United States. Their conquest is being
effected by the forces of the United States
and there appears to be no valid reason why
their future status should be the subject
of discussion with any other nation. 70
In April 1944, Dr. Isaiah Bowman, a member of the State
Department Advisory Committee on Postwar Foreign Policy, was
in London with Under Secretary Stettinius. Dr. Bowman informed
the British Foreign Office that the State Department still
wanted a joint Anglo-American declaration concerning trustee-
ship. He stated that the State Department's idea was now to
emphasize the promotion of material well-being and self-
government rather than political independence. This was
evidently felt by the State Department to be a concession
to the British feelings about the British Empire. Dr. Bowman
also stated that the State Department envisaged international
machinery of a "supervisory and not merely a consultative
character. " Dr, Bowman went on to state that American public
7U, U, S. Department of State, Foreign Relations. 1944
.
Vol. 5, p. 1201. Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of
State, March 11, 1944.




opinion would expect something to be said on the subject of
a trusteeship system for dependent areas in connection with
I
the proposed United Nations.
The British Foreign Office gave no response to Dr. Bowman's
presentation. In fact, the British officials were less than
charitable in ascribing the following motives to the State
Department's pressure for a joint Anglo-American declaration
on trusteeship j
The Foreign Office thought that the Ameri-
cans wished for a statement in order to
justify their own plans to annex certain
Japanese islands in the Pacific, and be-
cause the President wanted in his elec-
tion campaign to avoid any risk of being
called a champion of imperialism. 72
Of interest in respect to that last surmise, a Gallup
Poll published on May 23, 1944, gave a boost to the advocates
of American control of the islands. It indicated that 69 per-
cent of the American public desired to "keep" Micronesia as
well as the islands owned or controlled by Britain and
73
Australia that the United States had captured. This ques-
tion of American public opinion on the issue will be further
explored later in this chapter.
In June 1944, a respected naval officer, Admiral Harry E.
Yarnell, U.S.N. (Ret,), was asked by the Navy to give his
analysis of the postwar Far Eastern situation. One of the
points he discussed was the postwar disposition of the mandated
islands. He recognized that the issue of trusteeship (he
72. Ibid.
73. Huntington Gilchrist, "Japanese Islands: Annexation




called it "mandate") versus outright possession of the Pacific
islands would arise. He stated that it would be argued that
outright possession violates the Atlantic Charter and might
lead to a scramble on the part of other nations for other
areas. His recommendation was that the United States would
require a naval and air base in the Marshalls as well as in
the Carolines; plus, an air base in the Pelews and Bonins.
Since the islands had little commercial value and their main-
tenance would be a continuous source of expense, the decision
"whether to accept a mandate in lieu of outright possession
should depend on whether the former would impose any restric-
tions on our right to fortify them and to build the naval and
air bases deemed necessary in our plan of defense in the
74
Pacific. If so we should insist on outright possession."
This analysis was reached independently of the Navy and
the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Admiral Yarnsll's memorandum was
not circulated outside the Navy; and, therefore, his prestige
was not added to the Navy's cause. His comments, however, on
the postwar disposition of the islands must have reinforced
the determination of the naval officers concerned with this
problem to maintain their advocacy of unlimited American con-
trol over the islands.
The State Department officers in postwar planning still
intended that the islands be placed under the trusteeship
74. U. S. Naval Classified Archives Office, Memorandum
on Post-war Far Eastern Situation by ADM, H. E. Yarnell, U.S.N.




system; and the latest form of the plan, dated ,'une 22, 1944,
was submitted to the State Department's high- le- el Postwar
Programs Committee which, under Hull as chairman and Under
Secretary of State Stettinius as vice-chairman, reviewed
proposals before they were submitted to the President.
The next day, June 23, 1944, a representative of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, Major George V. Strong (Senior Army
Member of the Joint Postwar Committee), saw Joseph C. Grew,
Director of the State Department Office of Far Eastern Affairs.
General Strong expressed the Joint Chiefs of Staff's concern
over the Australian and New Zealand Agreement of January 21,
1944, in which those two nations had declared that no disposi-
tion of Pacific islands should be made without their consent.
General Strong then repeated the Joint Chiefs' position on the
disposition of the islands as stated in January and March of
1944. Mr. Grew reported General Strong's comments to the
75
Secretary of State. There is no indication in the record
of Mr, Grew's feelings on the matter, his reply to the General,
or any reaction by the Secretary of State in response to
General Strong's comments.
The military officers gained a strong supporter in this
matter when James V. Forres tal became Secretary of the Navy.
He saw the State Department's June 22, 1944, trusteeship plan
and was shocked. He talked to Stettinius about it on July 7,
1944, asking "if this was a serious document and if he under-
stood that the President was committed to it (I [Forrestal]
75. U. S., Department of State, Foreign Relations 1944 ,
Vol. 5, p. 1266. Memorandum by the Director of the Office of
Far Eastern Affairs to the Secretary of State, June 23, 1944.
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added that it seems to me a sine qua non of any postwar
arrangements that there should be no debate as to who ran
76
the Mandated Islands ...)."
This reaction by Secretary Forrestal was, indeed, the
beginning of additional support for the advocates of unlimited
control over the mandated islands. It also demonstrates the
appalling lack of coordination between the Joint Chiefs of
Staff and the Office of the Secretary of the Navy.
Even prior to Secretary Forrestal* s talk with Stettinius
on July 7, 1944, the State Department began to feel the influ-
ence of those advocating retention of the mandated islands.
In addition to the presentations by the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
several Senators were also speaking out for annexation of the
islands. Former President Hoover supported retention of Paci-
fic bases in a speech to the Republican national convention
77
in June 1944.
Probably because of the above-mentioned pressures, the
trusteeship plan was radically revised by the State Department
planners between June 22 and July 6, 1944. The State Depart-
ment planners desired that the mandated islands be included
in the trusteeship system. They, therefore, downgraded the
supervisory powers of the Trusteeship Council in an attempt
to make the trusteeship system acceptable to the advocates of
full American control over the islands. Additionally, as
described above, the British Government had been resisting
76. Walter Mil lis, ed
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the concept of a strong international trusteeship system.
Indeed, the British at this point were against any declara-
tion committing them to the establishment of any form of
international trusteeship system.
The new plan, dated July 6, 1944, downgraded the powers
of the Trusteeship Council to merely examining reports from
the administering authorities, conducting periodic inspections,
and considering petitions. Under the older plans, the stress
had been on direct international administration with the
Trusteeship Council having power to recommend and revise
trusteeship charter terms, to designate or replace adminis-
tering authorities, and to terminate trust status. These
points were eliminated in the new plan. Another gain for
the Joint Chiefs of Staff was -that the new plan emphasized
the active role that the trust territories were to play in
providing for the maintenance of international peace and
73
security.
The President, himself, was finally influenced by the
consistent opposition of the Joint Chiefs to international
administration of the islands. In reply to a letter from
the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommending annexation, he pointed
out on July 10, 1944, that the United States was seeking no
additional territory but then stated, " I am working on the
idea that the United Nations will ask the United States to
78. Russell and Muther, A History of the United Nations
Charter
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act as Trustee for the Japanese Mandated Island^. With this
will go the civil authority ... and also the military authority
i
to protect them; i.e. fortifications, etc. It does not neces-
79
sarily involve a decision on permanent sovereignty."
The President's statement to the Joint Chiefs of Staff
was a shift from his earlier position that the United States
would not occupy all of the mandated islands. The President
also approved the new State Department trusteeship plan on
July 15, 1944. His approval represented a shift from his
earlier conviction that the old mandate system had been too
weak and that the mandatory authorities, therefore, soon came
to believe that the mandate carried sovereignty with it. The
new trusteeship plan, the President's indication that the United
States would be named as the Trustee for all of the mandated
islands, and the President's decision to approve the new trustee-
ship plan, all represented a movement by the "internationalists"
toward a compromise with the advocates of unlimited American
control of the islands.
Even with this movement by the "internationalists" toward
a compromise position, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secre-
taries of War and Navy (now Stimson and Forrestal) still felt
uneasy over the situation. Their position for unlimited
American control over the strategic islands had not waivered.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff were soon to take a step in direct
confrontation with the State Department in order to protect
their position. This step was the blocking of any discussion
79. Notter, Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation , p. 387.
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of the trusteeship plan at the Dumbarton Oaks Conference,
The President had left Washington on July 15 (the same
day he approved the trusteeship plan) for a conference in
Honolulu with General MacArthur and Admiral Nimitz. While
he was gone, the American Delegation for the Dumbarton Oaks
Conference met on July 18 preparatory to the conference. The
conference at Dumbarton Oaks was to be held in two stages-
-
one with the United States, United Kingdom, and the Soviet
Union, and the other with the United States, United Kingdom,
and China--to develop positions for an eventual United Nations
conference.
The American Delegation was composed of Under Secretary
Stettinius, Grew (then Director of the Office of Far Eastern
Affairs), Bowman, Cohen, Dunn,- Hackworth, Hiss, Hornbeck,
Pasvolsky, Notter, Admiral Willson, Admiral Train, General
Embick and General Strong, among others, Mr, G, H, Hackworth
was the Legal Adviser of the Department of State, later a
Judge in the International Court of Justice, Mr, James F.
Green, a former State Department officer, refers to Hackworth
as follows* "a man of great common sense as well as legal
learning, he was, I believe, the single most influential
officer in State. I do not recall that he took any specific
position on trusteeship matters in these various discussions,
but I feel sure that Hull would not have made a move in this
80
field, or in any other, without consulting Hackworth," Alger
Hiss worked closely with Leo Pasvolsky on security issues but





played no direct role on the trusteeship issue. The other
major delegates have already been mentioned.
At this meeting, the members representing the Joint
Chiefs of Staff- -Admirals Willson and Train, with Generals
Embick and Strong- -achieved a "coup" when they M by specific
and insistent request" obtained the decision to omit the
section on trusteeship from the draft of "Tentative Proposals"
to be submitted by the United States to the other nations at
the conference and from the scope of matters to be raised by
82
the United States at the conference. In other words, the
question of a future trusteeship system was not to be raised
by the United States at this conference. Secretary Hull
described this as a "great disappointment for it
had been a project conceived and elab-
orated in the State Department by my
associates and me and enthusiastically
concurred in by the President..,. The
Joint Chiefs felt that a discussion of
the trusteeship system would inevitably
embrace concrete questions of who should
"~
— be trustee over what territories, and
that dissension might therefore arise
among the Allies,
Furthermore, they were anxious to
keep the whole matter open pending a
determination within our own Government
of a definite policy with regard to the
subsequent disposal of some of the Japan-
ese islands in the Pacific, including
those held by Japan under mandate. It
was their view that complete control of
these islands by the United States for
military purposes was necessary to our
national security, and they felt that
this could perhaps best be achieved
through outright annexation rather than
through a trusteeship system.
81. Ibid.
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My associates and I, on the other
hand, were convinced that the securit.
objective of the United States contro'
of the islands for military purposes,
could be fully secured through a system
of trusteeship.... While we agreed to
the omission of this subject from the
Dumbarton Oaks discussions, we did not
intend to let the project die and hoped
to bring it up again at the general
meeting of the United Nations, 83
These views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were later
officially conveyed to the Secretary of State in a letter
84
dated August 3, 1944, from General Marshall. The Joint
Chiefs of Staff expressed the opinion thati
From the military point of view, it
is highly desirable that discussions con-
cerning the related subjects of territorial
trusteeships and territorial settlements,
particularly as they may adversely affect
our relations with Russia, be delayed
until after the defeat of Japan. 85
At the Dumbarton Oaks Conversations, held between August
and October, 1944, trusteeship was not discussed except for
an informal expression of interest by each of the foreign
governments in a future consideration of the issue after a
86
private exchange of papers.
For two weeks after the Dumbarton Oaks Conversations,
the State Department worked on a draft letter addressed to
83. Hull, Memoirs . Vol. 2, pp. 1706-1707.
84. Notter, Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation
, p. 295
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General Marshall for consideration by the Joint Chiefs of
Staff. It proposed that the portion of the "Tentative Pro-
posals" concerning trusteeship that had been withheld from
the conversations at Dumbarton Oaks should now be sent to
the other three major powers for inter-governmental exchanges
of views prior to the general United Nations conference. An
ad hoc committee was established to consider the problem as a
87
whole and the draft letter in particular.
Rather than delivering the draft letter, the State Depart-
ment decided to invite Admiral Willson and General Strong of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff to informal discussions on the issue.
Such a discussion was held on November 8th with Acting Secretary
of State Stettinius, Hackworth, Dunn, Pasvolsky, and Edwin C.
Wilson (Office of Special Political Affairs) participating.
No meeting ground could be reached, and consideration of the
88
problem was inconclusive.
On November 15, 1944, Stettinius, Hackworth, and Pasvolsky
saw the President who told them that the principle of inter-
national trusteeship should be firmly established with adequate
89
machinery for this purpose. He also directed the State
Department, "in consultation with the military and naval
87. This ad hoc committee was comprised at the "policy
level" of Pasvolsky and Dunn and at the "working level" of
Henry S. Villard of the Near Eastern Office, Robert B. Stewart
of the European Office, Harley A. Notter of the Office of
Special Political Affairs, Benjamin Gerig, Donald C. Blaisdell,
James F. Green, and Ralph J. Bunche from the various divisions
of the latter Office, and C. Easton Rothwell, the Executive
Secretary of the Post-V/ar Programs Committee. Notter, Postwar
Foreign Policy Preparation
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Two major organizational changes were made in December
1944 that had immense influence on the formulation of a policy
on this issue. The first was a critical change in the field
of politico-military coordination that was sorely needed.
Various inter-departmental committees had been estab-
lished since the start of the war, such as the Combined Civil
Affairs Committee for problems relating to civil government
in occupied areas and the Working Security Committee, to
formulate instructions to Ambassador Winant on the European
Advisory Council. These, and other liaison machinery, had
91
gradually evolved to provide collaboration on various issues.
The Service Secretaries, however, were still out of
touch with the activities of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and
with the postwar planning of the State Department. Liaison
between the State Department and the Offices of the Secre-
taries of War and Navy was purely on a low- level, ad hoc
basis.
There was no permanent machinery in existence to provide
continuing overall liaison between the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
the Service Secretaries, and the State Department, The Combined
Civil Affairs Committee had proved to be restricted in its
scope by its parent committee, the Combined Chiefs of Staff,
90. Thullen, Problems of the Trusteeship System
, p. 34,
91, Notter, Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation , pp. 99,
220-225, 349-350, 368. Military officers were also often con-
sulted by the various State Department committees and sub-
committees on an ad hoc basis.
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The Working Security Committee was not satisfactory as an
inter-departmental liaison device since it had no high rank
in the hierarchy. The members were ill-informed on what had
been agreed to on higher levels. Obstacles were placed before
92
it by other agencies of similar rank.
The State Department did deal with the high-level Joint
Chiefs of Staff; but, here again, liaison was on an ad hoc
basis with no overall direction. The Joint Chiefs of Staff
as a corporate body were isolated from the War and Navy Depart-
ments. As stated earlier, the Joint Chiefs of Staff answered
only to the President and did not even distribute their papers
to the Service Secretaries.
Secretary Stimson wrote Secretary Hull a complaint letter
on the lack of inter-departmental liaison in early November
1944; and Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy and Secre-
tary of the Navy James V. Forres tal saw Under Secretary of
State Stettinius about the situation. From this meeting devel-
oped the idea of reviving the Secretaries 1 meetings and, also,
providing a working- level committee for continuous staff work.
In response, Mr. Stettinius wrote Stimson and Forrestal
on November 9, 1944, proposing the establishment of a committee
composed of representatives of State, War, and Navy and of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff to undertake studies regarding problems
in the Far East "similar to those which have come before the
92. Stein, ed,, American Civil-Military Decisions
, p. 462.
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European Advisory Committee in respect to the eremy states in
93
Europe," Studies contemplated were the surrei der terms for
Japan, the military administration of civil affairs in the
Far East and "such questions as may arise in connection with
the disposition of various territories now occupied by the
94
enemy."
Admiral King commented on this proposal favorably, stating
"that it is eminently desirable to set up the proposed Committee,
without delay, to formulate the U« S. view as to surrender terms
for Japan, disposition of territories now occupied by the enemy
95in the Far East and Pacific, and collateral matters." He
stated that the machinery set up for the European Advisory
Committee and the Control Commission for Germany had been
inadequate, resulting in "bela'ted and piecemeal handling" of
96
American policies. He recommended that the Joint Strategic
Survey Committee (JSSC) represent the Joint Chiefs of Staff on
the committee and that the Under Secretary of the Navy, of the
Central Division (OP-13;, represent the Navy. His evaluation
was, "I think the Committee proposed by Mr. Stettinius will be
adequate, particularly if JSSC is part of it. It should be
noted that JSSC has under its control the Joint Post-War Com-
97
mittee to do the spade work." This statement, incidently,
93. U. S,, Naval Classified Archives Office, Stettinius
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indicates the Admiral's reliance on the Joint Chiefs of Staff
system.
When Stettinius succeeded Hull (officially on December 20,
1944), the State-War-Navy Secretaries Committee was revived,
holding its first meeting on December 19, 1944. It now had
better organization with an agenda and with Assistant Secre-
tary McCloy appointed recorder. The Three Secretaries' Com-
mittee met once a week at the State Department. The meetings
were informal. Unfortunately, decisions were often not passed
on throughout the three departments. Assistants eventually
were included in the meetings, who got together afterwards
to decide "who said what" and to ensure proper dissemination
98
of decisions.
Meanwhile, the "working- level committee" (the idea which
had been favorably endorsed by Admiral King) had been formed
in November 1944--a probable time record for establishing a
large inter- departmental committee after its initial suggestion.
The initial members of the committee were James C. Dunn
(State), then Director of the Office of European Affairs;
Assistant Secretary John J. McCloy (Army); and Assistant Secre-
tary Arternus L. Gates (Navy), all of whom had worked together
on the Combined Civil Affairs Committee and its American inter-
departmental counterpart. The State member was chairman, as
requested by Stettinius' first letter, "in view of the fact
that much of the work of the proposed committee will have to




do with political problems involving foreign policy and rela-
99
tions with foreign nations."
One major change, however, had been made in the concep-
tion of the committee. It was not restricted to Far Eastern
and Pacific issues. It was called the State-War-Navy Co-
ordinating Committee (SWNCC, or SWINC as it was dubbed),
which had a full-time secretariat and smaller "working groups"
100
of permanent and ad hoc subcommittees. It was authorized
to make positive commitments for the three departments? and
its main purpose was to "reconcile and coordinate the action
to be taken by the State, War, and Navy Departments on matters
of common interest and, under the guidance of the Secretaries
of State, War, and Navy, establish policies on politico-
101
military questions referred to- it."
Thus, the lack of coordination on the Far Eastern issues,
such as the disposition of the islands, had some role in the
initiation of the first effective and competent coordination
of the three departments in the politico-military field. Also,
of interest is the first use of the term "politico-military"
99. U. S., Naval Classified Archives Office, Stettinius
to Forrestal, November 9, 1944, Declassified 1970, King papers.
100. Huntington, The Soldier and The State
, p. 320 and
Notter, Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation , pp. 347-348. The
committee continued until June 30, 1949, under the name of the
State, Army, Navy, Air Force Coordinating Committee. It was
the direct ancestor of the National Security Council. Seei
Harry S, Truman, Memoirs (2 vols., Garden City, New Yorki
Doubleday, 1955), Vol. 2, p. 58.




in an official document.
There was effective and direct liaison bet 1 een SWNCC
and the Joint Chiefs of Staff with some military personnel
holding positions in both systems and many SWNCC papers
going formally to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for comment
102
and/or concurrence. The Service Secretaries were brought
back into the mainstream of things. By way of this machinery,
the Service Secretaries now started to play an increasingly
important role in the issue of the Japanese mandated islands.
Area subcommittees were established within SWNCC for
Europe, Latin America, the Middle East, and the Far East,
SWNCC was a vast improvement over the pre-war Standing Liaison
Committee, Its main drawback was that it was formed so late
in the war that "the practical" shape of its subject matter was
largely determined by the military commanders in the field,
103
Eisenhower in Europe and MacArthur in the Far East." This
criticism did not apply to the controversy over what to do
with the Japanese mandated islands and the connected problem
of developing a policy on a trusteeship system acceptable to
all departments. This issue was still very much in conten-
tion at the time of the formation of SWNCC.
The second major organizational change at the end of 1944
was within the State Department. It did not affect the issue
of the islands' disposition as dramatically as did the initiation
102. The files of SWNCC papers at the U. S. Naval Classi^
fied Archives Office show an extremely close liaison and co-
ordination between the JCS and SWNCC.
103. Walter Millis, Harvey C. Mansfield, and Harold





of SWNCC, but It did streamline the State Department and
organize it for the work of initiating the United Nations
Organization. The final, hectic work involved in the draft-
ing of the United Nations Charter, with its trusteeship
system, was done within this State Department organization.
Stettinius and Grew were confirmed as Secretary and
Under Secretary of State on December 20, 1944, and quickly
put into effect a reorganization plan that had been deve-
loped within the State Department. Dr. Pasvolsky continued
as Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Interna-
tional Organization and Security Affairs and was in charge
of "the work of preparing for a United Nations Conference
104
to establish an International Security Organization."
The Office of Special Political Affairs, under Edwin C.
Wilson since May 8, 1944, and under Alger Hiss after Janu-
ary 27, 1945, assumed more responsibilities. It had a Divi-
sion of International Organization Affairs under Durward V.
Sandiferj with Benjamin Gerig as associate chief, who also
headed the new Division of Dependent Area Affairs. Under
the Division of Dependent Area Affairs, came Ralph J. Bunche
as associate chief} and James F. Green, who was in charge of
the Trusteeship Administrative Branch.
The new Division of International Security Affairs, under
Joseph E. Johnson, was responsible for matters regarding the
security phases of the proposed United Nations organization
104. Notter, Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation , p. 349.

54
including "the relevant security aspects of United States
105
foreign policy generally." The high-level Policy and Post-
war Programs Committees were transformed rather than abolished?
being effectively replaced by a new Secretary's Staff Com-
mittee. This committee had a secretariat under Mr. Charles W.
Yost which succeeded the former secretariats of the Policy
106
and Post-War Programs Committees
.
Thus, the State Department was now better organized to
handle the issues relating to the proposed United Nations
Organization. Within this new organization, the same indi-
viduals as had previously worked on the trusteeship issue
continued to be responsible for that project.
* * *
About this time, the second major round of this issue
broke into the open. The question of which governmental agency
should administer the islands began to be raised.
Within the Navy, it had a very inauspicious beginning in
September 1944 when Captain H. W. Vanderbilt, Assistant Officer
in Charge of the Military Government Section of the Central
Division (OP-13-2, headed by Captain L. S. Sabin)
,
prepared
an informal memorandum suggesting "the removal of all Japanese
105. Ibid.
, p. 351.
106. The members of the Secretary's Staff Committee were:
The Secretary of State as Chairman; the Under Secretary, Joseph
C. Grew; the Assistant Secretaries; the Legal Adviser, Mr. Hack-
worth; and the Special Assistant to the Secretary for Interna-
tional Organization and Security Affairs, Leo Pasvolsky. The
Assistant Secretaries included William L. Clayton, Economic
Affairs j Nelson A. Rockefeller, Latin American Relations; Brig.
General Julius C. Holmes, Administration; Dean Acheson, Congress-
State Relations; and James C. Dunn, European Affairs.
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from the former Japanese Mandated Islands as a war- time measure
which would yield post-war returns in easier anc better adminis-
107
|
tration of the islands."
In replying to this memorandum, Captain Colclough, of the
Central Division, raised a broader question—that of the form
and organization of a naval government in .the mandates. He
directed the Military Government Section on September 7, 1944,
108
to undertake a study of the problem. However, nothing
further was done on this matter until December when "it had
become evident that Cominch-CNO [Admiral King] and the Secre-
tary of the Navy were interested in this problem, and at that
time Admiral Home wrote a general memorandum to the Secretary
109
on the subject." With this high-level interest, a group
of officers in the Military Government Section (OP- 13-2) were
designated to prepare preliminary plans for the study. As
soon as they made their report, the Military Government Section
was directed to prepare a comprehensive plan for the govern-
ment of the Japanese mandated islands.
Soon, it became evident that a special group of officers
assigned full-time to this work would be required if the plan
was to be prepared expeditiously. Two officers returning from
Europe were, therefore, assigned to a special "Z Plan" group,
under the direction of the head of the Military Government
Section} and in early March 1945, three officers from the staff
107. U. S., Naval Classified Archives Office, OP-22 Office
History, April 10, 1944, to December 1, 1945, Declassified 1970,





of the Princeton School of Military Government were added to
110
the group. The various plans that this group devised will
be briefly discussed in the next chapter. They are fully
described in the definitive work by Cdr. Dorothy E. Richard,
U.S.N.R. , United States Naval Administration of the Trust
Territory of the Pacific Islands . Their importance in regard
to this study lie in the fact that the Navy only commenced
making such plans as late as December 1944 after indications
of high-level interest. Also, of interest for this study is
the degree to which the plans included civilian participation
in the government of the islands. This aspect will be mentioned
later.
At this very same time, December 1944, the Interior Depart-
ment first expressed interest in obtaining the role of adminis-
trator of the islands. On December 12, 1944, Jack B. Fahy,
Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Interior, drafted a
scathing review and analysis of the Navy's administrative
record in American Samoa (1900-1944), Guam (1899-1941) and
the Virgin Islands (1917-1931), This sixteen-page report
ended with:
In conclusion, the naval administra-
tion of Guam, American Samoa and the Virgin
Islands, has not conformed either with the
best interests of the United States or with
those of the islanders. Part of the fail-
ure is due to public and Congressional
apathy. But the basic failure can be traced
to fundamental obligations of the naval
organization to military goals.
As a matter of policy the War and Navy
Departments should have a free hand in the
establishment and maintenance of military




run without creating political dictator-
ships. Civilian populations, regardless of
whether they reside in the Hudson Valley or
Guam, must be provided with a form of govern-
ment that is both civilian and representa-
tive. HI
Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes was evidently
casting covetous eyes on the Navy-administered islands in the
Pacific, i.e., American Samoa and Guam, and by extension, the
mandated islands. Some Navy personnel had evidently been
reciprocating these sentiments, for Ickes wrote the following
letter to Forrestal on November 1, 1944:
For Personal Attention
Dear Jimi
I have again received word from a
reliable source that the Navy is working on
a bill to transfer jurisdiction over the
islands and territories [Interior adminis-
tered Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and the
Virgin Islands] from- this Department to the
Navy. I may have told you that I mentioned
this matter to the President, and he ex-
pressed his opposition to any such trans-
fer. I am virtually certain that work is
being done in the Navy, and I believe that
it is being done without your consent. I
have reason to believe that a Captain Ramsey,
of the Judge Advocate General's Office, is
participating in this activity.
I hope that you will take immediate
steps to put a stop to this enterprise. 112
Perhaps it was this sub-rosa activity within the Navy that
prompted Mr. Fahy to prepare his report attacking the Naval
administration of island possessions. Additionally, the mili-
tary had taken over the government of Hawaii from Interior after
lllo U. S. National Archives, U. S. Department of the
Interior, Office of Territories, Preliminary Report on Naval
Administration of Island Possessions by Jack B. Fahy, De-
classified, 1969, RG 126, 9-0-48 Islands-Pacific-Gen-Pt 1.
112, U. S. National Archives, U. S. Department of the
Interior, Office of Territories, Ickes to Forrestal, RG 48.

58
Pearl Harbor. As early as July 1942, Admiral N ; mitz had told
Admiral King that the "military government in t! e islands
[referring to Hawaii] is working out and urged that after the
113
war, it should continue."
It is impossible to determine which Department first
started the in-fighting, but this was the beginning of a long
and bitter conflict between the Navy and the Interior Depart-
ment that was to last through the 1950' s. Both Departments
desired to administer the Pacific island possessions, and
Harold Ickes' personality and contempt for the Navy only exac-
erbated the struggle.
Prior to leaving the year 1944, it is useful to take a
look at Congressional and public opinions concerning this issue
during this period, August 1944 through January 1945. There
really was no public-opinion problem on this issue. The rela-
tively small groups that did express considered opinions on
the subject were, more or less, evenly divided and tended to
offset each other. The general public held general attitudes,
such as a bias against imperialism which was offset by a
desire to promote American security in strategic areas.
Public opinion is a subjective matter. As mentioned
earlier, one Gallup poll was taken on this issue (May 1944)
;
and it indicated that 69 percent of those polled favored "keep-
ing" the islands. This poll is the only "objective" indication
113. U. S., Naval Classified Archives, Notes of CominCh-
CincPac Conference, July 4, 1942, Declassified 1970, King papers.
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of the public opinion concerning this issue. Even in the
case of this poll, the public-opinion polls at 1 his time were
not as precise as at present. Furthermore, the poll may have
merely reflected the general attitude of those polled toward
promoting American security. The poll does not indicate
whether or not those polled had thought much about the ques-
tion or cared much about it one way or the other.
The personal conceptions of the individuals involved in
the decision-making process on the problem of the postwar dis-
position of the mandated islands were more important than any
pressures from Congress or the American public in general.
The policy makers were, however, influenced by their percep-
tions of the public and Congressional opinion; with each side
probably emphasizing in their -own minds, as well as in their
proselytizing, those expressions that supported their own
position on the issue.
For example, Mr. Green a former State Department officer
who had been concerned with this issue, recalls:
State felt that outright annexation
would not be acceptable to the American
public and to world opinion. Rightly or
wrongly, I believe (and I may well be
wrong on this) that this estimate of
public opinion played its part in the
strong anti-annexation policy in State,
particularly in the drafting levels.
Roosevelt was the smartest poli-
tician of his ear and would certainly
not have adopted a policy that he knew
ran completely contrary to congressional
and public opinion. 114
Of what opinion was expressed, the most vocal individuals




and groups definitely were those in favor of American reten-
tion of the islands. The American Legion recommended in
September 1944 that "support be given such measures as may
be needed to assure our nation of the continued control and
supervision of such Army and Navy bases as may be deemed neces-
115
sary for national security and protection of our nation."
In Congress, Senator McKellar (D-Tenn.) introduced a res-
olution asking for permanent American tenure of all Japanese
islands between the equator and 30°N which would include all
116
of the mandated islands. The resolution also asked for
permanent American tenure of Bermuda, the West Indian colonies,
and the Galapagos Islands. Senator Reynolds (D-N.C.) concurred
with Senator McKellar and offered to extend the proposition to
117
include "southern" California.- Senator Albert B. (Happy)
Chandler (D-Ky.) announced the United States must "have pos-
session of every island in every ocean which, if in the posses-
sion of an enemy, would be a direct menance to the people of
118
the United States." Of course, this was a period close to
the 1944 elections, and the political statements might not always
reflect sober judgment; but the general tenor is important.
115. John W. Mas land, "Group Interests in Post-War Ameri-
can Pacific Policy," Ninth Conference of the Institute of Paci-
fic Relations , American Council Paper No. 6, January 1945, p. 25,
Resolution adopted by the Twenty-Sixth Annual Convention of the
American Legion, Chicago, Illinois, September 18-20, 1944.
116. U. S., Congressional Record , 78th Cong., 2nd sess,,
August 15, 1944, p. 7007.
117. Ibid.
.
August 15, 1944, pp. 7017-7018 and August 18,
1944, p. 7170.
118. Ibid. . August 15, 1944, p. 7017.
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The M anti- annexation" view was supported b" a variety
of organized groups such as church groups, labo: • groups
affiliated with the Congress of Industrial Organizations,
the Commission to Study the Organization of Peace, and the
Universities Committee on Post-War International Problems
(which summarized the views of faculty groups in forty-five
colleges and universities) all of which advocated the advance-
ment of dependent peoples, with a variety of administrative
machinery recommended. However, beyond their general atti-
tudes, the above groups gave very little attention to the
119
Japanese mandated islands.
The Universities Committee proposed three main solutions
for the islands. One solution was to put them under the direct
supervision of the international organization. Another solu-
tion was to put them under a regional commission represent-
ing the United States, Australia, New Zealand, and China. The
commission might, in turn, report to an agency of the inter-
national organization. The third solution was that they
should be mandated by the international organization to some
one country, in the case of many islands to the United States.
The report stated the first solution was favored by two-thirds
of the faculty groups expressing an opinion, and that the other
third were evenly divided between the other two solutions.
However, several groups mentioned they would favor the third
120
choice as an alternative if the first one was unavailable.
119. Mas land, "Group Interests in Post-War American Paci-
fic Policy," Ninth Conference of the Institute of Pacific Rela-
tions





The Ninth Conference of the Institute of Pacific Rela-
tions, held at Hot Springs, Virginia, in January 1945, dis-
cussed dependent peoples. It was attended by Phillip C.
Jessup, Admiral T. C. Hart, Ralph J. Bunche, Huntington
Gilchrist, and Felix M. Keesing, among other Americans. A
total of twelve countries were represented. The round-table
discussions strongly emphasized the need for the political
development of dependent peoples. Those representing subject
peoples felt that M security" might become an excuse after the
war for the deferring of independence. The representatives
from the colonial powers argued that their countries had no
desire to extend their possessions and that they were in favor
of future self-government but had to keep in mind their respon-
sibilities which, if hastily abandoned, would increase the
121
"instability and insecurity of the world as a whole." When
the mandated islands were discussed, an American member, not
identified, told the round table that the United States, be-
cause of postwar security commitments to the Philippines,
might need bases in the islands. The United States would then
need to exercise full sovereignty over the islands. He pointed
out that the "islands were deficient in economic resources and
that their maintenance will involve enormous expense.... There
was no doubt, however, that if the general doctrine of account-
ability prevailed, the United States would fully accept its
122
requirements." A British member said that a transfer of the
121. Security in the Pacific » A Preliminary Report of the
Ninth Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations (New
Yorki Institute of Pacific Relations, 1945), pp. 89-90.
122 « Ibid. , p. 117.
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Islands to the United States could hardly be considered a
matter of imperialism but "of common sense and world security,
as v/ell as in the interests of the local people; but such a
matter was tied up with the future of the mandate system.
There could be no objection if the transfer were with the
consent of the people and made by international agreement
123
and if the principle of accountability were adopted."
There is no record of other responses. "Accountability"
referred to the proposed requirement that the administering
powers, while having full sovereignty, would make reports on
the administration of their dependent territories and would
permit visits by members of an international authority.
* * *
The year 1944 ended with the State Department anxious
to have an approved trusteeship plan ready for the San Fran-
cisco Conference. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had blocked any
discussion of trusteeship at the Dumbarton Oaks conversations.
The President had directed the State Department on November 15,
1944, to redouble its efforts in examining the trusteeship
proposals in consultation with the military and naval author-
ities. At the same time, the President had indicated that the
principle of international trusteeship should be firmly estab-
lished with adequate machinery for this purpose.
The State Department trusteeship planners had already
compromised their original position by downgrading the inter-




some further action had to be taken by them in order to meet
the objections of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, The Joint Chiefs
Staff had objected to the State Department's goal of including
the mandated islands within the proposed trusteeship system
and to any inter-governmental discussion of territorial trustee-
ship or territorial settlements prior to the end of the war.
The State Department planners evidently decided to fight
one objection at a time. They decided to press for their main
goal of incorporating some form of international trusteeship
system in the United Nations Charter. The question of incor-
porating the mandated islands in the trusteeship system, as
well as any other territorial settlements, could be set aside
for a time.
Accordingly, Secretary of State Stettinius sent identical
letters, undoubtedly drafted by the trusteeship planners, to
Forrestal and Stimson stating that the State Department was
"confronted with the need of reexamining the whole matter from
124
the viewpoint of further procedure." Stettinius stated that
this necessity arose because the topic of international trustee-
ships had been raised by the other participants at the Dumbar-
ton Oaks conversations j although, the United States government
had eliminated the topic "in deference to the wishes of the
125
Joint Chiefs of Staff." He summarized the comments
124. U. S., Naval Classified Archives Office, SWNCC 27
file, Appendix A, Stettinius to Stimson and Forrestal, Decem-
ber 30, 1944, Declassified March 1970. Also published ini
Notter, Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation , Appendix 54, pp.
660-661. Appendix C below is a copy of the SWNCC 27 file




of the Soviet, British, and Chinese delegations and then
mentioned that M in none of the above instances was any ques-
tion raised as to the particular territories which might be
involved. The emphasis was exclusively upon general prin-
ciples and, particularly, upon the kind of machinery which
might effectively and appropriately be established in con-
126
junction with the international organization."
Stettinius expressed the following two conclusions and,
in doing so, communicated the State Department's willingness
to meet the objections of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to terri-
torial discussions prior to the end of the war:
1, It is inescapable that the question
of international trusteeships will have
to be discussed at least at the general
conference, and that in all likelihood a
chapter on general principles and machin-
ery will have to be included in the final
charter of the United Nations.
2. It is entirely possible, in dealing
with this subject, to separate the formu-
lation of general principles and of pro-
visions for machinery from consideration
of specific territories, the latter sub- ~_
ject to be left for future determination.
Secretary Stettinius then stated that his department was
presently working on a draft proposal for inclusion within the
United Nations Charter which would be limited to expressions
of general principles and to provision of appropriate machinery
of an international nature. Also, under consideration was the





British, Soviet, and Chinese governments prior t-o the general
128
conference. He ended by inviting the Joint Chiefs of Staff
I
and the War and Navy Departments to participate with State in
the preparation of this proposal.
It is interesting to note that this letter was addressed
to the Secretary of War and to the Secretary of the Navy. It
was not addressed directly to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Earlier, correspondence concerning the trusteeship proposals
had been between the State Department and the Joint Chiefs of
Staff. The President had directed the State Department to con-
sult with the "military and naval authorities." The State
Department planners probably felt that the Secretaries of War
and Navy would be more receptive than the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
The Joint Chiefs had maintained a firm position throughout the
prior discussions. The Service Secretaries, having been rela-
tively isolated from the discussions, might prove to be less
in opposition to the inclusion of an international trusteeship
system in the United Nations Charter.
Additionally, this was the exact time that the Secretaries
of State, War, and Navy were initiating the new machinery for
inter-departmental policy liaison. The recognition that many
of the policy problems contained both military and political
aspects was developing among the officers of the three depart-
ments ,
The Stettinius letter did end by inviting the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, as well as the War and Navy Departments, to partici-




However, it is significant that this invitation was followed
by Stimson and Forrestal being asked to "designate members of
129
the Joint Chiefs of Staff for that purpose." The word
"designate" implied that the Service Secretaries had adminis-
trative control over the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This was just
not so. The Joint Chiefs of Staff still answered only to the
President. The letter, in respect to both its addressees and
its wording, reflects the desire of the Secretaries of State,
War, and Navy (as well as their subordinate officers) to re-
assert themselves in relation to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
After being almost completely restricted to relatively un-
important responsibilities for the reasons stated earlier in
this chapter, the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy were
now attempting to assume new responsibilities.
Relatively, the Joint Chiefs of Staff continued to wield
the most power throughout the war. Following them in general
influence were the War and Navy Departments. The civilian
departments trailed behind. Yet, December 1944 marks a slight
shift in influence in that the Secretaries of State, War, and
Navy began to play a more active and influencial role- -at
least in regard to the issues of a future trusteeship system
and the postwar disposition of the mandated islands. From
this time on, the Service Secretaries and their representatives




Chiefs of Staff, in representing the "pragmatist" position on
the deliberations concerning the trusteeship system and the
130
disposition of the mandated islands.
130. It must be noted that the assumption of a more
active role in inter-departmental deliberations on a policy
issue does not necessarily mean that a shift in power has
occurred. However, the changes in scope of a bureaucratic
agency's activities does provide some rough indication of
the contractions and expansions of that agency's power. A
much more accurate indicator of power is the degree to which
the agency actually achieves its goals, e.g., budgetary allo-
cations or maintaining its initial positions in formulating
joint policies with other agencies. In other words, the
degree to which an agency "gets its own way" in dealings with
other agencies or interest groups is an accurate indication
of that agency's power.

69
Both the Army and Navy are aware that they
are not the makers of policy but they have
a responsibility to define to the makers of
policy what they believe are the military
necessities of the United States.... The
United States must have the means with
which to implement its responsibilities..,.
Those that hate war must have the power to
prevent it.
James V. Forres tal
April 17, 1945
I never haggled with the President. I swal-
lowed the little things so that I could go to
bat on the big ones. I never handled a matter
apologetically and I was never contentious.
It took mc a long time to get to him. When
he thought I was not going for publicity and
doing things for publication --he liked
it.... While it would be difficult at times
and [there]] would be strong pressures for me
to speak to the public, I thought that it was
far more important in the long run that I be
well established as a member of a team and
try to do my convincing within that team
than to take action publicly contrary to the









FINAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE
TRUSTEESHIP PLAN 1945
The December 30, 1944, letter from Secretary Stettinius
was referred by the War and Navy Secretaries to the Joint
Chiefs of Staff for comment. The comments of the latter were
presented to Secretaries Stimson and Forrestal in the form of
a recommended reply to be signed by Stimson and Forrestal and
sent to Stettinius. It was dated January 19, 1945.
This draft reply to the Secretary of State repeated the
main points of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's letter of August 3,
1944, and the Secretary of State's letter of December 30, 1944.
The draft letter read:
In view of the above, the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, with whom I am in agreement, [this
was to refer to the signers of the letter,
both Stimson and Forrestal"] find no objec-
tion, from the military point of view, to
the proposed discussion of International
—
-
-— Trusteeships, provided such discussions
»
a. Give full consideration to the
future defense needs of the United States.
b. Exclude direct or indirect discus-
sion of the disposition of any territory
under the sovereignty of the United States,
or any Japanese territory occupied by United
States forces.
c. Consider no agreement that may
eventually give to any foreign nation claim
to any control of the "Japanese Mandated
Islands*' north of the Equator.
In this connection, it is desired to
emphasize that all studies and discussions
of this subject should give full considera-
tion to the policy approved by the Presi-
dent 23 November 1943, that the Bonins and
all Japanese Mandated Islands lie in the
M Blue Area" described as "Required for the




The usual military representatives,
who are working v/ith the Department of
State in connection with the establish-
ment of the International Organization,
will be available for work in connection
with these discussions ,
*
This draft letter forwarded to the two Secretaries by
Admiral Leahy demonstrates clearly the Joint Chiefs of Staff
position on this issue. When Secretary of War Stimson received
the draft, he was not satisfied with it and took a "harder"
line on the matter. He had Assistant Secretary of War McCloy
draft a proposed joint War-Navy reply to Admiral Leahy. The
McCloy draft basically stated that without prior understandings
on the part of the three or four principal nations "as to the
role each is to play in guaranteeing the maintenance of peace,
that is to say, as to the nature of the responsibility which
is implicit in the word 'trusteeship,' the discussion of
trusteeships at a general conference will open the door to
the broadest kind of claims on the part of some powers and we
will incur the hostility of others, to whom our interest in
2
the subject may appear suspect."
The draft letter further stated that the signers were
doubtful of the possibility of discussing trusteeships without
1. U. S., Naval Classified Archives Office, SWNCC 27 file;
Memorandum for the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the
Navy from the Joint Chiefs of Staff enclosing a draft letter
from the Secretaries of War and Navy to the Secretary of State,
January 19, 1945, Declassified, March 197U. See: Appendix C
for a copy of the entire SWNCC 27 file.
2» Ibid. , Proposed letter submitted by the Assistant
Secretary of War to the Secretary of the Navy for consideration
as a Secretary of War and Navy joint letter to Admiral Leahy,




discussing the particular areas for which they were intended.
The draft letter continued by reiterating the idea that any
discussions of particular areas would create dissension among
the allies and harm the war effort. It concluded j
For these reasons I [this was to refer
to the signers of the letter, both Stimson
and Forrestal] think our Government should
not propose a discussion of trusteeship at
present and should in fact make a determined
effort to avoid discussion of the subject.
We need not fear that this attitude will
provoke suspicion since it is based on a
realistic ground, the impracticability of
discussing the organization and machinery
of trusteeship without some common under-
standing of the obligations of the trustee
and without full knowledge of the types and
character of the territories to be dealt
with.
I realize that these considerations are
not solely military and for that reason, may
not all have been brought to the attention of
the Joint Chiefs of -Staff or considered by
them. Nevertheless, these considerations
bear, in my opinion, so directly on the possi-
bility of attaining objectives of prime mili-
tary importance that I believe the State
Department would be greatly aided by a full
expression of opinion by the Joint Chiefs of
Staff on these points.
3
The last paragraph is an interesting example of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff being urged to consider political aspects in
the development of their position on an issue. Additionally,
in this case it is interesting to note that the political
factors considered by McCloy led to his taking a "harder"
position vis-a-vis the State Department.
Assistant Secretary McCloy informally presented this




a joint War-Navy reply to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Forrestal,
however, did not believe that McCloy's draft waj the proper
response nor the proper method of considering the problem. He
desired to use the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee system
and to build up the role of the Service Secretaries in general.
Accordingly, he had prepared a draft reply to the Secretary of
State from the two Service Secretaries and had his representa-
tive on SWNCC, Artemus L. Gates, submit this draft, along with
the preceeding letters and drafts pertaining to the problem, to
SWNCC for consideration before action was taken. This was one
of the first important utilizations of SWNCC.
The Navy's covering letter to SWNCC pointed out that the
determination of proposals agreeable to all concerned within
the government was the first priority, for it was "premature
to endeavor to decide finally what to do about initiating
external discussions of any kind until our own position has
4
been formulated with reasonable care and prevision." It
urged that the work of drafting such proposals be proceeded
with as expeditiously as possible, and "that the drafts be
submitted to the War and Navy Secretaries and, through them,
5
to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for comment." This covering
letter clearly indicates the more active role that Secretary
Forrestal was determined to play in this issue and the more
orderly procedure he was promoting. It is a far cry from the
4. Ibid. , Paper submitted to SWNCC by the Assistant Secre-
tary of the Navy for Air, February 15, 1945, Declassified,




days when Secretary Knox was uninformed on the basic positions.
The proposed letter submitted by the Navy to SWNCC for
consideration as a joint letter from the Secretaries of War
and Navy to the Secretary of State placed the matter of inter-
governmental negotiations as second in priority to formulating
a policy acceptable to all concerned within the American
Government.
The draft letter then stated, "if we are able to agree
within our own Government upon proposals which we would be
willing to discuss with other nations, then in my opinion [the
opinion of the signers, the Secretaries of War and Navy] such
discussions should be limited to the four powers which took
part in the Dumbarton Oaks conversations, and only after full
examination and complete agreement among those powers should
the subject be opened for consideration by a general confer-
6
ence of the United Nations,"
This, the Navy believed, incorporated McCloy's and Stimson's
view that the general international conference was not a desir-
able forum for such discussions at this point. The Navy also
reasoned that there was no need to ask the Joint Chiefs of
Staff to reconsider their conclusion, since they had already
indicated their approval of the introduction of the trusteeship
subject into a general conference. It could, therefore, be
assumed that the Joint Chiefs of Staff would have no objection
&• Ibid. , Proposed letter submitted by the Navy Represen-
tative on SWNCC for consideration as a joint letter from the
Secretaries of War and Navy to the Secretary of State, dated




to the more limited discussions envisaged by the proposed
7
letter.
The Navy's draft letter took note that discussions had
already commenced within the State Department on draft pro-
posals for possible discussion by the United States vzith Great
Britain, Russia, and China on the general principles of inter-
national trusteeships and the machinery for their effectuation,
It also noted that appropriate military and naval representa-
8
tives were taking part in these discussions.
These discussions were taking place within a new ad hoc
Inter-departmental Committee on Dependent Area Aspects of
International Organization. Agreement had been reached in
January 1945 on its establishment, and the State Department had
appointed its members on January 5; but the first meeting was
not held until February 2, 1945.
The first meeting of this committee was probably delayed
until the Joint Chiefs of Staff had approved the proposed dis-
cussions with their previously listed conditions. There is no
documentation on this connection, but the military members of
the new committee represented the Joint Chiefs of Staff and
would not have participated without the endorsement of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff. Therefore, one would conclude that
the JCS gave their approval to the establishment of this com-
mittee and to the commencement of discussions on the subject
7« Ibid
»
Paper submitted by the Assistant Secretary of
the Navy for Air, February 15, 1945, Declassified, March 1970.
8« Ibid. , Proposed letter submitted by the Navy Repre-
sentative on SWNCC for consideration as a joint letter from
the Secretaries of War and Navy to the Secretary of State,




at the same time or even prior to their submittal to the Service
Secretaries of a draft reply to Secretary Stettinius* letter.
They did not wait for the Service Secretaries* approval and
were, therefore, probably disquieted by Assistant Secretary of
War McCloy's and Secretary Stimson's harder line on the ques-
tion of discussions of proposed trusteeship drafts. They were
probably heartened when Secretary Forrestal placed the emphasis
on the development of an intra-governmental position, leaving
the question of inter-governmental negotiations for later
consideration.
This whole situation is indicative of the state of politico-
military affairs at that time. The Service Secretaries were
starting to play a more active role in the issue, as evidenced
by their expressions of divergent views in regard to the Joint
Chiefs of Staff's recommended reply to the Secretary of State.
Of interest is the comment in the Navy Department's proposed
letter that the draft proposals should be submitted to the War
and Navy Secretaries and, through them, to the Joint Chiefs of
Staff for comment. Additionally, the Service-Secretary-oriented
SWNCC was utilized for the first time in this issue. The Joint
Chiefs of Staff still operated in an orbit of their own as
exemplified by their participating in the ad hoc Inter-Depart-
mental Committee on Dependent Area Aspects of International
Organization prior to any approval of such discussions by the
Service Secretaries. However, the Service Secretaries, as
well as the Secretary of State, were beginning to assert some
authority on this issue.
On February 26, 1945, SWNCC agreed, by informal action, to
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forward to the Secretary of State a letter over the signature
of Mr. Dunn, Chairman of SWNCC, which was almost identical to
9
the one submitted by the Navy. By this time, the inter-
departmental discussions were already proceeding within the
ad hoc Inter-Departmental Committee on Dependent Area Aspects
of International Organization.
The Secretary of State, however, did benefit by receiv-
ing, via his representative on SWNCC, the undiluted views of
the War and Navy Departments, as well as the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, since all of the preliminary documentation leading to
the final letter from Mr. Dunn had been submitted to SWNCC for
consideration.
The State Department was represented on the ad hoc Inter-
Departmental Committee on Dependent Area Aspects of Interna-
tional Organization by Dr. Pasvolsky (Chairman), Assistant
Secretaries Dunn (also on SWNCC) , Nelson Rockefeller, and
Clayton, as well as Mr. Isaiah Bowman. Admiral Willson repre-
sented the Navy Department, while Generals Embick and Fairchild
represented the War Department and Air Corps respectively.
These military representatives were all from the Joint Chiefs
of Staff.
Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes sent his Under
Secretary, Abe Fortas, and his Director of Interior's Division
of Territories and Island Possessions, Mr. Benjamin Thoron,
on the basis of Interior's administration of certain island
9» Ibid. , SWNCC 27/1, Memorandum from the Chairman of
SWNCC to the Secretary of State, February 26, 1945, Declassi-
fied, March 1970. Also: U. S., Department of State, Foreign
Relations, 1945




possessions of the United States. This was the first official
representation of the Interior Department on a < ornmittee con-
sidering trusteeship provisions. The Interior Department was
also to be represented at the San Francisco Conference by Abe
Fortas and Benjamin Thoron on the direct request of Secretary
11
Ickes.
While this committee was being established, informal dis-
cussions were held between the State Department and Col. Oliver
F. G. Stanley, British Minister of State for the Colonies.
Harley Notter has recorded that these discussions concerned
the possibilities of regional commissions for colonial terri-
tories, of a declaration of standards for administration of all
dependent territories, and of trusteeship. There evidently
was little substantive agreement between the State Department
and Col. Stanley, for Notter states that there was "recognition,
most fully expressed in the discussion of January 18, of the
heightening urgency for effecting an exchange of papers on
trusteeship before the projected general United Nations
10. Other members of the committee were Charles W, Taussig,
Chairman of the United States Section, Anglo-American Caribbean
Commission as well as an adviser to the Department of State's
Caribbean Office j Edwin C. Wilson, Director of the Office of
Special Political Affairs and the committee's Acting Chairman,
when necessary? Charles P. Taft (brother of Senator Taf t)
,
Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs
and alternate for Mr. Clayton; Mr. Haley, Director of the Office
of Commercial Policy; and Gerig and Green from the staff of the
Division of Dependent Area Affairs, Admiral Harold C, Train
represented Admiral Willson on one occasion, and Alger Hiss
attended for Mr. Wilson on one occasion.
11. U. S., National Archives, U. S. Department of the
Interior, Office of Territories, RG 48, Letters, Ickes to Stettin-





The State Department was going ahead with < xploratory dis-
i
cussions with the British even before a united position had been
worked out within the American Government. This was the one
action that the Navy Department was to stress should not be done
in its draft letter submitted to SV7NCC on February 15, 1945.
The State Department had difficulties with the British
Government over the question of trusteeship. These difficulties
were soon to be demonstrated clearly by Prime Minister Churchill
at Yalta. However, the State Department, according to Harley A.
Notter, recognized that the immediate problem in the remaining
preparation on trusteeship for the United Nations conference
was not international but in arriving at an agreed policy pro-
13
posal within the Government. - Notter continues his comments
by stating that the agreed policy proposal in regard to trustee-
ship would have to take into account "all the vital national
interests of the United States involved in this complex ques-
tion, including especially provision for the security of the
14
United States in the Pacific." Notter then states:
Congressional interest in the disposition
to be made of the Pacific islands not under
the control of an Allied power was strongly
expressed in this period, and a subcommittee
of the Committee on Naval Affairs of the
House of Representatives was appointed on
January 23 to study this matter.
"








It is interesting to note that Notter's account does not
specify the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the War Depaitment, or the
Navy Department in this reference to the immediate problem in
the remaining preparation on trusteeship. The immediate prob-
lem was mainly caused by the Service Secretaries and the Joint
Chiefs of Staff. The Congressional interest shown at this
time only served to reinforce the bargaining positions of the
"pragmatists" in the Pentagon and the State Department.
About January 20-21, 1945, Forrestal entered in his diary
a memorandum that Stimson had prepared for the Secretary of
State which was eventually delivered on January 23 just prior
to Stettinius' departure for the Yalta Conference. Forrestal
recorded that Stimson felt the disposition of the mandated
islands should be settled by the big powers in advance instead
of through the proposed trusteeship system. As Stimson phrased
the point in his memorandum to Stettinius, "You will get into
needless mazes if you try to set up a form of trusteeship which
will include them [the mandated islands] before the necessity
of their acquisition by the United States is established and
16
recognized," Secretary Stimson further pointed out in his
memorandum to Stettinius that the mandated islands could not
properly be regarded as colonies since they did not have large
populations or considerable economic resources. He then
continued
i
They do not really belong in such a
classification. Acquisition of them by





the United States does not represent an
attempt at colonization or exploitatir n.
Instead it is merely the acquisition 1 y
the United States of the necessary ba:<es
for the defense of the security of the
Pacific for the future world. To serve
such a purpose they must belong to the
United States with absolute power to rule
and fortify them. They are not colonies;
they are outposts, and their acquisition
is appropriate under the general doctrine
of self-defense by the power which guar-
antees the safety of that area of the
world, 17
These points made by Stimson in his memorandum to the
Secretary of State on January 23, 1945, were the same as those
expressed in the draft letter submitted to Forrestal by John C,
McCloy on February 1, 1945, for consideration as a joint letter
from Stimson and Forrestal to Stettinius, Therefore, Stettinius
and the other State Department officers knew Stimson* s views
on the subject as of January 23, 1945, which was prior to the
first meeting of the ad hoc Inter-departmental Committee, The
State Department did not receive Forrestal' s views until the
Navy submitted its proposed joint War-Navy letter to SWNCC on
February 15, 1945, which was after the ad hoc Inter-departmental
Committee had accomplished a large segment of its work.
At the first meeting of the ad hoc Inter-departmental Cora-
cittee, held on February 2, 1945, Dr. Pasvolsky stressed the
"necessity of responding to the approaches of other governments
18
concerning our views on a trusteeship system," This was a
repetition of the main point in the Secretary of State*
s
December 30, 1944, letter.
17, Henry L, Stimson and KcGeorge Bundy, On Active Ser-
vice in Peace and War
, p, 600,
18. Notter, Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation , p. 389,
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A breakthrough of sorts occurred during the second meet-
ing held on February 8. Certain essential differentiations
between strategic and non-strategic areas for trusteeship
purposes were developed at this meeting. This was the new
idea referred to above. Strategic areas would come within
the purview of the Security Council where the unanimity rule
19
would apply. This was the basic concept that eventually
proved acceptable to all parties. Of course, the military
had gone into the discussions with the firm agreement that
any discussions or agreements would not prejudice the ulti-
mate decision as to the disposition of any specific territory.
The trusteeship plan eventually adopted by the committee
specifically stated that it made no assumption about the in-
clusion of any specific territory. It included a special
category of trusteeships i that of "strategic areas" which
would come under the United Nations Security Council where
20
the United States* veto would safeguard American interests.
An additional safeguard, at least in the eyes of the
State Department drafters, was the provision that the terms
of all trusteeship agreements, including any alteration or
amendment, would have to be agreed upon by "all the states
directly concerned." James F. Green believes
i
This was State's invention -- probably
Pasvolsky's invention, but I am not abso-
lutely sure -- to ensure that the United
19. Ibid. , pp. 389-390,
20. U. S. Department of State, Foreign Relations, 1945 ,
Vol. 1, p. 134. Memorandum by the Inter-departmental Committee
on Dependent Areas, March 17, 1945. The Committee completed




States would be involved in every trustee-
ship agreement, including a possible one
for the Japanese Mandated Islands. The US
had no status under the League, of course,
but did have a claim as one of the Allied
and Associated Powers that concluded the
peace settlement. The phrase was suffic-
iently broad to justify US interests as
conqueror of the islands in World War II.
The phrase would also exclude the USSR,
it was hoped. From State's viewpoint,
"the States directly concerned" and later
Security Council veto would amply safe-
guard US interests in a trust territory.^ 1
No evidence is available to indicate exactly when or by
whom the "strategic -area" suggestion was made. Between meet-
ings of the Inter-departmental Committee, the State Department
representatives on the Committee, as well as Ralph J. Bunche,
Robert W. Hartley (Pasvolsky's assistant), Johnson, Notter,
and Sandifer, met to consider the problems and devise or ap-
praise solutions. The original idea may have come from one
of these men or, possibly, from one of the other Departments
represented on the Committee, Secretary Stimson had come
close to it in his thinking. Ambassador John D. Hickerson
states it probably originated in Pasvolsky's and Benjamin
Gerig's "United Nations Office" of the State Department; and
that it was a real compromise of "one-worlder" Gerig's prin-
22
ciples to accept the strategic trusteeship concept, James
F. Green believes that the originator probably was the "in-
credibly ingenious Pasvolsky." He writes of Pasvolsky, "He
played, I believe, the principal role in working out the veto
formula, which would protect US and Soviet interests; the
21. James F. Green, letter, September 8, 1970.




formula of 'the States directly concerned,* which would maxi-
mize US and minimize Soviet influence in the trusteeship agree-
ments; and probably the eventual formula for strategic trust
territories, to reconcile the civilian-military positions.
So far as I can recall, he supported the view that all the
mandated territories should be placed under UN trusteeship
agreements, but agreed with the military that the special US
23
position in the Japanese islands should be recognized,
"
Ambassador Hickerson believes that Pasvolsky and Gerig
probably felt it was the only way to break the deadlock after
seeing how strongly the Navy felt about annexation. For
Ambassador Hickerson, who was on the State-War-Navy Coordinat-
ing Committee and in the State Department's European Affairs
Office, the strategic concept 'was acceptable since annexation
of the islands appeared to be out of the question. He had
previously argued within the State Department for the exclusion
of the mandated islands from trusteeship by their annexation
rather than water down the proposed trusteeship system in
order to include the islands, while at the same time, pro-
24
tecting American security interests.
The State Department felt that American security would
be fully safeguarded by such a "strategic trusteeship,"
From this time on, the State Department argued for making
the islands a "strategic trusteeship" with the United States
23, James F. Green, letter to the author, September 8,
1970.





The military documents make no mention of ' he concept
of "states directly concerned" as being a safeguard. They do
mention the veto provision of the Security Council, as applied
to a strategic trusteeship agreement, as being a safeguard.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff were still not ready to discard
their preference for outright annexation. As a fall-back
position, however, the Joint Chiefs of Staff now had a cate-
gory of trusteeship that was the next closest thing to annex-
ation. They continued to stress the point that their coopera«
tion in developing the trusteeship system did not prejudice
in any way the ultimate decision on the postwar disposition
of the mandated islands.
While the plan was still being worked out in the Inter-
departmental Committee on Dependent Areas, President Roosevelt
took the original, broad trusteeship ideas to the Yalta Con-
ference, During the meeting on February 9, 1945, Secretary
Stettinius started to read them to Churchill; and the Prime
Minister exploded I He stated that "after we have done our
best to fight in this war and have done no crime to anyone I
will have no suggestion that the British Empire is to be put
in the dock and examined by everybody to see whether it is
25
up to their standard."
25, James F. Byrnes, Speaking Frankly (New Yorki Harper
and Brothers, 1947), Foreword, no page number.
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Eden writes that "though the Prime Minister's vehemence
was a warning signal to the Americans it appeared to give most
pleasure to Stalin. Ke got up from his chair, walked up and
down, beamed, and at intervals broke into applause. This em-
barrassed Roosevelt and did not really profit anybody, except
perhaps Stalin, who was able to please himself and point ("at"]
26
the division of his allies at the same time,"
Churchill calmed down when Stettinius explained that the
United States did not contemplate any discussions of specific
islands or territories to be placed under the trusteeship
system. Stettinius added, "later on, we have in mind that the
Japanese mandated islands be taken away from the Japanese. We
27
have nothing in mind with reference to the British Empire,"
Churchill, still distrustful, obtained the Allies' approval
to the following statement for the record
i
It would be a matter of subsequent
agreement as to which territories within
the above categories would actually be
—
- _. placed under trusteeship. No discussions
of specific territories are contemplated
now or at the United Nations Conference.
Only machinery and principles of trustee-
ship should be formulated at the Confer-
ence for inclusion in the Charter, 28
These statements reassured American military leaders as
much as they did the British. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had
found a helpful ally in Prime Minister Churchill, and vice versa.
26, Anthony Eden, The Reckoning;
, p. 595.
27, Byrnes, Speaking Frankly , Foreword, no page number.
See also: Edward R, Stettinius, FDR and the Russians: The Yalta
Conference (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1949), pp. 232-
239 and: Leahy, I Was There , p. 313 for slightly different
accounts of the incident.




One disturbing thought is suggested by Sir Llewellyn
Woodward's comment that one of the reasons why ( hurchill did
not oppose President Roosevelt on matters which Churchill con-
sidered secondary was that "he expected to have to resist
American proposals hostile to the recovery of British terri-
29
tory. M Churchill was concerned with Roosevelt's "thing"
about India and so opposed to placing any part of the British
Empire under international supervision and/or trusteeship that
it effected his position on non- related issues. Churchill
explained his Yalta position in a letter to the Lord President
of the Council on March 10, 1945, as follows*
The expression "mandate system" was
only used at Yalta to limit the territories
which would come within the scope of dis-
cussions affecting 'territorial trusteeship.'
This is necessary in view of the disappear-
ance of the old League of Nations, on whose
authority the mandates were held. It in no
way governs any arrangement that may be made
for the future. We are certainly not com-
mitted to the maintenance of the mandate
system; but there is no question of subject-
ing any non-mandated British territories to
any form of territorial trusteeship unless
we choose to do so of our own accord. I
should myself oppose such a departure, which
might well be pressed upon nations like
Britain, France, Holland, and Belgium, who
have great colonial possessions, by the
United States, Russia, and China, who have
none. 30
It is interesting to speculate whether or not the Joint
Chiefs of Staff and the Service Secretaries had been previously
29. Sir Llewellyn Woodward, British Foreign Policy in
the Second World War
, p. xlvii.
30. Winston Churchill, The Second World War: Triumph
and Tragedy
. Vol. 6, pp. 739-740.
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aware that the British Government was so hesitant about a new
trusteeship system. The State Department lette: of December 30,
1944, had asserted that a provision on trusteeship was bound
to appear in the United Nations Charter because of the British,
Soviet, and Chinese interest. This same point had been made
by Dr, Pasvolsky at the first meeting of the ad hop Inter-
departmental Committee. The United States Government was the
initiator of the trusteeship system. The British, Soviets, and
Chinese may have wanted discussions on trusteeship for their
own reasons; however, they probably would have acquiesced in
the dropping of such discussions from the San Francisco Confer-
ence agenda if such action had been urged by the United States
Government
•
The papers in the SWNCC 27 file indicate that the Joint
Chiefs of Staff and the Service Secretaries were definitely
influenced by the State Department's assertation, undoubtedly
initiated by Dr. Pasvolsky, Gerig, and the other "international-
ists," that a trusteeship system was bound to be in the United
Nations Charter because of British, Soviet, and Chinese interest.
The question is not whether, but how much, influence this asser-
tation had on the Joint Chiefs of Staff's decision to approve
discussions on trusteeship at the San Francisco Conference.
Another question is whether or not Dr. Pasvolsky, Gerig, and
the other "internationalists" in the State Department led the
Joint Chiefs of Staff "down the garden path" on this matter.
At a cabinet meeting on March 9, 1945, Roosevelt talked
of his ideas on the trusteeship of the mandated islands.
Forrestal summarized the discussion in his diary as follows:
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He [Roosevelt] said that his idea
which he advanced to Stalin and Churchill,
was based on the concept of what he called
multiple sovereignty - that is, sovereignty
would be vested in all of the United Nations,
for example, of the Pacific islands, but
that we would be requested by them to exer-
cise complete trusteeship for the purpose of
world security. He further said that the
Australians had advanced the theses that
they would take by direct acquisition every-
thing south of the equator, leaving to us
those islands north of that line [the man-
date]. This he said was unacceptable. I
said there were a number of places that we
ought to have for our naval security -
Kwajalein, the Marianas, Truk, etc. He also
included Manus in this category and said
that he would even be inclined to have mili-
tary rights on Noumea while leaving to the
French the economic accruals from New Cale-
donia. The Secretary of War [Stimson] ex-
pressed the hope that if the trusteeship
idea was adopted the basis of our exercise
of powers under it would be very clearly
stated so that there could be no misunder-
standings in the future. 31
This account, if accurate, indicates that Roosevelt had
clarified his thoughts on the sovereignty of the islands since
his letter to the Joint Chiefs of Staff the past July. He had
written then that the idea that the United Nations would ask
the United States to act as Trustee for the Japanese mandated
islands did not necessarily involve a decision on permanent
sovereignty. Now, the President elaborated on his concept by
stating that the sovereignty of the islands would be vested
in the United Nations.
At the Three Secretaries' [State-War-Navy] Meeting on
March 13, Stimson repeated his concern about the trusteeship
concept and "told the Secretary of State [Stettinius] he




thought he would in due course have to get rid c f the gentle-
man [Leo Pasvolsky"] in his Department who was tl e sponsor of
this idea. The Secretary of State agreed, said he had dis-
32
cussed this matter last night with Mr. Hull." This account
is very remarkable. There are no other indications or evi-
dence to support this account which would seem to reflect
doubts about the views of the man who, above all others, played
the key role in developing the whole United Nations system,
including Trusteeship. The "pragmatists" would naturally
have some doubts about Dr. Pasvolsky, and Stimson's comment
can be seen in this light. However, there is no explanation
for Stettinius 1 reply to Stimson.
On March 15, Mr. Charles W. Taussig, the Chairman of the
United States Section, Anglo-A'merican Commission and a member
of the Inter-Departmental Committee on Dependent Area Aspects
of International Organization, met with the President and
briefed him on the trusteeship discussions within the Inter-
Departmental Committee, Mr. Taussig was a friend of Roosevelt
and Fortas, serving as a one-dollar-a-year man. He has been
described by a close associate, Frances McReynolds Smith,
as follows:
He [Taussig] was one of the original
braintrusteers under Roosevelt and had
access to the White House at all times.
He was a man of vision, courage and prin-
ciple and had definite ideas on the treat-
ment of the inhabitants of these islands -
as well as those in the Caribbean. He was
a strong advocate of trusteeships and I
believe was one of the real architects of
the idea of a •strategic trusteeship.'
32, Ibid.
. p 6 36.
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He did, I know, influence the President's
thinking on the whole subject of terri-
tories.,,. Taussig was definitely a
friend and advocate of islands peoples
and their rights. 33
Mr, Taussig was later a member of the American Dele-
gation to the San Francisco Conference, He recorded his brief-
ing of the President by first stating that he outlined the
agreement that had been reached within the Inter-Departmental
Committee on the general category of strategic areas. He then
told the President that "the military had indicated that they
would interpret strategic areas as an entire area - for in-
stance, all of the Japanese islands, north of the Equator, that
34
might come under the administration of the United States,"
Mr, Taussig was evidently disturbed by this interpretation
of the military representatives on the Committee. He reported
to the President that under that interpretation the entire
group of islands, irrespective of whether or not they were
fortified, would be exempt from substantially all of the inter-
35
national agreements pertaining to civilian populations,
Mr, Taussig then stated that the military representatives
had been unwilling to agree to divide strategic areas into
two categories--closed areas and open areas. The President
replied that he would favor these two categories, and the
open areas should be subject to international agreements.
33, Frances McReynolds Smith, letter to the author,
September 23, 1970,
34, U. S. Department of State, Foreign Relations 1945,
Vol. 1, pp. 121-122, Memorandum of Conversation with Presi-




The President said that if the military, at a later date,
wanted to make all or part of an open area a closed area
because of a change in strategy, provisions should be made
that this could be done with the approval of the Security
36
Council.
Mr. Taussig's account then continues with a very interest-
ing insight into the attitudes of some of the participants in
this policy debate;
The President then asked me, "What
is the Navy's attitude in regard to terri-
tories? Are they trying to grab every-
thing?" I replied that they did not seem
to have much confidence in civilian con-
trols. The President then asked me how
I accounted for their attitude.
I said that I thought that the mili-
tary had no confidence in the proposed
United Nations Organization. The Presi-
dent replied that he' thought that was so.
I told the President of the letter that
Admiral Willson showed me addressed to
the Secretary of the Navy, referring to
the need of sending representatives to
San Francisco in order to protect them-
selves against "the international welfare
boys." The President then said that nei-
ther the Army nor the Navy had any busi-
ness administering the civilian govern-
ment of territories; that they had no
competence to do this, 37
The President's comment- -that neither the Army nor the
Navy had any business administering the civilian government
of territories; that they had no competence to do this- -reflects
a lack of objectivity on the part of the President. The Navy





Samoa (1900 to this time), Guam (1899-1941), and the Virgin
Islands (1917-1931). The Army had previously a< ministered
the Philippine Islands, Cuba, Puerto Rico for short periods,
not to mention the experiences of the Army and the Marine
Corps in administering the civil affairs of various Carib-
bean states between the world wars. Additionally, Hawaii
was currently under military government,
Mr. Taussig only refers to "the military" and does not
differentiate between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Ser-
vice Secretaries in attributing a lack of confidence in the
proposed United Nations Organization and a fear of the "inter-
national welfare boys," However, these attitudes appear to
have been completely shared by Stimson, Forrestal, and the
Joint Chiefs of Staff. Additionally, it might be said that
many State Department officials also shared these attitudes,
Forrestal met with Stimson and Assistant Secretary of
War McCloy on March 30, 1945, to discuss their fears over
the trend of thinking on trusteeships. Stimson thought that
the United States "might be tempted into making quixotic ges-
tures the net result of which might be that we would surrender
the hardly won islands which we had taken in the Pacific to
the princiDle of trusteeship, whereas the British, Dutch, and
38
French would not." Stimson was also of the opinion that the
State Department proposals camouflaged the realities of the
situation and were pointlessly roundabout. He saidi




The State Department proposals were
meticulously building up a world organiza-
tion which was to be the trustee and were
• proposing that we should turn over these
bases to this trustee and then take back
the management of them and try to make the
powers of management big enough to give us
the power which we now hold from our efforts
in the war. 39
Stimson felt that the United States should retain the
necessary bases to secure the American position in the Pacific
He stated that the United States could do this with no objec-
tions from other states if the fact could be properly demon-
strated that the defense of strategic islands was essential
to the United States and a definite advantage to all Pacific
powers. Stimson elaborated on this statement as follows t
My point was that we had always stood for
freedom and peace in the Pacific and we
had waged this war to throw out an aggres-
sor and to restore peace and freedom and
everybody knew it; that these bases had
been stolen by the aggressor, who had used
them to attack us and destroy our power;
that we had fought this war with much cost
of life and treasure to capture these bases
and to free from the threat of aggression
all of the peace-loving nations of the Paci-
fic. We had actually thus saved from threat
Australia and the Philippines and we were
engaged in the process of doing it to the
East Indies and to China; that if we had
called attention to all of this and then
said that we proposed to hold the bases
which we now had gained in this painful
struggle as a means and for the purpose
of protecting freedom and peace in the
Pacific, no one would have objected. In
other words, we should have announced our
possession with a declaration of trust in
which all peace-loving nations were the
beneficiaries . 40
39, Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service In Peace and
War




At this time, there was no indication that other nations
would have objected to American sovereignty ove: the mandated
i
islands. Australia and New Zealand had declared in their
January 21, 1944, agreement that no postwar disposition of
Pacific islands should be made without their consent. However,
at the beginning of the United Nations Conference, the repre-
sentatives of Australia and New Zealand, as well as the repre-
sentatives of The Netherlands, stated publicly that the United
States should retain control of the mandated islands, some
advocating annexation and others stating that they did not
41
care whether it was done by annexation or by trusteeship.
The potential territorial aggrandizers, the Soviet Union
and the United Kingdom, would probably not have objected to
American annexation of the mandated islands. The Soviet Union,
in fact, had received American assurances at the Yalta Confer-
ence of American support for Soviet annexation of Southern
Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands, The Soviet Government was,
therefore, in no position to object to American annexation of
the mandated islands. Furthermore, there is no indication that
the Soviet Union would have taken possession of any more terri-
tory than it actually did if the United States had annexed the
mandated islands. The United Kingdom was not planning to
acquire any more territory as a result of the war. The American
41, The New York Times , April 20, 1945, quoting
Dr. Herbert V. Evatt, Australian Minister for External Affairs?
The New York Times , April 24, 1945, quoting Dr. E, N, van
Kieffens, Foreign Minister, The Netherlands; and The Washing-
ton Star





planners knew this. American annexation of the mandated
islands would not have changed this British pol'cy,
Stimson* s argument- -that no one would have objected to
American possession of the strategic bases in the mandated
islands- -was never adequately refuted by the "international-
ists." The argument that the United States should not annex
any territory in order to discourage other nations from annex-
ing territory was contradicted by the American agreement to
support Soviet annexation of Southern Sakhalin and the Kurile
Islands,
Secretary Stimson proposed at the March 30, 1945, meet-
ing with Secretary Forrestal that a joint War-Navy letter be
sent to the State Department expressing the view that "(a)
These islands were of primary importance not merely to the
security of the United States but of the world, and essential
to the success of any world security organization. (b) That
we propose not only to keep them but to exercise our ownership




Forrestal and Stimson decided, however, that a better
idea would be a joint State-War-Navy letter to the President.
Accordingly, at the Three Secretaries' Meeting on April 2, 1945,
held in Stimson 1 s office, Stimson presented a letter drafted
by his Special Assistant, Mr. Harvey H. Bundy.
The Three Secretaries agreed that it was not possible to
arrive at agreement with respect to any satisfactory draft
42. Millis, ed., The Forrestal Diaries , p. 38.
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paper on the subject of trusteeship with a view of presenta-
tion for discussion of the subject with the sponsoring powers
43
before the San Francisco Conference. Forrestal wrote in his
diary that it was decided to "try to get postponement of the
whole subject of trusteeships at the San Francisco Conference,
and that they should also draft a public statement, to be made
either by the President or the Secretary of State, to the
effect that the United States intended to keep the islands
but *only for the continued insurance of peace and liberty
44
for all nations and peoples' adjacent to the Pacific."
The decisions reached by the Three Secretaries demon-
strate how interwoven were the issues of trusteeship and the
disposition of the mandated islands. Forrestal and Stimson
had gone to the meeting with the goal of obtaining a joint
State-War-Navy letter to the President on the issue of retain-
ing the mandated islands. The ad hoc Inter-Departmental Com-
mittee had already agreed to a trusteeship plan which presum-
ably did not prejudice the ultimate disposition of the man-
dated islands. However, the Three Secretaries now agreed
that the issues of trusteeship and the disposition of the
islands were interwoven; and there was, therefore, disagree-
ment with respect to a satisfactory trusteeship plan.
The State Department immediately drafted a memorandum
to the President, for Stettinius 1 signature, which incorporated
43. U. S., Naval Classified Archives Office, Proposed
State Department memorandum to the President, dated April 2,
1945, Declassified, 1969, Secretary of the Navy (SC) A14-7/EF
files. See » Appendix D for a copy of this document,




segments of Bundy's draft concerning the reasoning behind
American retention of the Pacific islands. The draft memo-
randum stated that the Secretaries of War and Navy felt
strongly that "the position of this Government with respect
to the necessity for retaining complete control over certain
strategic areas in the Pacific should be made known unequivo-
cably to other nations and to the world before any discussion
even of machinery or principles with respect to a trusteeship
45
system could be entered into." The draft ended with the
recommendation that the United States Government should inform
the representative's of the other sponsoring powers (United King-
dom, Soviet Union, and China) and the provisional government
of France that it would be unlikely that the United States
could develop any definite ideas as to machinery and procedures
for a trusteeship system prior to the opening date of the San
Francisco Conference; and, if such were the case, it would be
advisable for the nations convened at the Conference to agree
to postpone any discussions of trusteeships until after the
46
United Nations Organization was formed.
Secretary Stettinius was to prove indecisive and vacillat-
ing throughout the inter-departmental discussions on this topic.
No reasons were recorded for his agreement to the probable
postponement of any discussions of trusteeship at the San
45. U. S., Naval Classified Archives Office, Proposed
State Department memorandum to the President, dated April 2,
1945, Declassified, 1969, Secretary of the Navy (SC) A14-7/EF




Francisco Conference. Unfortunately, there is no indication
as to which State Department officers drafted tl e memorandum.
This memorandum must have greatly disturbed the "internation-
alists" within the State Department.
On April 7th, Stettinius reported to his Staff Committee
that serious differences of opinion existed among State, War,
and Navy Department officials regarding trusteeships, and he
was going to send a "short memorandum to the President present-
ing both sides and pointing out the importance of my discussing
47
it with the President and reaching a decision promptly."
Stettinius wrote in his diary that he was very dissatisfied
with the proposed trusteeship system developed by the ad hoc
inter-departmental committee which he claimed had been developed
while he was out of town and without full consultation with
him (he had been at Yalta). Yet, he also wrote that the memo-
randum that the State Deuartment had drafted after the April 2
48
Secretarial meeting did not fit with his views either. Un-
fortunately, his own views were never written down.
At the next Secretarial meeting on April 9, Stettinius
informed Stimson and Forrestal that he "did not propose to
associate himself with the document [the State Department draft
memorandum]
. .
. that he proposed to let the document go as a
statement by War and Navy, informing the President that he
reserved judgment." When Forrestal asked him why he did not
47. U. S. Department of State, Foreign Relations 1945 ,
Vol. 1, pp. 140-141. Extracts from the diary of Edward R.
Stettinius, Jr., March 18, 1945-April 7, 1945.
43. Ibid. , Vol. 1, pp. 209-210. Extracts from the diary
of Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., April 8-14, 1945.
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want to go along with the recommendation to postpone trustee-
ship discussions at San Francisco, Stettinius s; id "that while
I
his private views accorded v/ith ours, he was under orders to
49
the contrary. " This comment by Stettinius is remarkable.
The only person in the Nation who can give orders to the Secre-
tary of State is the President. If it had been the President,
then Stettinius should have informed the other two Secretaries
of this so that they could plan accordingly. If it were not
the President, the best guess would be Harry Hopkins or, a
more remote possibility, former Secretary Hull. Possibly, he
was referring to Pasvolsky and his trusteeship "experts."
Secretary of the. Interior Ickes had sent a letter drafted
by Under Secretary Abe Fortas to the President on April 5, 1945,
urgently recommending against -any postponement of the discus-
sions at San Francisco on trusteeship. The letter, shown to
Stettinius by the President, may have had some influence on
Stettinius' actions. It stated
i
I am considerably disturbed
. .
.
as to the attitude of the Army and Navy
with respect to the international trustee-
ship problem. Under Secretary Fortas, who
participated in the State-War-Navy- Interior
committee discussions of this problem, has
advised me from time to time of the atti-
tude taken by the representatives of the
various agencies. I understand that the
representatives of the Armed Forces [prob-
ably referring to both the Joint Chiefs of
Staff and the Service Secretaries] have
indicated a strong feeling that the United
States should insist upon complete sover-
eignty of the Japanese mandated islands.
I am now informed that the War and Navy
Departments are urging that the matter of
international trusteeship should not be
discussed at the San Francisco Conference,
or at least should not be discussed until
49. Millis, ed., The Forrcstal Diaries , p. 38.

101
there is a firm agreement as to United
States jurisdiction over the Japanese man-
dated islands.
I agree that the United States should
be the administering power for the Japanese
mandated islands. The arrangement worked
out by the interdepartmental committee seems
to me to assure to the Government all of the
rights which it could desire for security
purposes. The only question in my mind is
whether the arrangement has not gone too far
in providing a scheme by which these areas
may be exempted from international account-
ability. But I feel most strongly that if
the United States should insist upon com-
plete sovereignty, an international grab-
bag would result,... I also feel that it
would be a mistake to fail to reach an agree-
ment on the subjects of mandated territories
and dependent areas at the San Francisco Con-
ference. The elimination of this topic from
the agenda of the Conference would arouse
suspicions and would be a continuing source
of hostility and distrust. 50
This letter from Secretary of the Interior Ickes indicates
that Under Secretary Fortas was well informed as to the results
of the Three Secretaries' Meeting of April 2, 1945, and the
resulting State Department draft memorandum. Mr. Fortas had
been a member of the ad hoc Inter-Departmental Committee which
had drafted a proposed trusteeship plan. Probably, the "inter-
nationalists" in the State Department had informed Mr. Fortas
of the move to postpone any discussion of trusteeships at the
San Francisco Conference in the hope that Mr. Ickes could help
counter such a movement.
The argument that any elimination of the topic of man-
dated territories and dependent areas at the San Francisco
50. U. S. Department of State, Foreign Relations 1945 ,
Vol. 1, pp. 198-199. Secretary of Interior to the President,
April 5, 1945. An apparent earlier draft of this letter,
stronger in tone but without substantive difference, is on
file at U. S. National Archives, U. S. Department of the
Interior, Office of Territories, RG 48, 9-0-7, Islands Gen.
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Conference would be a source of hostility and distrust was
opposite the views of Secretary Stimson. Additionally, the
"internationalist" argument that American sovereignty over
the islands would result in an "international grab-bag" was
included in the letter. Of course, Secretary Ickes was not
aware of the American agreement with the Soviet Union concern-
ing Southern Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands. The letter, how-
ever, does not cite any evidence to support the charge that a
"grab-bag" would result.
At the President's press conference of April 5th (his
last press conference), he indicated he wanted the islands
placed under a trusteeship by saying when asked whether the
controlling government in the islands would be the United
States, "I would say the United Nations. Or it might be
called the world, which has been much abused and now will
51
have the chance to prevent any more abuse," Another account
records he said, "the United States and the other United Nations
must accept trusteeships over Japanese mandated islands, build
52
new naval and air bases..." This statement to the press made
while Roosevelt was in Warm Springs may also have influenced
Stettinius.
For whatever reasons or influences, Stettinius had in-
formed the Secretaries of War and Navy on the ninth that he
would not recommend postponing the trusteeship discussions at
51. Samuel I. Rosenman, The Public Papers and Addresses
.
of Franklin D. Roosevelt (9 vols., New York* Random House,
1938-1950), Vol. XIII, p. 610.
52. U. S. Department of State, Foreign Relations 1945 ,
Vol. 1, pp. 282-283. Secretary of State to the President,
April 13, 1945. See alsot The New York Times . April 13, 1945.
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San Francisco but would inform the President of Stimson's
and Forrestal's views while stating that he, hinself, reserved
judgment.
On that very same day, Stettinius sent to the President
the trusteeship plan as developed by the ad hoc Inter-Depart-
mental Committee on Dependent Areas along with a long letter
detailing the differing views of the State Department and the
War and Navy Departments.
Stettinius stated in the letter to the President that
the main difference between the Service Secretaries and the
State Department was not on the trusteeship plan but on the
question of considering trusteeship at that time. He ex-
plained that Forrestal and Stimson were stating their posi-
tion separately, but then continued by detailing the Service
Secretaries' views. Stettinius stated that the Service Secre-
taries felt: (a) the United States should retain complete con-
trol over certain strategic areas in the Pacific; (b) that
this point should be made known unequivocally to other nations
and to the world before participating in any discussions on
trusteeships; and (c) that any discussions on this matter
should be postponed since they believed it would be impossible
to discuss the form of trusteeships without bringing into dis-
cussion particular areas which would lead to disputes between
the Allies and prejudice the united military efforts underway
53
to finish the war.
53. U. S. Department of State, Foreign Relations 1945 ,




The Secretary of State did not take a personal position
but stated the countering arguments in terms of the "Depart-
ment of State's" beliefs and views. Stettinius, however, did
not go so far as to declare that he was reserving judgment,
as he had informed Stimson and Forres tal he would do. He
stated the Department of State* s position as follows*
The Department of State agrees, of
course, that any plan must provide for our
retaining such strategic positions, as of
right, in the Pacific, as you and your mili-
tary advisers deem necessary. It believes
that this is provided for in the draft plan
attached within the system of international
trusteeship. The Department of the Interior,
as Secretary Ickes has written you, agrees
with the Department of State, The Depart-
ment of State believes further, that if we
do not include these areas, with adequate
safeguards, within the trusteeship system
we shall prejudice all possibility of inter-
national trusteeship', and that it would ap-
pear to large sections of the public to
violate our expressed statements against
annexation of territory as a result of the
war. , ..
The Department of State recommends that
the matter be settled now, and in favor of
the attached draft, with possible minor re-
visions on which, I think, the three Depart-
ments can agree. The Department of State
believes that having repeatedly taken the
lead in raising this matter with other coun-
tries, we admit a serious internal weakness
by not having a policy when the moment for
action arrives. We also, by so doing,
expose the whole Dumbarton Oaks plan to
attack in this country and in ether countries
by its failure to face up to this question.
The lack of trusteeship proposals in the
plan to date has already been criticised.
Recent polls indicate the public is in favor
of such a system, ->4




and the other " internationalists" within the State Department.
Secretary Stettinius, as usual, did not state his own personal
views. The letter was concluded by a request that a repre-
sentative of the State Department and a representative of the
War and Navy Departments go to Warm Springs, where the Presi-
dent was relaxing, to discuss the problem in order that a
prompt decision could be reached.
Meanwhile, the Service Secretaries were disconcerted by
Stettinius* actions, Stimson and Forrestal discussed the matter
over the telephone that afternoon (April 9, 1945) and tenta-
tively decided to submit their views directly to the President,
Mr, Bundy informed General Marshall that:
Secretary Forrestal now reports that
the Secretary of State is inclined to shift
his position athird -time and perhaps present
no recommendation to the President,,,,
The Secretary [Stimson"| just telephoned
me to say that his position and that of Mr,
Forrestal would be much better stated by the
attached letters than it could possibly be
stated in any more elaborate paper by the
Secretary of State which attempted to state
to the President the War and Navy Depart-
ment views, 55
This memorandum from Stimson* s Special Assistant, Harvey H,
Bundy, to General Marshall reflects exasperation of the two
Service Secretaries with Stettinius* repeated change of mind.
It demonstrates the close working relationship between Stimson
and Marshall, Mr, Bundy evidently thought about keeping Gen-
eral Marshall and the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed as to
55. U. S,, Naval Classified Archives Office, Harvey H.
Bundy, Special Assistant to the Secretary of War, to General
Marshall, April 9, 1945, Declassified, 1970, Secretary of the
Navy files, (SC) A14-7/EF.
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Stimson's activities. Another example of this phase of Bundy^s
job is his memorandum to Stimson attached to the draft letter
t
If the joint letters are sent there
should be a request for a personal hear-
ing before the President with Secretary
Stettinius present. This is not now in
the draft letters.
The Joint Staffs will probably also
want a representative present. ^6
The two draft letters concerned both the question of post-
ponement of trusteeship discussion at San Francisco and the
question of strategic control over the Japanese mandated islands.
The first letter, dealing mainly with the strategic control ques-
tion, stated that postwar strategic control of the islands would
be necessary for the United States to discharge its responsi-
bility in respect to freedom in the Pacific. It concluded:
It is, therefore, with misgivings
that the Secretary of War and the Secre-
tary of the Navy have contemplated the
establishment of international trustee-
ships in respect to these islands. They
believe it is desirable to retain full
control, at least with respect to cer-
tain former Japanese -he Id islands and
former Japanese Mandated Islands, ac-
companied by a declaration on the part
of the United States that it will hold
these areas in the interests of the same
cause for which we are now fighting, the
cause of freedom of all law-abiding na-
tions in the Pacific Ocean. We believe
a Declaration of Policy should be made
public promptly and before any discus-
sions about trusteeships. We enclose a
proposed draft of such a declaration. 5V
56. U. S., Naval Classified Archives Office, Harvey H.
Bundy (initialed: HHB) to Secretary of War, April 9, 1945, De-
classified, 1970, Secretary of the Navy files, (SC) A14-7/EF.
57. U. S., Naval Classified Archives Office, Draft of joint
SECWAR and SECNAV letter to the President, April 9, 1945, De-
classified, 1970, Secretary of the Navy files, (SC) A14-7/EF.
See: Appendix E for a copy of this draft letter.
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The second draft letter was shorter and dealt specifically
with the question of postponing any discussion of trusteeships
at the San Francisco Conference
i
Dear Mr. President!
In view of recent developments and the
strong possibility of radical differences
of opinion at the coming conference in San
Francisco, we desire to bring to your atten-
tion the dangers involved in discussing at
that time international trusteeships as
applied to particular areas in which the
United States or other nations have vital
interests. We do not believe it will be
possible to discuss effectively the form
of trusteeships as a general proposition
without bringing into the discussion the
particular areas as to which the probabil-
ity of sharp disagreement is evident.
We very much fear that the discussion
of the territorial problems and adjustments
involved will bring about disputes between
the United Nations which may greatly prej-
udice united military operations which are
necessary for the prompt finishing of the
war with Japan as well as that with Germany.
We suggest to you the advisability of
postponing these questions of trusteeships
until such time as hostilities in the Paci-





The history of what came of these letters is an interest-
ing story. Secretary Stimson was evidently anxious to get the
letters refined, typed, signed and sent to the President. This
was never done. The two Secretaries did not know that Stet-
tinius had sent the draft trusteeship plan to the President
that very day.
58. U. S., Naval Classified Archives Office, Draft of
joint SECWAR and SECNAV letter to the President, April 9,




Not knowing of Stettinius 1 action, Secretary Forres tal
assured Mr. Stirason "that there was no immediate urgency in
this matter, " and Stimson, therefore, left Washington on the
59
tenth for Tennessee without having signed the letters.
Before Stimson left Washington, he signed a joint Secre-
tary of War and Secretary of the Navy letter to Stettinius at
General Marshall's request. This letter had been drafted by
the Joint Chiefs of Staff and requested that the Chiefs of
Staff be present at any meetings with the President "prelim-
inary to the San Francisco Conference, on the matter of trustee-
ships or other disposition for the islands in the Pacific Area"
in view of the vital interests of American national defense
60
involved in such considerations. This letter was given to
Forrestal for his signature and decision on the necessity and
61
timing of it in light of his discussions with Mr. Stettinius.
Meanwhile, the staffs of the two Service Secretaries
worked to refine the two draft letters to the President. This
staff work was not completed until April 13.
59. U. S., Naval Classified Archives Office, Memorandum
from Col. W. H. Kyle, Aide to the Secretary of War, to Major
Mathius F. Correa, Special Assistant to the Secretary of the
Navy, April 9, 1945, Declassified, 1970, Secretary of the
Navy files, (SC) A14-7/EF.
60. U. S., Naval Classified Archives Office, Draft joint
SECWAR and SECNAV letter to SECSTATE, signed by Secretary
Stirason, no date, attached to memorandum from Mr. Harvey H,
Bundy to Major Correa, April 10, 1945, Declassified, 1970,
Secretary of the Navy files (SC) A14-7/EF.
61. Ibid. t Memorandum from Mr. Harvey H. Sundy to Major
Correa, April 10, 1945.
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In the meantime, two events occurred which, in conjunction,
completely changed the course of events on this entire issue.
The first event was the President's receiving Stettinius' letter
with the trusteeship plan and cabling Stettinius from Warm
Springs on the tenth, "Your message on International Trustee-
ship is approved in principle, I will see your representative
and that of the Army and Navy on the 19th. That will be time
enough. And if you have already left I will, of course, see
62
you on the 25th. " Thus, President Roosevelt approved the
trusteeship plan "in principle" after receiving Stettinius*
letter. This action was to influence greatly the three Secre-
taries and the new President.
The second event, of course, was the death of President
Roosevelt on the afternoon of -April 12, 1945. His death, only
two days after approving the trusteeship plan "in principle
,
M
finalized that decision. President Truman's first decision as
President was to continue with the plans for the San Francisco
Conference for drafting a United Nations Organization Charter,
All of the high governmental officials were anxious to have as
smooth a transition as possible allowing the new President
time to attend to the most pressing problems, Mr, Stettinius
did, however, brief President Truman on this current matter
on April 13 asking for an early conference on the question
63
with all concerned.
62, U. S. Department of State, Foreign Relations 1945 .
Vol. 1, pp. 211-214. Secretary of State to the President,
April 9, 1945; Footnote to p. 211.
63. Ibid, . Vol. 1, pp. 282-283. Secretary of State to
the President, April 13, 1945.
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Arrangements were made between the Departments of State,
War, and Navy for a high-level conference to iron out the diffi-
culties on this issue. This conference was held at the State
Department on April 16, 1945. It is interesting to note that
the Joint Chiefs of Staff were not represented at this all-
Important meeting. They had specifically requested represen-
tation at any Presidential meeting on this subject and, by
logical extension, at such a meeting as this one. This was a
foretaste of the downgrading of the Joint Chiefs of Staff under
President Truman relative to their former position under Presi-
dent Roosevelt.
Those present were: Stettinius, Stimson, Forrestal, Joseph
C. Grew, James C. Dunn, Leo Pasvolsky, Harvey H. Bundy (Special
Assistant to the Secretary of %r) , and Major Mathias F. Correa
(Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Navy). At the out-
set of the meeting, it was agreed that the issue of interna-
tional trusteeships would not be eliminated from discussion at
San Francisco. This important decision was not resisted by
Secretaries Stimson and Forrestal, Their position on this
matter seems to have changed since the 9th, as will be further
demonstrated. The reason, no doubt, being the death of the
President just after he had approved the trusteeship plan "in
principle" and President Truman's public announcement that the
United Nations Conference would be held as scheduled.
Next, Secretary Stettinius urged that the declaration of
policy annexed to the draft letter of the Secretaries of the
Navy and War addressed to the President (now evidently revised
and dated April 13, 1945) not be promulgated at this time

Ill
"because of the effect it would have on the other nations
64
participating in the conference," It was agreed it would
not be announced at that time, but "at some future date such
65
a declaration would be promulgated,"
The statement of policy, which was drafted by Mr, Bundy,
was premised on the United States entering into discussions
on a trusteeship system at San Francisco. It declared that
the United States does not seek annexation
of territory or economic wealth but stra-
tegic rights in a certain number of these
islands and atolls [in the Pacific"] are
vital to any effective military guaranty
of peace in the Pacific,.,, In order to
discharge its responsibility as a champion
of peace and freedom in the Pacific, it
will be necessary for the United States to
have these strategic rights and such rights
will involve complete control in the case
of certain atolls in the Pacific,,.,
The United States Government considers
that it would be entirely practicable under
a trusteeship system to provide, by agree-
ments, for the maintenance of such United
States military and strategic rights and
64, U. S,, Naval Classified Archives Office, Major
Correa to Secretary Forrestal, minutes of April 16, 1945,
conference, dated April 16, 1945, Declassified, June 20,
1969, Secretary of the Navy files, (SC) A14-7/EF. Seet
Appendix F for a copy of this document,
65. Ibid. On May 2, 1945, James Forrestal wrote a
letter to Secretary of War Stimson that referred to this
agreement and asked Stimson' s view as to whether or not it
would be proper to renew their inquiry to the Secretary of
State. He concluded, "I share your feeling that we should
do nothing that would either embarrass him or hamper him.
At the same time I am quite anxious that the views of the
War and Navy Departments with regard to our external de-
fense should be on record quite clearly with the President,
U. S., Naval Classified Archives Office, Forrestal to
Stimson, May 2, 1945, Declassified, 1970, Secretary of
the Navy files (SC; A14-7/EF. Evidently no action came
of this letter and the draft declaration of policy was
never sent to President Truman.
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control as will be necessary to assure
peace and security in the Pacific Ocean
or elsewhere in the world, 66
The wording is of importance since the Joint Chiefs of
Staff were still remaining firm on their position that any
discussions or agreement on a trusteeship system should not
prejudice the ultimate decision for the disposition of the
Japanese mandated islands. This draft statement indicates
that Forrestal and Stimson were now willing to have the
islands as a strategic trusteeship on the condition that
the United States have absolute control. The actual draft
letter of April 13, 1945, has not been located to confirm
this; but subsequent statements by Forrestal and Stimson,
especially at the April 17 conference, would seem to support
this conclusion.
The draft letters of April 9, 1945, were arguing for
postponement of any trusteeship discussions at San Francisco
j
whereas, the draft policy statement attached to the April 13,
1945, letter is premised on such discussions being held. This
is further evidence that Forrestal' s and Stimson' s positions
changed on this matter sometime after the ninth and before
the sixteenth of April. Not only was their position changed
about whether or not trusteeship discussions should proceed
at San Francisco but, also, about the practicality of obtain-
ing sufficient strategic control of the islands within a
trusteeship system. Their first letter of April 9, 1945, had
66. U. S. , Naval Archives Office, Draft Declaration of
United States Policy, HHB #2, April 16, 1945, Declassified,
1969, Secretary of the Navy files, (SC) A14-7/EF. Seei
Appendix G for a copy of this document.
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stated their "misgivings" on the establishment of interna-
tional trusteeship in respect to the former Japanese mandated
islands. Now, their policy draft dated April 13, 1945,
stated that it would be "practicable" to maintain American
strategic and military rights in the Pacific islands under
a trusteeship system.
The reasons for this change of position could only be
caused by the President's cable on the tenth approving the
trusteeship plan "in principle" and his death immediately
after that decision. President Truman may have given Stet-
tinius some indication of his feelings on the matter when
Stettinius briefed him on the issue on April 13. However,
Stettinius had urged an early Presidential meeting with all
concerned to resolve the difficulties; so, President Truman
probably did not make any decision at the briefing. Addi-
tionally, the draft policy was refined and dated April 13,
the same day Stettinius saw the President.
Stimson and Forrestal were strong men with clear views.
Their views were not likely to change suddenly. They may
have seen the inevitable, or what they considered the inevi-
table, and changed their positions to bow to the inevitable.
However, such a change in position probably did not reflect
a change in their personal views on the advisability of pro-
ceeding with discussions on trusteeship at San Francisco or
the practicality of obtaining sufficient strategic control
of the islands within a trusteeship system.
During the conference on April 16, Forrestal asked
Stettinius whether or not it would embarrass him if the
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Secretaries of War and Navy were to send to the President
their draft letter (dated April 13, 1945) that detailed their
positions. Stettinius replied it would be embarrassing at
that time and "asked that the sending of such a statement be
deferred 'for a few days.' The implication of his statement,
although it was not entirely clear, was that he did not wish
such a statement to go forward to the President until the San
Francisco Conference was finished or at least until it was
well underway. The Secretaries of War and Navy indicated
67
that they acquiesced in his request." The San Francisco
Conference was scheduled to commence on April 25, 1945, only
nine days hence. Perhaps Stettinius felt that such a state-
ment might complicate his relations with the new President,
It was also agreed at this meeting that the United States
draft on trusteeship (the one approved "in principle" by Presi-
dent Roosevelt) would include language that made it clear the
United States did not commit itself to placing any particular
territory under the system. The formula worked out at this
meeting was that the draft was changed to readi "It shall be
a matter for subsequent agreement as to which specific terri-
tories within the foregoing categories should be brought under
68
the trusteeship system and upon what terms."
Finally, Forrestal asked that the United States draft be
further changed to provide that the initial negotiation of
67, U. S., Naval Classified Archives Office, Major
Correa to Secretary Forrestal, dated April 16, 1945, Declas-




trusteeship agreements for strategic areas would be in the
Security Council rather than in the General Assembly. Dr.
Pasvolsky dissented, believing all negotiations should be
made with the General Assembly but was overruled. It is
apparent that Forres tal and Stimson were still keeping their
options open by including a statement that the United States
was not committed to placing any particular territory under
the system. At the same time, they were also stiffening the
strategic trusteeship provisions in case the islands were
ever placed under that category.
On the 17th, the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy
met with the full United States Delegation to San Francisco
69
and discussed their decisions of the day before. At this
meeting on the 17th, Forrestal' expressed his fundamental
philosophy on civil-military relations and on this issue in
particulari
1, Both the Army and Navy are aware
that they are not makers of policy but they
have a responsibility to define to the makers
of policy what they believe are the military
necessities of the United States , both for
its own defense and for the implementation
of its responsibility for maintenance of
world peace..,. 2, I take it as a premise
about all discussions of world peace that
the United States is to have the major re-
sponsibility for the Pacific Ocean security,
and if this premise is accepted there flows
from it the acceptance of the fact that the
United States must have the means with which
to implement its responsibilities..,. 5, I
closed by re-emphasizing the fact that re-
tention of power by the United States was
69. U, S. Department of State, Foreign Affairs 1945 ,
Vol. 1, pp. 311-32Z. Eleventh meeting (Executive Session)
of U. S. Delegation, April 17, 1945.
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not inconsistent with the work on and the
hopes for a world peace organization - that




Senator Vandenberg, a member of the delegation, noted
of this conference that Stimson made a "particularly moving
speech - told of the mistake we made after the last war in
letting Japan get these mandated islands.... He said he
didn't care so much about the 'title 1 to these islands if we
71
have absolute , undisputed control over our base needs,
"
This is a different attitude than Secretary Stimson revealed
in his diary on March 30. Unfortunately, there is no mention
of this conference or any change in attitude in his memoirs.
While noting that Forrestal backed up Stimson • " 100%", Senator
Vandenburg wrote that he, himself, agreed with the State Depart-
ment which insisted "that this [control over the islands] must
be accomplished without setting a precedent for all the other
Big Powers to take what they claim they need for their defense
72
(precisely as Russia is already doing)." It is difficult
to tell whether this comment about Forrestal referred to his
backing Stimson on the necessity for complete control over the
islands or to backing Stimson* s view that the "title" to the
islands did not matter so long as the United States had con-
trol. There is no clear mention of this fine distinction in
Forrestal 1 s diary, although the latter interpretation appears,
70. Millis, ed., The Forrestal Diaries
, p. 45.
71. Arthur H. Vandenberg, Jr., ed., The Private Papers of




In the context of events, to be the correct one. Forrestal
is clearly for absolute control, but he does not specifically
mention whether he is still for annexation at this time or
whether he now feels compelled to accept a strong strategic
trusteeship for the islands.
That night, and at the Delegation meeting the next day,
the final wording of the trusteeship plan and a United States
trusteeship policy was hammered out. Stettinius was able to
submit a mutually agreeable policy recommendation to the Presi-
73
dent. The President approved it the same day. The policy,
not intended for publication but intended, mainly, as a guide-
line for the American Delegation at San Francisco, stated:
It is not proposed at San Francisco
to determine the placing of any particular
territory under a trusteeship system. All
that will be discussed there will be the
possible machinery of such a system.
The United States Government considers
that it would be entirely practicable to
devise a trusteeship system which would
apply only to such territories in the follow-
ing categories as may, by trusteeship arrange-
ments, be placed thereunder, namely: (a) terri-
tories now held under mandate: (b) territories
which may be detached from enemy states as a
result of this war; and (c) territories volun-
tarily placed under the system by states re-
sponsible for their administration. It shall
be a matter for subsequent agreement as to
which of the specific territories within the
foregoing categories shall be brought under
the trusteeship system and upon what terms.
This system would provide, by agreements,
for (1) the maintenance of United States mili-
tary and strategic rights, (2) such control
as will be necessary to assure general peace
and security in the Pacific Ocean area as well




Vol. 1, pp. 350-351. Secretaries of State, War, and Navy
to President Truman, April 18, 1945.
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as elsewhere In the world, and (3) the
advancement of the social, economic, and
political welfare of the inhabitants of
the dependent territories. 74
This policy is a far step from that which was behind the
initial plans drafted by the State Department in 1942 and 1943.
These had emphasized the international supervision aspect of
the trusteeship system and the economic, social, and political
advancement of dependent peoples. They had also envisaged
wide usage of the trusteeship system, including dependent
territories of the Allies as well as former mandates and terri-
tories detached from the Axis powers. This policy was also a
far departure from President Roosevelt's initial plans for a
string of bases around the world under the control of the new
international organization.
On the other side, the new policy was a far cry from the
initial position of the military services. The Joint Chiefs
of Staff were still maintaining their annexationist position
on the former Japanese mandated islands, but the question of
trusteeships would be discussed at the San Francisco Confer-
ence and a trusteeship system established. The Secretaries
of War and Navy had changed their original position against
any such discussions prior to the end of the war and evi-
dently felt compelled (or constrained) by President Roose-
velt's final wishes to agree to placing the islands within
the strategic trusteeship category of the new system as long
as American military and strategic rights were maintained.




trusteeship system would provide. The military factor of
maintaining American military and strategic rights was listed
first. This goal was followed by that of obtaining "such con-
trol as will be necessary to assure general peace and security
in the Pacific Ocean area as well as elsewhere in the world,"
Finally, at the bottom of the list came the concern for the
"advancement of the social, economic, and political welfare
of the inhabitants of the dependent territories,"
As stated above, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were still
absolutely for annexation. They feared that control of the
islands might be inadvertently lost at San Francisco by some
"quixotic" gesture. Admiral Leahy sent a memorandum to the
Secretaries of War and Navy on April 24, 1945 (the day before
the San Francisco Conference convened) stating the Joint Chiefs
of Staff's views on the military aspects of certain matters
that would be discussed at San Francisco, Among other matters,
he stressed, "If the question of Territorial Trusteeships is
considered, the position of the military advisors should be
based on the considered opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
concurred in by the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the
Navy, that unrestricted strategic control by the United States
of the Japanese mandated islands and certain other islands in
the Pacific is essential to the future security of the United
75
States."
75. U. S., Naval Classified Archives Office, Memorandum
from Admiral Leahy to SECNAV and SECWAR, April 24, 1945, De-
classified, 1970, Secretary of the Navy files, (SC) A14-7/EF.

120
To ensure that there were no "quixotic" gestures on this
issue, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had representatives on the
American Delegation as advisers who briefed Governor Stassen,
the American representative for this matter on the Big- Five
discussions (preliminary discussions held at San Francisco by
the American, British, Soviet, French, and Chinese delegations)
and, also, the American delegate on the conference's Committee
II/4, which was writing the trusteeship section of the Charter
after receiving the Big-Five's draft. These military advisers
ensured that there was no deviation from the policy approved
76
by the President on April 18, 1945.
The military leaders also felt that some public pressure
had to be developed in favor of their position. Admiral King
publicly called for retention 'of the islands and asked "how
long can the United States afford to continue a cycle of
fighting and building and winning and giving away, only to
77
fight and build and win and give away again?" This is the
first public statement (April 5, 1945) on the controversy by
an American military leader.
The question of military leaders making public statements
on matters still under contention within the Government is a
major question of civil-military relations and of the proper
role of the military within a democracy. The question is
76. U. S. Department of State, Foreign Relations 1945 ,
Vol. 1, pp. 448-452, 1205-1206, 1209, "TT79- 1280, 1303, 1417-
1421. Minutes of U. S. Delegation meetings.
77. Army and Navy Journal , Vol. 82 (April 7, 1945),
p. 987. Also; The New York Times . April 5, 1945, and U. S.




merely raised at this point and will be analyzed to some ex-
tent in the conclusions chapter.
Admiral Nimitz, Commander in Chief of the Pacific, had
long agreed with Admirals Leahy and King on the necessity of
retaining the former Japanese mandated islands. As early as
September 1944, he had expressed the opinion to Admiral King
and the Secretary of the Navy that the United States should
78
H keep our Marshall and Caroline bases." Now, probably
having seen the reports of Admiral King's public comments,
Admiral Nimitz spoke out to the reporters on Guam saying that
the Marianas (in the Mandate) and Iwo Jima (in the Bonins)
were "vital to our defense in the future.... Those islands
are as important to the United States as the Hawaiian Islands."
Public support quickly came. Former Admiral Hart, now a
80
Senator from Connecticut, made similar statements. The
Senate Naval Affairs Committee sent a subcommittee, headed by
Senator Harry F. Byrd (D-Va,), to "oversee" the American Dele-
gation at San Francisco "to see that the United States got
81
control of the mandated islands."
78. U. S., Naval Classified Archives Office, Minutes
of Conference at San Francisco between CorainCh and CincPac
with SECNAV present, September 29-October 1, 1944, Declas-
sified, 1970, King papers.
79. The New York Times , April 13, 1945.
80. Address by Senator Hart given April 22, 1945, over
NBC network. Quoted in: Earl S. Pomeroy, Pacific Outpostt
American Strategy in Guam and Micronesia (Stanford, Califor-
nia! Stanford University Press, 1951;, p. 170.




Secretary Forrestal received almost daily reports on
the subject of trusteeships from his Special Assistant, Keith
82
Kane, who was an adviser to the American Delegation.
No amendments were submitted to the trusteeship plan
proposed by the Americans that would have seriously harmed
American security interests. One amendment to include "inde-
pendence" as a political goal for dependent areas, rather than
just "self-determination," created a stir between the Navy and
83
the Interior Departments. The Delegation as a whole re-
fused to get involved in an inter- departmental fight j and the
situation was finally resolved by avoiding the word "indepen-
dence" in Article 73(b) of the Charter concerning non-self-
governing territories in general, whether or not they were
trusteeships. The Navy Department did not consider the term
84
"independence" in that context to be of military concern.
The problem was also resolved by qualifying the word
"independence" in Article 76(b) of the Charter concerning the
basic objectives of the trusteeship system. The Navy Depart-
ment was more worried about the trusteeship system (Chapter
XII of the Charter) than about policies dealing with dependent
82. U. S., Naval Classified Archives Office, Memorandums
from Major Correa to Secretary Forrestal transmitting reports
from Keith Kane, dated April 30-May 25, 1945. All declassified
June 20, 1969. Includes State Department drafts of April 17
and 26, 1945, Secretary of the Navy files, A14-7/EF.
83. U. S. Deoartment of State, Foreign Relations 1945 ,
Vol. 1, pp. 1205-1216, 1279-1280. Minutes of U. S. Delegation
meetings.
84. U. S., Naval Classified Archives Office, Memorandum
from Major Correa to Secretary Forrestal transmitting reports
from Keith Kane, May 21, 1945, Declassified, June 20, 1969,
Secretary of the Navy files, (SC) A14-7/KF.
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areas in general. Thus, the phrase in Article 76(b) under
Chapter XII was qualified to read: "their progressive develop-
ment towards self-government or independence as may be appro-
priate to the particular circumstances of each territory and
its peoples and the freely expressed wishes of the peoples
concerned, and as may be provided by the terms of each trustee-
85
ship agreement. 11
It is clear that the qualification was intended by the
Americans to fit the former Japanese mandated islands. It is
also of interest that the Navy Department was not worried that
much about the use of the word "independence" in the Chapter
dealing with dependent territories in general, [Chapter XI
under which was Article 73(b)] even though Hawaii, Alaska,
American Samoa, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands
might be (as they, indeed, became) involved.
This Chapter (XI) on non- self-governing territories had
originally been proposed by the Australian Delegation as an
amendment to the trusteeship proposals. The Navy Department
considered the original Australian proposal "clearly unaccept-
86
able from the point of view of the military." Several
revisions were made in the original Australian proposal at
the urging of the Navy Department. The final result, including
85. United Nations, Charter of the United Nations and
.Statute of the International Court of Justice (New York:
United Nations Office of Public Information, 1968).
86. U. S., Naval Classified Archives Office, Memorandum
from Major Correa to Secretary Forrestal concerning status of
Australian amendment to the Chapter on Trusteeships, June 8,




a requirement to submit reports "subject to such limitations
as security and constitutional considerations may require 1' on
each nation's own non-self-governing territories, did not
adversely affect American military interests.
Overall, the final forms of the Chapters of the United
Nations Charter that cover trusteeships, Chapters XII and XIII,
did not vary to any major extent from the Presidential Policy
87
on Trusteeship dated April 18, 1945.
* * *
Within the American public, some of the non- governmental
organizations associated with the American Delegation to the
San Francisco Conference pushed for a strong trusteeship sys-
tem while other pressure groups concentrated on the United
States gaining control of the former Japanese mandated islands.
Such organizations have been mentioned at the end of the pre-
ceeding chapter.
Other indications of public opinion were the comments of
several members of Congress, military and naval experts, edu-
cators, writers and others contained in two issues of The
United States News
.
This magazine had a column entitled!
"Question of the Weeki" and this controversy was of such
public interest that the column was devoted to it on two
successive issues, May 4 and 11, 1945. The question was
phrased
i
87. For the details of the negotiations on the drafting
of the United Nations Charter at San Francisco, see the defin-
itive worki Ruth Russell and Jeanette Muther, A History of the
United Nations Charter: The Role of the United States 1940-
1945 (Washinfttont The Brookings Institution, October 1958).
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Should the United States take title
to the former Japanese mandated islands of
the Pacific, or have military use of them
and administer their affairs under an
international trusteeship?88
The published answers to this question, thirteen in all,
were approximately balanced on each side of the issue. The
editors probably selected the responses in order to present
"equal time" for the two sides of the issue. For example,
the "annexationist" side of the issue was represented by
Senator Taft. His comment on the question was as follows*
I believe the U. S. should take title
to the former Japanese mandated islands of
the Pacific. The inhabitants are so few
that there can never be any question of
their self-government. Our men have con-
quered them and I see no reason why we
should be trustees for an international
body. 89
Published directly under Senator Taft's comment was the
opposite point of view presented by Frederick J. Libby, Execu-
tive Secretary of the National Council for Prevention of War
and former European Commissioner for the Society of Friends.
Libby* s comment was as follows:
We must live up to our pledge in the
Atlantic Charter to abstain from territor-
ial aggression, regardless of whether our
allies do so or not. Nations must return
to the standards of common honesty, and
our country must take the lead.
For us to take title to these islands
on the further side of the Pacific Ocean
would commit us permanently to a policy of
imperialism, the ultimate outcome of which
would almost certainly be another great
war. 90
88. The United States News . Vol. 18 (May 4, 1945), p. 30,
32| and The United States News . Vol. 18 (May 11, 1945), p. 30, 32




Of interest, because of his present position as Chairman
of the House Armed Services Committee, is the published comment
of Representative F. Edward Hebert (D-La.)» a member at that
time of the House Committee on Naval Affairs. In response to
the question presented by The United States Ne'//s . Representa-
tive Hebert stated
j
Those of us who live have no right to
dissipate possessions which were bought and
paid for with the blood of those who have
died. The time has come when Americans must
be realistic and practical for their future
safety and security.
During times of war, I as a member of
Congress, was willing to accept the opinion
of the military leaders as to what was neces-
sary for the successful prosecution of the
war. If the opinion of these military
leaders, who have been so successful, was
good enough in times of war, they are good
enough for me in times of peace to prevent,
as long as possible, - another war.
The Navy should have complete control
and direction of whatever islands in the
Pacific that are needed for the safety and
security of our nation. We cannot lack back-
bone, courage and determination now by advanc-
ing such a weasel proposition as trusteeship.
—
--
_ Annexation, with the complete force and might
of U. S. power behind it, is the only real-
istic approach and answer to our future
safety. 91
The comments quoted above which were published in The
United States News demonstrate the basic cleavage between the
"internationalists" and the "pragmatists" over the question
of the disposition of the former mandated islands. Of
interest, because of his later position as Secretary of
State, is the published comment by Representative Christian A.
91. Ibid. . May 4, 1945, pp. 30 and 32.
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Herter (R-Mass.). Representative Herter's response to the
column's question was as follows
i
i
I do not see how we can insist on
outright acquisition of the islands as
being essential to our national security
without acknowledging that any other na-
tion, if it is strong enough to do so,
has the right to seize by force of arms
and acquire whatsoever territories it
might deem necessary to its own national
security.
I feel confident that we can achieve
the desirable end of assuring our own
security through the process of trustee-
ship and at the same time retain a moral
position of very real benefit toward the
solution of a number of other vital terri-
torial problems. 92
The fact that the question and the resultant comments were
published in a mass-circulation magazine is indicative of the
public interest at that time concerning this issue. Represen-
tative Hebert's comment reflects the fact that the Admirals
had gone to the public for support. In fact, the question of
the disposition of the mandated islands had never really been
this much in the public eye until after April 5, 1945, when
Admiral King made his statement. The question had definitely
never been so well defined for the public as it was at this
time.
It appears that most Americans at this time were in favor
of retaining control over the islands. The public debate was
generally limited to the question of whether to annex the
islands or to administer them under some form of trusteeship
agreement. The division of opinion was not over whether or
not the United States should control the islands but over the
92. Ibid. . May 11, 1945, p. 32.
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legal form of control, I.e., trusteeship or annexation. There
were many public statements by various supporters of the two
points of view during the spring and summer of 1945, The
annexationists appeared to be the most vocal side at this point
in time.
* * *
Secretary of State Stettinius, whether for diplomatic
reasons at the San Francisco Conference or for domestic, poli-
tical reasons, felt the need to state publicly on May 28, 1945,
that the United Nations Charter sufficiently safeguarded Ameri-
93
can security interests in the Pacific. He also felt the need
for a formal military endorsement of the Charter for insurance
94
purposes and for use in the Senate Hearings on the Charter.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff gave their endorsement on June 23,
1945, stating they were "of the opinion that the military and
strategic implications of this draft charter are as a whole in
95
accord with the military interests of the United States."
The Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy gave their
96
concurrence to this statement. This statement was not a
change of the Joint Chiefs of Staff position that American
93. U. S. Department of State Bulletin, Vol, 7, No. 310
(June 3, 1945), Secretary of State speech of May 28, 1945.
94. U. S. Department of State, Foreign Relations 194 5,
Vol. 1, p. 1355. Minutes of 76th meeting of the U. S. Delega-
tion, June 19, 1945.
95. Ibid. . Vol. 1, pp. 1430-1431. Secretary of War and




control of the mandated islands by sovereignty was considered
by them as the only sure way of guaranteeing American stra-
tegic rights. The Joint Chiefs of Staff were to continue
until late October 1946 their unsuccessful fight against the
application of the strategic trusteeship system to those islands.
During the Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings on
the Charter (July 9-13, 1945), Secretary of State Stettinius
testified that the War and Navy Departments had stated that
the military and strategic implications of the Charter were,
as a whole, in accord with the military interests of the United
States. He then continued by saying
i
No commitment is made to place any
particular area, strategic or nonstrategic,
under the trusteeship system. The Charter
thus leaves for future determination to
what extent and under what terms islands
in the Pacific which are taken from Japan
at the end of the present war are to be
placed under the trusteeship system. Any
agreement into which the United States might
enter to this end would have to be on terms
satisfactory to us. 97
Following Stettinius, Dr. Pasvolsky gave his testimony.
When he started to mention the trusteeship system, the Chairman,
Senator Tom Connally, inserted into the record letters to him
from the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy.
Stimson's letter, dated July 6, 1945, merely repeated the
quote above of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Secretary Forrestal's
letter, dated July 9, 1945, stated the Joint Chiefs of Staff's
quoted position, attributed it to them, and endorsed it. How-
ever, Forrestal's letter then went on to express his concern
97. U. S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Rela-
tions, Hearings . The Charter of the United Nations , 79th Cong.,
1st sess., 1945, p. 221.
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about the trusteeship system as follows
i
A further specific comment concerning
the Charter, which I believe to be of suffi-
cient importance to warrant calling it to
your attention, has to do with the chapter
on the trusteeship system. This chapter has
been a matter of particular concern to the
Navy because of our recognition of the fact
that undivided control of certain strategic
areas in the Pacific wrested from the Japan-
ese by our armed forces in this war, is es-
sential to the security of this country.
Our agreement that this Charter is in ac-
cord with the military interests of this
country is conditioned by our understand-
ing that the United States is not committed
by this charter or any provision thereof to
place under trusteeship any territory of
any character, and that if this country
hereafter determines to place any terri-
tory under trusteeship this will be done
only on such terms as it may then volun-
tarily agree to. 98
After some Senatorial comments about the meaning of the
term "as a whole" as used by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the
Service Secretaries, the discussion returned to the subject of
the trusteeship system. Senator Connally, who had been on the
American Delegation at San Francisco, then stated, "in short,
it was our attitude that if we are in possession of an island
which we have conquered from Japan at the cost of blood and
treasure we can remain in possession of it, if it is within
the strategic area, until we consent to have it go under
trusteeship j and when we do agree that it go under the trustee-
ship, we have the right to stipulate the terms upon which it
99
will go there."
98. Ibid. , p. 314.
99. Ibid. , p. 315.
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The Joint Chiefs of Staff did not testify at the hearings;
therefore, their position on the trusteeship system was not
advanced before the Committee on Foreign Relations, Stettinius
testified that the Charter had been drafted with the advice of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the War and Navy Departments,
Secretary Forres tal's letter put forward the Joint Chiefs of
Staff's general endorsement of the Charter as a whole. How-
ever, there was no specific comment by the Joint Chiefs of
Staff on the trusteeship system,
Enroute to the Potsdam Conference, President Truman made
a public statement on July 20, 1945, that dismayed the annex-
ationists. The President stated, "we are not fighting for con-
quest. There is not one piece of territory or one thing of
100
monetary value that we want out of this war."
The official Potsdam Declaration did not clarify the situ-
ation, merely reaffirmed the Cairo Declaration's terms that
Japanese sovereignty would be limited to the four main islands
101
and "such minor islands as we determine,"
President Truman must have thoroughly confused the issue
when he stated during a broadcast, August 9, 1945, in his
report on the Potsdam Conference:
• , , though the United States wants no terri-
tory or profit or selfish advantage out of
this war, we are going to maintain the mili-
tary bases necessary for the complete pro-
tection of our interests and world peace.
100, Cdr, Dorothy E. Richard, USNR, United States Naval
Administration of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands
(3 vols,, Washington! U. S, Government Printing Office, 1937)
,
Vol. 2, p. 69.
101. U. S. Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 13, No.
318 (July 29, 1945), Potsdam Declaration, p. 137.
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Bases which our military experts deem to
be essential for our protection and which
are not now in our possession, we will
acquire. We will acquire them by arrange-
ments consistent with the United Nations
Charter. 102
It is possible that Forrestal and Stimson did after all
take their letter and statement of policy (dated April 13,
1945, see above) to the President, and this was the result?
This, however, is pure speculation since no evidence has been
located concerning the background of this particular statement.
President Truman had now been in office for four months and
presumably had become completely knowledgeable of the contro-
versy over the disposition of the former mandated islands.
The August 9, 1945, statement, of course, raised many
questions. Were the mandated ^islands considered already in
American possession? Or were they to be "acquired" by arrange-
ments "consistent with the United Nations Charter?" What did
the President mean by that phrase? That the United States
would refrain from the use of force in acquiring bases? This
could be a logical interpretation to avoid worrying the cur-
rent possessors of bases that the United States wanted. It
was openly known that the United States was pressuring Aus-
tralia for cession of a base on Manus island, as well as desir-
ing other bases around the world.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff, originally under President
Roosevelt's direction and later under the direction of Presi-
dent Truman, had drafted postwar, world-wide base requirements.
102. U. 3. Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 13, No. 320
(August 12, 1945), President's broadcast August 9, 1945, p. 208.

133
These base requirements were continually being radified, and
the State Department was currently conducting diplomatic
negotiations for their acquisition.
President Truman* s August 9, 1945, statement was inter-
preted by those advocating the inclusion of the former man-
dated islands within the trusteeship system as implying that
the United States would acquire the military bases consistent
with the trusteeship provisions of the United Nations Charter.
This interpretation was vastly different than the interpre-
tation which focused on the prohibition on the use of force.
When the war ended on September 2, 1945, with Japan
accepting the terms of the Potsdam Declaration by the instru-
ment of surrender, the postwar disposition of the former Japan-
ese mandated islands was still far from settled.
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In its proper manifestation the jealousy




A more egregious error never took possession
of the mind of an American than the notion
that a military officer should take no part
in political affairs.... If a military officer
feels no interest in the important political
struggles of the day ... he acknowledges
himself at once to be a mere machine ... a
hireling.
"Alcibiades," in Army £*
Navy Chronicle , 1836
The Party commands the gun; the gun will
never command the Party.
Mao Tse-tung
There are some militarists who say: "We
are not interested in politics but only in
the profession of arms." It is vital that
these simple-minded militarists be made to
realize the relationship that exists between
politics and military affairs. Military
action is a method used to attain a politi-
cal goal. While military affairs and polit-
ical affairs are not identical, it is impos-






LEADING TO THE DECISION OF STRATEGIC
TRUSTEESHIP FOR THE MANDATED ISLANDS
As stated earlier, the Navy and the Joint Chiefs of Staff
had conducted many studies at the President's direction on the
probable postwar base requirements. The military, for the
purposes of these studies, defined the term "post-war" as
"the period following cessation of organized resistance by
Germany and Japan, and preceding effective implimentation of
1
international security organization." It is interesting to
note that by this definition the world is still in the "post-
war" period.
On January 7, 1944, the President had forwarded to the
Secretary of State the Joint Chiefs of Staff's study on post-
war island air bases which the Joint Chiefs considered neces-
sary for the postwar period. The State Department was requested
to initiate negotiations with the various governments concerned
2
to acquire permanent or long-term benefit of the bases. On
February 1, 1944, the President again wrote the Secretary of
State referring to the letter mentioned above and supplement-
ing the letter by broadening the scope of postwar bases to
include all military bases instead of air bases alone. These
1. U. S., Naval Classified Archives Office, CominCh-
CincPac conference minutes, March 5-6, 1945, Declassified,
1970, King papers,
2. U. S., Naval Classified Archives Office, SECNAV





studies listed the proposed postwar bases in terns of various
categories according to the degree of American control desired.
One category was for those bases for which base-rights agree-
ments were desired with the host governments. Those bases
would be administered directly by the United States, jointly
administered, or administered by the host country with Ameri-
can usage privileges.
Another category was entitled i "exclusive rights are
desired." The exclusive rights would presumably, be obtained
by annexation, strategic trusteeship, or through some form of
agreement with the host country (such as the Panama Canal Zone
or Guantanamo Bay). The methods of obtaining "exclusive rights"
were not delineated in these studies. The former mandated
islands were included within this "exclusive rights" category.
Additionally, the Ryukyus (Okinawa), Bonin-Volcano Group (Iwo
Jima), and Marcus Island (administered by Australia) were
included within the "exclusive rights" category.
Within the islands under the "exclusive rights" category,
naval bases were planned at Majuro, Kwajalein, Eniwetok, Truk,
the Palaus, Ulithi-Yap (all within the former Japanese mandated
3
islands), the Iwo Jiraa area, and on Marcus Island.
On July 7, 1945, the Secretary of State wrote to the
Secretaries of War and Navy suggesting a new over-all examina-
tion of United States requirements for military and base
4
rights outside the continental limits of the United States.
3. Ibid.
4. U. S., Naval Classified Archives Office, SWN-3475
dated November 7, 1945, Declassified, 1970, SWNCC 38 files.
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The Navy had just completed a reevaluatlon of its requirements,
for it was aware of the probable postwar budget restrictions.
Secretary Forrestal had approved the resulting "Basic Post-
5
War Plan No. L" dated May 2, 1945, for planning purposes.
This plan stated that all of the former Japanese mandated
islands, plus Marcus Island, the Ryukyus, and the Bonin-
Volcano Islands, "should be wholly under United States con-
trol for strategic reasons, but the establishment of facil-
6
ities is necessary only at key points as indicated below...."
Under this plan, most of the bases in the former mandated is-
lands would be in "reduced or maintenance status" or in "care-
taker status - available for emergencies only."
This plan demonstrates that the Navy Department planners
saw the strategic value of the former mandated islands not
only in the positive sense, i.e., the presence of active status
bases, but also in the negative sense, i.e., the denying of
the entire area of the islands to any other power. When budget
limitations dictated, the status of the bases envisaged within
the former mandated islands was downgraded to either the reduced
or the caretaker levels of maintenance. The strategic value
of the islands was still recognized, even though very few
active bases would be maintained within the area.
Also, of interest is the fact that the methods of obtain-
ing "exclusive rights" were mentioned in this plan. The former
5, U. S., Naval Classified Archives Office, Navy CNO
OP-50D letter dated May 7, 1945, Subject: Basic Post-War Plan




Japanese mandated islands, Marcus Island, the Ryukyus, and
the Bonin-Volcano Islands were placed within the category of
those areas "where the United States may reasonably expect to
secure exclusive military rights either through trusteeship
7
or through some other form of negotiated agreements ,
"
The Joint Chiefs of Staff were still agitating for full
sovereignty, i.e., annexation, over the former mandated
islands. Since the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved this plan,
they presumably felt that full sovereignty could be achieved
by means of "some other form of negotiated agreements." The
peace treaties, for example, could be utilized to legitimize
American annexation of the former mandated islands.
In contrast to the controversy over the former mandated
islands, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the War and Navy Depart-
ments were favoring the placing of the Ryukyus and the Bonin-
Volcano Islands within the strategic trusteeship system. At
no time was annexation of the Ryukyus or the Bonin-Volcano
Islands seriously considered.
The question of the postwar base structure in the Pacific
and the acquisition of the Japanese mandated islands, in parti-
cular, was also the subject of interest and study on the part
of the Naval Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives.
In January 1945, the Committee constituted a subcommittee to
study this matter. This subcommittee was headed by Represen-
tative Ed. V. Izac of California. The subcommittee toured the




findings and recommendations on August 6, 1945, The report
stated that the United States "should take outright the Japan-
ese mandated islands and the outlying Japanese islands. There
are those who favor trusteeship of these islands. There are
those who subscribe to the thesis that what is everybody • s
job is nobody's responsibility. Regardless of which view
prevails, the United States should have the dominating control
8
over these islands."
In justification of this recommendation, the Subcommittee
report cited the heavy loss of American life in capturing the
islands and the following considerations!
We will have restored peace to the
Pacific almost single-handedly and if we
are to be charged with the responsibility
of maintaining that peace, we must be
given the authority and the means by which
to maintain the peace - one of the princi-
pal means being the authority over stra-
tegic islands in the Pacific. Nor must
the fact be overlooked that our retention
of these islands will be predicated solely
upon the desire and responsibility to main-
tain peace in the Pacific, rather than upon
imperialism. Prewar mandates mean little
to enforcement of world peace if the coun-
tries that hold them are incapable of main-
taining and defending the islands.
9
Meanwhile, the Navy had been developing various plans for
the civil government of the former Japanese mandated islands.
8. U. S., Congress, House of Representatives, Subcommittee
on Pacific Bases of the Committee on Naval Affairs, Study of
Pacific Base s. 79th Cong., 1st sess., First report, dated Au-





The Initiation of this work was mentioned earlier. Substan-
tive progress had started in March 1945 j and during the suc-
ceeding six months, many different draft plans were prepared.
The first plan (April 28, 1945) proposed a civilian
administration within the Navy Department divorced from the
naval establishments in the Pacific and responsible directly
10
to the Secretary of the Navy.
The second plan (June 14, 1945) presented four alternative
forms of government for the mandated islands. These forms were:
(1) of the Guam-Samoa pattern, (2) of the military government
pattern, (3) by a civilian organization in the Navy Department,
and (4) of a mixed military-civilian nature. The study recom-
mended that the last alternative be approved. However, Admiral
King approved the first alternative and directed that a compre-
11
hensive plan be developed on that pattern. This new plan
was submitted on August 15, 1945, and modified on August 28,
1945, A final draft, dated September 17, 1945, provided for
a government patterned after prewar Guam,
The major policy problems that necessitated the many
changes in the Navy draft plans were the question of the ex-
tent to which civilians would be used in administrative capac-
ities and the question concerning the areas to be under naval
12
jurisdiction after the war.
10. U. S., Naval Classified Archives Office, OP 22 Office
History, April 10 to December 1, 1945, Declassified, 1970, MIL-





On the first question, Secretary Forrestal insisted that,
for political and public relations reasons, the civil govern-
13
ment be divorced from the local military command structure.
Admiral Nimitz, Commander in Chief of the Pacific, objected to
the removal of the civil government from the chain of military
14
command but, otherwise, approved the final draft plan.
This question of the degree of civilian participation
and the civil government's relation to the military chain of
command was an internal Navy Department debate. Secretary
Forrestal showed acute sensitivity to the public opinion and
political factors involved in this matter by his insisting that
the civil government be divorced from the local military com-
mand structure.
The second question, concerning the areas to be under
naval jurisdiction after the war, developed into an inter-
departmental controversy. During the fall of 1945, the con-
troversy concerning which governmental agency would have respon-
sibility for the postwar civil administration (as distinct from
the temporary military government assumed by the Navy as each
island was conquered) matured into a head-on clash among the
Navy, War, and Interior Departments.
The Navy got the first jump on this question when Vice
Admiral R. S. Edwards drafted a letter from Secretary Forrestal
to the President requesting consent to naval administration of
the Marianas. This consent was given by President Truman on
13. U. S., Naval Classified Archives Office, Francis X.
Downey, SECNAV Office, Memorandum to Major Correa, October 18,





August 14, 1945, without consulting any of the other depart
-
15
raents. The Navy's letter also suggested that "consideration
be given to placing under naval government all islands taken
16
from the Japanese,"
The Army heard of this authorization; and for the first
time in this entire issue, the Navy and the Army split on
their interests. The Army wanted to administer Okinawa as
well as the following islands within the former Japanese man-
date! Saipan, Tinian, and Kwajalein, The Army also wanted to
17
administer Midway and Wake. The Army had been taken by sur-
prise by the President's sudden granting of the Navy's request
to administer the Mariana Islands (which included Saipan and
Tinian)
.
Indeed, even the Navy was' surprised at the President's
action. Only one day after the President had received the
request, it had come back marked "approved" over the Presi-
dent's signature.
Drew Pearson later wrote a column which made public most
of what happened in this matter between August and October
18
1945. His column is very detailed and, as for the points
15. Cdr. Dorothy E. Richard, USNR, United States Naval
Administration of the Trust Territory o f the Pacific Island s
(3 vols., Washingtoni U. S. Government Printing Office, 1957),
Vol. 2, pp. 70-71.
16. U. S., Naval Classified Archives Office, Secretary
Stimson memorandum to the President, September 10, 1945, Declas-
sified, 1970, SWNCC 191/D files.
17. U. S., Naval Classified Archives Office, Note by Admiral
Edwards on memorandum from M. B. Gardner to Admiral King, Novem-
ber 15, 1945, Declassified, June 20, 1969, CNO files (SC) A14-7/EF.
18. Drew Pearson, column, "The Washington Merry-Go-Round,
"
The Washing,ton Post , October 15, 1945.
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that can be verified, very accurate. Obviously, a source
within one of the agencies had leaked the inforr ation to him.
Among the unsupported facts, Pearson claimed that President
Truman's Naval Aide, Rear Admiral James Vardaman, had helped
to "grease the ways" in obtaining the President's approval,
which came as a surprise to the Navy. Another unverified
fact included in the column was the statement that the Army
and Army Air Corps considered the Marianas as vital to long-
range bomber operations and did not want to be "hamstrung" by
19
naval administration.
In an attempt to retrieve the situation, Assistant Secre-
tary McCloy drafted a memorandum which Secretary Stimson sent
to the President on September 10, 1945. It referred to the
President's approval of the naval administration of the Mari-
anas and the suggestion that consideration be given to plac-
ing the other ex-Japanese islands under naval government.
Then, the memorandum requested the President to consider that
decision as granting "interim authority" pending inter-depart-
mental study and recommendations. The memorandum continued:
The question of military bases in the
Pacific is a matter of vital interest to
both the War and Navy Departments, and the
subject of continuing studies by the Joint
Chiefs of Staff. Only by an integrated
system of mutually supporting bases for
land, sea, and air forces can military
security and control be achieved. The
type of government to be established over
those Pacific islands, such as the Marianas
and Okinawa, which are key areas in our na-
tional security program, is an important




integrated system of land, sea and air
bases, and concerns both the War and Navy
Departments as well as other departments
of the Government.
It is therefore recommended that
your approval of the recommendations of
the Secretary of the Navy on this matter
be regarded as an interim authority, and
that the Secretaries of State, War, and
Navy be directed to study and submit joint
recommendations on the type of government
to be established on the various Pacific
islands. 20
Surprisingly, the President also marked this memorandum
"approved" the day after it reached the White House. As
Pearson reported, H it was obvious to them [the Army^) that
21
the new President believed in speed, not consultation,"
Perhaps, the President had confidence in these Cabinet mem-
bers and assumed all was well and all necessary coordination
had been made.
Assistant Secretary McCloy submitted the President's
action on Secretary Stimson's memorandum to the State-War-Navy
Coordinating Committee (SWNCC) on September 19, 1945, and recom-
mended that the SWNCC Subcommittee for the Far East be charged
22
with preparing the study.
These actions by the War Department disturbed the Navy in
no uncertain terms. Drew Pearson's column, in another unveri-
fied statement, reported that Secretary Forrestal quickly sent
a memorandum to President Truman on September 11 (the same day
20. U. S., Naval Classified Archives Office, Secretary
Stimson memorandum to the President, September 10, 1945, Declas'
sified, 1970, SWNCC 191/D files.
21. Drew Pearson, column, "The Washington Merry-Go-Round,
'
The Washington Post . October 15, 1945,
22. U. S., Naval Classified Archives Office, SWNCC 191/D,
September 19, 1945, Declassified, 1970, SWNCC 191 files.
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the President had approved the Army's request) asking whether
he had approved a "permanent" policy of putting the islands
under naval administration or a mere "interim" policy pending
joint study and recommendation. This memorandum, according to
the Pearson column, immediately came back marked "approved as
an interim proposition pending the findings of the State-War-
23
Navy Departments."
At the same time, Admiral Edwards sent the Navy's civil-
government plan to Admiral Nimitz for his comment. Admiral
Edwards made one major concession in this plan by eliminating
Okinawa from the islands to be administered by the Navy on the
ground that it had too large a civilian population for a naval
24
government. This was a concession to the Army.
Additionally, the Pearson column stated that Under Secre-
tary of the Navy Artemus L. Gates called McCloy and suggested
that "it would be better if the Army and Navy worked things
out between themselves without consulting the State Department.
Then, they could surprise the other Government agencies with
25
an accomplished fact which couldn't be upset." This, of
course, is unsubstantiated; but it is supported to some ex-
tent by the fact that on September 24, 1945, only five days
23. Drew Pearson, column, "The Washington Merry-Go-
Round," The Washington Post . October 15, 1945.
24. In July 1946, the Navy transferred control of the
civil administration of the Ryukyus, including Okinawa, to
the Army. The Army is still administering the Ryukyus.
These islands are scheduled to be returned to Japan in 1972.
25. Drew Pearson, column, "The Washington Merry-Go-
Round," The Washington Post . October 15, 1945.
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after McCloy had submitted the Army's request to SWNCC, the
Army requested that it be withdrawn from consideration by the
26
subcommittee. No reason was officially given for this re-
quest, but it was withdrawn from the SWNCC agenda.
The reason for this request might not have been from any
Machiavellian Army-Navy deal but from the actions of the
Interior Department. As stated previously, the Interior Depart-
ment had commenced its own studies about the same time as the
Navy, December of 1944. Mr. Jack B. Fahy's hostile study of
naval administration was updated in April 1945 in order to
prepare a case against naval administration over any Pacific
27
islands.
This increased concern was partly as a result of Repre-
sentative Cole's introducing a- bill in the House in January
1945 "to transfer all activities in regard to the territories
28
and possessions to the Navy Department." It was also a
reaction to the appointment by the House Naval Affairs Com-
mittee of a subcommittee to study the Pacific islands (the
29
Izac Subcommittee). Mr. Fahy was determined to have Interior
26. U. S., Naval Classified Archives Office, Sl/NCC 191/1,
September 24, 1945, Declassified, 1970, SWNCC 191 files.
27. U. S. National Archives, U. S. Department of the
Interior, Office of Territories, Military Government of United
States Territories and Island Possessions, by Jack B. Fahy,
April 1945, RG 126, 9-0-48 Islands-Pacif ic-Gen-Pt 1,
28. U. S. National Archives, U. S. Department of the
Interior, Office of Territories, B. W. Thoron, Director, to
Mr. Jack B. Fahy, January 8, 1945, RG 126, 9-0-48 Islands-
Pacific-Gen-Pt 1.
29. U. S. National Archives, U. S. Department of the
Interior, Office of Territories, B. W. Thoron to Abe Fortas,
January 23, 1945, RG 48, 9-0-1 Admin. Gen. Pt 2.
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"become strongly associated, Inside and outside the government,
In people's minds as the agency that actually spark-plugs the
30
administration of colonial matters."
Interior had no idea that the Navy Department had received
President Truman's approval to their request for naval adminis-
tration of the Marianas on August 14, 1945. On August 23, 1945,
Edwin G. Arnold, the Director of Interior's Division of Terri-
tories and Island Possessions, sent a memorandum to Interior's
Under Secretary Abe Fortas. In it, he mentioned the report
(described above) of the Subcommittee on Pacific Bases of the
House Naval Affairs Committee (the Izac Subcommittee) and
requested a discussion of the entire problem with Mr, Fortas
and Eric Beecroft (Arnold's Special Assistant) in order to
determine the course Interior .should take in inter-department
31
discussions and the preparation of any specific proposals.
This discussion within Interior was held within the week.
Drew Pearson's column, in yet another unverified state-
ment, reported that Acting Secretary Fortas went to the Pentagon
for a conference with Assistant Secretary of the Navy Sullivan
and several admirals. Mr. Fortas outlined the Interior Depart-
ment's views of how to handle the Pacific islands and proposed
that the Navy and the Interior Departments set up a joint com-
mittee to study the subject. The Pearson column stated that
30. U, S. National Archives, U. S, Department of the
Interior, Office of Territories, Jack B. Fahy to B. W. Thoron,
January 16, 1945, RG 126, 9-0-48 Islands - Pacific Gen. Pt 1.
31. U. S. National Archives, U. S. Department of the
Interior, Office of Territories, Edwin G. Arnold to Abe Fortas,
August 23, 1945, RG 48, 9-0-7 Islands - Gen. Pt 2.
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"Sullivan and the admirals listened politely and with poker
faces. They knew Truman had OK'd their memo making the Navy
supreme over Pacific islands, but they never uttered a peep.
32
Fortas left knowing nothing."
Secretary of the Interior, Harold L. Ickes, sent a two-
page letter to the President on September 12, 1945, concern-
ing civil administration of any areas that might be placed
under the supervision of the United States. This was the day
after the Army had received the President's approval for
"interim" naval administration of the Marianas and joint. State-
War-Navy study of the question. Ickes* letter does not refer
to any of the recent decisions by the President. It presents
an argument for civilians administering inhabited areas adjacent
to strategic bases without handicapping the activities of the
defense services. The main points of the letter were as
followsi
It would be in keeping with the traditions
of the American people to devise suitable
forms of civil administration, under civil-
ian personnel, for the peace-time government
of new overseas territories, with adequate
provision being made to protect the security
interests of the United States and to enable
this Nation to assist effectively in main-
taining the conditions of permanent peace.
Although I recognize that it will be
some time before decisions can be made con-
cerning either the disposition or the admin-
istrations of Pacific territories, I have
asked the Division of Territories and Island
Possessions to make a general study of the
problems of the Pacific Islands and to be
ready to undertake a more detailed preparation







of plans. We ought to draw fully upon
- expert opinion and upon the practical
experience gained by the Department of
Interior which has long been the chief
Federal agency responsible for the well-




To be prepared adequately for the
conduct of civil affairs, I believe that
you will wish the work of planning to
begin at once, without awaiting decisions
either as to the time required to complete
the tasks of military government or as to
the particular geographic areas to be ad-
ministered by the United States,
With your approval, I shall ask the
Division of Territories and Island Posses-
sions to draft a detailed report for sub-
mission to you as soon as possible. In
the preparation of such a report, dealing
with the conduct of civil affairs in new
territories, I assume that the Departments
of State, War, and Navy would be consulted
regarding any plans or programs which they
may have developed. 33
This letter is a remarkable indication of the lack of any
coordination among the agencies concerning the postwar civil
administration of new territories. It also appears that the
Interior Department was now six months behind the Navy in
developing plans for the civil government of the former Japan-
ese mandated islands. Interior evidently had no knowledge of
President Truman's decisions of August 14 and September 11.
The files of the Interior Department documents indicate that
this letter was not a cynical attempt by Interior to "muscle
in" based on foreknowledge of the recent actions of the Navy,
Array, and the President. The letter was based on an internal
33. Harry S. Truman Library, Ickes to the President,
September 12, 1945, Official file, 85-L. Seei Appendix I
for a copy of this letter.
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memorandum from Edwin G. Arnold to Secretary Ickes dated two
34
days previously, September 10, 1945. There is no mention by
Mr. Arnold either of the Army-Navy dealings on the subject, or
of the President's recent decisions. The Interior Department
was obviously M out of the picture" in regard to recent events
concerning plans for the civil administration of the former
mandated islands.
The President evidently replied to Ickes' letter on the
next day, September 13, 1945, in a vague, general manner con-
cerning the conduct of civil affairs in Pacific areas. No
copy of the President's letter has been located, but it is
referred to in Secretary Ickes' next letter to the President.
It is evident that the President's reply did not alert Interior
to his recent decisions concerning the civil administration of
the Pacific islands.
The military's actions could not be kept secret forever,
especially after John C. McCloy submitted the problem to SWNCC.
Word was bound to leak to Interior, About September 24, 1945,
the day the War Department requested that the problem be re-
moved from the SWNCC agenda, the Interior Department found out
about the President's actions.
The Interior Department reacted quickly, Abe Fortas,
Acting Secretary during Secretary Ickes' absence in London,
signed a letter addressed to the President on September 28,
1945, and sent it to the White House at once by special
34, U. S. National Archives, Department of the Interior,
Office of Territories, Memorandum to the Secretary from Edwin
G. Arnold, September 10, 1945, RG 48, 9-0-7 Islands Gen. Pt 2.
See i Appendix H for a copy of this memorandum.
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messenger. In this letter, Mr. Fortas mentioned that, since
Mr. Ickes* letter of the 12th and the President's reply of the
next day, he had been informed that the President had referred
the subject of the civil administration of the Pacific islands
35
to the Secretaries of State, War, and the Navy. Mr. Fortas
then stated he was sure that it was the President's intention
to include the Interior Department in the discussions. The
letter concluded with the following, "I hope that you will
advise the Secretaries of State, War, and the Navy and Secre-
tary Ickes that you wish the Interior Department to participate
36
in the discussion of this problem."
Prior to this concluding request, Mr. Fortas set forth
Interior s basic argument for civilian administration of over-
seas dependent areas:
By maintaining naval administration
of Samoa and Guam, the United States has
had the dubious distinction of being the
only Pacific power which governs an in-
habited colonial area as a mere appurte-
~~— nance of a military base. This is not,
I believe, a distinction which the Ameri-
can people will justify at a time when
enlightened opinion, at home and abroad,
demands expert attention to the progress
of dependent peoples,
I recognize the vital interests of
the Department of State and the defense
services in determining policies and
methods of administration in all areas
having strategic importance in inter-
national affairs.... If we commit
35. Harry S. Truman Library, Abe Fortas to the Presi-
dent, September 28, 1945, Official file, 85-L. See: Appendix




ourselves to the principle of civil govern-
ment, we strengthen the already strong case
we have for retention and control of stra-
tegic bases.
The Department of the Interior would
like to assist in assuring expert civil
government with a view to the ultimate
attainment of democratic institutions and
economic stability in dependent areas. 37
This letter is further substantiation of the conclusion
that Interior was completely unaware of the state of affairs
concerning this problem when Ickes sent his letter to the
President on September 12, 1945. Abe Fortas did not have to
fear Ickes* disapproval of this initiative since Ickes had
signed the letter of September 12, 1945, and since Ickes'
38
opinion of naval administration was well known.
The President, however, deferred action on the letter;
and Secretary Ickes wrote a letter on October 18 to remind
the President of Fortas 1 letter and to "offer the suggestion
that a joint expert group representing the four Departments
visit the Pacific islands for the purpose of preparing for
you a detailed plan for interim administration, pending deci-
sions and agreements concerning future disposition and admin-
39
istration of the islands." President Truman then took
action and sent a memorandum to the four Secretaries (State,
War, Navy, Interior) on October 20, 1945, appointing them as
a committee to study "the problems arising from the
37. Ibid.
38. See i Harold L. Ickes, "The Navy at Its Worst,"
Collier's , Vol. 118 (August 31, 1956), pp. 22-23, 67 and below
pp. 193-194 for examples of his attitude toward the Navy.
39. Harry S. Truman Library, Ickes to President, October




Administration of the Pacific Islands. This should be done
without delay and we should outline a policy which is satis-
40
factory to all four Departments."
Following the appointment of this Cabinet Committee,
representatives of the four Secretaries met on October 25,
1945, in the office of Mr. James Dunn, Assistant Secretary
41
of State.
The War Department representative, Mr. Lovett, proposed
a subcommittee be appointed to consider the problems involved
in the administration of the Pacific islands. He also recom-
mended that this subcommittee "determine formally what real
estate we will assert title to" in the Pacific after ascer-
taining what areas have been selected by the Joint Chiefs of
42
Staff for use as military bases. He further recommended
that a group representing the four Departments be sent by the
subcommittee to the Pacific to study the problems at first
hand.
While the group agreed to establish a subcommittee and
to send a study group to the Pacific, it disagreed over the
40, U. S. National Archives, U. S. Department of the
Interior, Office of Territories, President to SECSTATE,
SECWAR, SECNAV, and SECINT, dated October 20, 1945, RG 48,
9-0-7, Islands Gen. Pt 2.
41, Those present were Mr, H. Freeman Matthews, for
Mr. Dunn? Mr, Robert A. Lovett, Assistant Secretary of War,
for Mr, McCloy (who normally represented the War Department
on SWMCC) j Mr, Artemus L, Gates, Assistant Secretary of the
Navy; Mr. Michael W, Straus, Assistant Secretary of the In-
terior, for Mr, Fortasj and several others.
42, U. S. National Archives, Department of the Interior,
Office of Territories, Minutes of October 25, 1945, meeting,
RG 48, 9-0-7 Islands Gen. Pt 2.
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suggestion concerning the determination of areas over which
title should be asserted. The State and Interior represen-
tatives felt that this determination was not within the terms
of reference of the President's charge to the Committee.
Of interest in regard to the increasingly assertive role
that the agencies were beginning to play vis-a-vis the Joint
Chiefs of Staff is the group's agreement that the Joint Chiefs
of Staff's opinion concerning essential base requirements would
be useful to the subcommittee but would not define or limit the
work of the subcommittee.
Differences arose regarding islands covered by the Presi-
dent's instruction. For example, Mr, Gates of the Navy Depart-
ment proposed that the Marianas should be exempt from the scope
of the Committee's study since their administration had already
been given to the Navy by the President, The account of the
meeting, written by Jack B. Fahy of Interior, does not specify
whether the War Department representative supported Mr Gates
on this proposal. It does mention that both Mr, Gates and
Mr. Lovett made reference to the interim jurisdiction over
certain islands already given to the Navy Department by the
President, It would be interesting to know whether or not the
Army and the Navy were presenting a common position on the
Marianas, If they were taking a common position on this matter,
it might have reflected an attempt to make a separate deal bet-
ween themselves. The suggestion that a possible separate Army-
Navy deal had, as mentioned above, been raised in the Pearson
column published only ten days prior to this meeting,
Mr, Fahy's account of the meeting stated that there was
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no objection to the Interior Department's representative stat-
ing at the close of the discussion concerning tire scope of
the Committee's study that he interpreted the President's
letter to mean that the Committee was to consider in its dis-
cretion any problems arising from the administration of the
43
Pacific islands "regardless of present arrangements." Of
course, Mr. Fahy's account may be biased in its report that
there was no objection to that statement.
Organizationally, Mr, Lovett suggested that the subcom-
mittee be regarded as a subcommittee of SWNCC with Interior
also represented on the subcommittee. He stated that this
arrangement would provide the subcommittee with the assis-
tance and facilities of SWNCC and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Mr. Straus of Interior objected to this proposal and obtained
the agreement that the proposed subcommittee would be under
the Committee of the Four Secretaries (sometimes referred to
as the Quadripartite Committee) appointed by the President's
44
memorandum of October 20. Mr. Straus evidently did not feel
that the Interior Department would be on an equal footing with
the other departments within the SWNCC context.
43. Ibid.
44. The subcommittee members were the following
»
Edwin G. Arnold representing Interior, with Jack B. Fahy
and Eric Beecroft as his alternates; Fred Searls, Jr. repre-
senting State, with John D. Hickerson as his alternate; and,
probably, McCloy and Gates representing War and Navy Depart-
ments respectively; although, these representatives were




The State, War, and Navy Departments had not been con-
sulted by the President prior to his appointment of the Com-
mittee of the Four Secretaries on October 20, In fact, none
of these departments welcomed the appointment of the Cabinet
Committee to study the problem of civil administration of the
various Pacific islands.
The Presidential memorandum of October 20, 1945, was the
first official connection of the State Department with the
question of which agency should administer the former Japan-
ese mandated islands. The State Department was engaged in
negotiations with various foreign governments for base rights
in the Pacific and had no desire to become embroiled in a new
controversy at a sensitive time.
The War and Navy Departments would obviously have preferred
that Interior, as well as State, remained out of the discussions
over which agency should administer various Pacific islands.
The Interior Department's claim to a legitimate interest in
such discussions was recognized by the President's memorandum.
The Army and the Navy would have preferred to keep the com-
petition for the administration of the former mandated islands
restricted solely to themselves. Now, a new competitor was
on the scene.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff were being left out of this
debate over the civil administration of the Pacific islands.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff were conspicuously absent from the
President's appointed committee and its subcommittee. The
Joint Chiefs of Staff were still insisting on exclusive Ameri-
can strategic control over the former Japanese mandated islands.
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This position was reaffirmed on November 7, 1945, in the Joint
Chiefs of Staff's detailed answer to the State Department's
request for an overall examination of postwar overseas base
45
and base-rights requirements.
Mr. Eric Beecroft, of the Interior Department's Division
of Territories, attempted to have a meeting called of the
inter- departmental subcommittee but was rebuffed by the State
Department. After several attempts to get someone in the
State Department to take action, he met with Mr. Searls of
the State Department on November 13, 1945. Beecroft summa-
rized the discussion in the following memorandum for the
Interior files j
he [Searls] said he was firmly convinced
that, while delicate discussions concern-
ing the islands [many islands such aa Manus,
Marcus, and Okinawa were concerned, not just
the mandated ones] were in progress, all
talk about the handling of civil affairs
should be deferred. Too open a discussion
of civil affairs would be a disturbing in-
. ...__
fluence on current conversations looking
toward acquisition of such areas. If inter-
departmental meetings were held, the talk
about the islands would reach too wide a
circle,
I said I understood the delicacy of
the subject from the State Department's view-
point and that I was sure that every other
Department of the Government would want to
assist in simplifying the task; but I won-
dered, I said, whether the degree of diffi-
culty or delicacy in international discus-
sion would not depend on the kind of civil
affairs program proposed by the United
States. Mr. Searls said he believed it
45. U. S., Naval Classified Archives Office, Over-all
Examination of U. S. Requirements For Military Bases and




was always better • to catch the rabbit
first. *46
Mr. Beecroft's memorandum for the files did not have
any security classification assigned to it and was, therefore,
an unclassified document. One wonders at his understanding
of the delicacy of the subject, especially since he had
desired to discuss the matter with Searls over the telephone
before Searls told him to come to the State Department for a
personal meeting if he desired to know Searls* viewpoint.
All the State and military documents for this matter were
either TOP SECRET or SECRET, whereas all of the Interior
documents for this period of time were classified either
CONFIDENTIAL or UNCLASSIFIED.
Mr. Beecroft was very disturbed by Mr. Searls* comments.
His account of the meeting indicated that the conversation
was very strained. For example, his memorandum of the con-
versation stated
i
Mr. Searls said he would be glad if
I would give his views to Mr, Straus and
others concerned in the Interior Depart-
ment. I said I would do so. He added
pointedly that I should not assume these
to be only his personal views.
I then drew Mr. Searls* attention to
the wording of the President's memorandum
of October 20, which called for action
•without delay* and for an outline of
policy 'satisfactory to all four Depart-
ments.* Mr, Searls* comment on this wast
•I think you can assume that the Secretary
has read that letter,'
I did not feel that I should remain
with Mr, Searls at this time to debate
whether the Secretary of State could over-
rule the President, I therefore repeated
46. U. S. National Archives, U. S. Department of the
Interior, Office of Territories, memorandum by Eric Beecroft,
November 15, 1945, RG 126, Islands, Pacific Gen. Pt 1.
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that I would convey his views to my Depart-
ment. The remainder of our conversati on,
as I was leaving, related only to a mutual
acquaintance.
Later in the day, I called Mr. Searls'
secretary and asked her for his title. She
said she was sorry to say that Mr. Searls
had no title. In reply to a further ques-
tion as to whether he was attached to the
Office of the Secretary of the Office of
the Assistant Secretary (Mr. Dunn), she
said she thought he was 'a little closer
to the Office of the Secretary. A later
inquiry to the Information Office of the
Department brought a similar answer, namely,
that Mr. Searls had no title but was attached
to the Secretary's office. 47
Secretary Ickes, of course, was not happy with the course
of events. On November 27, 1945, he fired off a short blast
to James F. Byrnes, Secretary of State. He stated that the
subcommittee had not yet met more than a month after the Presi-
dent had appointed the Four Secretaries' Committee, He ended
by stating "in view of the plain words of the President's
directive, I am sure that you will agree that we cannot defer
action on this matter any longer. Would you ask the Department
of State's representative on the subcommittee to summon a meet-
ing of the group in order that work can begin at once on the
48
recommendation required by the President?"
Secretary Ickes was so anxious for this work to be
accomplished that he was the only one of the four Secretaries
to request money ($19,800) from the President's Emergency Fund
47. Ibid.
48. U. S. National Archives, U. S. Department of the
Interior, Office of Territories, Ickes to Byrnes, November 27,
1945, RG 48, 9-0-7 Islands Gen. Pt 2.
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for his "participation in the Committee established by the
49
President." This sum had been arrived at by a detailed
breakdown of probable expenses for the study trip to the
Pacific, Perhaps this was a way for Secretary Ickes to
press his interest. The other Secretaries may have felt
no need for special expenses or had not bothered to think
about the matter in that much detail.
The high point of dissension between the State and Inte-
rior Departments came during December of 1945, Secretary
Byrnes had replied to Ickes 1 letter on December 6, 1945,
stating the same reasons for the delay that Searls had given
Beecroft, He also stated that there had been yet no determina-
tion as to trusteeship, ownership, or exclusive rights in
regard to several of the islands, including the former Japan-
ese mandated islands. Secretary Byrnes put the icing on the
50
relationship by sending a copy of this letter to the President,
Secretary Ickes replied in kind by sending a long, critical
letter back to Byrnes, while sending a copy to the President,
It was drafted by Beecroft and approved up the line by Fahy
and Fortas prior to being signed by Ickes on December 29, 1945,
The last sentence stating that a copy was going to the Presi-
dent was typed separately on the carbon copy which would seem
to indicate that it was a last minute addition, probably added
49, U. S. National Archives, U. S. Department of the
Interior, Office of Territories, Ickes to Harold D, Smith,
Director, Bureau of the Budget, November 6, 1945, RG 48,
9-0-7, Islands Gen Pt 2.
50, U. S, National Archives, U. S. Department of the
Interior, Office of Territories, Byrnes to Ickes, December 6,
1945, RG 43, 9-0-7, Islands Gen, Pt 2.
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by Secretary Ickes, himself. Some of the more important points
in this letter are quoted below:
i
As I understand the problems of admin-
istration in the Pacific islands, they are
not, for the most part, hypothetical ones
that might arise only in the event of cer-
tain international agreements, but immediate
and interim problems of an administrative
and economic character arising from our de
facto control.... To await formal inter-
national decisions before providing orderly
administrative arrangements would be to
leave these arrangements to haphazard, day-
to-day planning. I am sure that this Nation's




With respect to all of the Central Paci-
fic islands taken from Japan, about which I
am mainly concerned, the actual governing
responsibility has been assumed wholly by
the United States for the time being. Even
if we knew that these islands would later be
assigned to another power, I assume that in
the meantime the United States Government
would be obliged to look after the welfare
of their inhabitants ....
I am sure that, to accomplish these
results (the assisting of the natives toward
a better way of life), the American people
will be overwhelmingly in favor of civil
government. Not only is our own tradition
decisively opposed to military rule, but
even the old colonial powers have apparently
outgrown it. The Japanese themselves main-




I cannot understand why attention should
be centered only on acquiring 'bases* when
local human problems and our relations with
the island peoples constitute an immediate
and pressing responsibility of the United
States Government, The President's memorandum
of October 20 referred not to 'bases' but to
'islands,' That memorandum still stands, and,
for the reasons that I have stated, I hold to
the opinion that the sub-committee should go
to work at once to prepare the required recom-
mendations as directed by the President,
I request that you have the subcommittee
summoned to draft an interim report for sub-
mission to the President by the Committee of
four Secretaries on or before February 1,
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Since a copy of your letter of Decem-
ber 6 was sent to the President, I am send-
ing him a copy of this communication. *1
Thus, it is clear that relations were extremely strained
between the State and Interior Departments,
Meanwhile, the Navy was not wasting any time. It was
engaged in a two-way fight- -one between it and the Army and
another one which was shaping up between the Navy and Interior
but was being delayed by State's actions.
Secretary Forrestal orally directed the naval commander
of Guam, Henry L. Larsen, to submit a report summarizing
reasons for continuing the naval administration of the islands
52
under American control in the Pacific. The report, dated
November 8, 1945, which was prepared by Larsen in response to
this instruction, stated that the information was desired
"promptly" by Secretary Forrestal, so promptly that the infor-
53
mat ion had been "hastily and perhaps incompletely recorded,"
This report was forwarded via Rear Admiral G. D. Murray,
Commander Marianas. Admiral Murray concurred with the opinions
and recommendations contained in Larsen' s report and added his
own observations on why the former Japanese mandated islands
should be administered by the Navy. He presented a concise
exposition of the Navy's rational for administering the former
51. U. S. National Archives, U. S. Department of the
Interior, Office of Territories, I ekes to Byrnes, December
29, 1945, RG 48, 9-0-7, Islands Gen. Pt 2.
52. U. S., Naval Classified Archives Office, Island
Commander, Guam, to the Secretary of the Navy, November 8,






mandated islands listing nine reasons.
Separately, Admiral Nimitz, Commander in Chief, U. S.
Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas, sent his comments on
this matter to the Chief of Naval Operations on October 1,
1945, and November 12, 1945. Admiral Nimitz* s letters empha-
sized the necessity for "unity of command" in the Western
Pacific area regardless of which agency administered the
former mandated islands. In his November 12, 1945, letter,
Admiral Nimitz stated:
It is the opinion of the Commander
in Chief that the security of the Pacific
Ocean Areas would not be jeopardized were
the responsibility for civil administra-
tion transferred to a civilian agency such
as the Department of the Interior, provid-
ing the authority of the military com-
mander remains paramount within the bound-
aries of military areas and provided that
the Area Commander is empowered in times
of emergency, or threatened emergency, to
take such steps as may be necessary to
prevent espionage and acts of sabotage.
The considerations which prompted the rec-
ommendation referred to in the foregoing
~~— paragraph [for the chain of governmental
responsibility to be married to the chain
of military command^ are equally appli-
cable to a civil administration under a
civil agency. Such an administration
should be common to the Bonin, Volcano,
Mariana, Caroline and Marshall groups as
well as to American Samoa. Any arrange-
ment resulting in the parcelling out of
responsibility for civil government among
several departments of the Federal Govern-
ment will militate against uniformity of
policy and will retard the social and eco- -j.
nomic advancement of the native populations.
54. U. S., Naval Classified Archives Office, Commander,
Marianas, to the Secretary of the Navy, November 21, 1945, ser.
003059, Declassified, June 20, 1969, Secretary of the Navy files.
Sees Appendix L for a copy of this letter.
55. U. S., Naval Classified Archives Office, Admiral Nimitz
to CNO, November 12, 1945, ser. 004485, Declassified, June 20,
1969, CNO files (SC) A14-7/EF.
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It, therefore, appears that Admiral Nimitz, who shortly
thereafter relieved Admiral King as Chief of Naval Operations,
was not that concerned as to which agency administered the
former Japanese mandated islands as long as there was uni-
formity of policy and the authority of the military commander
in the area was sufficient and clearly defined.
Meanwhile, the Navy and War Departments were holding
joint discussions in an attempt to settle their differences
in this matter. Mr. M. B. Gardner, of the Office of the Chief
of Naval Operations, developed a plan for the consideration of
the Army planners on the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It was dated
November 14, 1945, and recommended that administration of all
of the islands be uniform (under the Commander in Chief, Paci-
fic Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas) in order to avoid increased
overhead and undesirable duplication. The naval commander
would delegate the actual administering of the islands to a
Deputy Governor General on Guam who would deal directly with
a joint agency similar to the Joint Civil Affairs Committee
which would be a policy-making and advisory body under the
War and Navy Departments. The Deputy Governor General would
deal with this joint agency for matters of administration and
civil government, while dealing with the naval commander in
56
Pearl Harbor on matters concerning military operations.
This plan got nowhere with the Army officers in the Joint
56. U. S., Naval Classified Archives Office, draft agree-
ment attached to a memorandum from M. B. Gardner to Admiral




Chiefs of Staff. They told Gardner that It was a matter for
the War and Navy Departments rather than for the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, Gardner reported to Admiral King that he believed
that the real reason was M that the Army will not admit to any
primacy of responsibility in the Pacific Ocean Areas on the
part of the Navy. The Army Planners admitted that they wished
control of Iwo, Saipan and Tinian, and would seek, further,
military agreements as to the use of other stepping-stone
57
islands, notably Midway, Wake and Kwajalein." Admiral
Edwards added the following hand-written note to the bottom
of Gardner's report
i
Admiral Nimitz feels strongly that
civil government in the Pacific should be
administered entirely by one Department.
He would prefer that the Navy undertake
the task, but if the- Navy can not have
all islands except the Ryukyus (which is
apparently what is impending) he thinks
the Interior Department can handle the
task satisfactorily.
Since the matter is now deadlocked,
I recommend that SecNav, in his next meet-
—
— ing with the Secretary of War and the
Secretary of State, propose that the
Interior Dept take over as soon as the
status of the former Jap islands is
settled. 58
When the report, with Admiral Edwards' attached note,
reached Admiral King, he added a note dated November 18, 1945,
telling one of his assistants, "Show Gardner's memo to SecNav
59
and recommend that we press that solution." It is unclear
57. U. S., Naval Classified Archives Office, M. B.
Gardner to Admiral King, November 15, 1945, Declassified,





whether Admiral King referred to Gardner's draft agreement
or to Admiral Edwards* recommendation.
Evidently, Gardner's suggestion was adopted as a basis
for negotiations in light of a report dated January 9, 1946,
by George A, Brownell, Brigadier General, U.S.A., and John L.
Sullivan, Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Air. This
report refers to their having been informally appointed by
the Secretaries of War and Navy to "consider and make recom-
mendations with respect to the civil government of various
60
Pacific islands."
Their recommendations closely follow those of Gardner's
draft agreement. They agreed that Guam, American Samoa,
Bonins-Volcanoes, Marcus, and the former Japanese mandated
islands should be under civil governments administered by the
Army and the Navy, The islands listed above would come under
the policy control of a joint Army-Navy civil government com-
mission located in Washington. The local administration of
civil government would be the responsibility of the local
Army or Navy commanders. Brownell and Sullivan divided the
islands on the basis of which service would have the initial
local responsibility. Under this division, the Army would
administer the Bonins-Volcanoes, Marcus, and Tinian. Tinian
was one of the Marianas, part of the former Japanese mandate.
The Navy v/ould administer Guam, Rota (in the Marianas), the
Marshalls, and the Carolines. The six-member Joint Army-Navy
60. U. S., Naval Classified Archives Office, Brownell-
Sullivan memorandum for the Secretaries of War and Navy, Jan-




Commission (three from each service with the Secretaries
deciding on deadlocks or the President, if need be) would
determine which service would administer the other islands
and any future changes.
The two men reported disagreement over the island of
Saipan (in the Marianas); each wanting his own service to be
the initial administrator. They also recommended that the
Ryukyus (with Okinawa) be administered by the Interior Depart-
61
ment because of their large population.
This report was initialed by Secretary Forre3tal as ap-
proved; yet, evidently, nothing came of it. For some reason,
the War Department after January 1946 ceased pressing its
claim to administer any of the former Japanese mandated
islands. Perhaps the Army, realizing the pressure coming
from Interior in respect to the former mandated islands,
decided to concentrate on obtaining the administration of
the Ryukyus rather than press for Tinian and Saipan. All of
these islands (Okinawa, Tinian, and Saipan) would make excel-
lent long-range bomber bases. Strategically, any one of them
would probably have been acceptable for this purpose.
The Army eventually administered the Ryukyus and the
Bonins-Volcanoes (with Iwo Jima and Marcus). It is interest-
ing to note that none of the Interior Department papers even
mention these two island groups. Interior's attention was
focused, primarily, on the former mandated islands and,





The main reason for Interior's lack of interest in the
Ryukyus and the Bonins-Volcanoes and the Army's success in
obtaining the role of administrator (in contrast to the Navy's
failure vis-a-vis Interior) is tied in with the American Govern-
ment's policy that the Ryukyus and the Bonins-Volcanoes were to
be considered under the "residual sovereignty" of Japan with
the presumption, therefore, that they would be eventually
62
returned to Japan. This, of course, was not the policy in
regard to the former Japanese mandated islands.
At the same time that the Brownell- Sullivan report was
being submitted, Secretary of State Byrnes wrote a letter to
the President in an indirect reply to Ickes* bitter letter of
December 29, 1945. He stated that he could not summon the
subcommittee to draft a report for submission to the President
on or before February 1, 1946, as Secretary of War Patterson
was out of the country that week. He, himself, would be leav-
ing for the United Nations Assembly meeting in London the
next week. Byrnes continued, however, "I do not wish my
absence to deny to Secretary Ickes his request for prompt
action. If you agree that action must be had promptly, Under
Secretary Acheson will call a meeting as soon as Secretary
Patterson returns. Or, if you do not think this advisable,
62. The Bonins-Volcanoes were returned to Japan in 1968,
and the Ryukyus are to be returned in 1972.
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you can withdraw my name from the committee and advise the
other three Secretaries, War, Navy and Interior, to report
63
to you. H
Secretary Byrnes then stated his own views to the effect
that "under the position you [the President] took at Potsdam
there can be no final settlement as to the disposition of
64
enemy territory until there is a peace conference." Secre-
tary Byrnes continued with the following thoughts which would
indicate he favored military administration of the former man-
dated islands
i
Whenever we have a peace conference
and the state of the Pacific Islands is
determined it would then be timely to
determine the character of the occupa-
tion, whether military, civilian or whether
it would be shared by military and civil
authorities.,..
In other words, my thoughts are (1)
that if you desire to introduce civil admin-
istration prior to a peace conference dur-
ing the period of military occupation, it
should be done only after consultation with
the Supreme Commander [MacArthur] and what-
ever Department is placed on the Island
should report through the Supreme Commander;
and (2) that as to the administration which
will follow the decisions at a peace con-
ference, consideration should be given to
whether or not the Army and Navy, because
of military installations on some islands,
and because the population is not large,
should be placed in charge, rather than to
have two Departments operating where there
are few people.
For the reasons above given [sic*] I
do not see the necessity for immediate
63. The Harry S. Truman Library, Secretary of State




decision. However, the Secretary of the
Interior is earnestly of the opinion that
it is urgent. If the matter is not dis-
posed of before my return, I shall be
glad to discuss it with my colleagues.
If, on the other hand, it is disposed of,
whatever decision is reached will be en-
tirely satisfactory to me. 65
With this parting letter, Secretary Byrnes departed for
London where he was once again confronted with the problem of
the disposition of the former mandated islands.
Before turning to Byrnes 1 actions at the United Nations
Assembly meeting in London, a word should be said about the
President's Navy Day speech on October 27, 1945. In this
speech, he repeated the pledge that the United States did not
seek "one inch of territory in any place in the world. Out-
side of the right to establish necessary bases for own pro-
66
tection, we look for nothing which belongs to any other power,"
Yet, this public statement could be read in different ways.
The question whether or not the United States would submit the
former Japanese mandated islands to an international trustee-
ship was still undecided within the Government. The Joint
Chiefs of Staff were still maintaining their view that the
"islands should be under permanent and exclusive United States
67
control."
On December 1, 1945, the State Department transmitted to
the War and Navy Departments and the Joint Chiefs of Staff for
65. Ibid.
66. Richard, Naval Administration of the Trust Territory ,
Presidential speech quoted « Vol. 3, p. 8.
67. Ibid. , Vol. 3, p. 5.
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their comment a document of 106 pages entitled, "Tentative
Foreign Policy of the U. S." From the politico- military
relations point of view, this was a far step from the days
prior to the war when the State Department never officially
informed the military as to foreign policy.
The first twenty-five pages of the document contained
the fundamental points of foreign policy and were intended to
be released to the public. On page seven there was the follow-
ing i
Military bases. Although the United States
wants no territory or profit or selfish ad-
vantage out of this war, we intend to main-
tain the military bases necessary for the
complete protection of our interests and of
world peace. Bases which our military ex-
perts deem to be essential for our protec-
tion, and which are not now in our posses-
sion, we will acquire. We will acquire
them by arrangements consistent with the
United Nations Charter. 68
This was exactly the same wording as the President's
broadcast of August 9, 1945. Therefore, the President's
October 27 speech did not reflect any change in policy in
this matter.
Meanwhile, the question of what the United States intended
to do with the former mandated islands remained alive in the
public domain. The Soviet Union was also curious to know the
American intentions. At the first meeting of the three Foreign
Ministers in Moscow on December 16, 1945, Molotov asked Byrnes
what the United States intended to do with the islands. Byrnes
68. U. S., Naval Classified Archives Office, Tentative
Foreign Policy of the U. S., drafted by the State Department,
December 1, 1945, Declassified 1970, Leahy papers.
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told him that the Government's views had not yet been formu-
lated, and the only agreements concerning Japanese islands in
the Pacific were the Cairo Declaration and the Yalta agreement
69
regarding Southern Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands. Thus,
Byrnes kept his options open while gently reminding the Soviets
that jl£ the United States kept the mandated islands, the Soviet
Union had nothing to complain about as they had Southern
Sakhalin and the Kuriles. However, there were no indications
of any Soviet objections to possible American annexation of
the former mandated islands.
At this point, the "debacle" revolving around the First
Session of the United Nations General Assembly, which opened
in London on January 10, 1946, can be described. The confusion
started on the ship enroute to- the conference, Forres tal
recites that Byrnes, at a cabinet meeting on January 29, told
of his "difficulties with Senator Vandenberg and John Foster
Dulles, who, spurred on by General Kenney [General George C.
Kenney, U.S.A., Air Representative on the United Nations Mili-
tary Staff Committee] during conversations on the way over on
the boat, let the word leak out that there was dissatisfaction
with the American policy and position on trusteeship.... Byrnes
said that the fact had to be faced that Vandenberg' s - and for
that matter Dulles 's - activities from now on could be viewed
70
as being conducted on a political and partisan basis." Just
before the General Assembly session, General Kenney told newsmen
69, James F. Byrnes, Speaking Frankly , p. 218.
70. Walter Millis, ed., The Forrestal Diaries , p. 132.

173
at a press conference that the United States should annex all
71
the Japanese Islands that it needed.
i
These comments and leaks to the press naturally produced
press speculations and foreign inquiries at London. Perhaps
for these reasons, Secretary Byrnes suddenly cabled home on
January 15 asking the President for permission to state that
the United States would be prepared to place the islands under
the trusteeship system "either under ordinary trusteeship
72
arrangements or as strategic areas."
The military were unaware of Byrnes* cable to Washington
and were concerned with the press reports which appeared in
the London morning papers on January 15, 1946. These reports
had indicated uncertainty among the American representatives
at the United Nations meeting '"as to what the United States
position should be as to the future status of the Pacific
73
islands."
The Secretary of the Navy fired off a message to the Com-
mander of Naval Forces in Europe, located in London, asking
what was happening. This message was sent from Washington at
3tl0 p.m. on the fifteenth. The Admiral in London called in
Admiral Turner, the naval representative on the United Nations
Military Staff Committee, the next day and reported to Forres tali
71. Richard, Naval Administration of the Trust Territory .
Vol. 3, p. 10, See alsoi Hans W. Weigert, "U.S. Strategic
Bases and Collective Security," Foreign Affairs , Vol, 25
(1947), pp. 250-262.
72. Richard, Naval Administration of the Trust Territory ,
Vol. 3, p. 11.
73. U. S. , Naval Classified Archives Office, memorandum
from ASST SECNAV FOR AIR (Sullivan) to SWNCC, January 17, 1946,
Declassified 1970, SWNCC 249 files.
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Turner informs me question of trusteeships
has so far as known been discussed only in
US delegation with Military Staff Committee
representatives present. No decisions have
been arrived at. State Department has been
informed by military that as yet no instruc-
tions have been received from Joint Chiefs
of Staff, Consequently discussions have
been purely on informal basis and no recom-
mendations to delegation have been made by
our military representatives. In this con-
nection attention is invited to USREPMIL-
COMNO 161606 to JCS [a message from the mili-
tary representatives to the JCS on the 16th],
Turner recommends position of CNO might be
that any offer by US to place Japanese Man-
dates or Volcano and Bonin Islands or Ryukyus
under UNO trusteeship might well be deferred
until after ratification of Japanese peace
treaty, and that for present trusteeships
establishment might be confined to those
territories still held by allied powers
under original League of Nations Mandates.
However there is a tendency among some civil-
ian members of delegation to favor early
offer by US to agree to trusteeships for
captured Pacific territory in order to pro-
duce favorable effect toward offer by other
countries to agree to place under trustee-
ship territories which come under Article
77 para 1C UNO Charter,... He considers
press reports unjustified conflict in ideas
between civilian and military delegations. 74
This message indicates that the military representatives
of the American delegation did not know that Byrnes had sent
the cable to Washington nor did they appreciate the serious-
ness of the situation. It also provides another motivation
for the Byrnes cable- -that some civilian members of the dele-
gation wished to induce other countries into placing their
dependent territories under the trusteeship system (Article 77,
para 1C of the Charter)
.
74. U. S., Naval Classified Archives Office, COMNAVEU
message to SECNAV, DTG 162212, January, 1946, Declassified 1970,
Secretary of the Navy files.
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There is no indication of Byrnes' personal views on the
desirability of announcing that the United States would place
the former mandated islands under the trusteeship system.
Perhaps he was pressed by certain members of his staff of
the delegation. The United States delegation included Pasvolsky,
Cohen, Dunn, Hackworth, Hiss, Bunche, Gerig, Green, Hartley,
Notter, Sandifer and Fortas. The " internationalists 1 ' were
therefore well represented on the United States delegation.
The President held a news conference on the fifteenth
(it is not known if he had already seen Byrnes' cable) and
made certain extemporaneous remarks, in general terms, on
this subject. The State Department's Radio Bulletin reported
on this press conference as follows:
The President declared that those
(islands) we do not need will be placed
under UNO trusteeship, and those we need
we will keep. Asked how long we intended
to keep these islands, Mr, Truman said,
as long as we needed them.... Asked if
they would be under individual trusteeship
-.___ of this country, President replied in the
affirmative in regard to those islands we
need.... Asked if we would have to ask
UNO's authority for our individual trustee-
ships, President replied affirmatively. . . .75
The Radio Bulletin reported that the President also said
that some islands would be under individual trusteeship as well
as collective trusteeship, "but that policy would have to be
worked out by the United Nations as it went along. He said
75. U. S. Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 14, No. 343
(January 27, 1946), p. 113, quoting the Department of State




that we had not demanded any of the islands we need." These
statements could not have been more ambiguous! The questions
by the reporters certainly did not clarify anything. The Presi-
dent was never asked about the inconsistency between his first
statement and his answer to the second question.
In Washington on the seventeenth, John L. Sullivan, the
Navy's representative on SWNCC, sent a memorandum to the other
members of SWNCC referring to the London press articles and
the President's remarks to the reporters. He stated in this
memorandum that there was an "urgent need" for the State, Navy,
and War Departments to consider the question "with a view to
reaching agreement as to United States policy with respect to
77
the future status of the Pacific Islands." He recommended
that a special meeting of SWNCC be held "as soon as possible"
to consider the present state of affairs, to send instructions
or guidance to the Delegation in London, and to then "decide
upon steps to be taken to develop and clarify the governmental
- 78
position at the earliest practical date." Sullivan took
this action without knowing of the cable that Byrnes had sent
to Washington on the fifteenth.
On the same day that Sullivan sent his memorandum to the
other members of SWNCC, Acting Secretary of State Dean Acheson
obtained the President's consent for Byrnes to make a statement
that the United States would be prepared to place the former
76. Ibid.
77. U. S., Naval Classified Archives Office, Memorandum
from AbST SECNAV FOR AIR (Sullivan) to SWNCC, January 17, 1946,




mandated islands under the United Nations trusteeship system
"either under ordinary trusteeship arrangements or as stra-
tegic areas." Acheson obtained this Presidential consent,
and so cabled Byrnes on the seventeenth without ever having
consulted the Army, Navy, or Joint Chiefs of Staff, It is
not known who within the State Department took the initiative
in proposing this action to Dean Acheson. Undoubtedly, the
officers concerned with trusteeship matters who had remained
in Washington were responsible for this action by Acheson.
They should have informed Acheson about the prior inter-
departmental discussions concerning possible trusteeship for
the mandated islands and the firm annexationist position of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Acheson, himself, should have
known about the Joint Chiefs of Staff's position from the
public press.
President Truman must also be criticized for giving his
consent to the request, as he knew of the inter-agency contro-
versy over the issue. Perhaps, he believed that all necessary
coordination had been made prior to Acheson presenting Byrnes*
request. However, this is hard to believe. He had been in
office long enough by this time to realize the extent of the
differences within the Government over the disposition of the
former mandated islands.
Dean Acheson has. subsequently- described (in his memoirs)
his impressions of President Truman's administrative style.
Acheson' s impressions are completely contrary to the circum-
stances surrounding this hasty Presidential decision without




description of President Truman's administrative style is as
fo 1 lows
;
Mr. Truman brought another major
asset to decision. He had a passion for
orderly procedure and a deep, if simple,
idea of how to attain it. Although many
presidents had been lawyers, none of them
-- notably his immediate predecessor --
utilized in administration the law's most
fundamental procedure. For centuries
courts have required all parties in inter-
est to be present before the court at the
same time with the right to be heard and
to hear one another. President Truman
introduced this procedure into executive
administration. To it he added an equally
ancient, and in administration equally
novel, practice of law: the decision was
immediately reduced to writing. 7
9
This comment is made by the individual who went to the
President and obtained his hasty decision granting approval
for Secretary Byrnes to announce in London that the former
mandated islands would be placed under some form of trustee-
ship. No rule concerning all parties being present before the
court was followed at that time by either Acheson or the Presi-
dent. Acheson does continue in his memoirs to state that the
vehicle for these administrative innovations was the National
Security Council, This organization was created in 1947,
which was after this "hasty decision."
However, the belief in the principles of hearing all
interested parties and, immediately, reducing all decisions
to writing was supposedly held by the President independently
of the existance of the National Security Council. Perhaps
79. Dean Acheson, Present At The Creation: My Years In





such debacles as this Presidential decision served to reinforce
the President's belief in these administrative principles and
contributed to his urging the creation of the National Security
Council.
It is not known how the Joint Chiefs of Staff learned of
the State Department's actions. However, it is known that as
soon as they heard of Byrnes' request and the President's
approval, they transmitted via Admiral Leahy an unsolicited
80
position on the matter to the President. The Joint Chiefs
also fired off a quick letter notifying the Secretary of State,
and indirectly the President, that they still considered it
essential to national defense for the United States to gain
strategic control of the mandated islands by assuming full
81
sovereignty.
Forrestal heard of Byrnes' request, the Presidential deci-
sion, and Acheson's July 17 cable from Under Secretary of the
Navy Sullivan on the afternoon of January 20, Sullivan had
heard of these actions at a SWNCC meeting on the twentieth.
This meeting had been called evidently, as a result of Sullivan's
earlier memorandum. At this meeting, Sullivan and the War Depart-
ment's representative, Howard C. Peterson, learned of the situa-
tion from H. Freeman Mathews, the State Department representa-
tive. The War and Navy men were astonished and felt that the
80, U. S., Naval Classified Archives Office, Memorandum to
Forrestal, unsigned (undoubtedly from Sullivan,), on SWNCC meet-
ing January 20, 1946, dated January 21, 1946, SWNCC 249 files.
81, Richard, Naval Administration of the Trust Territory ,
Vol. 3, p. 12.
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President should not commit the Government without consulting
the War and Navy Departments
.
Sullivan and Peterson convinced Mathews that the Joint
Chiefs of Staff's views should be brought to Acheson's atten-
tion at once. They also urged Mathews to cable Byrnes request-
ing him to make no statement until advised further after con-
81
sultation with the President.
Later that evening, Sullivan reported to Forrestal that
cables had just been sent to Byrnes, with the President's
82
approval, recinding the earlier authorization. Fortunately,
these cables arrived in London before Byrnes had made any
announcement offering the mandated islands as a trusteeship.
Evidently, the Joint Chiefs of Staff's actions, plus the
results of Sullivan's and Peterson's meeting with Mathews,
had induced the President to recind his earlier authorization.
- On the twenty-first, Forrestal decided to lodge a formal
complaint with the President over Acheson's action. He took
the Under Secretary of War, Kenneth Royall, with him to see
the President. The meeting with the President was described
in Forrestal' s diary as follows:
Royall and I said that we thought it
was a most unwise and precipitate decision
and requested the President to tell Byrnes
not to make any such statement [evidently
Forrestal and Royall did not let the Presi-
dent know that they had heard via Sullivan
81. U. S., Naval Classified Archives Office, Memorandum
to Forrestal, unsigned (undoubtedly from Sullivan), on SWNCC





that the President had already sent cables
to Byrnes recinding the authorization]. He
said that the message had gone today re-
questing Byrnes not to commit this country
to any definitive position; it was not clear
to me, however, whether he meant that Byrnes
was not to make any statement.
I told the President that I think
Acheson's method of securing his approval to
Mr. Byrnes' request was not consistent with
our general ideas of cooperation between War,
State, and Navy, and rather in my opinion was
a desertion of the general idea of coopera-
tion by getting hasty decisions out of him
on behalf of a particular point of view, and
I told him I propose to make such a repre-
sentation to Acheson in very strong terms.
He said he hoped I would,,..
This incident is a reflection of the
rapidly vanishing determination in America
to see to it that we do not repeat the mis-
takes of 1918-19 when the formerly German-
owned islands of the Pacific were turned
over to Japan and Australia
. .
. under a
secret agreement between England and Japan
without American knowledge until after it
was a fait accompli .- It is a case for the
greatest concern to see this tendency develop-
ing so soon in the attitude of the State
Department, 8
3
There is no account of this incident in Truman's, Byrnes',
or Acheson's memoirs. It is almost like the "pot calling the
kettle black" in terms of the Navy's end-run to the President,
in August 1945, to obtain his consent to naval administration
of the Marianas, Another interesting point is Forrestal's last
paragraph. Earlier in the spring of 1945, during the drafting
of the trusteeship system, it had appeared that Forrestal had
reluctantly accepted the idea of strategic trusteeship for the
mandated islands. Now, he expressed his opposition to announc-
ing that the islands would be either an ordinary trusteeship
83. Millis, ed,, The Forrestal Diaries , pp. 130-131.
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or a strategic trusteeship, as opposed to annexrtion, in
order not to "repeat the mistakes of 1918-19."
On January 22, Acheson held a news conference and stated
that in respect to strategic trusteeship agreements, a refusal
of any of the five permanent members of the Security Council
would mean there would be no agreement j and the result would
be to maintain the status quo . These words implied that the
United States had nothing to fear from a failure to reach an
agreement protecting American strategic interests. If the
United States did not like the final draft trusteeship agree-
ment, there would be no obligation to accept it; and the status
quo would be maintained. Furthermore, he pointed out that once
such an agreement had been signed, it could not be changed
without the consent of the United States, thanks to the veto
power. In other words, the only way the United Nations would
get the mandated islands under a trusteeship agreement would
be by accepting terms agreeable to the United States. When a
reporter asked him if the United States did not have to wait
until a peace conference awarded the area to the United States
before decisions could be made on trusteeship, Dean Acheson
replied that he did not think it was necessary and that one
84
could proceed in any order "that the nations think best."
The press reports and public reaction increased in atten-
tion, rather than decreased, after the President's statement
84. U. S. Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 14, No. 344,
(February 3, 1946), pp. 150-151.
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of January 15, 1946. James Reston in The New York Times
reported that the Army and Navy, with the support of many
Senators and Representatives, were still not reconciled to
the trusteeship formula for the mandated islands, even under
85
the strategic formula. An informal poll conducted by The
New York Times among a limited number of Senators and Repre-
sentatives indicated more sentiment for annexation than for
86
"individual trusteeship under the U.N.O."
In February, the news of the Yalta decision (a year
earlier) concerning the granting of Southern Sakhalin and the
Kurile Islands to the Soviet Union was publicly revealed; and
this information only increased the cry for annexation. Sen-
ator Byrd of Virginia stated that it would be "absurd" to con-
sider placing Pacific bases under trusteeship when the Soviet
87
Union was gaining sovereignty over the Kuriles. Former Presi-
dent Hoover spoke out in favor of annexation at the graduation
ceremonies of the School of Naval Administration at Stanford.
Hoover believed that "the holding of these islands is not an
extension of imperialism because we have no designs of eco-
nomic exploitation.... What we are doing is looking after not
only our own defense but we are looking after the defense of
88
the world as a whole."
85. The New York Times , January 17, 1946.
86. Ibid. . January 31, 1946.
87. Richard, Naval Administration of the Trust Territory ,
Vol. 3, p. 16.
88. Ibid. , pp. 16-17.
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In March 1946, a survey of American public opinion by
the National Opinion Research Center of the University of
Denver showed 40 percent of the American people were for out-
right ownership of the islands, 28 percent were for American
operation without ownership, and 25 percent were for the United
States sharing its control with other members of the United
89
Nations.
The press reports and public reaction quoted above support
Stimson's contention (expressed in the spring of 1945 and quoted
above) that the United States could annex the islands without
any major opposition and with considerable approval.
Meanwhile, the subcommittee of the Four Secretaries' Com-
mittee finally held its first meeting. As described above, the
State Department had resisted the calling of this subcommittee
which was supposed to consider the problems involving the civil
administration of American possessed islands in the Pacific.
The relations between the State and Interior Departments were
strained over this question. The circumstances surrounding the
calling of the first meeting and the conduct of the meeting,
itself , demonstrate the strained relations between the State
and Interior Departments.
On January 9, 1946, the President wrote to Acting Secre-
tary of State Acheson expressing the wish that he call a meeting
89. Jane Bedell, "In Trust We Annex," New Republic , Vol.
116, No. 11 (March 17, 1947), p. 31.
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of the Four Secretaries' Committee to start consideration of
the problems arising from the administration of the Pacific
islands. Acheson replied on the sixteenth that an ad hoc
subcommittee had been appointed to consider those problems,
and "I am taking steps to expedite the work of this sub-com-
mittee and as soon as it submits recommendations, and the Secre-
tary of War returns, shall, in accordance with your wishes, call
90
a meeting of the four Secretaries' committee."
Mr. Beecroft, of the Interior Department, learned of these
letters during informal talks in the State Department. He and
his senior, Edwin G. Arnold, therefore, drafted a letter for
Secretary Ickes to send to Acheson requesting a meeting of the
91
subcommittee "at once." Arnold's attached memorandum to
Ickes stated that the letter would
help to expedite the summoning of wthe sub-
committee and would have the additional
advantage of reemphasizing our view that
the character of our actual administrative
plans for the islands will have an impor-
tant value in the development of a trustee-
ship policy, 92
This memorandum was dated January 18, 1946, at the height
of the confusion emanating from the American Delegation in
London. Secretary Ickes signed the letter on January 22; and
90, The Harry S. Truman Library, Acting Secretary of
State Acheson to President, January 16, 1946, Official files
85-L.
91, U. S. National Archives, U. S. Department of the
Interior, Office of Territories, Ickes to Acheson, January 22,
1946, RG 48, 9-0-7 Islands Gen. Pt. 2.
92, U. S. National Archives, U. S. Department of the
Interior, Office of Territories, Arnold to Ickes, January 18,
1946, RG 48, 9-0-7 Islands Gen. Pt, 2.
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a meeting of the subcommittee was- subsequently called for
January 30, 1946, at the State Department.
Present at the meeting were the following
i
Mr. Fred Searls, State Department, Chairman
Brigadier General G. A. Lincoln, War Department
Colonel Reynolds, War Department
Mr. E. G. Arnold, Interior Department
Mr. Beecroft, Interior Department
Captain L. S. Sab in, Navy Department
The meeting got off to a difficult start when Mr. Searls
opened it by stating, "in view of the Department of Interior's
desire to be 'Cannibal Governor of the Cannibal Island*, it
seemed appropriate for the representative of the Interior
93
Department to state the position of that Department. M
Mr. Arnold stated that Interior felt it should have the
responsibility for the civil administration of dependent peoples.
He presented a rough plan for civil administration of the Pacific
islands for the consideration of the subcommittee. The State,
War, and Navy representatives gave Mr. Arnold an extremely diffi-
cult time. Mr. Searls basically repeated Byrnes' feelings about
waiting until the disposition of the islands had been settled.
Captain Sabin supported him and also stated the reasons why the
War and Navy Departments were interested in retaining responsi-
bility for civil administration in the island areas during the
postwar period. General Lincoln, with Captain Sabin' s concur-
rence, did state that Interior had a strong argument for ad-
ministering the highly populated Ryukyus "as opposed to the
94
island areas of the Central Pacific."
93. U. S. f Naval Classified Archives Office, Memorandum
from Captain Sabin to Mr. Sullivan, January 30, 1946, SWNCC




The meeting ended with Mr. Searls stating that the Chair
would entertain a motion to the effect that Interior would sub-
mit its plan formally to the subcommittee for transmission to
the Committee of the Four Secretaries, but "the Subcommittee
would recommend that no action be taken on it until such time
as a final settlement on the international level were made as
to the status of the islands. The motion was made and sec-
onded. It was carried, with one dissenting vote on the part
of the Department of Interior. The representative of the
Department of Interior stated that he could not agree to a
95
recommendation that nothing be done about it at this time, M
Interior went ahead and "polished up M its proposal and
submitted it on February 20, 1946. It called for the Depart-
ment of the Interior to be immediately designated as the admin-
istrative agency for "all Pacific islands under the control of
the armed services, with the exception of islands or parts of
96
islands which may be designated as military reservations."
It also recommended that, in the interest of economical and
effective administration, the Micronesian area, including Guam,




96. U. S. National Archives, U. S. Department of the
Interior, Office of Territories, Department of the Interior
proposal, February 20, 1946, RG 48, Office file of Oscar
Chapman - Division of Territories. See: Appendix N for a




This proposal was considered by the Secretaries of State,
War, and Navy on February 28, 1946. These three Secretaries
unanimously decided to recommend to the President that "no
action should be taken . . . until such time as the status and
98
title of the Pacific islands concerned should be determined."
This recommendation was transmitted to the President on March 6,
1946, without any notification of the Interior Department. The
Secretaries of State, War, and Navy did, however, forward the
Interior Department's proposal of February 20, 1946, to the
President but without their endorsement of that proposal.
The Interior Department was not informed of this action
by the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy until June 8, 1946,
The Committee of the Four Secretaries never did meet to con-
sider this Interior proposal. "
Another reason for the lack of action, beside those stated
by the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy above, is suggested
by the transcript of a telephone conversation that occurred
more than a year later. On May 16, 1947, Secretary of the
Interior J. A. "Cap" Krug, who had since replaced Ickes, met
with Secretary of State Marshall, Secretary of the Navy For-
restal, and Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson. This was
actually the first meeting of the Four Secretaries* Committee,
and it will be described in detail in its proper sequence.
After that meeting, Krug telephoned his assistant, Girard
Davidson, and commented on the reason that Patterson gave
98. U. S. National Archives, Department of the Interior,
Office of Territories, Background Information Memorandum, May 1,
1947, signed by Roy E. James, RG 48, 9-0-7, Islands Gen. Pt. 1.
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for the long delay in calling the first meeting of the Four
Secretaries* Committee as follows
t
he [Patterson] said when President named
this four-man committee, Byrnes decided
it was useless to sit down with Ickes.
He said something to the effect that he
wouldn't sit down with him and that was
the end of it. Then directed Fred Searles
[sic] to get hold of Abe Fortas and work
thing out and Patterson says that was done,
but so far as I know, nothing was done, 99
About April 3, 1946, the new Secretary of the Interior,
J. A. "Cap" Krug, met with Secretary of State Byrnes for a
100
general discussion of this matter. On May 31, 1946, Eric
Beecroft tried once again. He drafted a letter for the Secre-
tary of the Interior to sign which was addressed to Secretary
Byrnes, Krug signed this letter which reviewed the situation
and asked for a meeting of the- four Secretaries. He concluded:
I am aware that the belief is held in
some quarters that a transfer to civil
administration now will be regarded as
an intention to take and hold the islands
permanently. However, I am of the opinion
— -
~ that an early announced decision to deal
with native affairs through a strictly
civilian administration would go far to
strengthen the hands of the United States
Government in international discussions.
In the absence of such a decision, there
appears to be a wide-spread belief, both
at home and abroad, that our military
interest in the Pacific outweighs our con-
cern for the civil rights and the economic
welfare of the island inhabitants, 10
1
99, Library of Congress, Transcript of telephone call
from J. A. Krug to Girard Davidson, May 16, 1947, Krug papers.
100. U. S. National Archives, U. S. Department of the
Interior, Office of Territories, Memorandum from Arnold to the
Secretary, April 3, 1946, RG 48 file, 9-0-7 Islands Gen. Pt. 2.




This is an interesting line of reasoning in terms of
turning the argument of timing for the introduction of civil
administration around to counter the State Department's posi-
tion. Additionally, it is unusual to find the Secretary of
the Interior advising the Secretary of State on foreign affairs.
Attached to Interior's copy of this letter is a typed note,
undated and initialed by "JAS" which indicated Interior's atti-
tude toward the explanation for this delay
»
The failure of State to move ahead on
the President's directive of October 20, even
by May 31 (seven months later) would seem
close in [sic") insubordination. There may
be several explanations for this failure to
act or at least to get a new directive.
Byrnes was an independent operator, never
really part of the State machinery, abroad
most of the time at peace negotiations. In-
deed, he was later fired by HST for becoming
too independent! Mr-, SearIs was a lone wolf
within State, representing Byrnes but out-
side channels. It was probably he who
blocked action, from lack of interest, hos-
tility toward Interior, or even on orders
from Byrnes? 102
- Secretary Byrnes replied to Krug's letter of May 31, on
the eighth of June. In this reply, he enclosed a copy of the
letter that the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy had sent
to the President on March 6, 1946, which had recommended "that
no action should be taken on this matter at this time for the
103
reasons stated in Mr. Searls' report."
This was the first time that Interior had been informed
102. Ibid. t attached note,
103. U. S. National Archives, U. S. Department of the
Interior, draft letter from Krug to President, attached to memo-
randum dated June 19 and 20, 1946, from Beecroft to Arnold and
Chapman, RG 48, Office files of Oscar Chapman, Territories,
Declassified October 21, 1969.
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of the action taken earlier by the Secretaries cf State, War,
and Navy. Mr. Beecroft, now officially head of a new Pacific
Branch in the Division of Territories, was extremely disturbed
and wrote memorandums to his Director, Mr. Arnold, and to the
Under Secretary, Mr. Chapman, on June 19 and 20, respectively.
These memorandums reviewed the situation and suggested that
Interior take the initiative in the matter. He enclosed a
draft letter for Secretary Krug's signature addressed to the
President. This draft referred to Byrnes* reply and the lack
of knowledge by Interior of the action taken by the Secretaries
of State, War, and Navy. Mr. Beecroft let his frustration
release itself on the third paragraph:
I [Krug] cannot let this action by
Secretary Byrnes go unchallenged. The deci-
sion of February 28 'which he transmitted to
you was, in effect, a decision to advise you
that the Interior Department's participation
In discussion of Pacific Island administra-
tion would be inappropriate. It was a deci-
sion to ask you to nullify an explicit order
which you had issued on October 20 last.
Its significance as a defiance of your order
is apparent from the failure of the Secre-
tary of State to summon the Secretary of the
Interior to meet with the other three Cabi-
net members i from his failure to notify this
Department that only three of the Secretaries
had met and had decided to advise you that
the full Committee should not act on this
vital matter; and from the repeated actions
of Mr. Searls, verbally and in correspon-
dence for the past eight months, to block
the inter-agency discussion which your dir-
ective explicitly required. 104
The draft letter ended by requesting the President to reconfirm




recommendation looking toward the establishment of civil goven-
ment at the earliest feasible date in those Pacific Islands
105
which are under United States administration." A memoran-
dum was enclosed for the President's signature to accomplish
this recommendation by Interior.
This draft letter for the Secretary's signature was cleared
by Director Arnold, but it went to Krug with the following at-
tached hand-written memorandum initialed "R.E.D.", which brought
calmer minds to bean
I feel sure that you will not want to
sign this letter in its present form.
You were not Secretary of the Interior
at the time the Secretaries of State, War
and Navy met without benefit of presence of
the Secretary of the Interior, nor when
Secretary Byrnes wrote to the President.
Therefore, without hurling criticism
in a letter which despite its "Secret" classi-
fication will sooner or later be quoted pub-
licly, I think you could appropriately and
effectively ask the President to review the
situation -- possibly in personal conversa-
tion with him, and then write a suitable
letter for the record, 106
Secretary Krug decided not to send any letter at all, with
the terse comment, "I do not consider this the proper time for
107
pushing civilian control of the Pacific islands!" His reasons
for this feeling are not recorded. He was. later to indicate
that he was not that opposed to naval administration. This
viewpoint of his will be mentioned in more detail in the next
chapter. For whatever reasons, the Interior Department under
105. Ibid.
106. Ibid. , attached memorandum, dated June 24, 1946.
107. Ibid. . attached note by Secretary Krug.
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Secretary Krug ceased agitating for the administration until
May of 1947, after the decision had been made to submit the
former mandated islands to a strategic trusteeship.
Public opposition to the annexationists was minor but
vocal during the summer and fall of 1946. Secretary Ickes and
Secretary Forres tal had always had bitter words whenever the
subject of trusteeship or naval administration was raised.
When Secretary Ickes left office in March 1946, he took his
views to the public forum. On May 29, 1946, he delivered a
speech entitled, "Meet the Navy M before a joint meeting of
the Institute of Ethnic Affairs and the Institute of Pacific
Relations. He severely criticized the government for not
having prepared a trusteeship agreement for the former man-
dated islands. Blasting the Navy for desiring a strategic
trusteeship (which, actually, it did not want) in order that
it could keep its administration of dependent peoples "top
secret, H he saidi
It is time that the State Department
ceased to be beguiled by the pleasant tinkle
of brass and the luster of gold braid, for
it is the Navy which has largely been res-
ponsible for our moral failure to date as
to our dependencies.,.. Naval absolutism
sneers at every Constitutional guarantee . .
.
The Navy is arbitrary, dictatorial and ut-
terly disregardful of civilian rights . .
.
The Navy is bent upon ruling these
island peoples and it is determined that
they shall not have those rights which the
Charter of the United Nations guarantees;
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that they shall not have self-government
or democracy or racial equality. ... 10f
He repeated the same sentiments in his journalistic column
109
on June 14, 1946.
The Institute of Ethnic Affairs, under the leadership of
John Collier (Commissioner of Indian Affairs, 1933-1945; Editor
of the Guam Echo
,
published in Washington) contended that mili-
tary security and trusteeship under the General Assembly were
corapatable, and the United States should place the islands
under a General Assembly trusteeship just because they "lie
in a strategic zone where defensive and offensive interests of
three powers overlap - China, the Soviet Union and the United
110
States." The Institute also declared that:
When the military makes foreign policy,
foreign policy makes, toward war.
All Americans know that the Army and
Navy exercise a pressure power very strong
and also dangerous to lasting peace.
But apparently, few Americans - few
editors, for example - are aware that the
military control over our nation's foreign
policy goes entirely beyond mere influence,
mere pressure.
The Army and Navy control over foreign
policy exists as a formalized, technically
and procedurally implemented arrangement,...
[which^] is known in Washington as SWNCC -
the State, War and Navy Co-ordinating Com-
mittee through which foreign policies of
even the remotest military interest must be
cleared. That committee operates under an
108. Richard, Naval Administration of the Trust Terri-
tory , Vol. 3, p. 19.
109. U. S. National Archives, U. S. Department of the
Interior, memorandum from Beecroft to Arnold, June 1946, De-
classified October 21, 1969, Office files of Oscar Chapman,
Territories.
110. News Letter of the Institute of Ethnic Affairs,
Inc.
. Vol. 1, No. 5 (November 1946;, p. 3.
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unanimity role, so that not merely Army and
Navy acting together, but Army and Navy act-
ing separately, are empowered to veto any
proposal made by State.,,. The State Depart-
ment technicians, adequate in numbers and
often in technical knowledge, and inter-
nationally experienced, confront the mili-
tary snap- judgment and prejudice; and again
and again, to procure action at all, they
find themselves accepting compromises or
worse, to the grave and cumulative injury of
the United States and of the peace hopes. HI
Collier, Ickes, and former Vice President Wallace main-
tained a running public attack throughout 1946 on the military.
In general, and on the naval administration of the islands and
112
the need for overseas bases, in particular, Forrestal took
no public notice of these attacks even when The New York Times
and the Washington Daily News both urged, in their June 18,
1946, issues, the development of a "colonial" policy, in light
of the acquisition of the Japanese mandated islands and the
113
obligations under the Charter of the United Nations.
In late August 1946, Secretary Krug announced publicly in
informal remarks that the Four Secretaries* Committee had never
met, and that he feltj
that the proposal of the State, War and
Navy Departments to defer a decision upon
the form of Administration of the Pacific
Islands formerly under Japanese mandate
until the international status of those
islands had been clarified was a reasonable
111. Ibid.
, pp. 6-7.
112. These took the form of letters to editors of papers
and public speeches. It is interesting to note that in 1945
and 1946, Ickes had "strongly opposed" the early granting of
independence to the Philippines by taking a "vigorous stand"
and showing violent opposition" to the idea, Seei Harry S.
Truman, Memoirs , Vol. 1, p. 275.
113. The New York Times , June 18, 1946, and the Washing-
ton Daily News , June 18, 1946.
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recommendation in the light of present
circumstances . H4
This comment was the subject of an August 30, 1946,
editorial in the Honolulu Star Bulletin . Unfortunately, the
editorial was also based on a speculative story from another
sourcei and the result was an erroneous representation of
115
Secretary Krug's attitude. This same misrepresentation
was picked up by The New York Times in its editorial of Sep-
tember 2, 1946. The Times stated, based on the Honolulu Star
Bulletin editorial, that there was an "indefinite" postpone-
ment of any decision concerning the Pacific islands which
America possessed; and that unless Congress should make the
Executive branch change its mind, the islands would remain
116
indefinitely under military rule.
Secretary Krug sent a letter to the Honolulu Star Bulle-
tin on September 9 protesting its editorial. Within the Navy
Department, Captain R. L, Dennison drafted a defense of naval
administration of the Pacific islands for Forrestal to send to
The New York Times
. In this draft reply to the Times editorial,
Captain Dennison intentionally avoided raising the question of
"sovereignty" versus "trusteeship" and any comment about the
117
work, or lack of it, of the Four Secretaries' Committee.
As an exception to his policy of not answering the public
114. Library of Congress, Krug to Editor, Honolulu Star
Bulletin
. September 9, 1946, Krug papers.
115. Ibid.
116. The New York Times , September 2, 1946.
117. U. S., Naval Classified Archives Office, Memorandum
from Dennison to Forrestal, September 7, 1946, OP- 35 files.
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attacks on naval administration, Forrestal decided to send
this reply to The New York Times , and it was pul lished in the
paper on September 24, 1946,
I
To further offset the bad publicity, the Navy arranged for
ten newspapermen to tour the various islands in the Pacific that
were under naval administration, including the former mandated
islands. Their reports were consistently favorable to the
118
Navy's position and record in administering the islands.
The Pentagon (the V7ar and Navy Departments, plus the Joint
Chiefs of Staff) was not only fighting Interior over which De-
partment should govern the former mandated islands but was also
embroiled in the question of whether or not these islands would
be annexed or placed under strategic trusteeship. At the first
meeting of the First Session of the United Nations at London
in January and February 1946, the question of dependent areas
had been deferred. However, the second meeting of the First
Session of the General Assembly was scheduled to convene in
New York on October 23, 1946. The State Department desired to
have an agreed policy concerning the former Japanese mandated
islands prior to that meeting. All concerned wished to avoid
the debacle that had occurred in January over Byrnes' request
from London.
Little work was done on the problem until August 1946,
118. The Baltimore Sun . January 11, 1947; The Christian
Science Monitor , December 2 and 4, 1946 j The Washington Pos t,
December 1, 1946; The New York Times Magazine . May 19, 1947.
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In the meantime, the Pentagon took an interest in the trustee-
ship agreements that were submitted by other nat ions (United
Kingdom for Togoland, British Cameroons and Tanganyika; Belgium
for Ruanda-Urundi) in March 1946. In respect to these trustee-
ship agreements, the question arose whether the United States
should assert that it was a "state directly concerned." Secre-
tary Forrestal wrote to Secretary of State Byrnes that he had
no objection to the substance of these trusteeship agreements,
but he believed the United States should not assert that it
was a "state directly concerned" when the agreements were pre-
sented to the United Nations General Assembly for consideration.
He gave the following reasons for this recommendationi
I believe that the United States has no
real interest in these territories other
than a general concern for the welfare of
their inhabitants.
I further believe that any assertions
by the United States of direct concern in
these territories might well serve as a
precedent for other nations voicing their
direct concern with respect to trusteeship
—
-- for Pacific islands in which we have a
definite strategic interest. In as much
as it is the view of the Navy Department
that the number of states directly con-
cerned in Pacific islands trusteeships
should be kept to a minimum, I am strongly
of the opinion that it would be most un-
wise for the United States to assert that
it is directly concerned in connection
with these four African territories. H9
Forrestal was thinking ahead in case the former Japanese
mandated islands or any of the other islands taken from Japan
became trusteeships. Additionally, Australia was known to be
119. U. S., Naval Classified Archives Office, Forrestal
to Byrnes, April 4, 1946, Declassified June 2U, 1969, Secre-
tary of the Navy files, (SC) A14-7/EF.
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intending to place the former mandate of North-east New Guinea
under trusteeship. The strategically important island-base of
Manus was located within that territory.
Within SWNCC, various studies were conducted on the impli-
cations of various interpretations of the articles in the
Charter of the United Nations pertaining to trusteeships. For
example, the question of "states directly concerned" was ex-
plored. On May 7, 1946, Captain Dennison wrote a memorandum
commenting on a SWNCC paper concerning strategic trusteeships.
He criticized the paper for placing too much importance on
the mere designation of strategic areas. He concluded, "the
protection of U.S. interests should be sought by suitable
terms in the trusteeship agreement. There is no automatic
120
protection in applying the designation of strategic areas."
Thus, an awareness developed that the decision would not
be merely whether to place the former Japanese mandated islands
under a strategic trusteeship. It would be necessary to develop
a definite strategic trusteeship plan for the mandated islands
in order to see whether American security interests could, in
fact, be protected under a strategic trusteeship.
Even with this consensus developing, the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, evidently still felt that American security might be
impaired under a strategic trusteeship plan for the former
Japanese mandated islands. Accordingly, on June 28, 1946,
they reviewed the situation and "reached a conclusion that
120. U. S., Naval Classified Archives Office, Memorandum
from R. L. Dennison to Captain Colin Campbell, May 7, 1946,
Declassified 1970, SWNCC 38 files.
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the United States sovereignty over the Japanese Mandated Islands
is, from the military point of view, necessary to the national
defense, and decided to report that conclusion to the Secretary
121
of State and the President."
The issue of what to do with the mandated islands continued
to be discussed throughout the summer and fall of 1946 within
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Three (State, War, Navy) Secre-
tarial meetings, and SWNCC in an attempt to reach a consensus
prior to the United Nations General Assembly meeting in late
October. The Interior Department was not included in these
discussions.
Finally, at the SWNCC meeting on August 20, 1946, it was
agreed to appoint an ad hoc subcommittee to "prepare as a matter
of priority and for exploratory purposes, separate types of
trusteeship agreements to cover territories formerly mandated
122
to Japan and pre-war Japanese territory." It was within
this ad hoc subcommittee of SWNCC that substantive work was
done in close liaison with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the
Navy's OP-35 Division (under Captain Dennison) on the develop-
ment of a draft strategic trusteeship agreement that might be
acceptable to all parties.
In order to get the Joint Chiefs of Staff to agree to the
121. Library of Congress, Leahy papers (diary), Vol. 12,
June 28, 1946, p. 66.
122, U. S., Naval Classified Archives Office, memorandum
SWN-5660, August 20, 1946, Declassified 1970, SWNCC 59 file.
The designated members of this ad hoc subcommittee were: Dr.
Hugh Borton, Department of State, Steering Member ; Mr. Dean
Pvusk, Department of State; Mr. E. A. Gross, Department of State;
Brig. Gen. Cortlandt VanR. Schuyler, War Department; Col. Sidney




development of a draft trusteeship agreement for the former
Japanese mandated islands, several conditions h<- d to be met.
The development of any draft trusteeship agreement was to be
without prejudice to the Joint Chiefs of Staff's stated posi-
tion that only traditional sovereignty could safeguard for
all time the rights of the United States in the islands. It
was also to be without prejudice to the ultimate decision on
what to do with the islands. On these conditions, the Joint
Chiefs then agreed that discussions leading toward a draft
strategic trusteeship could commence.
Also, on these conditions, the Joint Chiefs stated that
a strategic trusteeship agreement would be the next best thing
to annexation and would probably prevent any future compromise
of American security if it contained the following points*
(1) the entire trusteeship to be designated a strategic
area;
(2) the United States to be sole administering authority;
(3) no limitation to be placed upon the utilization of
all or any part of the area for United States secur-
ity purposes;
(4) the right of the United States to exclude any areas
utilized for military purposes from inspection or
report to the United Nations or any of its agencies. 12 ^
Of course, a strategic trusteeship, by mere designation
alone, would come under the Security Council where the veto
power would ensure that any agreement followed the proposed
draft and, once made, could not be changed without United
States' consent.
123. Richard, Naval Administration of the Trust Territory ,
Vol. 3, p. 18.
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With the above points in mind, the SWNCC ad hoc sub-
committee set to work. The Army took little part in the work
since it felt that the Navy sufficiently upheld the Army's
124
interests. By October, a draft trusteeship agreement had
been developed containing the above four points and was refer-
red to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for comment. They repeated
their position but conceded that if other considerations than
military had priority, then the proposed agreement was con-
125
sidered adequate to safeguard American security.
On October 22, 1946, the day before the convening of the
United Nations General Assembly, the SWNCC Secretariat proposed
to forward this reply to the ad hoc committee "for preparation
of a statement of the diverse views of the three departments
and the JCS for transmission to the President for final reso-
126
lution by him."
However, on this very same day, President Truman at the
request of the Secretary of State (Byrnes) called a conference
of the State, War and Navy Secretaries to decide whether or
not to place the former Japanese mandated islands under a
United Nations strategic trusteeship. The Secretary of State
did not want to delay matters any longer and evidently believed
that the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy plus the Joint
124. Admiral Robert L. Dennison, U.S.N. (Ret.), Interview
with the author, September 4, 1969.
125. Millis, ed., The Forrestal Diaries , p. 213.
126. U. S., Naval Classified Archives Office, Memorandum
from Captain Dennison to Under Secretary of the Navy, October 22,
1946, Declassified 1970, SWNCC 59/6 file.
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Chiefs of Staff could make their views known to the President
orally.
Admiral Nimitz was also present at this conference, as
was Admiral Leahy, the Chief of Staff to the Commander-in-
Chief and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Admiral
Nimitz, now Chief of Naval Operations, still argued the Joint
Chiefs of Staff's consistent policy at this meeting with the
President. According to Forrestal's diary entry, Admiral Nimitz
stated that, "sovereignty of the ex-Japanese mandates should be
taken by the U.S., that the ultimate security of the U.S.
depends in major part on our ability to control the Pacific
Ocean, that these islands are part of the complex essential
to that control, and that the concept of trusteeship is in-
applicable here because these islands do not represent any
colonial problem nor is there economic advantage accruing to
127
the U.S. through their ownership."
Secretary of State Byrnes later wrote in his book his
account of the conference as follows t
The State and War departments felt
that, since Japan had received these islands
under a mandate from the League of Nations,
our rights were not superior to those dele-
gated by the League and that therefore, if
possible, the United Nations should declare
them a strategic area to be administered by
us under a United Nations trusteeship agree-
ment. We pointed out that at San Francisco
the United States delegation, by direction
of President Roosevelt, had been a strong
advocate of the trusteeship system. We
argued that we could not properly adopt a
policy that would show a lack of confidence
in the system we had urged upon the United
Nations. Japan had violated her mandate
127. Millis, ed., The Forrestal Diaries , p. 214.
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and therefore we could seek a decision
from the United Nations on these mandc ted
islands, while those islands that belc nged
to the Japanese, such as the Ryukyus,
would have to await disposition by the
peace conference. 128
It would be surprising if the Secretary of War, Robert P,
Patterson, supported this view. The War Department had con-
sistently backed the Navy in the long struggle for American
absolute control over the islands. Byrnes* comment refers to
the "War Department" and not to Secretary Patterson personally.
Yet, Secretary Patterson was the only representative of the War
Department present at this meeting. Unfortunately, there has
not yet been located any account by Mr, Patterson or the War
Department of this conference or any other evidence to support
or refute Byrnes* statement.
President Truman's memoirs are slightly confusing on this,
perhaps because he does not directly mention this particular
conference. He states:
In earlier meetings with Cabinet members on
the question of trusteeships, I found that
the State Department held views that differed
from those of the War and Navy Departments,
I listened carefully to both points of view.
In the end I sustained the Army and Navy
chiefs on the major issue of the security of
the bases. But I also saw the validity of
the ideal for which the State Department was
contending - that the United Nations should
not be barred from the local territories
beyond the bases, if at any time the United
Nations should want to look into social and
economic conditions on these islands. The
United States would never emulate the policy
of Japan in the areas that were given her
under mandate by the League of Nations, We
thus assured full protection to our nation




against a future Pacific aggressor and, at
the same time, laid the foundation for future
self-government of the island people.... I
had always been opposed to colonialism. What-
ever justification may be cited at any stage,
colonialism in any form is hateful to Ameri-
cans. America fought her own war of libera-
tion against colonialism, and we shall always
regard with sympathy and understanding the
desire of people everywhere to be free of
colonial bondage..,. I still believed in
Woodrow Wilson's philosophy of "self-deter-
mination. *129
None of the other recorders of the discussion mention
President Truman's talking about not barring the United Nations
from local territories beyond the bases. The trusteeship agree-
ment, as finally concluded, gave the United States the right
to close any area for security reasons. This had been one of
the four points stressed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Perhaps
the President was talking of an earlier conference on this
matter or of Okinawa or was giving oral instructions to the
military not to close off any area more than necessary while
still obtaining the right to do so in the agreement with the
United Nations.
Mr. Truman wrote his memoirs after leaving office and
may have overlooked the terms of the final trusteeship agree-
ment in the writing of his memoirs. This could explain the
slight inconsistency, Mr. Truman was M a devoted admirer of
both Wilson and Roosevelt, a staunch anti-colonialist, and
130
probably not a great admirer of the military." During
the first years of his Presidency, he stressed the United
129. Truman, Memoirs , Vol. 1, pp. 274-275.
130, Mr. James F. Green, Interview and letter to the
author, September 8, 1970.
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Nations and the high principles of de-colonialism and self-
determination. He was also inclined to follow the policies
and commitments made by President Roosevelt because of his
lack of experience and the overwhelming, often hectic, events
requiring decisions and action during his initial years in
office.
This October 22, 1946, conference occurred just prior to
the 1946 elections, at the same time as the controversy over
the meat-ration controls, and under the pressure of preparing
for the United Nations General Assembly meeting. Additionally,
President Truman was deeply involved in the military unifica-
tion struggle with Forrestal and the Navy bucking him and the
other services over some of the points of the unification plan.
Also, American relations with -the Soviet Union were rapidly
deteriorating. To his credit, President Truman made a firm
decision on whether to annex the former mandated islands or
place them under the trusteeship system. This contrasted
Roosevelt's lack of any clear-cut command decision on this
question.
In August of 1945 and January of 1946, President Truman
had made hasty decisions relating to this subject prior to
hearing all sides of the issue. This time all sides, except
for the fact that Interior played no part in the drafting of
the trusteeship agreement or the Presidential conference,
were heard; and a binding decision was made.
President Truman's firm decision was to submit the islands
to the United Nations as a strategic trusteeship with the
United States as sole administrator under the terms of the
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agreement drafted by the SWNCC subcommittee,
Secretary Forrestal, by the time of this cciference, had
accepted the idea of a strategic trusteeship. At the confer-
ence, his main concern was that the State Department negotiators
might compromise and accept an arrangement that would jeopard-
ize the security of the United States, Secretary Byrnes assured
him that no changes in the draft agreement would be accepted
without the approval of the President or the Secretary of State,
131
Forrestal then stated that he was satisfied,
Forrestal was also reassured by Byrnes on his fear that a
subordinate of Byrnes or a delegate to the United Nations might
leak an opinion to the press to the effect that "the intransi-
gence of the military was blocking the good intentions of the
132
State Department," Forrestal was very sensitive to the
public opinion trend toward disarmament and the belief in the
133
thesis that the military was running American foreign policy.
Admiral Leahy was very dissatisfied with the Presidential
decision. In his unpublished diaries (on restricted access at
the Library of Congress), one finds his reaction to the deci-
sion and his belief in the underlying reason for it as follows:
decision was made to accept a United States
trusteeship over these islands on terms ac-
ceptable to the United States, In view of
public announcements previously made by Presi-
dents Roosevelt and Truman, it did not appear
possible to take any other action . I cannot
escape a fear that sometime in the distant
131. Byrnes, Speaking Frankly
, pp. 219-220 and Millis,
ed,, The Forrestal Diaries
, pp. 213, 215, and 216.




future this decision will permit possible
enemies to obtain positions in the Pacific
that will require great expenditures of life
and treasure to retake, 134 [Emphasis added]
Admiral Leahy believed that the previous sweeping state-
ments of national policy (Atlantic Charter, United Nations Dec-
laration, and Cairo Declaration, among others, which were enun-
ciated primarily for war-time propaganda purposes; had backed
the American government M into a corner" at the time of a cru-
cial decision. One will never know exactly the main reason
for the Presidential decision to submit the former Japanese
mandated islands to a strategic trusteeship- -whether it was
President Truman's anti-colonialist sentiments, Secretary
Byrnes* legal and foreign prestige viewpoints, or Admiral
Leahy's belief that, because of previous statements, no other
option was open. The decision, in all probability, rested on
a blend of all of these forces.
Unfortunately, Admiral Nimitz f papers are not yet openj
but the general feeling of Admiral Leahy and Admiral Nimitz
was probably described by Benjamin Gerig, one of the State
Department's strong trusteeship advocates, when he talked
with John D. Hickerson about "a meeting with the Admirals
[not named!.... The Admirals were over- ruled. They left
135
with their tails between their legs."
The President made the unequivocal public announcement
on November 6, 1946, that the United States was prepared to
134. Library of Congress, Leahy papers (diary), Vol. 12,
October 22, 1946, p. 86.
135, Ambassador John D. Hickerson, Interview with the




place under trusteeship the former Japanese mandated islands.
Concurrently, the United States Government made public
137
the draft trusteeship agreement. It also circulated the
draft agreement for information to the other members of the
Security Council (Australia, Brazil, China, Egypt, France,
Mexico, the Netherlands, Poland, the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics, and the United Kingdom) and to New Zealand and the
Philippines. This transmission was to fulfill the requirements
of Article 79 of the Charter (states directly concerned) by
obtaining the agreement of "all members of the United Nations
which, in the view of the Government of the United States,
138
may have special interest in these islands ..."
Press reaction was, on the whole, favorable; with the
usual small number of vocal dissenters. For example, The New
York Times criticized the plan as constituting virtual annexa-
139
tion.
To wrap things up, the State Department member of the
SWNCC ad hoc subcommittee proposed about December 3, 1946, that
no further action be taken with respect to the various papers
produced by the subcommittee "since events have overtaken the
136. U. S. Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 15 (Novem-
ber 17, 1946), p. 889.
137. Ibid. This was the draft produced by SWNCC. See:
Appendix for a copy of this draft trusteeship agreement.
138. U. S. Department of State, Draft Trusteeship Agree-
ment for the Japanese Mandated Islands, Publication 2784, Far
Eastern Series 20 (Washington! U. S. Government Printing Office,
1947), Statement by U. S. Representative on Security Council,
February 26, 1947.
139. The New York Times . November 10, 1946. See also
»
Jane Bedell, "In Trust We Annex," New Republic , Vol. 116, No.




problem set forth." The War Department member concurred
but noted that the question "of which former Japanese Islands,
other than the Japanese Mandates, are to be proposed as trustee-
141
ships has not been resolved,"
The ad hoc subcommittee had, indeed, been appointed to
prepare draft trusteeships for all of the ex-Japanese islands,
not just for the former Japanese mandated islands. However,
the question of the Ryukyus and the Bonin-Volcanoes was allowed
to drop pending the peace treaty with Japan.
Thus, 1946 ended with two of the three phases of this
issue (the postwar disposition of the former Japanese mandated
islands) settled. The phase dealing with the drafting of the
trusteeship system had ended in June 1945 with its inclusion
in the United Nations Charter.- The phase dealing with the
decision whether to annex the islands or to submit them for
trusteeship had ended on October 22, 1946, in favor of a stra-
tegic trusteeship with terms acceptable to the United States.
The third phase- -which governmental department would admin-
ister the islands--had narrowed down to a choice between the Navy
and Interior Departments. At the end of 1946, this controversy
was quiescent because of the State Department's delaying tactics
and Secretary of the Interior Krug's agreeing with State that
the status of the islands should be settled before deciding which
department would have the civil administration responsibility.
140. U. S., Naval Classified Archives Office, Memorandum
from Captain Dennison to the Under Secretary of the Navy, Decem-




Let arras yield to the toga; let the military
yield to the civil power.
Cedant arma togae (Motto of Wyoming)
Cicero: Orationes
Philippicae, c, 60 B.C.
In all cases the military should be under
strict subordination to and governed by the
civil power.
Virginia Declaration of
Rights June 12, 1776
Policy is the intelligent faculty, war only
the instrument, not the reverse. The sub-
ordination of the military view to the poli-




I cannot too entirely repudiate any casual
word of mine, reflecting the tone which was
once so traditional in the Navy . . . that
"political questions belong rather to the
statesman than to the military man," I
find these words in my old lectures, but





ACCEPTANCE OF THE TRUSTEESHIP AGREEMENT
AND TRANSFER OF ADMINISTRATION FROM
NAVY TO INTERIOR
On February 17, 1947, Warren R. Austin, United States
Representative on the Security Council, forwarded the draft
trusteeship agreement to Secretary General Trygve Lie request-
ing that "this matter be placed on the agenda of the Security
1
Council at an early date." None of the governments to which
the draft had been submitted earlier had voiced any major ex-
ceptions to either the United States request for appointment
as sole administering authority of the islands or to the draft
agreement. No other member of the United Nations asserted
2
any claim for trusteeship of the islands.
The other member nations of the United Nations also
realized the political fact of life that if the draft agree-
ment should be amended in a way unacceptable to the United
States, then the United States could merely veto the agree-
ment and continue occupying the islands under the status quo
.
In fact, this point had been implied by Dean Acheson in his
January 22, 1946, press conference when he had stated that if
any of the five permanent members of the Security Council
should refuse a strategic trusteeship agreement, the result
1. United Nations, Security Council, Document S/281,
February 17, 1947.
2. U. S. Department of State, Draft Trusteeship Agree-
ment for the Japanese Mandated Islands , Publication 2784, Far
Eastern Series 20 (.Washington! u » s » Government Printing Office,
1947) Statement by U. S. Representative on Security Council,




would be to maintain the status quo
.
This point evidently was also made by John Foster Dulles
and, indirectly, made by Representative Mike Mansfield of Mon-
tana. On the House floor February 3, 1947, Representative
Mansfield commented on an investigative trip he had made to
the Pacific Islands as a member of the House Foreign Affairs
Committee with a subcommittee of the House Naval Affairs Com-
mittee. At the conclusion of his comments, he inserted into
the Congressional Record the results of an investigation deal-
ing with the present and future status of trusteeship for the
former mandated islands. This investigative report mentioned
Dean Acheson's January 22, 1946, statement. It also stated
(based on a report in the Christian Science Monitor of Novem-
ber 8, 1946) that John Foster Dulles had "pointed out to the
Trusteeship Committee of the [United Nations] General Assembly
on November 7, 1946, if a trusteeship agreement is rejected by
the United Nations, the dependent territory still continues
under the present controlling power. This would mean that
the Pacific islands would still be under direct United States
control, even if the Security Council rejected the American
3
draft plan. 11
The authorship of this investigative report is not indi-
cated. Probably the report was written either by a member of
the House Foreign Affairs Committee or the subcommittee of the
3. U. S. Congressional Record , House, Statement by Repre-
sentative Mike Mansfield, February 3, 1947, 80th Cong., 1 sess.,
February 3, 1947, pp. 807-811.
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House Naval Affairs Committee or by someone on Representative
Mansfield's staff. The important fact is that the report was
inserted into the Congressional Record by Representative Mans-
field just prior to the formal submission of the draft trustee-
ship agreement to the United Nations by the United States.
Dean Acheson's press statement, John Foster Dulles*
reported comment at the United Nations, and Mike Mansfield's
indirect endorsement of the investigative report were all
available to the other governments for their consideration
during the time that they were developing their positions in
respect to the American draft trusteeship agreement which had
been circulated on November 6, 1946. The other governments
could not fail to realize that if the former mandated islands
were ever to be placed under the trusteeship system, it would
have to be on terms acceptable to the United States,
Mr. Austin formally submitted the trusteeship plan to
the Security Council on February 26, 1947, together with
article-by-article explanatory comments and a general state-
4
ment. Further consideration of the trusteeship proposal was
deferred by the Security Council until March 7, 1947, while
negotiations proceeded informally among the members for minor
changes in the agreement.
The minor changes were proposed by the Soviet Union and
4. U. S. Department of State, Draft Trusteeship Agree-
ment for the Japanese Mandated Islands, Publication 2784, Far
Eastern Series 20 (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office,
1947), pp. 3-20. Also: United Nations, Security Council, U. S.
Delegation Document US/S/119 of February 26, 1947.
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discussed within the American Government: by the State, War,
and Navy Departments via SWNCC and the Joint Ch efs of Staff
via SWNCC's liaison with the JSSC.
The Department of the Interior attempted to be included
and requested that it have representation at the United Nations
via an adviser or observer and also desired that the intra-
governmental discussions on the changes be conducted within
the "interdepartmental Non-Self-Governing Territories Committee."
Presumably, the Interior Department was referring to the Four
Secretaries' Committee, with its appointed subcommittee, which
would indicate one more attempt by Interior to get these organs
functioning. Interior evidently did not get the requested
representation at the United Nations; and although Mr. Gerig
of State had seemed favorable >.to the second request at the time
it was made, there is no evidence that the Interior Department
participated in any intra-governmental discussions on the stra-
tegic trusteeship agreement.
The changes requested by the Soviet Union were to delete
the words, "as an integral part of the United States" from
Article 3 and to amend Article 6 to refer to the territory's
development "towards self-government or independence, as may be
appropriate to the particular circumstances of the Trust Terri-
tory and its peoples and the freely expressed wishes of the
peoples concerned," rather than merely reading development
5, U. S. National Archives, U. S. Department of the
Interior, Office of Territories, memorandum to Arnold from





These changes were discussed by the SWNCC ad hoc sub-
committee between February 28 and March 4, 1947. Under Secre-
tary of the Navy Sullivan objected to the amendment about In-
dependence, and Captain Dennlson tried to convince the State
Department members (Cohen, Hickerson, Gross, and GerigJ on
7
this point. The latter were "unanimous in opposition." Cap-
tain Dennison reported their position to Forrestal who advised
that, in view of the State Department's attitude, the Navy
8
Department should concede the point.
Mr. James F. Green believes that the reason for the State
Department's acceptance of the Soviet amendments probably was
because the United States had "fought hard against 'as an
integral part* and for 'independence' [in previously approved
trusteeships in the General Assembly] on general principles,
9
and it was thus hoist on its own petard later."
The Security Council accepted the trusteeship agreement
with the two amendments on April 2, 1947. As previously de-
scribed, the agreement gave the United States wide powers,
including full powers of administration, legislation, and
jurisdiction, the right of fortification, and the right to
6. Robert R. Robbins, "United States Trusteeship for
the Territory of the Pacific Islands," U. S. Department of
State Bulletin . Vol. 16 (May 4, 1947), pp. 783-79Z.
7. U. S. , Naval Classified Archives Office, Memorandum
from Captain Dennison to Under Secretary of the Navy, March 4,
1947, Declassified 1970, SWNCC 59 file.
8. Ibid.





close areas for security reasons.
As soon as the Security Council approved the United
States* draft trusteeship agreement, the Interior Department
started to move, once again, to achieve its goal of adminis-
tering the islands. Secretary Krug had laid the groundwork
for this new initiative by personally visiting American Samoa,
Guam, and the island of Kwajalein (which is in the mandated
islands) during the months of February and March 1947. He
submitted an eleven-page report of his "inspection tour" to
the President on May 12, 1947, in which he stated
t
In keeping with our basic philosophy
of government, we should establish civil
government for civil populations under our
flag in time of peace,,..
I recommend further that the United
States, in accepting trusteeship of the
former Japanese mandated islands from the
United Nations, do so with a declaration
of intention to establish civilian admin-
istration throughout the area at the
earliest possible moment. The Congress
should then be called upon to define the
civil rights and political status of the
islanders in their new relationship to the
United States. In my opinion it is vital
that by act of Congress we guarantee these
people the maximum degree practical of the
civil liberties and basic freedoms enjoyed
by United States citizens....
There is no question in my mind about
the strategic importance of the islands and
their value to the United States as forward
outposts of defense. The Army, the Navy
and the Air Forces must be assured free
access to all of the islands at all times
and must be allowed to set aside and ex-
clusively control such islands or parts
10. United States Treaties and Other International Acts
Series, 1665, and United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 8, No. 123,
"Trusteeship Agreement for the Former Japanese Mandated Islands,"
See also: Harold Karen Jacobson, "Our •Colonial" Problem in the
Pacific," Foreign Affairs , Vol. 39, No. 1 (October 1960), pp. 56-
66, See Appendix for a copy of the trusteeship agreement.
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of islands and their surrounding waters
as are necessary to the establishment and
maintenance of military and naval instal-
lations. The armed forces, of course, must
have exclusive jurisdiction over military
bases and reservations. I do not agree,
however, with the belief that civilian ad-
ministration of that portion of the islands
which are not a part of the military bases
is incompatible with effective provision
for national defense.... To commit our-
selves to a course of action requiring
permanent military administration of the
affairs of the Pacific islanders in time
of peace would imply an admission of a non-
existent weakness in our basic principles
of government,,,, I fully concur in the
belief that by actually practicing democ-
racy in the Pacific the United States can
best overcome the non-democratic philoso-
phies of government which today are bid-
ding for control of the whole of Asia.H
This report continued in the same line of reasoning and
gave examples of civil governments continuing in Alaska, Puerto
Rico and the Virgin Islands during the war and of the military
control of Hawaii, smoothly expanding and later contracting,
during and after the war-time emergency, Krug argued for
civilian government, not only of the former Japanese mandated
islands, but also for Guam and American Samoa, More than half
of the report was a call for civilian government rather than
a report of existing conditions in the islands.
Krug did not think there had been any "misgovernment M
under naval government but based his belief on "consideration of
12
the fundamental principles which are basic to our democracy,"
11, Library of Congress, Report to the President: Pacific
Island Inspection Tour of J. A. Krug, February - March 1947,
(no date on report itself), Krug papers,
12. U. S. National Archives, U. S. Department of the
Interior, Krug to W. M. McBridge, Post Commander, VFW, Post 404,
Guam, April 7, 1947, RG 48, 9-0-7, Islands Pacific Gen. Pt. 2.
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He. evidently- did not see the distinction between military
government and civil government administered by military per-
sonnel. The question of granting civil rights and degrees of
self-government was not one of which agency was the adminis-
trator but of the instructions set forth by Congress and the
President. Krug did admit that an Organic Act would be needed
from Congress to establish these civil rights but, continually,
in all his discussions on this subject, interchanged the term
"civil government" with "civilian government."
To lay further groundwork for his initiative, Krug en-
couraged the holding of a round-table discussion on the subject
of civil government for Pacific islands by the American Polit-
ical Science Association in March 1947. He referred to the
fact that "a similar suggestion was made to the Association
over a year ago and that a round-table discussion, largely on
the international aspects of the island problem, was held dur-
13
ing the Association's annual meetings in March 1946.
With this groundwork being laid and the formal approval
of the Security Council given to the strategic trusteeship,
the Interior Department made its first outright move toward
obtaining civil administration of the Pacific islands since
the previous May. On April 17, 1947, Assistant Secretary of
the Interior Davidson wrote the following memorandum to
Secretary Krugi
13. U. S. National Archives, U. S. Department of the
Interior, Krug to Luther Gulick, Institute of Public Adminis-
tration, March 19, 1947. This letter was drafted by Eric
Beecroft, RG 48, 9-0-7, Admin. Ser. Pt. 3.
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You wanted this note to remind you to
talk to Under Secretary of State Acheson
about civilian administration of the island
possessions. As I understand it, the lower
echelons of the State Department favor
civilian administration, but the group be-
tween this and the Secretariat are opposed
and rather friendly to military control. I
would assume that Acheson would be definitely
in favor of civilian administration but would
like to have the assurance that we will carry
the ball on this point. 14
Roy E. James, who had relieved Eric Beecroft as head of
the Pacific Branch of the Division of Territories and Island
Possessions, wrote a background memorandum to his superiors
reviewing developments of the previous year concerning the
Four Secretaries* Committee and the Security Council's action.
He then concluded with a piece of information that definitely
set Krug to action. James stated, "we have informal informa-
tion from a confidential source that the State-V7ar-Navy Co-
ordinating Committee has been meeting of late to draw up a
form of interim administration for the islands and that their
15
proposal will be placed before the President in a few days."
Secretary Krug wrote to Secretary of State George C.
Marshall on May 3, 1947, requesting, now that the status of
the former Japanese mandated islands had been determined, that
the President's Four Secretaries' Committee meet to work out
a mutually satisfactory policy for the administration of all
16
the Pacific islands. On May 12, 1947, Krug sent a letter
14. Library of Congress, Davidson to Krug, April 17,
1947, Krug papers,
15. U. S. National Archives, U. S. Department of the
Interior, Memorandum of information by Roy E. James, May 1,
1947, RG 48, 9-0-7, Islands Gen. Pt. 2.




to the President submitting his report of the Pacific tour
(copy to State, War, and Navy) and requesting that it be
17
released to the press.
Meanwhile, the President had received a copy of a Guam-
anian Congress Joint Resolution petitioning the United States
Congress to grant American citizenship to Guamanians and to
enact an organic law for the Guamanian Government. President
Truman mentioned this petition in a memorandum to the Secre-
tary of State on May 7, 1947, and recalled his appointment of
the Four Secretaries* Committee in October 1945 with its report
being postponed pending a determination of the status of Japan-
ese islands. He now stated he understood that "in the mean-
time some of the departments represented on the committee have
18
been giving study to the problems involved." It is not known
whether Krug had planted this memorandum in the White House or
whether he did not approach President Truman until he sent his
letter dated May 12, 1947. The main point is that pressure
was being put on the State Department to call a meeting of the
Four Secretaries* Committee to reconsider the problem of admin-
istration of the Pacific islands.
On May 14, 1947, probably as a result of Krug's letter
of May 12, President Truman sent the following memorandum urging
action to the Secretaries of State, War, Navy, and Interior:
Almost two years ago I asked the Depart-
ment of State, War, Navy and Interior to
17. Harry S. Truman Library, Krug to President, May 12,
1947, Official file 35-L.
18. Library of Congress, President to Secretary of State,
May 7, 1947, Krug papers.
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make recommendations to me for the purpose
of implementing a Civil Government in the
Pacific Islands which we then held an
which we proposed to take over.
I have a memorandum from the Secre-
tary of the Interior [possibly the pro-
posed plan of February 22, 1946, or Krug's
report of his tour], I have no report
from the Cabinet Committee and no further
information on the subject, except a recom-
mendation which was published in the Sun-
day New York Times [sic] by a Civilian
Committee, which the Navy had asked to
make a survey. I'd like very much to have
the Cabinet Committee get together and co-
ordinate a plan to present to me.
It is particularly necessary that we
implement a Civil Government in Guam, at
least with the privileges that are now
obtained in Puerto Rico, and a survey
should be made of all the other islands
which we have under our control for the
purpose of giving the native populations
the best Civil Government possible, 19
This searing memorandum was, however, unnecessary to the
starting of consideration of this problem by the Four Secre-
taries' Committee. Secretary Marshall had written to Secre-
tary Krug that very same day in response to Krug's letter of
May 3, 1947, suggesting a meeting of the Secretaries of State,
War, Navy, and Interior after the Cabinet meeting on Friday,
20
May 16. While the President's memorandum was, therefore,
unnecessary in that respect, it did place increased pressure
on the four Secretaries to arrive at a joint plan expeditiously;
and it did indicate that the President desired civil govern-
ments in the islands. The Presidents memorandum takes a far
19. Harry S. Truman Library, President to Secretaries of
State, War, Navy and Interior, May 14, 1947, Official file 85-L,





sharper tone than his earlier, May 7, memorandum to the Secre-
tary of State. The concern over the Guamanian petition com-
bined with Secretary Krug's letter evidently produced this
sharper tone.
Secretary Marshall's letter indicated that the meeting
time was satisfactory to the Secretaries of War and Navy and
included a list of five recommendations concerning this matter
that SWNCC had just submitted to its three departments. It is
interesting to note that SWNCC had been working on the problem
of administration of all of the American controlled Pacific
islands during the early months of 1947. Interior had only
learned of this work via a "confidential source 1' about May 1,
1947. The SWNCC subcommittee was so far along on its task
that the five recommendations -had been submitted to the Secre-
taries of State, War, and Navy on May 9, 1947. This fact,
plus the fact that Marshall cleared the proposed meeting with
the Secretaries of War and Navy prior to suggesting it to
Interior, is indicative of the success of SWNCC and of the
development of the field of politico-military relations in
general. The President's directive of October 20, 1945,
appointing the Four Secretaries 1 (State, War, Navy, and
Interior) Committee to work on this matter had been completely
ignored or frustrated by the three- member departments of SWNCC.
After May 1947, however, Interior was not to be denied
entry into discussions on this matter. This change was
because the status of the mandated islands had been estab-
lished, because of President Truman's strong memorandum and
because Interior managed to insert the word "civilian" in
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the SWNCC recommendations. Prior to describing this last
action of Interior's, the five recommendations submitted by
SWNCC on May 9, 1947, and transmitted to Interior by Marshall
on May 14 should be listed as follows:
(a) That separate organic legislation for
Guam and American Samoa granting citi-
zenship, a bill of rights, legislative
powers to island representatives and an
independent judiciary, should be drafted
by the Navy Department and introduced in
Congress as soon as possible.
(b) That organic legislation for the Trust
Territory, to be drafted by the Depart-
ment of State, should be introduced in
Congress as soon as possible after the
trusteeship agreement enters into force,
(c) That these laws should authorize the
President to determine which agency or
agencies of the U. S. Government should
have permanent administrative responsi-
bility therein.
(d) That the Navy Department should continue
to have administrative responsibility for
the islands on an interim basis pending
determination of the agency or agencies
to be given responsibility.
(e) That pursuant to this, an Executive
Order be issued upon approval by Congress
of the trusteeship agreement, terminat-
—
----. ing military government in the Trust
Territory and delegating civil adminis-
tration to the Navy Department on an
interim basis. 21
These civil rights and measures of self-government were
the points that Krug, in his report to the President, had argued
so forcefully as expressing the basic philosophy of the American
Government. Krug, however, intertwined them with " civilian"
administration. Perhaps he felt that military personnel in
uniform could not provide for these rights. However, this




by the Navy and later attempted, successfully in many cases,
to induce the naval administrators to leave the naval service
and work in their same positions for Interior after the islands
were transferred from the Navy to Interior. These officers
had been trained at The School of Naval Administration (SONA)
at Stanford University. A good description of this school
and its graduates is given in Dorothy E. Richard, CDR, U.S.N.R.,
United States Naval Administration of the Trust Territory of
the Pacific Islands (Volume II, pp. 147-173).
The Interior Department had only two days to prepare for
the May 16 meeting. Using the five points listed in Marshall's
letter (the SWNCC subcommittee recommendations) as a basis for
discussion, a position paper was developed for Secretary Krug.
The position paper listed several "basic premises." The most
pertinent ones are quoted as follows t
(1) There should be civil governments for
civilian populations under the American
flag in time of peace,
(2) Such civil governments must be founded
on Organic Acts, which are in effect con-
stitutions, wherein the Congress of the
United States prescribes the form of
government for the area concerned. That
government must be a democratic form in
which the local inhabitants will parti-
cipate to the greatest extent possible,,,.
(5) The right and power of the armed forces
of the United States to take, use, and
exclusively occupy for military purposes
such land areas and harbor and anchorage
facilities as are needed in the interest
of national defense, must be confirmed
and safeguarded.
(6) Administrative responsibility and the
functions of territorial and dependent
area administration for all dependent
areas of the United States, including
the Pacific Island Trust Territory, must
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be centralized in one office or agency
of the Federal Government. That office
must be given a status of sufficient
importance in the structure of govern-
ment to give power and effect to its
policies and to give it access to the
highest councils of government. If
placed in one of the Departments, it
will have access to the President at
Cabinet level and can treat with other
Departments on a position of equality.
If made a separate and independent
bureau or office, steps should be taken
to ensure it position of such stature
as to enable it to effectively look [sic]
after the interests of the peoples for
whom it must speak in the councils of
our government,
(7) The Department of the Interior has long
experience and a working knowledge with
respect to dependent areas of the United
States which it has gained in the handl-
ing of the affairs of U. S. territories
and island possessions. If Guam, Samoa
and the Trust Territory are not placed
in the Division 'of Territories of Interior,
then the Division of Territories of Inte-
rior should be combined with such new
office or agency as may be established
for the administration of territorial
affairs. The Division's record in develop-
ing and fostering the territories on the
road to self-government or statehood com-
bined with its small budget suggest that
the first alternative be followed (com-
bine all areas in the Division of Terri-
tories), 22
The reasons stated in this position paper for granting
Interior the administrative responsibility for the Pacific
islands seem much more logical than the earlier reasons given
by Ickes and Krug ("military" government vs. "civilian" govern-
ment). These logical arguments of experience and consolida-
tion were solid arguments for Secretary Krug to take with him
22. Library of Congress, Suggestion Position for State-




to the Four Secretaries' Committee meeting.
The position paper suggested two goals for Krug to attempt
to achieve at the meeting. These two goals related to the five
points listed in Marshall's letter. When point (d) of the list
(recommending that the Navy Department should continue to have
administrative responsibility on an interim basis) was brought
up for discussion, Krug was to "agjree that the Navy Department
continue to have administrative responsibility for the trust
territory on an interim basis pending determination of the
agency to be given permanent responsibility PROVIDED the interim
is precisely and definitely defined either as a definite period
of years (1-2-3-5) or as 'an interim period not to exceed
years,' (In the case of Guam and American Samoa which have been
American possessions for almost 50 years, an interim, if agreed
23
upon at all, should not be more than one yearV' [Emphasis in
original]
The other goal Krug was to achieve at the meeting was to
make his agreement to point (e) of the SWNCC recommendations
(recommending that an Executive Order should be issued terminat-
ing military government in the Trust Territory and delegating
civil administration to the Navy Department on an interim basis)
conditional "on the acceptance of the proviso stated in (d)
above, re the fixing of the number of years to be considered
24





The results of the May 16, 1947, meeting and subsequent
meetings were reported to the President on June 18, 1947, in
a memorandum from Secretary of State Marshall. A summary of
the conclusions reached at thatmeeting have also been located
attached to an Interior Department internal memorandum dated
July 15, 1947. Excerpts from these two documents will be
quoted below. These documents, however, do not describe the
actual discussions at the May 16 meeting during which the
critical decisions were made. Fortunately, Secretary Krug
evidently had transcripts made of his more important telephone
conversations. At 11»55 a.m. on May 16, 1947, just after he
returned from the meeting, Krug called his Assistant Secretary
Girard Davidson to inform him of what had occurred at the
meeting. -*
This transcript of the telephone call is the only document
available that covers the actual discussions at this critical
meeting. Therefore, only one side of the story, i.e., Interior's,
is known. The motivations that led Secretary of the Navy For-
restal, Secretary of State Marshall, and Secretary of War
Patterson to agree to the decisions are, therefore, conjectured.
These motivations will be speculated upon later.
The five points of the SWNCC recommendations were dis-
cussed in order. On the first point concerning organic legis-
lation for Guam and American Samoa, agreement was reached with
the modification that amendments would be attached to existing
bills before Congress, rather than the submission of new bills.
The second point (recommending that the State Department draft
organic legislation for the Trust Territory and that this
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legislation should be introduced in Congress as soon as possi-
ble after the trusteeship agreement enters into force) was
accepted with the proviso that the State Department would give
Interior a chance to look at the proposals for the bill on the
Trust Territory. It was agreed then that the President would
decide on the permanent administrative agency for Guam, Ameri-
can Samoa, and the Trust Territory,
Then point (d) (Navy Department to continue to have interim
administrative responsibility on an interim basis) came up for





question there of interim re-
sponsibility in the Navy Department. All
agreed subject to the provision that we dis-
cussed this morning that at earliest prac-
tical date the President would place in the
hands of a civilian agency the civilian
government functions relating to these ideas.
They agreed to that. They squawked and
creaked, particularly Forrestal, but Marshall
seemed to think it was a sound thing to do.
They all agreed to it. 25
Krug and Davidson, evidently that very morning prior to
the meeting, had agreed to push for including the word "civil-
ianM in the fourth point. The last point (e) (recommending the
termination of military government and delegation of civil ad-
ministration to the Navy Department on an interim basis by
means of an Executive Order after Congress approved the trus-
teeship agreement) was then approved subject to the condi-
tions of the revised point (d)
.
25, Library of Congress, telephone transcript, Krug to
Davidson, May 16, 1947, Krug papers.
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David then asked Krug, "that is earliest practicable date.
You didn't discuss time?" Krug replied:
Yes, we did. In the opinion of the
Navy any move to take out Navy control
while major construction program under way
in Guam would be fatal thing. Thing they
were worried about mostly is difficulty of
Guamanian laborers. I suggest [sic] at the
end of the year, but both Army and Navy
were very adamant it would be too soon.
Finally decided this group could decide
as to date. I was very pleased. Finally
they all seemed to understand desirability
of ultimate civilian control, Patterson
thought it ought to be in Interior Depart-
ment rather than a new one ,26
Later in the telephone conversation Krug stated, "I brought
up at the end without being too cantankerous, my feeling about
27
the way they have operated in this deal." Then, he continued
with the portion of the telephone conversation quoted in Chapter
Three (pp. 188-189) about Patterson's recounting Byrnes' strained
relations with Ickes being a factor in the failure of the Four
Secretaries' Committee to meet. The telephone conversation
then continued!
Krugi Difficulty arose over feeling of all
three of them [Marshall, Forres tal, and Pat-
terson") . One thing we have to keep in mind
in our dealings on these matters is that
military people are just full of instances
where civilian government has worked bad in
time of emergency. Marshall can cite you
chapter and verse . . , [of] all kinds of in-
stances in the Hawaiian Islands in the early
days where civilian governors balked the
defense effort.... [Krug then repeated some
of Marshall's instances,]
I know and realize the problems we are
up against and I would be the last one to
say our jurisdictional desires and sincere







in time of war. It seems to me some way
should be worked out to get things they
need. They said as long as you [Krug]
are Secretary of the Interior we aren't
worried about it but how do we know he
[Ickes] won't be back in the future.
Davidson ? Maybe we can work out some
language that will protect them on that.
KruR t That is one reason I don't want
James on that job. He is too vindictive
on the subject. [Referring to Roy E.
James, Head of the Pacific Branch, Divi-
sion of Territories and Island Posses-
sions. ~|28
This, then, is the sole available account of the meeting
on May 16, 1947, between the Secretaries of State, War, Navy,
and Interior. Another document entitled, "Conclusions Reached
by the Secretaries of State, War, Navy, and Interior on May 16,
1947 On the Administration of the Pacific Islands" was located
attached to an Interior memorandum of July 15, 1947. This
document listed six points as conclusions "incorporating modi-
fications suggested by Secretary Krug and agreed to in prin-
29
ciple by the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy."
The first point listed was, as Krug described it, amend-
ments to existing bills before Congress but added that these
amendments would be "agreed upon between the Secretary of the
Navy and the Secretary of the Interior, Such legislation would
become effective immediately except for the transfer of juris-
diction to a civilian agency which would be accomplished at a
28. Ibid.
29, U. S. National Archives, U. S. Department of the
Interior, Document titled "Conclusions Reached by the Secre-
taries of State, War, Navy, and Interior on May 16, 1947, on
the Administration of the Pacific Islands," attached to memo-
randum from Roy E. James to Robert E. Day, July 15, 1947, RG 48,





The second point, concerning organic legis" ation for the
Trust Territory, was unchanged from the original SWNCC recom-
mendation. No mention was made of any agreement for State
granting Interior a chance to look at the proposals for this
bill.
The third point was the same as the original SWNCC recom-
mendation; Krug having approved it. The fourth point, however,
was very different from that described by Secretary Krug in his
telephone conversation. It was listed on this document as
follows:
d. That the Navy Department should con-
tinue to have administrative responsibility
for the islands [referring to all of the
Pacific islands: Guam, American Samoa, and
the Trust Territory3- on an interim basis
pending the determination of the agency to
be given permanent responsibility, pro-
vided that wherever there is a significant
civilian population the civilian government
of these islands will be headed up in a
civilian department of the government, at
the earliest practicable date, to be deter-
mined by the President. 31
The fifth point was as described by Krug in the telephone
conversation with Davidson; and the new sixth point stated that
the four Departments, in commenting on the legislation to effect
the foregoing, would withdraw any previous comments made to the
Bureau of the Budget.
Therefore, the two versions differ slightly in their
interpretations regarding conclusions reached at this meeting.





Mr. James on July 15, 1947, In the memorandum, Mr. James refer-
red to the attached document as being a copy of a letter that
the Secretary of State transmitted to the President on June 18,
1947, containing a summary ot the May i6 discussion of the
Secretaries of State, War, Navy, and Interior, However, the
letter that Secretary of State Marshall sent to the President
on June 18, 1947, has been located? and it differs from the
document attached to the James memorandum.
The Marshall letter was enclosed in a letter that the
President sent to Senator Vandenberg, President of the Senate
pro tempore , on June 19, 1947. President Truman forwarded
Marshall's letter to the Senate for its information and for
its inclusion in the Congressional Record . Therefore, an
accurate copy of Marshall's report to the President is avail-
able.
Marshall's report differs in minor details from the two
accounts given above of the decisions reached at the May 16,
1947, meeting. The differences are probably due to further
revision of the points by the four Secretaries. Marshall
reported to the President that several meetings of the Secre-
taries of State, War, Navy, and Interior had been held on
this matter. The report then lists five points of agreement
which are quoted as follows
i
1. Separate organic legislation for
Guam to provide civil government and to grant
citizenship, a bill of rights, and legisla-
tive powers to Guamanians should be enacted
this session. In recent hearings on such
organic legislation the Departments have
recommended the transfer of administration
from the Navy Department to a civilian agency

234
designated by the President at the earliest
practicable date, the exact date to be de-
termined by the President.
2. Organic legislation for American
Samoa, providing civil government and grant-
ing citizenship, a bill or rights, and legis-
lative powers should be prepared by the Navy
and Interior Departments and presented to
the next session of Congress.
3. Suggestions for organic legislation
for those Pacific islands placed under United
States trusteeship are in preparation by the
Department of State for presentation to Con-
gress, provided favorable congressional
action is taken on the trusteeship agree-
ment to be shortly presented for approval.
4. The Navy Department should continue
to have administrative responsibility for
Guam and American Samoa on an interim basis
pending the transfer to a civilian agency of
the Government at the earliest practicable
date , such date to be determined by the Presi-
dent. With respect to the trust territory, a
similar transfer should be effected by the
President at the earliest practicable date .
5. Provided Congress acts favorably on
the trusteeship agreement, an Executive order
should be issued when the agreement enters
into force terminating military government
in the trust territory and delegating civil
administration to the Navy Department on an
interim basis, subject to the conditions set
forth in paragraph 4,32 [Emphasis added]
This was the official report sent to the President. There
is no reference to "significant civilian population" being the
criteria for having the "civilian government . .. headed up in
a civilian department of the government ..." Secretary Krug's
telephone conversation gives an account of the flavor of the
meeting and the way in which he interpreted the decisions
reached at that meeting. Probably the document attached to
the James memorandum which summarized the conclusions was the
32. U. S. Congressional Record , Senate, Marshall to




one mentioned in the following memorandum from J. E. Fobes,
of the Bureau of the Budget, to Charles Murphy, of the White
House, dated May 23, 1947
i
A draft memorandum prepared by General
Marshall summarizing the conversation
held by the Secretaries of State, War,
Navy and Interior on May 16 has been
revised after suggestions by Interior.
It will be considered at a second meet-
ing of the four Secretaries on Monday,
May 26, and presumably will then go to
the Pres ident . 3 3
At the later meetings, the four Secretaries would have
arrived at a common interpretation which was presented by
Marshall to the President. It must be remembered that Admiral
Niraitz, the Chief of Naval Operations at this time, had a deep
belief that only one agency should administer the Micronesian
islands. He had once even recommended the Department of the
Interior for the job, if the Army continued to demand the
administration of certain of the Micronesian islands. He
surely would have argued for naval administration if he had
been present at the meeting; yet, if he saw the interpretation
of the decisions which lists the "significant civilian popula-
tion*4 criteria, he would have probably insisted that there be
only one agency for all of the islands, whether or not they
had large populations.
One hypothesis that would logically explain the differ-
ences of the three documents concerning the point about
"civilian agency" would be as follows. Secretary Krug probably
33. The Harry S. Truman Library, J. E. Fobes, Bureau of




laid great stress on the island peoples, their government,
rights, and political advancement. He also probably recog-
nized that the military should have jurisdiction over their
bases--almost all of which were in caretaker status at that
time. These points were in his briefing paper as Interior's
premises on the subject.
On the other side, various military leaders, as long ago
as the Brownell-Sullivan Report of January 6, 1946, had recog-
nized that the Ryukyus should be administered by Interior
because of the islands* large population. Marshall, Forrestal,
and Patterson may well have been ignorant of Admiral Nimitz*
feelings about having only one agency administer the former
mandated islands for military reasons. They may, therefore,
have agreed with Krug that a civilian agency should administer
the islands that possessed a large population. These would be
Guam, American Samoa and, in their opinion, only Saipan in the
former mandated islands. They would have interpreted the agree-
ment as meaning that all of the Pacific islands, except those
with large populations, would have their administering agency
(military or civilian) determined by the President with the
proviso that heavily populated islands should go to a civilian
agency.
Krug would have seen this agreement from the other side,
i.e., the understanding that all of the islands, except for
military bases, would be under civilian administration. This,
indeed, was the situation in Hawaii, Alaska, and Puerto Rico.
Later, Admiral Nimitz may have persuaded Forrestal that
only one agency should administer all the islands. Possibly
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Krug, finding out about the different interpretations when
the summary was distributed, persuaded the others to his inter-
pretation.
The main point is that a critical decision was made,
either at the May 16 meeting or shortly thereafter, in terms
of specifying that the agency having permanent administrative
responsibility for the former Japanese mandated islands would
be a civilian agency designated by the President.
Secretary of State Marshall seems to have supported Krug
on the "civilian agency 11 point even with his low opinion of
the record of civilian governments in time of emergencies.
Secretary of War Patterson, perhaps with the Ryukyus Islands
especially in mind, seems to have objected at first but then
agreed and even mentioned that Interior should have the job
rather than a new agency. Secretary of the Navy Forrestal's
agreement to the proposal is unexplainable, particularly in
light of the strong stand he and the Navy had consistently
maintained throughout. Moreover, no governmental bureaucracy
willingly relinquishes its scope of jurisdiction! indeed, it
usually attempts to increase its scope of jurisdiction as
Interior was attempting to do. This decision to transfer
administrative authority to a civilian agency not only applied
to the Trust Territory but, also, to islands that had been
under naval administration for over fifty years, i.e., Guam
and American Samoa. Unfortunately, Forrestal's diaries do
not mention the May 16 meeting or this decision or, for that
matter, any following meetings on this subject.
After the May 16, 1947, meeting, the struggle was over
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for all practical purposes. There were a few rear-guard
actions by the Navy, but the Interior Department maintained
undisputed command of the situation.
One factor that may have influenced Forres tal's decision
to accept the ultimate transfer of administrative responsibility
to a civilian agency was the Congressional opinion on this
matter. On December 21, 1946, the Subcommittee on Pacific Bases
of the House Naval Affairs Committee, which had called for dom-
inant, outright control of the Micronesian islands in their
1945 report, submitted a supplemental report after a tour of
the Pacific. The report praised the naval government in Micro-
nesia in glowing terms; however, it also made the following
recomraendat ion »
This committee feels that it is desir-
able for the future to have a civil ad-
ministration over the islands of the Paci-
fic, Our Navy, as a professional military
organization, should not be saddled with
the expense and responsibility of adminis-
tering this far-flung panorama of islands.
The Navy should only be concerned with
strategic bases and their maintenance
upon a basis of mutuality and security of
the territory under our guidance, 34
Representative Mike Mansfield of Montana reported on his
Far Eastern and Pacific trip to the House on February 3, 1947,
as follows:
I would prefer to have the United States
assume complete and undisputed control of
34, U. S. Congress, House, Subcommittee on Pacific Bases
of the Committee on Naval Affairs, Study of Pacific Bases . 79th







If, however, it does become necessary
to create a trusteeship for these islands,
I would favor the proposals made by our
State Department and President Truman ...
£the draft strategic trusteeship agreement
had been announced]
The question of government is bound to
be an important consideration. For a long
time I have studied the possibility of
civil government for the mandates, but,
desirable though that would be, I have come
to the conclusion that the only way they
could be governed for the present would be
by the Navy on the same basis as Guam and
Samoa are administered. Personally, I
would rather have a civil administration
over the mandates, but, in view of practical
and realistic considerations, I am forced to
the conclusion that the Navy would be the
best administrator. It would have the best
and only means of maintaining liaison bet-
ween the various islands and it would have
the only trained personnel to carry out the
job of administration. Stanford University,
which has the task of training military
government men for administration of the
islands, has done an outstanding job in this
respect, and both it and the Navy are to be
complimented for the initiative shown and
the progress already made...,
I should like to repeat, in conclusion,
that my own personal opinion is that civil
administration would be best for the mandates.
This, however, is impractical at this time,
due to the circumstances mentioned. It is
necessary, though, that the eventual change
over to civilian control be given a thorough
study by the Navy Department so that recom-
mendations can be made at the appropriate
time to achieve this goal, 35
Here, again, was the intertwining of the concepts of civil
government with civilian government, Forrestal's one letter to
the press (The New York Times , September 24, 1946) had tried
to emphasize the distinction between "civil" and "civilian"
35, U. S. Congressional Record , House, Statement by
Representative Mike Mansfield, February 3, 1947, 80th Cong.,
1st sess., February 3, 1947, pp. 807-811.
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government and the fact that the Navy had a good record In the
civil government of Guam and American Samoa, even with the lack
of any organic act (or guidance from Congress) as to civil
rights and development toward self-government. Perhaps Forres tal
was just tired of the whole controversy at the time of the May 16
decision. He had the more important controversy of the mili-
tary services' unification issue demanding his time. Secre-
tary Marshall's support for the inclusion of the "civilian
agency" terra may have been the final factor that tipped For-
restal into acceptance of the proposal.
There is only one indication of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's
position on this matter. In a letter from Secretary Krug to
Representative Robert T. Secrest dated March 10, 1949, Krug
refers to the decision that the islands' administration should
be transferred to a civilian agency at the earliest practicable
date. He then added, "the Joint Chiefs of Staff have indicated
that they had no objection to this recommendation from a mili-
36
tary point of view." After this time (May-June 1947), the
Joint Chiefs of Staff are not involved in this matter, it
being mainly one of consultations between the Navy and Inte-
rior Departments.
The President, in his forwarding letter to the Senate on
June 19, 1947, gave his approval to Secretary of State Marshall's
report of the agreements reached by the Four Secretaries' Com-
mittee dated only the day before. The President also mentioned
36, U. S. National Archives, U. S. Department of the
Interior, Office of Territories, Krug to Secrest, March 10,
1949, RG 48, 9-0-7, Islands Gen. Pt. 3.
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his appointment of the Four Secretaries' Committee on October 20,
1945, the fact that it had seemed advisable to postpone any
final recommendations until after the status of the former man-
dated islands had been determined, and the fact that he had
asked the committee to resume its consideration after the
Security Council had approved the draft trusteeship agreement.
He then stated that the report of the Committee (Marshall's
June 18 letter) would be of interest to the Congress ° in con-
nection with its consideration of legislation to provide civil-
37
ian government for these islands." The President concluded
his letter to the Senate with the following comment
i
I hope that the Congress will approve
legislation for the purposes indicated in
the enclosed report and that such legisla-
tion will provide for the full enjoyment
of civil rights and -for the greatest prac-
ticable measure of self-government. 38
By this action of sending Marshall's report of the agree-
ments reached by the Four Secretaries' Committee to the Senate
for its information and for its inclusion in the Congressional
Record and by his comments in the forwarding letter, President
Truman not only indicated his approval of the agreements
reached by the Four Secretaries' Committee but. also made
them public.
37. U. S. Congressional Record , Senate, President to
Senator Vandenberg, June 19, 1947, 80th Cong., 1st sess.,




The strategic trusteeship agreement was formally intro-
duced to Congress on July 3, 1947, in the form of a joint reso-
lution authorizing the President to approve it. The State
Department had pondered over the correct procedure to obtain
Congressional approval of the trusteeship agreement, whether
by Congressional Joint Resolution or by the treaty procedure
in the Senate, and had decided upon the joint resolution format.
Admiral Nimitz appeared before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee on July 7, 1947, and recommended the approval of the
trusteeship agreement. Admiral Nimitz emphasized in his
comments the strategic importance of the islands to the
security of the United States. He talked of the future when
he statedj
It is felt that the relationship of
the territory of the Pacific to our own
security will assume a far more vital char-
acter in the future. The development of
new long-range weapons of tremendous des-
tructive potential requires that we be
prepared for the future, although it is
difficult to foresee at this time what
the strategic and tactical uses of these
new weapons will eventually be. We feel
that we must maintain our hard won con-
trol over the area in order that we may
deny to any future enemy access to the
Western Hemisphere by way of the Central
Pacific. 39
Admiral Nimitz recommended the approval of the agreement
in order to resolve the "present uncertain status of the terri-
40
tory. M No mention was made by him of the long, and sometimes
39. U. S., Naval Classified Archives Office, Statement
by Fleet Admiral Chester Nimitz, CNO, before the Senate Foreign




bitter controversy between the annexationists and the officials
who wanted to submit the islands to trusteeship. No mention
was made by him to the effect that he had always favored
annexation.
In a statement submitted to the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee on July 7, 1947, Secretary Forrestal gave his assent
to the trusteeship agreement. He also stressed the strategic
importance of the islands while omitting any reference to
either the annexation option or the question of which agency
41
would administer the islands.
This, then, was a case of the military establishment, both
its military and civilian parts, supporting a Presidential
decision before Congress. Secretary Forrestal had been agree-
able to trusteeship at the October 22, 1946, Presidential meet-
ing, but Admiral Nimitz was definitely opposed to it. Thus,
for Admiral Nimitz, the perennial civil-military question
arose. To what extent is the Congress entitled to the straight-
forward views of the uniformed military leaders when those of-
ficers differ with the civilian leadership in the Executive
Branch of the Government? Congress maintains it has the right
to receive such testimony and has even passed laws supposedly
protecting those governmental officials, military and civilian,
who testify before its committees.
For example, the National Security Act of 1947 (passed on
July 25, 1947), which was being considered by Congress at the
time of Admiral Nimitz' testimony on the trusteeship agree-
ment, specifically states that nothing in the Act would prevent
4i. U. S., Naval Classified Archives Office, Statement
by Secretary Forrestal before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, July 7, 1947, CNO files (SC) AL4/EF.
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the Joint Chiefs of Staff from having direct access to Congress.
However, while the law states that the officers have the right
to testify before the Congress, there is no indication that
the officers have the duty to do so. As a practical matter,
the uniformed officers have been indoctrinated in the concept
that the "civilian control of the military" emanates, mainly
from the President (the Commander-in-Chief) and his subordinates
within the Executive Branch. With an inate sense of respect for
authority, and a desire, as Marshall phrased it, to be a member
of the team, it is extremely difficult for an uniformed mili-
tary leader to appeal to the Congress for assistance in a policy
dispute between him and his superiors within the Executive
Branch. Admiral Nimitz certainly could not have been worried
about his career; therefore, the other factors must have influ-
enced his decision to let the past be past and not to attempt,
once more, to obtain the annexation of the former mandated
islands.
* * it
On July 18, 1947, Congress passed the joint resolution
authorizing the President to approve the trusteeship agree-
ment. The President signed the trusteeship agreement on the
42
same day.
The same day as the ratification of the trusteeship agree-
ment, July 18, 1947, military government of the islands was
terminated by Executive Order No. 9875, which also appointed
42. Public Law 204, 80th Congress, 1st session.
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the Navy Department as interim administrator pending the
transfer to a civilian department or agency.
One incident occurred over the drafting of this Executive
Order. The original draft had been developed within the SV7NCC
43
subcommittee and made no mention of the word "civilian. H On
July 15, 1947, Secretary Krug wrote a letter to Secretary
Marshall mentioning this omission and requesting that the word
44
"civilian" be inserted before the words "department or agency."
He also noticed that neither the draft Executive Order or the
proposed draft release placed any limitation on the duration
of the interim period of naval administration. The public
statement draft did, however, contain the words "at the earli-
est practicable date." Secretary Krug, therefore, requested
that "a statement that such period will not exceed one year
or eighteen months would be helpful in connection with plan-
ning, which the civilian agency must necessarily undertake in
45
advance of the actual transfer."
Following the signing of this letter, Roy E. James, Chief
of the Pacific Branch of Interior's Division of Territories
and Island Possessions, telephoned Captain Jennings, Assistant
Chief of Naval Operations for Island Governments, on the matter.
Captain Jennings told James, that while he could not speak
43. U. S. National Archives, U. S. Department of the
Interior, Office of Territories, SWNCC 364/1. May 9, 1947,
Declassified October 21, 1969, RG 48, 9-0-7, Islands Gen. Pt.
2.





for Secretary Forrestal, it was his opinion that the Navy
Department probably would not agree to the insertion of the
46
word "civilian" as suggested by Interior.
On that same day, however, Secretary Marshall agreed with
the request to insert the word "civilian" and persuaded Secre-
47
tary Forrestal to accept it. The final draft of the Execu-
tive Order reflects this change.
Krug's second request- -to fix a maximum time within which
the transfer of administrative responsibility for the trust
territory should be effected- -did not fare so well. The
Executive Order did not mention any time- frame for the transfer,
but the President's public statement did include the words "at
the earliest practicable date." Marshall and Forrestal evi-
dently felt this statement was- sufficient, and the drafts were
not changed in this respect.
Secretary of State Marshall answered Krug's letter on
August 5, 1947, stating that the fixing of a maximum time for
the transfer of administration "should, in the view of this
Department, be considered by the four Secretaries in conjunc-
tion with the recommendations which should be made to the
President as to the designation of the civilian agency which
should have permanent administrative responsibility for the
48
trust territory."
46. U. S. National Archives, U. S. Department of the
Interior, Office of Territories, James to Robert E. Day,
July 15, 1947, RG 48, 9-0-7, Islands Gen. Pt. 2.
47. U. S. National Archives, U. S. Department of the
Interior, Office of Territories, Day to Krug, July 15, 1947,
RG 48, 9-0-7, Islands Gen. Pt. 2.




By the end of November 1947, the State Department had
prepared a draft organic legislation for the Trust Territory
49
and submitted it for comments to Interior and Navy. James P.
Davis, Director of the Division of Territories and Island Pos-
sessions in the Interior Department, felt that the draft was
inadequate both in terms of organizing a government, and in
taking into account the diversity among the island groups that
made up the Trust Territory, He indicated in a memorandum that
the Navy had parallel adverse comments on the State Department
50
draft.
Because of these adverse comments, a series of inter-
departmental conferences were required to revise the draft to
meet everyone's suggestions. The resultant draft organic
legislation, dated January 14, 1948, was submitted by the
State Department to the Bureau of the Budget, which in turn,
51
submitted some question to the Department of Justice.
While the proposed organic act was in the Bureau of the
Budget, the President made his determination as to which
civilian agency would have the permanent administrative
49. U. S. National Archives, U. S. Department of the
Interior, Memorandum from Irwin W. Silverman, Chief Counsel,
to Under Secretary Chapman, November 20, 1947, RG 48, Office
files of Oscar Chapman, Division of Territories.
50. U. S. National Archives, U. S. Department of the
Interior, Memorandum from Davis to Secretary of the Interior,
December 1, 1947, RG 48, Office files of Oscar Chapman, Divi-
sion of Territories,
51. U. S. National Archives, U. S. Department of the
Interior, Memorandum on status of Pacific Island legislation,
February 2, 1948, and memorandum from Davis to Secretary of the




responsibility for the Trust Territory, Guam, and American
Samoa. On February 11, 1948, the President wro' e a letter to
the Secretary of the Interior (copy to the Secretary of the
Navy) which stated
t
It is my intention, upon approval
of organic acts for the aforementioned
islands [Guam, American Samoa, and the
Trust Territory], to designate the Depart-
ment of the Interior as the civilian agency
with general supervision over civil admin-
istration of those islands. Assumption by
the Department of such responsibility, of
course, will await transfer from the De-
partment of the Navy which should be ef-
fected at the earliest practicable date
after approval of the organic acts. Des-
ignation of the Department of the Interior
will be without prejudice to study and
determination, based upon further study
of long-range plans for administration
of United States territories and posses-
sions. 52
The President made reference to his letter to the Congress
on June 19, 1947, transmitting the Secretary of State's June 18
letter indicating the agreements reached by the Four Secretaries'
Committee, It, therefore, would appear that the President never
formally sent a letter directly to the four Secretaries approv-
ing their decisions but, rather, only communicated his approval
indirectly by means of his letter to the Congress. The Presi-
dent informed the Secretary of the Interior that he was advis-
ing him of the intention to designate Interior in order that
Interior could "expedite preparatory planning for an orderly
transition to civil government and for speedy achievement of
the aims of this Government with respect to its territories
52. U. S. National Archives, U. S. Department of the Inte-
rior, President to Secretary of the Interior, February 11, 1948,
RG 48, Office files of Oscar Chapman, Division of Territories.

249
as expressed in the aforesaid communication to the Congress
53
and in the recent Message on the State of the Ihion." It
would also appear, therefore, that there was no direct com-
munication from the President to the Department of the Inte-
rior stating what the policy and aims of the Government should
be in the territories and island possessions. Using letters
to the Congress and the State of the Union message as a means
of communication within the Executive Branch is a very inter-
esting concept, to say the least. Various governmental policies
are often made by means of Presidential letters to Congress and
the State of the Union Message, These means, however, should
not be utilized to communicate policies to members of one's
"own team," i.e., from the President to his subordinates within
the Executive Branch. While this procedure is not recommended,
in reality it does take place.
Furthermore, this decision by the President to designate
Interior as the administering agency was not the result, as
far as can be determined, of any consultation between the depart-
ments concerned (State, Interior, Defense, Army, Navy, and Air
54
Force). Nor was it a result of any suggestion by Interior.
It appears to have originated purely from the President's
Executive Office. It, of course, is the logical decision
based on the assumption that a civilian agency would administer
the islands. The choice could only be between Interior or some
newly created agency. In his letter of February 11, 1948,
53. Ibid
.
54, By the National Security Act of 1947, the Department
of Defense was created with its sub-departments of the Army
(formerly the War Department), Air Force (formerly the Army
Air Corps), and the Navy.
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President Truman even kept open the option of an eventual new
agency to govern territories and island possessions contingent
on future study and determination of long-range plans.
In April 1948, the President received petitions from
Guam and American Samoa asking that the Navy remain in control.
He sent these petitions to Mr. David Stowe, evidently on his
staff, asking that Stowe get all the interested agencies to-
55
gether and report what should be done. At the resultant
meeting, Mr. Stowe asked Captain Jennings "who held the gun
56
while the natives signed [the petitions]." Jennings pro-
tested that both resolutions were entirely spontaneous, based
on the apprehension of the islanders that the new system would
involve disruption of their customs and way of living. Then
the question of the various organic legislative acts was
raised.
It was the impression of all present (representatives of
State, Interior, Navy, and Budget were present) that the Con-
gressional Committees would desire to make a personal investi-
gation of conditions in the islands before passing on the
legislation. They, therefore, agreed that passage of the
legislation was unlikely during the current Congressional
55, U. S. National Archives, U. S. Department of the Inte-
rior, Memorandum from Davis to Secretary of the Interior, April





session, although- the draft legislation should be submitted
as soon as possible anyway.
The President's letter of February 11, 1948, to Interior
was mentioned; and it was decided that, in view of the legis-
lation situation, there was no urgency in making any decisions
57
as to steps to be taken implementing that letter.
The draft legislation for the Trust Territory was finally
introduced in the Congress on May 21, 1948, as S.J. RES. 221
and was referred to the Senate Committee on Interior and In-
sular Affairs and the House Sub-Committee on Territories and
Insular Affairs of the House Public Lands Committee.
On the same day, legislation (H. CON. RES. 129) was intro-
duced to establish a Senate-House joint committee to study the
question of organic legislation for Guam, American Samoa and
the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. This committee
was subsequently established while the organic bill for the
Trust Territory was retained in the committees.
The Joint Investigating Committee included Senators Cordon
(Chairman), O'Mahoney, Wiley and Malone plus Representatives
Crawford and Fulton. This committee planned to depart from
San Francisco on November 29, 1948, and return about December
20, 1948.
At an informal meeting of this committee on July 2, 1948,
the question of organic legislation was discussed with Ben-
jamin Gerig and Emil J. Sady of the State Department's Divi-
sion of Dependent Areas; Captains Jennings, P. G. Hale, and




Mr. Davis reported to the Secretary of the Interior that Cap-
tain Jennings, "ignoring entirely the recommendation of the
four Secretaries to the President, made last spring, that a
civilian government be organized for all three of the areas,
... presented an argument for the continuation of Naval admin-
58
istration [of the Trust Territory]."
Mr. Davis reported that he had pointed out that Interior's
position rested "entirely on the joint recommendation of the
four Secretaries and the President's letter of February 11,....
I mentioned also our traditional responsibility for matters
59
affecting the territories and possessions,"
Senator Wiley indicated at that meeting a "strong inclina-
60
tion to leave the Navy in control." Therefore, Davis recom-
mended that the Secretary of the Interior or the Under Secre-
tary attend the next meeting of the joint committee and "state
as strongly as possible the case for civilian administration
61
under other than a military department."
Nothing came of this attempt by Captain Jennings to influ-
ence the Senate-House Joint Committee; and, in fact, the com-
mittee never went on the scheduled investigation trip to the
Pacific. On October 28, 1948, Senator Cordon informed Secre-
tary Krug that "in view of the apparent inability of any
member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to leave the
58. U. S. National Archives, U. S. Department of the
Interior, Davis to Secretary of the Interior, July 2, 1948,






United States during November and December, I regret that it
62
has been necessary to postpone the investigation indefinitely."
Meanwhile, between July 2, 1948, and August 11, 1948, Erail
J, Sady moved to Interior from the State Department and relieved
Roy E, James as Chief of the Pacific Branch of the Division of
Territories and Island Possessions. Sady had been a strong
advocate of civilian administration of all territories while
in the State Department and now assumed the leadership within
Interior for the transfer planning,
Access to all files, reports and other information con-
cerning Guam, American Samoa and the Trust Territory was granted
Mr. Sady by Acting Secretary of the Navy W. John Kenney on
63
August 24, 1948, in response to a request from Secretary Krug.
Additionally, Captain P. G. Hale, now the Assistant Chief of
Naval Operations for Island Governments, was directed to render
Mr, Sady "assistance to the fullest extent in developing plans
64
for further administration."
In September 1948, the Editor of the Honolulu Star Bul-
letin . Riley Allen, wrote to Emil P, Sady stressing that Inte-
rior should be certain it was fully ready to assume the
62. U. S. National Archives, U. S. Department of the
Interior, Senator Guy Cordon to Krug, October 28, 1948,
RG 126, 9-0-48, Islands Pacific Planning Pt. 1.
63. U. S. National Archives, U. S. Department of the
Interior, Office of the Secretary, Acting Secretary Chapman
to Secretary of the Navy, John L. Sullivan, August 11, 1948,
RG 126, 9-0-48, Islands Pacific Planning Pt. 1.
64. U. S., Naval Classified Archives Office, Secretary
of the Navy to Chief of Naval Operations, August 24, 1948,




administration of the various Pacific islands before doing so.
Spurred by this letter, Secretary Krug wrote to his subordinate
James P. Davis impressing upon him the importance of making
sure that Interior did not take over the administrative respon-
sibilities until it was fully prepared to assume them. Secre-
tary Krug then continued in his letter to Davis to expound on
what he considered the essential priorities involved in the
planning and timing of the transfer of that responsibility!
My own very vivid impression of Navy
administration in Guam and Samoa is a very
good one. Other than the fact that some of
the men were in uniform, it was hard for me
to imagine how the administration would be
any better under Interior Department super-
vision. I know this sounds like heresy,
but I cannot honestly say that our admin-,
istration of Alaska, Puerto Rico or the
Virgin Islands is on a par from the point
of view of taking care of the needs of the
population than that' now being provided by
the Navy in Guam and Samoa,
I fully appreciate the ideological
factor and also the general psychology in
the islands, in this country and through-
out the work [sic], which derives from
what some might consider as military
government in the Pacific Islands, How-
ever, regardless of the importance of
these factors, the first essential is to
improve the general economy of the people
and provide adequate health and educational
facilities. When all that is assured, they
will be well on their way to becoming good
democrats with or without Navy administra-
tion. 66
This letter no doubt disturbed Davis and Sady, James P.
Davis replied to Secretary Krug, stating that his assistant,
65. U. S, National Archives, U. S. Department of the
Interior, Riley Allen to Emil J. Sady, September 15, 1948,
RG 48, Office files of Oscar Chapman - Territories.
66. Library of Congress, Krug to James P. Davis, Dir-
ector, Division of Territories and Island Possessions,
October 11, 1948, Krug papers.
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Sady, was "the only person we have available for this job, and
he must at the same time handle matters relating to Hawaii,
Canton and Enderbury (for which details of the joint adminis-
tration are being worked out with the British) , and other
67
Pacific islands." He then stressed the need for obtaining
more funding and assistants to prepare for the transfer.
Special Assistant Dale sent a copy of Krug's letter to
his superior, Under Secretary Chapman, with the following note:
Attached is a letter from the Secretary
to Director Davis regarding the civilian
administration of the Pacific Islands. Its
tenor is very discouraging to those of us
who would like to push early civilian admin-
istration and would be wonderful propaganda
to the Navy if it could get hold of it. Ter-
ritories was preparing a detailed letter to
the Secretary on the necessity of civilian
administration last week, and hoped to get
it off to him on Friday, °8
This lack of funds and personnel within Interior compared
unfavorably with the funds, resources, and personnel available
within the Navy. For example, Sady's counterpart in the Navy,
Captain Hale, had a large number of assistants in Washington,
as well as the support of the actual staffs currently adminis-
trating the civil governments of the Trust Territory, Guam,
and American Samoa. The naval personnel concerned with the
islands* civil governments were largely officers performing
their military obligation in this manner after receiving
special training for these governmental duties.
67. Library of Congress, Davis to Krug, October 15,
1943, Krug papers.
68. U. S. National Archives, U. S. Department of the
Interior, Note to Chapman from Special Assistant Dale, October
18, 1948, RG 48, Office files of Oscar Chapman - Territories.
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Mr, Sady decided to conduct a preliminary study "of the
present organization of government in the three island areas
and the problems involved in the transfer of responsibility"
69
during the months of November 1948 - January 1949. The Navy
agreed to provide him with air transportation west of Honolulu,
and Sady went to Captain Hale's office on November 9, 1948, for
a farewell talk.
At this meeting, Captain Hale informed Sady that, while
the military recognized the need for a smooth transfer which
would require transportation and other logistic support by them
for some time after the transfer, there "would be pressure from
Naval Operations to release for naval duty most of the civil
70
government personnel shortly after the transfer is effected,"
Sady reported this to Rex Lee and continued:
In this connection, Captain Hale
pointed out that the Interior Department
has had about eight months to plan for the
assumption of this responsibility. He gave
me the impression that the Navy would not
———.. be unhappy if Interior was shown to be .
negligent or inept in the matter of plan-
ning for the transfer.,,. This points up
the need for funds and authority to get a
planning staff set up in this Branch. I
urge that every effort be made, through a
deficiency appropriation or otherwise, to
obtain funds for this purpose as soon as
possible, 71
The Navy's side of Sady's visit was described by Captain
W, J. Germershausen, an assistant of Captain Hale as follows:
69. U. S., Naval Classified Archives Office, Chapman to
Sullivan, November 2, 1948, CNO files, OP-22,
70. U. S. National Archives, U. S. Department of the Inte-
rior, Memorandum from Sady to Lee, November 9, 1948, RG 126,




Prior to departure from Washington for
the Pacific, Mr. Sady visited this office
and talked to the various officers in re-
gard to the islands to be visited. His
manner was insulting and insinuated that
the present administration is incompetent
and that he intended to indulge in political
discussions with the natives. In talking to
me, he asked for the names of various leaders
to whom he should go for discussion in Samoa.
He particularly asked for the names of what
he termed 'the hellers 1
. I pressed for a
definition of 'hellers* but could not elicit
a clearcut answer though I concluded he meant
those who were opposed to Naval Administra-
tion. 72
Mr. Sady did go to the Pacific, and he did talk to the
"hellers." He also attempted to convince many of the naval
officers in administrative positions to leave the Navy and
join Interior to continue in their same positions. Especially
in American Samoa, but also in the Trust Territory, Sady talked
to mass meetings and to local leaders stating that they would
be better administered under Interior than they would be under
the Navy.
As he left Guam, Sady issued a press statement that
particularly disturbed Captain Hale's office. It stated in
parti
I have discovered that contrary to reports
on the mainland there is no opposition in
the field to the recommendations of the
four secretaries or to the President's
policy with respect to the transfer. Not
a single officer has expressed the view
that the transfer should not be made and
almost everyone of the sixty or seventy
72. U. S., Naval Classified Archives Office, Germershau-
sen to Hale, January 11, 1949, CNO files, OP-22.
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officers with whom I have talked expressed
the view that a transfer can and shou' d be
made. 73
The naval Governor wrote to Captain Hale's office that the
officers in the government had been interviewed; and they all
74
"denied even having been approached on the subject by Sady."
Captain Germershausen reported that Sady was making little
"preliminary study of the present organization," spending
most of his time selling the Interior Department to the
75
island peoples.
The reports from the islands became so disturbing to
Captain Hale's office that a letter was drafted for Acting
Secretary of the Navy. John T. Koehler, addressed to Secretary
of the Interior Krug, concerning the political situation in
American Samoa as a result of -Sady's contacts. For example,
the Samoan legislature, the Fono , had been so upset with Sady's
talks with the "hellers" that it, therefore, passed a unan-
imous resolution, shortly after Sady left, calling for a con-
76
tinuation of naval administration. Secretary Krug replied
to Koehler* s letter stating that there had evidently been a
misunderstanding and that Sady had met with the "majority"
leaders in the islands as well as with those that reflected
73. U. S. National Archives, U. S. Department of the
Interior, Sady press statement on Guam, dispatch 170525Z,
December 17, 1948, RG 126, 9-0-48, Islands Pacific Planning
Pt. 1.
74. U. S., Naval Classified Archives Office, Germers-
hausen to Hale, January 11, 1949, CNO files, OP- 22.
75. Ibid.
76. U. S., Naval Classified Archives Office, Koehler





The incidents and letters described above illustrate
the sense of distrust and formality that existed at this time
between the Navy and Interior officers handling the problem
of the administrative transfer. Captain Hale and Emil P.
Sady were to continue in their respective positions through-
out much of the transfer process. They worked together, and
the job was accomplished; but there was no sense of friendly
cooperation between their two offices,
Mr. Sady, besides worrying about the attitudes of several
Congressmen and his counterparts in the Navy, had to worry
about the State Department's attitude. An undated memorandum
from Mr. Davis to Under Secretary of the Interior Chapman,
written between October 15, 1948, and May 14, 1949, states
that it had been learned that the Office of Far Eastern Affairs
in the State Department "is taking the Navy's side on the trans-
fer proposal. This Office wants a delay in the transfer 'be-
78
cause of the situation in China and in Southeast Asia. 1 "
Later, on June 17, 1949, Davis reported that he had learned
"from a reliable source" that Francis B. Sayre, U. S. Repre-
sentative on the Trusteeship Council, had written a letter to
the Under Secretary of State recommending that the State Depart-
ment oppose the transfer of administrative responsibility for
77. U. S., Naval Classified Archives Office, Krug to
Sullivan, April 26, 1949, CNO files, Op-22.
78. U. S. National Archives, U. S. Department of the
Interior, Davis to Chapman, undated, RG 48, Office files of




the Trust Territory to Interior. Sayre had recently visited
the Trust Territory and opposed the transfer, iayre's position,
according to Davis, was based on his "lack of confidence in
this Department -- an outgrowth of his relations with Interior
80
when he was U. S. High Commissioner to the Philippines."
Further action by Sayre in this matter will be discussed below.
The Interior Department did, however, receive a tremendous
boost when President. Truman signed a letter addressed to the
Secretary of the Interior (copy to Navy; on May 14, 1949, in
which he directed that the transfer of the three island groups
proceed regardless of the status of pending legislation. He
set the deadline of September 1, 1949, for the Secretary of
the Interior to submit plans to him for the transfers. Presi-
dent Truman also mentioned that he preferred that "Guam should
be transferred within the next year, and American Samoa and
81
the Trust Territory within the next two or three years. H
This Presidential letter had its origin in the delays in
the Congress over the enactment of the organic legislation.
In fact, the Congress to this day has never passed an organic
act for the Trust Territory. It also had its origin in the
Interior Department the previous December. Davis submitted
draft letters to Under Secretary Chapman on December 16, 1948,
for the President's signature which stated the same points as
79. U. S. National Archives, U. S. Department of the Inte-
rior, Office of Territories, Davis to Chapman, June 17, 1949,
RG 48, 9-0-7, Islands Gen. Pt, 3.
80. Ibid.
81. U. S. National Archives, U. S. Department of the Inte-
rior, May 14, 1949, RG 48, Office files of Oscar Chapman - Terri-




were in the actual Presidential letter of May 14, 1949.
The only difference between the draft letters (addressed to
State, Navy, and Interior) and the final Presidential letter
is that the drafts set a transfer deadline of July 1, 1950,
for all three island groups and contained no deadline for
the submission of the transfer plans,
Davis mentioned in his covering memorandum to Under Secre-
tary Chapman that Chapman "might want to talk to the President
about them [the draft letters'] and leave them with him when
83
next you see him" A shorthand note in the margin of this
84
memorandum stated, "hold for further discussion." There-
fore, it appears that these drafts of December 1948 were held
for a while and then submitted to the President resulting in
the Presidential letter of May 14, 1949.
This Presidential deadline produced the desired action.
On July 21, 1949, a memorandum of understanding between the
Department of the Interior and the Navy Department which set
forth the proposed time schedule and plan for effecting the
85
administrative transfer of Guam was sent to the President.
The date of July 1, 1950, was set for the Guam transfer.
Meanwhile, discussions between Sady and Captain Hale
proceeded to develop a similar memorandum of understanding
82. U. S. National Archives, U. S. Department of the
Interior, Davis to Chapman, December 16, 1948, RG 48, Office
files of Oscar Chapman - Territories.
83. Ibid,
84. Ibid.
85. U. S., Naval Classified Archives Office, Chapman to
President, July 21, 1949, CNO files, OP-22.
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on the transfer of American Samoa and the Trust Territory.
Captain Hale and Mr. Sady held a conference with their
assistants about August 27, 1949, to set a date for the
transfer of administrative responsibility for the Trust Terri-
tory and American Samoa. The date selected was July 1, 1951,
86
for both the Trust Territory and American Samoa.
The two memoranda of understanding were drafted by Cap-
tain Hale and Emil J. Sady and submitted to their respective
superiors on August 29, 1949, These memoranda were approved
by Under Secretary Chapman of Interior and Acting Secretary of
the Navy John T. Koehler and submitted to the President on




On September 23, 1949, the President approved these memo-
randa of understanding between Interior and Navy which set
forth time schedules and plans for effecting the transfer of
administrative responsibility for American Samoa and the Trust
88
Territory. The President specifically approved the July 1,
1951, date.
The Secretary of the Navy, Francis P. Matthews, trans-
mitted these memoranda of understanding to all Navy Department
86. The main factor involved in setting the date was the
problem of sea and air transportation in the Trust Territory.
87. U. S. National Archives, Office of Territories,
Assistant Secretary William E. Warne to President, August 23,
1949, RG 48, Islands Pacific Gen. Pt. 3.
88. U. S., Naval Classified Archives Office, President
to Secretary of the Navy, September 23, 1949, CNO files, OP-22.
See i Appendix Q for a copy of the Navy/Interior memorandum of




Bureaus and Offices on October 7, 1949, for guidance purposes.
From this date, serious steps were taken to effect the transfer
of the various Pacific islands.
Relations between Sady and Hale must have improved some-
what during the summer and fall of 1949. When Captain Hale
received orders to other naval duty in February 1950, Sady
drafted a letter of appreciation concerning Captain Hale which
Mr. Chapman signed and sent to the Secretary of the Navy. It
stated in part:
Officers in this Department who have
been closely associated with Captain Hale
during the past eighteen months, ... have
asked me to convey to you an expression of
their high regard for Captain Hale and
their genuine regret that he is leaving
Washington.
Largely due to Captain Hale's efforts,
outstanding ability,- frankness, mature
understanding, and loyal adherence to
policies established by higher authority,
the President's program with respect to
the islands has gone forward efficiently
and harmoniously. Naval interests and
policies have marked his course in deal-
—
— ing with this Department, At the same
time, his rich sense of humor, warmth, co-
operative spirit, and determination to get
things done have won him the respect and
affection of his colleagues in this Depart-
ment • 90
Captain Hale must have been surprised to see this letter
in his official file. The words should not be taken at face
value, but they do indicate an improvement in the relationship
89. U. S., Naval Classified Archives Office, Secretary of
the Navy to All Bureaus and Offices, October 7, 1949, CNO files,
OP-22.
90. U. S. National Archives, U. S. Department of the Inte-
rior, Office of Territories, Chapman to Matthews, February 27,
1950, RG 48, 9-0-7, Islands Gen. Pt. 4.
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between the Navy's Office of Island Governments and Interior's
Division of Territories and Island Possessions. The comment
about Captain Hale's loyalty to policies established by higher
authority is interesting in light of what happened shortly
after Captain Hale was transferred.
Early in March 1950, Assistant Secretary of the Navy
Koehler requested a personal memorandum from Admiral Arthur W,
Radford, Commander • in Chief of the Pacific and High Commis-
sioner of the Trust Territory, "giving reasons why Navy might
wish to retain the Trust Territory indefinitely, necessitating,
91
of course, a reversal of the present Presidential directive."
This statement was contained in a message reporting on a con-
ference with Mr. Koehler. The originator of the message and
the exact date is unknown, but- it is very important in rela-
tion to what action followed. The message continued!
Koehler says he is on record as favoring
such a solution with Mr. Pace of BUBUD
[Bureau of the Budget"] as result of con-
— —... ference in which he and Ambassador Sayre
(mostly the latter) plead the Navy's case.
Koehler said he was surprised to learn
later that CMO was opposed to retention
of Navy control beyond cut off date and
asked CNO for an official statement of
position in the matter. He stated that
his decision whether to approach Presi-
dent or not through proper channels will
be made after receipt and study of Adm
Radford's memo (as HICOM) [High Commis-
sioner of the Trust Territory] and CNO's
statement. In this connection Sec'y of
Labor Tobin assured me in Boston Saturday
that he would be glad to champion Navy
control of the Trust Territory with the
91. U. S., Naval Classified Archives Office, message
concerning transfer of Trust Territory, undated and unsigned,
evidently transmitted in early March 1950, CNO files, OP-22.
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President at any time.... Have infomed
Mr. Koehler of Mr. Tobin's offer which he
will use if Navy decides to ask for r- con-
sideration. 92
Admiral Radford's and the Chief of Naval Operations 1
statements have not been located, but they evidently were
such to convince Mr. Koehler to attempt to reverse the Presi-
dential directive.
On March 15, 1950, the Secretary of the Navy, Francis P.
Matthews, wrote the President proposing that the date of
July 1, 1951, for the Trust Territory transfer be considered
tentative. He stated that some of the problems, including
those of transportation, needed to be studied and resolved.
He then stated
i
Although the Department of the Navy
agrees that it should relinquish responsi-
bility for the civil administration of all
Pacific Islands at the earliest practical
date, it is felt that this important trans-
fer should not be effected until it has
become clearly apparent that all problems
concerned therewith will be completely and
satisfactorily resolved. 93
This letter was sent directly to the President with a
copy being sent to Interior for its information. James P.
Davis informed Secretary Chapman (who had relieved Krug) that
"The Navy boys are out of bounds on this one. They did not
discuss the proposed delay with us until after the letter
to the President had been signed. They allege no logical
92. Ibid.
93. U. S., Naval Classified Archives Office, Matthews
to the President, March 15, 1950, CNO files, OP-22. Also:
The Harry S. Truman Library, Official files, 85-L.
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reasons for delay. The Transportation Survey is now in full
progress. I think we should insist at least on awaiting
result of that survey before agreeing to any modification of
94
the schedule."
Admiral Robert L. Dennison, now Naval Aide to the Presi-
dent, transmitted the Navy letter to Interior on March 28,
1950, stating that the President desired Secretary Chapman's
95
views on the Secretary of the Navy's proposal. Secretary
Krug asked Davis to prepare a letter for him to the President
along the lines of Davis' memorandum cited above. The resul-
tant letter was signed by Chapman on April 5, 1950, which
stressed that the transfer date should be maintained since
96
all plans and budget requests were based on that date.
The President evidently refused to reconsider the transfer
date since there is no indication to the contrary. No reply
by the President is in the files.
On June 1, 1950, the Interior and Navy Departments sub-
mitted a plan to the President for the establishment of civil-
ian sea and air transportation services in the Trust Territory.
This plan was to have been submitted by May 1, 1950, in accord-
ance with the Interior/Navy memorandum of understanding. The
plan provided that contracts were to be negotiated with a
94. U. S. National Archives, U. 3. Department of the
Interior, Office of Territories, Davis to Chapman, March 21,
1950, RG 48, 9-0-7, Islands Gen. Pt. 4.
95. U. S. National Archives, U. S. Department of the Inte-
rior, Office of Territories, Dennison to Secretary of the Inte-
rior, March 28, 1950, RG 48, 9-0-7, Islands Gen. Pt. 4.
96. U. S. National Archives, U. S. Department of the Inte-
rior, Office of Territories, Chapman to President, April 5, 1950,
RG 48, 9-0-7, Islands Gen. Pt. 4.
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commercial shipping line and a commercial air line using govern-
ment ships and planes in providing the necessary transportation
services under civilian administration. President Truman
approved this plan on June 6, 1950. In his approval, the Presi-
dent noted that the plan included a provision that "should it
be apparent prior to 1 November 1950 that a civilian transpor-
tation service cannot supply essential requirements in the
Trust Territory by 1 July 1951, a report of this fact will be
made to me, together with a recommendation of a date subsequent
to 1 July 1951 for the transfer of administrative responsibility
97
of the Trust Territory."
This provision of the plan was, therefore, the compromise
between the Navy and the Interior positions which had been
sent to the President in March and April.
With the invasion of South Korea on June 25, 1950, a new
situation developed in the Pacific in regard to the transfer
of Guam and the Trust Territory. The Secretary of the Navy
requested that the transfer of Guam be delayed "until the
98
situation in the Western Pacific has stabilized." The Presi-
dent, on June 30, 1950, had already postponed the transfer of
Guam for one month because of some minor problems involved in
the transfer. The Secretary of the Interior wrote to the
President requesting that Guam's transfer not be delayed
97. U. S. National Archives, U. S. Department of the Inte-
rior, Office of Territories, President to Secretaries of the
Navy and Interior, June 6, 1950, RG 48, 9-0-7, Islands Gen. Pt. 4.
98. U. S. National Archives, U. S. Department of the Inte-
rior, Office of Territories, Chapman to Mr. Lawton, July 25,




any longer. The President reaffirmed the August 1, 1950,
date; and Guam was transferred on that date in spite of the
Korean situation.
Secretary Matthews was still attempting to delay the
Trust Territory transfer date. He testified before the
Senate Appropriations Committee at hearings in support of a
request for funds to replace the naval sea and air transporta-
tion system in the Trust Territory with civilian transporta-
tion services by July 1, 1951. In his testimony, Secretary
Matthews stated that the Navy should retain control of the
Trust Territory "in this critical period" and referred to
his "being overruled" on a request for postponement of the
100
Guam transfer. This testimony was released just after
Christmas 1950 and was the subject of a United Press news
101
release. However, no action came as a result of his
testimony.
The memorandum of understanding called for Interior to
nominate a civilian High Commissioner for the Trust Territory
who should be appointed by the President on or about July 1,
1950, a year before the transfer. Interior delayed in making
the nomination} and in late August 1950, Secretary Matthews
had asked Interior if they wanted to postpone the transfer
proceedings in light of the long delay. Interior finally nom-
inated former Senator Elbert D. Thomas of Utah, and he was
99. Ibid.
100. U. S. National Archives, U. S. Department of the Inte-
rior, Office of Territories, Dan H. Wheller, Acting Director of
Office of Territories, to Secretary of the Interior, December 29,




appointed by the President on January 3, 1951.
The delay in the appointment of the civilian High Com-
missioner had retarded agreement negotiations between the two
departments; but after January 1951, rapid progress was made
in drafting a general transfer agreement between the Interior
and Navy Departments. The transfer agreement defined the
relationship between the two departments in the Trust Terri-
tory after the transfer date. It covered such matters as
transfer of property, communications, transportation, security,
and personnel. Additionally, after January 1951, steps were
taken to replace naval officers and enlisted men engaged in
government duties in the Trust Territory with qualified civil-
102
ians.
During the spring of 1951, the Interior and Navy Depart-
ments independently proceeded to draft proposed Executive
Orders for the transfer of administrative authority. On
April 27, 1951, the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Forrest
Sherman, directed that the security control of the Trust Terri-
tory be placed in the Navy Department by the Executive Order.
Accordingly, Captain T. F. Darden, the replacement of Captain
Hale, had his staff draft an Executive Order which included a
statement that the Secretary of the Navy would be responsible
for the security of the Trust Territory after the transfer
and could take action, as he deemed necessary, to discharge
this responsibility.
102. Similar negotiations and steps were taken in respect




Another statement v7as included which provided that the
Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of Stat s would have
the joint authority to close any areas within the Trust Terri-
tory for security reasons and to determine the extent to which
Articles 87 and 88 of the United Nations Charter (providing
for receiving petitions and reports and making periodic visits)
103
would be applicable to such closed areas. This second pro-
vision had been included in Executive Order 9875 of July 18,
1947, which had appointed the Navy Department as the interim
administrator of the civil government of the Trust Territory
pending its transfer to a civilian department or agency.
This Navy version of an Executive Order was submitted by
the Chief of Naval Operations to the Navy's Judge Advocate
General's Office for processing. A redraft of the Executive
Order containing no substantive changes was prepared and for-
warded to the Chief of Naval Operations on May 28 and approved
104
by him on June 5.
Meanwhile, without the Navy's knowledge, the Interior
Department submitted its version of a proposed Executive Order
to the Bureau of the Budget on May 25, 1951. Under President
Truman's administrative procedure, the proposed Executive Order
(as well as all proposed legislation) had to pass through the
Bureau of the Budget.
The draft Executive Order submitted by the Interior
103. U. S., Naval Classified Archives Office, Chief of
Naval Operations to Judge Advocate General, May 11, 1951, CNO
files, OP-22.
104. U. S., Naval Classified Archives Office/Captain
Darden to Admiral Hartman, June 27, 1951, CNO files, OP-22.
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Department did not provide for the security control of the
Trust Territory being retained by the Navy. It placed the
authority to close areas with the President; anl neither the
Executive Order nor the proposed transfer agreement, which
was drafted jointly by the Navy and Interior, provided for
the general responsibility for the security of the Trust
105
Territory.
On June 5, 1951, the Bureau of the Budget submitted Inte-
rior's version of the Executive Order to the Navy for comment
before being submitted to the President. It was on this date
that the Navy learned of Interior's proposed Executive Order,
its provisions and the fact that it had been submitted to the
Bureau of the Budget two weeks before. It was immediately
after learning these facts that the Chief of Naval Operations
106
approved the Navy version of an Executive Order.
The Secretary of the Navy was briefed on the situation
on June 11, and he telephoned Secretary of the Interior Chapman
on the issue on June 13, 1951. Secretary Matthews told Secre-
tary Chapman of the two proposals concerning the security of
the Trust Territory that the Navy desired and requested that
the Executive Order proposed by Interior be changed accord-
107
ingly. Secretary Chapman answered by letter on the same
105. Ibid.
106. U. S., Naval Classified Archives Office, Chief of
Naval Operations to Judge Advocate General, June 5, 1951, and
Chief of Naval Operations (signed by Admiral Hartman) to Judge
Advocate General, June 11, 1951, CNO files, OP-22.
107. U. S. Classified Archives Office, Secretary of the





day refuting the Navy's arguments for the changes. Secre-
tary Matthews then wrote a long letter to Secre ary Chapman
on June 20, 1951, detailing in writing the two changes requested
109
by the Navy. A copy of this letter later found its way into
the President's official files. It was possibly used in a
later briefing of the President by his naval aide, Admiral
Dennison.
The Secretary of the Interior never replied to Secretary
Matthews* letter of June 20. While awaiting a reply, Secretary
Matthews retained the Navy version of the Executive Order in
his office. Meanwhile, the Navy's Judge Advocate General's
office orally informed the Bureau of the Budget of the two
changes requested by the Navy and received assurances that the
Bureau of the Budget would await the Navy version of the Execu-
110
tive Order before taking action.
On June 27, Mr. Roger Jones of the Bureau of the Budget
called Mr. G. L. Russell of the Navy's Office of the Judge Advo-
cate General with some bad news for the Navy. Mr. Jones informed
Mr. Russell that the Bureau was going ahead with the processing
of the Executive Order submitted by Interior without waiting
for the written views of the Navy Department. He stated that
the Bureau was recommending that the President accept Interior's
108. Ibid.
109. The Harry S. Truman Library, Secretary of the Navy
to the Secretary of the Interior, June 20, 1951, Official file
85-L.
110. U. S., Naval Classified Archives Office, Captain
Darden to Admiral Hartman, June 27, 1951, CNO files, 0P-22.
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draft. The Bureau, according to Mr. Jones, considered the
first change proposed by the Navy (responsibility for security)
to be a question of organization; and granting that the Presi-
dent would have to decide it, the Bureau agreed with Interior
that the Navy should have no more authority than it had in
other territories. As for the second requested change (au-
thority for closing areas), Mr. Jones said that the President
had stated that he wanted the Executive Order to reserve that
111
authority to himself.
Mr. Jones continued his remarks by saying that the draft
Executive Order was currently in the Department of Justice
for clearance, and that it should reach the White House late
that day or early the next morning. He finished by stating
that Mr. Murphy of the Bureau -of the Budget, who knew of the
current status, would handle the Executive Order? and if the
Navy had any further representations to make, they should be
made to him.
Needless to say, this turn of events, only four days
before the transfer date, disturbed Captain Darden. He imme-
diately sent a memorandum to the Vice Chief of Naval Opera-
tions for Administration, Admiral Hartman, which included a
chronology of the events concerning the steps taken within
the Navy to present its views on this matter. He ended the
memorandum with a recommendation that Admiral Hartman arrange
for the Chief of Naval Operations to ask Secretary Matthews
111. U. S., Naval Classified Archives Office, G. L. Rus-




to authorize representatives of the Chief of Naval Operations
and the Judge Advocate General to appear before Mr. Murphy of
the Bureau of the Budget to present the Navy's case. Captain
Darden also requested that Admiral Dennison, the Naval Aide
to the President, be briefed on the subject and that either
the Chief of Naval Operations or the Secretary make an appoint-
112
ment with Mr, Murphy.
To solve the problem, Admiral Dennison personally briefed
the President on the matter and determined that the President
preferred that any security provisions be covered in the trans-
fer agreement and that President Truman desired the authority
113
to close areas to rest solely with the President.
The security changes—giving the Navy control over all
alien entry into the Trust Territory among other security
measures- -were made in the transfer agreement. The Navy did
not, however, get the broad sweeping statement concerning its
authority in terms of security that it had desired. The Execu-
tive Order was left as Interior had desired--leaving the Presi-
dent as the sole authorizing official in determining closed
areas
.
The Executive Order, No. 10265 of June 29, 1951, transfer-
ring the administrative responsibility for the Trust Territory
of the Pacific Islands from the Department of the Navy to the
112. U. S. , Naval Classified Archives Office, Captain
Darden to Admiral Hartman, June 27, 1951, CNO files, OP- 22.
113. U. S., Naval Classified Archives, Admiral Hartman




Department of the Interior, was signed by the President and
114
became effective on July 1, 1951.
The transfer agreement, with its technical details con-
cerning security, communications, transportation, personnel
and transfer of property, became effective on the same day.
Thus, the third and final phase of the total issue as
it had evolved in the period covered in this study came to a
close. The postwar disposition of the former Japanese man-
dated islands had finally been made--six years after the end
115
of the war.
114. See: Appendix R for a copy of this Executive Order.
115. An interesting side note is that nineteen Japanese
servicemen who had been marooned on Anatahan Island in the
Marianas for seven years surrendered on June 30, 1951. They
had refused to believe repeated leaflets and loudspeaker an-
nouncements that the war was over. Life , Vol. 31, No. 3
(July 16, 1951), p. 21.
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God and the soldier we adore,
In time of danger, not before.
The danger over, and all wrongs righted,
God is forgotten, the soldier slighted.
Unknown author quoted
by Winston Churchill
The influence of military professionals
in American society between 1946 and 1955
was significantly le-ss than it had been dur-
ing World War II. Nonetheless, it was still
at an unprecedented level in the absence of
total war. The extent to which professional
military officers assumed nonmilitary roles
in government, industry, and politics, and
developed affiliations with nonmilitary groups
was a new phenomenon in American history.
Military officers wielded far greater power
in the United States during this period than
they did in any other major country.
Samuel P. Huntington:






Because the decision-making process concerning the post-
war disposition of the former mandated islands was basically
a conflict between officials that took a "pragmatic" view
which stressed the optimizing of national security and those
officials that took an "international" view which stressed
the long-range visionary goals, it is of interest to show
how the arrangements worked out. To judge the wisdom of the
decisions concerning the postwar disposition of the former
mandated islands, it is necessary to study not only the manner
in which they were made but, also, the manner in which the
decisions bore the test of time.
The conflict between the Department of the Navy and
Interior over the administration of the Trust Territory did
not end with the transfer of administrative responsibility on
July 1, 1951, There was a basic conflict between security
and civil development considerations during the early 1950' s.
The existence of the Communist regime in China, the tense
relations with the Soviet Union, the Korean War, the alleged
utilization of Saipan by the Central Intelligence Agency for
training Nationalist Chinese and Tibetan military personnel,
and the utilization of Eniwetok Atoll on November 6, 1952,
for the first Hydrogen bomb explosion--all created conflicts
between the Department of Defense and the Interior Department




In a report to Admiral Radford the Commander in Chief
of the Pacific (and former High Commissioner of the Trust Terri-
tory, 1949-1951, who became Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff in August 1953) , Commander L. G. Findley of the Navy
Department analyzed the deteriorated situation and, without
labeling it as such, described the consequences of the lack of
what Admiral Nimitz had advocated be obtained at all costs, i.e.,
unity of command. Commander Findley* s report did not use the
phrase "unity of command" and stressed too much the importance
of the public airings of the conflicts bet\^een Interior and
Navy. The following segment of the Findley report, however,
clearly supports the Author's contention that the lack of any
"unity of command" made the civil government arrangements inad-
equate when new threats to national security required that
priority be given to certain Central Intelligence Agency
projectst




sions of the agencies (Navy and Interior)
and the manner in which the missions were
independently executed, certain areas of
conflict were bound to develop. The mili-
tary agency had been stripped of its civil
government functions and had no voice in
certain policies which conflicted in vary-
ing degrees with security considerations.
The civilian agency, on the other hand, had
aspirations for future civil development in
which security consideration played no part
since there was no directed responsibility
in that field. V/hen the inevitable con-
flicts occurred, the United States security
considerations were sometimes branded as
military obstacles to a free development
of the area.l
1. U. S. Department of the Navy, Office of Naval Opera-
tions, L. G. Findley to Admiral Radford, "A Review of U. S.
Administration in the Pacific", February 4, 1953, OP-61 files.
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Without stating any reasons, President Truman, by Execu-
tive Order 10408 executed on November 10, 1952, ordered that
the administration of that portion of the Trust Territory which
includes the islands of Tinian and Saipan be transferred from
the Secretary of the Interior to the Secretary of the Navy.
This transfer was effective on January 1, 1953. The previous
decision that a civilian agency would administer the Trust
Territory did not remain intact for very long.
Other islands in the Trust Territory were transferred to
Naval administration by Executive Order 10470 executed by
President Eisenhower on July 17, 1953. This Executive Order
modified the earlier one of November 10, 1952, to provide that
all of the Northern Mariana Islands of the Trust Territory,
with the exception of the Island of Rota, would be transferred
to the Navy. The transfer was effective on July 17, 1953
,
although, the detailed Navy/Interior transfer agreement was
2
not promulgated until December 4, 1953, Needless to say,
the multiple transfers- -first from the Navy to Interior and,
later, from Interior back to the Navy- -were not conducive to
efficient administration and development of the islands.
The groundwork for this latter transfer had been prepared
by the Findley report of February 1953, quoted above, which
set forth an argument for a return of all of the islands of
the Trust Territory, as well as Guam and American Samoa, to
military administration. This report had been prepared with
2, U. S. Department of the Navy, Office of Naval Opera-
tions, OPNAV 5430, OP-215, Ser. 4661P21, December 4, 1953, en-
closing and promulgating the Navy/Interior Transfer Agreement
for the Northern Mariana Islands, less Rota, OP-61 files.
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the assistance of LCDR. Dorothy E. Richard and LCDR. C. E.
Herrick.
The report stressed the "great harm to the United States"
resulting from the public airing of conflicts between the mili-
tary services and Interior because of "the propaganda value of
this type of dissention" which provided "fuel for the Communist
press who call the United States an imperialistic, aggressive,
3
war- like nation." The report, however, did not specify whe-
ther both sides were participating in the public airing of the
conflicts. It merely cited the case of the Secretary of the
Interior protesting to the press when Saipan and Tinian were
re-transferred to Navy administration as an example of the
public airing of conflicts.
The report then stated that "in light of international
events in the Far East it is apparent that the hopes for a
quiet Pacific Ocean Area must be laid aside for the present.
It is time to do first things first. It is imperative that
the essential nature of the Pacific Islands be recognized and
that their administration be tied in with national security
which is, after all, the primary reason for the United States
4
to hold the islands." This statement comes closer, in the
opinion of the Author, to the main reason for the breakdown
of the previous arrangements, i.e., the inadequacy of the
"split-control" system of administration to contend with
3. U. S. Department of the Navy, Office of Naval Opera-
tions, L. G. Findley to Admiral Radford, "A Review of U. S.




certain consequences (secret projects) of "international events
in the Far East."
The Find ley report then proposed three advantages to
having the Secretary of Defense designated as the administer-
ing authority for Guam, the Trust Territory, and American Samoa
as followsi
First, the public airing of differ-
ences which is inherent in the present split-
control situation would be obviated. There
would be no distracting factors in the single
aim to strengthen this country's defenses.
Civil government would be continued in
orderly fashion but long-range visionary
ideals would fall into their proper places,
Second, the Defense Department has the
only government reservoir of trained person-
nel.... There would be no desperate, hit-or-
miss recruitment program by the Navy [because
of Navy's supply of trained personnel, i.e.,
the graduates of the Navy's school on island
administration at Stanford University],
It would not make a particle of differ-
ence if the Secretary of Defense, in adminis-
tering the islands, put all the personnel,
military as well as civilian, into civilian
clothes for their tours of duty. It might
even make the Secretary of Defense super-
—
-— vision more understandable to those who may
retain mis-conceptions concerning the true
nature of former Naval civil government.
Third, there will be no need for a new
governmental organization to be built in
order to carry out the island administra-
tion duties. There is no need for a new
Bureau of External Affairs as has sometimes
been suggested. The Secretary of Defense
has only to turn the operating details over
to the Navy in order to find the needed
personnel and logistic support,
5
This is an interesting document for its exposition of the




the discussions within the Government leading to President
Truman's decision to re-transfer Tinian and Sai{ an and to
President Eisenhower's decision to re-transfer the rest of
the Northern Marianas, less Rota. Primarily, because no docu-
ments concerning the reasons for the transfers were found in
the files, this Author suspects that the main reason was the
desire of the Central Intelligence Agency to utilize Saipan
for training various clandestine forces. Such training has
not been confirmed by any Governmental source; but various
former officers and officials, as well as many inhabitants
of Saipan, have reported that Nationalist Chinese and Tibetan
troops were trained on Saipan by the Central Intelligence
Agency during the early 1950' s.
Of course, the specific act alleged above would have been
only a reflection of the total security atmosphere concerning
the Western Pacific at that time. The ANZUS Treaty had been
signed on September 1, 1951. Developments in Indo-China,
China, and Korea were foreboding. Indonesia, Malaysia, and
the Philippines were experiencing insurrections. In other
words, the postwar Pacific was not the peaceful area envisaged
by the "internationalists
.
H There was no great-power collab-
oration. The arrangements concerning the Trust Territory,
i.e., civil government administered by a civilian agency with
"split-control" over military projects, proved inadequate
when faced with the security problems and atmosphere of the
early 1950' s. The emphasis at that time was to contain Com-
munism at all costs. When, as this Author believes, the
Central Intelligence Agency desired the utilization of Saipan
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for clandestine projects, the Government realized that the
"split-control" arrangement would have to be ended in regard
to the area directly concerned. The "split-control" arrange-
ment had already given rise to conflicts between the military
agencies and the Interior Department- -some of which evidently
were aired publicly. The Central Intelligence Agency would
have required complete control over the area of its project
and the best protection possible against public discussion of
its activities.
The security atmosphere concerning the Western Pacific
did not, in itself, dictate the re-transfer of the Marianas.
Otherwise, they would probably have been re- transferred ear-
lier, or never transferred to Interior in the first place.
The Secretary of the Navy had ^attempted to postpone the trans-
fer because of the Korean situation but had failed. Addition-
ally, why were the Mariana Islands the only ones re- transferred?
The unofficial reports indicate that the Central Intelligence
Agency commenced the secret training project in 1953 This
timing, plus the fact that no documents have been located
concerning the motivation behind the re-transfers and the
complete lack of any public statements concerning the reason-
ing for them, tends to make one suspect that the Central Intel-
ligence Agency's project was the decisive factor behind the
transfers of the Mariana Islands from Interior control to
Navy control. The "split-control" system was inadequate in




"unity of command" had to be adopted.
* * *
The United States Congress, while never enacting an
organic act for the Trust Territory, did pass an act in 1954
(63 Statute 330; 48 U.S.C. 1681) providing for Presidential
control of the Trust Territory's government, including the
authority to designate the administrative agency or agencies
of the islands. This law merely formalized the powers that
the President had exercised de facto since the islands had
been captured. No bill of rights or self-government provi-
sions were included in this Congressional Act,
Because of the close social, economic, cultural, bio-
logical and geographical ties -between Guam (whose islanders
became American citizens in 1950) and the rest of the Marianas,
the people of the Marianas desired from the very beginning to
separate from the Trust Territory to be joined with Guam, As
early as June 12, 1950, the people of the Northern Marianas
petitioned the United Nations for their incorporation with
the United States as a possession or as a territory- -prefer-
ably as a territory. They declared at that time that they
wanted to someday be considered a part of the United States
7
and receive American citizenship.
6. Admiral Arthur W, Radford, Interview with the Author,
June 29, 1969, In this interview, the Admiral stated he could
not remember the facts concerning these re-trcvnsfers. At the
time of the interview, he was in the process of writing his
memoirs and had not yet reviewed his files on this matter.
7. United Nations, Trusteeship Council, Document
T/PET.10/5, June 12, 1950.
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By various petitions and unofficial plebiscites over the
years, the islanders of the Marianas District of the Trust Terri<
tory stressed, as they still do, their desire to separate from
the rest of the Trust Territory and to join in a union with
8
Guam.
The split administration (Navy administration of the
Marianas with Interior administering the rest of the Trust
Territory) was criticized by the United Nations Visiting Mis-
sions as encouraging these separatist tendencies. These Mis-
sions believed that there could be no question of the Mariana
Islands being separated from the rest of the Trust Territory
while the Trusteeship Agreement was still in force. They also
believed that the separatist tendencies were hindering the
development of the territory as a whole . towards political
development, a sense of "Micronesian" identity, and central-
9
ized leadership. As the journalist Robert Trumbull has
8, United Nations, Trusteeship Council, Documents :
T/PETo 10/31, November 5, 1959; T/PET. 10/2.4, July 31, 1963;
T/PET 10/2. 6, March 19, 1964; Report of the United Nations
Visiting Mission to the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands,
1964, T/1620, May 18, 1964, pp 155-159; T/PET. 10/L.9, Septem-
ber 29, 1964; T/PET. 10/L. 10, October 25, 1965; and T/PET. 10/L. 11,
January 20, 1966. See also: United States Congress, House of
Representatives, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs,
Reports on Pacific Affairs. 1965 (Washington: U. S. Government
Printing Office, 1965), p. 99; and United Nations, Trusteeship
Council, Report of the Visiting Mission to the Trust Territory
of the Pacific Islands, 1970, Document T/1707 . May 19, 1970,
pp 136 ff.
9. These opinions were stated in the Visiting Mission
reports of 1959, 1962, 1964, 1967 and 1970. See. United Nations,
Trusteeship Council, Report of the Visiting Mission to the Trust
Territory of the Pacific Islands, 1970, Document T/1707 , May 19,
1970, pp. 128 ff. See alsoi Whitney T, Perkins, Denial of Empire :_
The United States and Its Dependencies (Leyden, The Netherlands:
A. W. Sythoff, 1962), p. 324 and David W. Wainhouse, Remnants of
Empire: The United Nations and the End of Colonialism (New York:
Harper and Row, Inc., 1964), pp, 123-124.
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phrased it, the lack of unity among the islanders hinders the
"building [of] an administration staff by Micronesians and
greatly limits the rate of progress toward self-government
10
beyond a local level.
The Kennedy Administration, as a result of its own policy
to attempt to develop a sense of unity within the Trust Terri-
tory, was against such separatist tendencies as were most
clearly evidenced in the Northern Marianas. As a result of
this policy, re-enforced by the United Nations* criticism of
the "split" administration for encouraging such separatist
tendencies, the Kennedy Administration decided to transfer
the Northern Marianas back to Interior.
During the session of June 1961, after appropriate clear-
ances had been obtained by the State Department, the Trustee-
ship Council was advised by the High Commissioner that "the
Departments concerned are agreed in principle that the admin-
istration of the Territory should be unified. The detailed
steps for bringing about this unified administration are now
11
in process of being worked out." The Departments of the
Navy and Interior worked on the drafting of an appropriate
10. Robert Trumbull, Paradise In Trust; A Report On Amer-
icans In Micronesia, 1946-1953 (New Yorki William Sloane Assoc-
iates, 1959;, p. 109. Adding to the problem is the fact that
the Mariana Islands are more economically advanced than the
other areas of the Trust Territory and the fact that the Cham-
orros (three-fourths of the population of the Mariana Islands
District) are probably the most politically advanced of all
the islanders.
11. U. S. Department of the Navy, Office of Naval Opera-
tions, Assistant Secretary of the Interior, D. Otis Beasley, to




Executive Order. The work was timed so that the President
could sign the Executive Order prior to May 31, 1962, the
scheduled opening date of the next Trusteeship Council
session.
On May 7, 1962, the President signed Executive Order 11021
which transferred the civil administration of the Northern Mari-
anas back to the Interior Department. The effective date of
this Executive Order was July 1, 1962. Another detailed trans-
fer agreement had to be negotiated between the Navy and Inte-
rior. This time, the initial draft was prepared jointly bet-
ween Commander in Chief, Naval Forces Marianas (the civil
governor of those islands under naval administration) and the
High Commissioner of the Trust Territory. A number of points
of difference were noted for resolution on the departmental
level in Washington. These points were not settled until
12
shortly after the July 1, 1962, turn-over.
Meanwhile, President Kennedy, by National Security Memo-
randum No. 145 of April 18, 1962, established a Trust Territory
Task Force under the chairmanship of Assistant Secretary of the
Interior John A. Carver, Jr., with the responsibility, among
other things, of revising procedures regarding entry of non-
citizens and foreign flag vessels into all but designated
defense areas of the Trust Territory. This task force included
13
officers from the State, Defense, and Interior Departments.
12. U. S. Department of the Navy, Office of Naval Opera-
tions, Chief of Naval Operations' distributed letter, ser.
281P0932, July 2, 1962, OP-61 files.
13, U. S. Department of the Navy, Office of Naval Opera-
tions, Assistant Secretary of the Interior to the Assistant
Secretary of Defense (ISA), October 10, 1962, OP-61 files.
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Under the "split-control" arrangements then in force, the
Navy exercised control over alien persons and ships entering
the Trust Territory. This task force was directed to revise
these procedures in order to relax the entry controls.
Although the White House issued a press release on
August 23, 1962, concerning the relaxation of entry controls
for the Trust Territory, no substantive work was done on this
matter until October 10, 1962. On this date, Mr. John A.
Carver, Jr.
,
proposed to his task force that an agreement be
reached permitting the High Commissioner to exercise primary
control over the entry of aliens. The agreement would provide
that the High Commissioner would advise the Department of the
Navy with respect to aliens or foreign vessels, other than
alien tourists intending to remain in the Trust Territory
thirty days or less, which he intended to allow to enter the
Trust Territory and would give "due consideration to objec-
14
tions, if any, on the part of the Navy."
On November 14, 1962, a meeting was held between Interior
and Navy representatives to consider this matter of control
15
over alien entry into the Trust Territory. It was agreed
at this meeting that all alien entry applications would first
be made to the High Commissioner, with the Navy having an
opportunity to express its disapproval of each application.
14. Ibid.
15. Present at this meeting were the following! John
Kirwan, Assistant Director; Ruth Van Cleve, Assistant Solic-
itor; Chester Needham, Plans and Programs Officer (members
of the Interior Department's Office of Territories) and
Commander C. E. Herrick of the Navy Department.

289
If the Navy should object to the issuance of an entry author-
ization or request the revocation of an entry ai thorization,
the High Commissioner would refrain from issuing such author-
ization or revoke the authorization as the case might be.
If the High Commissioner felt that he could not agree, he
16
could refer the matter to the department level in Washington.
These points were incorporated into an amendment to the Navy/
Interior Transfer Agreement of July 2, 1962, and took effect
17
on July 1, 1963.
These relaxed procedures did not apply to any areas desig-
nated as defense areas. These were areas closed for security
reasons by the President and, therefore, not open to the United
Nations Visiting Missions and not subject to the annual report
to the United Nations, In 1963, two areas were so designated:
the Eniwetok and Bikini Atolls. These areas were controlled
solely by the Department of the Navy with respect to entry by
13
all individuals, vessels and aircraft.
In 1966, it became apparent that many aliens (mainly
Japanese) were entering the Trust Territory for the purpose
16. U. S. Department of the Navy, Office of Naval Opera-
tions, Memorandum for the Record by C, E.Herrick, November 14,
1962, OP-61 files.
17. U. S. Department of the Navy, Office of Naval Opera-
tions, Letter to Distribution List, ser. 294P0932, June 27, 1963,
OP-61 files.
18. Bikini Atoll was utilized for atomic bomb experimental
explosions on July 1 and July 25, 1946, Eniwetok Atoll was util-
ized for the first hydrogen bomb explosion on November 6, 1952.
At present, Eniwetok and Kwajalein Atolls are designated as
closed areas, being utilized for ballistic missile and anti-
ballistic missile testing. These two areas are now under the
exclusive control of the Department of Defense, with the Army
utilizing Kwajalein and the Air Force utilizing Eniwetok.
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of tourism. The agreement of 1963 had not provided the ex-
ception for tourists remaining within the Trust Territory for
thirty days or less, as had been originally requested by Inte-
rior o This time it was the Navy that requested the further
relaxation of entry controls. The right of objections had,
in fact, never been utilized by the Navy. The Navy's Politico-
Military Policy Division desired to do its share in encourag-
ing the development of tourism in the Trust Territory. This
office, therefore, recommended that the procedures be modi-
fied to eliminate the requirement for the High Commissioner
to refer any request to the Department of the Navy for entry
of alien personnel, ships or aircraft into the Trust Territory.
However, "should the Navy come into the possession of adverse
information concerning the entry of a non-U. S. individual,
ship or plane into TERPACIS [the Trust Territory] and request
the revocation of an entry authorization, the High Commissioner
19
shall give regard to such objection." This procedure, of
course, would not apply to the areas designated as closed
defense areas.
This initial offer of the Navy was discussed and modi-
fied; and the final result was an agreement effective August 1,
1968, eliminating the requirement for the High Commissioner to
provide the Navy with the data on alien entry prior to issuing
entry authorizations in those cases of "alien individuals who
19. U. S. Department of the Navy, Office of Naval Opera-
tions, Memorandum for the Director, Politico-Military Policy
Division, ser. 3456P0932, November 14, 1966, OP-61 files.
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possess a valid U. S. visa and seek admission to the Trust
Territory of the Pacific Islands for a period o' 30 days or
20
less for the purpose of tourism,"
Even with the transfer of the Northern Mariana Islands
back to the Interior Department, debate over which agency
should administer the Trust Territory continued. Indeed, as
late as 1966, the Assistant Secretary of State for Interna-
tional Organization Affairs attempted to float the proposal
that the State Department assume responsibility for adminis-
21
tering the Trust Territory. He circulated this proposal
M for clearance" to the Pentagon and the Peace Corps for six
months before confronting the Interior Department. He even
had his own candidate for the office of High Commissioner who
was at that time the Peace Corps Director for the V/estern
Pacific region.
In an April 1969 Foreign Affairs article, an expert on
Pacific affairs, Philip W. Quigg, suggested that the White
22
House directly administer the Trust Territory. Such pro-
posals could easily be adopted since the President, by the
stroke of his pen, can still transfer administrative agencies
20. U. S. Department of the Navy, Office of Naval Opera-
tions, Agreement on Alien Entry into the Trust Territory of
the Pacific Islands, August 1, 1968, OP-61 files.
21. Robert R. Robbins, "United States Territories in
Mid-Century," paper presented at the Conference of the History
of the Territories, National Archives and Research Service,
Washington, D, C, November 3-4, 1969, unpublished, pp. 59-60,
Also: Robert R. Robbins, "Remarks Before the House of Repre-
sentatives, Congress of Micronesia," January 18, 1971, unpub-
lished, p. 3.
22. Philip W. Quigg, "Coming of Age In Micronesia,"
Foreign Affairs . Vol. 47, No. 3 (April 1969), pp. 504-505.
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by Executive Order, Congress has yet to pass any organic act
for the Trust Territory.
The military agencies, particularly the Navy, have assisted
the Interior Department in the Trust Territory in many various
ways since 1968. In early 1969, the Department of the Interior
asked the Department of Defense to assign mobile construction
teams to the Trust Territory in an effort to construct projects
requested by the local legislatures and to develop a trained
corps of permanent residents capable of carrying out self-
23
improvement programs. The Navy sent its first thirteen-man
teams to the islands in June 1969, At present, the Army has
one team in the Marshalls District; the Air Force has one in
the Marianas; and the Navy has two in Ponape, one in Palau,
and one in the District of Yap. Additionally, the Trust Terri-
tory has received the highest priority designation for the
receipt of surplus military equipment in the Far East which
is suitable for civilian use, e.g., radios and construction
materials. The Navy provides sealift support for this equip-
ment from Viet-Nam and Okinawa to the Trust Territory. The
Navy provided six landing craft type vessels (LCU) on a long-
term loan basis to the Trust Territory in 1970, Other examples
of recent support are the training of Micronesians at the Naval
Construction Training School at Port Hueneme, California, and
the presence in the islands of unexploded ordnance demolition
teams to remove or destroy old ordnance left over from World
23. Navy Times , March 11, 1970.
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War II. The military is also currently supporting bills before
Congress to increase the appropriations for the Trust Terri-
tory, to settle Japanese war claims, to combat the Seastar
"Crown of Thorns'* (Acanthaster Planci) which is destroying
many of the coral reefs, and to promote the tuna fishing
industry.
The motivation behind this increase in military support
for the Trust Territory in the past two or three years can be
easily understood. One reason for this increased support is
a purely altruistic one--that of helping in the development
of the inhabitants of the Trust Territory. Another factor in
the motivation is that of national security. Security, after
all, is the mission of the Department of Defense. The mili-
tary agencies have become increasingly concerned over the
recent trend in thinking of the Micronesian political leaders.
The increased support, hopefully, will serve to improve the
image of the United States in the Trust Territory (as well as
the image of the American military services) and to, thereby,
help to ensure that the future political status that the Micro-
nesians choose will be one compatible with American security
interests.
The movement toward self-government began as soon as the
United States started to administer the islands. Local self-
governing bodies were first created. Later, elected district
legislatures evolved from advisory bodies whose members were
appointed by the District Administrators. Next, a Council
of Micronesia, whose members were elected by the district
legislatures, was created by the American administration.
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Finally, the Congress of Micronesia was created by Interior
Department Order No, 2882 on September 28, 1964. The first
territorial-wide elections were held on January 19, 1965} and
the first meeting of the Congress was held in July 1965. This
Congress has helped to create some sense of unity within the
Territory- -if from nothing else than the mere fact of initiat-
ing the first real communications between the peoples of the
islands. The process of evolution of the Congress provided
experiences of working together for common purposes. The
growth and transformation of these bodies was due in large
measure to the wishes, desires and cooperation of the Micro-
24
nexians with adivce being provided by the administrators.
In response to a request by the Congress of Micronesia,
President Johnson asked the United States Congress in August
1967 to establish a study commission to assess all the fac-
tors bearing on the political future of the Trust Territory.
The President also asked that Congress specify that the Micro-
nesians should express their wishes "as soon as possible, and
not later than June 30, 1972, on the future status of the
25
Trust Territory. H The Senate struck out the reference to
the date and passed the resolution; but the House failed the
24. U. S. Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 53 (August
16, 1965), Statement of Mr, Barley Olter, Representative, Con-
gress of Micronesia, before the United Nations Trusteeship
Council, May 28, 1965, p. 296. See: Norman Meller, The Con-
gress of Micronesia: Development of the Legislative Process in
the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (Honolulu: Univer-
sity of Hawaii Press, 1969) . Note: Secretary of the Interior
Order No. 2882 as amended was superceded by Order No. 2918 of
September 27, 1968.
25. Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 57 (September 18,
1967), Presidential letter to Congress with Text of Proposed
Joint Resolution Concerning Future of Pacific Islands Trust
Territory, August 21, 1967, pp. 363.364.
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measure, and no such status commission has yet been estab-
lished nor has any commitment been made to a date for an act
26
of self-determination.
Meanwhile, the Congress of Micronesia established its
own status commission on August 8, 1967, to study "the range
of possibilities and alternatives as may be open to Micro-
27
nesians with respect to their choice of political status."
This Status Commission met with United States Congressional
subcommittees touring the islands.
The Status Commission also retained a New Zealand polit-
ical science professor, John W. Davidson, as an adviser and
studied the political development of Guam, Fiji, Cook Islands,
Puerto Rico, Philippines, and Western Samoa.
The Status Commission filed its report in July 1969. Its
recommendation was:
that the Trust Territory of the Pacific
Islands be constituted as a self-governing
state and that this Micronesian state --
~~
~
- internally self-governing and with Micro-
nesian control of all its branches, includ-
ing the executive -- negotiate entry into
free association with the United States. 28
Ten Micronesian political leaders came to Washington for
three weeks in October 1969 to consult with the Government on
this vital issue. In May of 1970, the United States Government
26. Robert R. Blackburn, Jr., Desk Officer, Pacific
Islands, State Department, Interview with the Author,
March 21, 1969.
27. Congress of Micronesia, Interim Report of the
Future Political Status Commission of the Congress of Micro-
nesia
. July 1963, p. 4.
28. Congress of Micronesia, Report of the Future Polit-
ical Status Commission of the Congress of Micronesia, July 1969.
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sent a negotiating team, comprised of representatives of the
Defense and Interior Departments, to the islands with an offer
of a commonwealth status similar to that of Puerto Rico.
The Congress of Micronesia was represented in these negotia-
tions by its Political Status Delegation, which had replaced
the Future Political Status Commission. The Micronesians
insisted throughout the negotiations on their concept of "free
association" and the matter now rests at that point.
The United States Government (the President, the Depart-
ments of State, Defense, and Interior, plus various members of
Congress) are concerned about the definition that the Congress
of Micronesia gives to the term "free association." The Micro-
nesian Political Status Delegation, in its report on the 1970
negotiations, stated that there were four basic principles and
legal rights that it considered inherent to the nature of "free
association." These four points were listed as follows
s
(a) That sovereignty in Micronesia resides
—_
_
in the people of Micronesia and their duly
constituted government;
(b) That the people of Micronesia possess
the right of self-determination and may
therefore choose independence or self-
government in free association with any
nation or organization of nations?
(c) That the people of Micronesia have the
right to adopt their own constitution and
to amend, change or revoke any cons itution
or governmental plan at any time; and
(d) That free association should be in the
form of a revocable compact, terminable uni-
laterally by either party. 29
29. Congress of Micronesia, Report of the Political Status
Delegation, 3rd Cong., 3rd regular sess., July 1970, p. 11. Note:




By these terms, the United States Government would have
no right of eminent domain and no guarantee than the Micro-
nesian constitution would provide for the basic civil rights
that are contained in the American Constitution's Bill of
Rights.
Strategically, the islands are still of vast importance
even in this nuclear age of inter-continental ballistic mis-
siles. As in 1945, their main strategic value to the United
States is in their denial to any potential enemy. Over ninety-
eight percent of all material sent to the war in Southeast
Asia goes by ship. The sea and air lanes to Southeast Asia,
Asia and to Australia- -not to mention the protection of the
American citizens of Guam--would, once again, be threatened
if a potentially hostile power gained a foothold in these
Central Pacific islands.
Also, of strategic importance is the value of the islands
in the positive sense. The United States Government desires
to continue to maintain the ability to monitor and control
the sea and air space over the Central Pacific Ocean. These
islands contribute greatly to that ability. Additionally,
the islands could provide future training bases and logistic
areas for American armed forces. After the reversion of
Okinawa to Japan, many, if not most, of the military facil-
ities on that island will have to find new locations in the
Central Pacific. American military facilities are also
being closed or reduced in Japan and the Philippines. Guam
is already saturated with military installations. American
commitments to South Korea, Japan, Formosa, and the Philippines
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will continue under the Nixon Doctrine. Also, American in-
volvement in Southeast Asia will more than likely continue
for some time to come. American military installations in
the Central and Western Pacific areas will, therefore, still
be required.
The Micronesian Islands are the logical fall-back posi-
tion for such installations. It is, therefore, desirable for
the United States to obtain a stabilized, permanent political
association with Micronesia. The present intention of the
United States Government is to negotiate some agreement with
the Congress of. Micronesia that provides for full self-govern-
ment within a permanent, unrevokable association with the
United States. This agreement would then be voted upon in a
general plebiscite under the observation of United Nations
representatives. When the agreement had been accepted by
the population as a whole and, also, by the United States Con-
gress, the United States and Micronesia would declare that the
Trusteeship was ended.
The emergence of nationalism among many Asian and African
peoples has been coupled with national aspirations for polit-
ical independence and neutrality vis-a-vis the big-power blocs,
It is, therefore, advisable to consider Micronesia's emerging,
incipient sense of nationalism and national aspirations in
order to arrive at practical policies whereby the United States
can assist, guide, and influence these aspirations in order
to achieve an eventual political outcome truly in the best
interests of both the Micronesians and the United States.
Nationalism has various definitions, with Hans Kohn's
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definition being the classic example:
[
Nationalism is a state of mind, perme-
ating the large majority of a people and
claiming to permeate all its members; it
recognizes the nation-state as the ideal
of political organization and the nation-
ality as the source of all creative cultural
energy and of economic well-being. The su-
preme loyalty of man is therefore due to his
nationality, as his own life is supposedly
rooted in and made possible by its welfare.
™
Does an emergence of nationalism necessarily result in a
demand for a politically independent nation-state, or can a
sense of nationality be satisfied and compatable with only
local autonomy and local self-government? What if a nation-
ality evolves which has a sense of nationalism; yet, realizes
that political independence is impossible or impracticable due
to a lack of natural resources, population, education or a
modern economy? .That political aspirations develop when the
political development of a people outreaches their economic,
social and educational development? All of these questions
pertain particularly to Micronesia.
The politically-aware people in Micronesia are looking
at Asia and Africa and asking themselves the following ques-
tions: Is the preferred government really independence no
matter how bad it might be? Which is better: economic growth,
personal liberties, governmental stability but without polit-
ical independence; or a stagnant economy, restricted personal
liberties, governmental instability but with political inde-
pendence? Should the old culture and social system be
30. Hans Kohn, The Idea of Nationalism (New York:
Collier Books, 1944), p. 16.
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preserved at the expense of rapid economic development? Al-
though many aspiring peoples tend to overlook t' lese questions,
the Micronesian leaders are definitely asking themselves these
questions.
The Micronesian leaders are also trying to judge whether
or not their strategic importance to the United States will
remain into the far future. For if the "free association" is
revokable, there is no guarantee that the United States would
continue to remain interested in them if the strategic value
of the islands is diminished because of some radical change
in weapon technology or global political situation.
The Micronesian answers to these questions are vitally
important, not only for the Micronesians, but, also, for the
United States,
To conclude the epilogue, the international legal aspects
of the strategic trusteeship should be mentioned.
As early as July 1943, the legal questions involved in
terminating Japan's mandate and the proper procedures to trans-
fer the former-mandated islands to another administrator had
been studied within the State Department. The question of the
location of sovereignty in a mandate had not been settled by
the League of Nations or by any consensus among jurists. A
31. For examples of this self-questioning, see the state-
ments made by the Micronesians before the United Nations Trus-
teeship Council, the United Nations Visiting Missions Reports,
the reports of the Future Political Status Commission, and
the report of the Political Status Delegation.

301
number of theories had been advanced* one, that the sover-
eignty lay in the League of Nations; another, that the attri-
butes of sovereignty had been divided, possibly, among the
Principal Allied and Associated Powers, the League of Nations,
32
and the Mandatory.
The State Department's official position during the post-
war planning of 1943 was that the sovereignty of these islands
resided in the five Principal Allied and Associated Powers of
World War I (the United States, United Kingdom, France, Italy,
and Japan) and that Japan and Italy would, in the peace trea-
ties ending World War II, renounce any rights still theirs in
the islands. Legally, the United States, United Kingdom, and
France could then terminate the mandate and transfer the
islands* administration to the United States. For "political
reasons," it was recommended in 1944 that at an appropriate
time, the League of Nations should formally transfer all of
its powers in respect to mandates to the United Nations Organi-
zation. The new United Nations would then formally terminate
the Japanese mandate and assign the islands' administration
to the United States, The United Kingdom, France, and the
United States would be included, of course, in the United
33
Nations agreement.
32. U. S. National Archives, U. S. Department of State,
Hornbeck to Grey, May 9, 1944, quoting a memorandum "Japan's
Mandated Islands » Legal Problems" (T-345, July 8, 1943) by
Blakeslee, RG 890, 390.0146/13 #1.
33. U. S. National Archives, U. S. Department of State,
Hornbeck to Secretary of State, April 28, 1944, quoting a memo-
randum by Dr. Quincy Wright entitled "How May the Status of
Mandated Territories be Altered," RG 890, 890.0146/11.
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It is clear from the course of events that this second
method was utilized. Legally, the United States Government's
position- -never publicly stated but approved by Secretary Hull--
was that sovereignty of the mandated islands resided in the
34
five Principal Allied and Associated Powers since 1919. How-
ever, for political reasons, the mandate was terminated; and the
islands' administering authority was transferred by means of
actions by the League of Nations and the new United Nations.
By following the political course, the United States compro-
mised its legal position that sovereignty lay with the five
Principal Allied and Associated Powers.
The League of Nations assembly met and dissolved itself
on April 18, 1946, transferring all its powers, including
those in respect to mandates, 'to the United Nations. Then,
the United Nations Security Council (which included three of
the Principal Allied and Associated Powers: United States,
United Kingdom, and France) approved the strategic trusteeship
agreement on April 2, 1947. This agreement stated that the
United Nations Charter provided that trusteeship could be
applied to mandated areas and that Japan, as a result of World
War II, had ceased to exercise any authority in the mandate.
Italy, in its peace treaty signed February 10, 1947 (Sec-
tion VIII, Article 40 of the Treaty, TIAS 1648), renounced any
rights in the former mandated islands as one of the Principal
Allied and Associated Powers of World War I. Additionally,




1951 (Chapter II, Article 2 (d) of the Treaty, TIAS 2490) that
it renounced any rights in the former mandate. The United
States had included these provisions in the peace treaties to
cover any possible legal question on the matter.
The question of the location of sovereignty still is un-
resolved. Some jurists would maintain that it now resides in
the United Nations Security Council, based on the action of
the League of Nations in 1946, and the fact that the trustee-
ship agreement cannot be changed without the approval of the
Security Council. Other jurists would state that the sover-
eignty not* resides in the United States, United Kingdom, and
France, based on the fact that sovereignty had never passed
from the Principal Allied and Associated Powers to the League
of Nations. This had been the State Department's position
during World War II and might still be maintained, although
the United States may have compromised this position by util-
izing the League of Nations and the United Nations as described
above. Other jurists would say that the sovereignty resides
in the islanders themselves, especially after they hold an
election which grants them full self-government. Other jurists
would say that no state holds sovereignty over the islands
since it M fell between the cracks" during World War II j and
that the islands are, therefore, technically terra nullis
until sovereignty is asserted by some power or is assumed by
the islanders, themselves, when they eventually achieve full
self-government.
The question of the location of sovereignty is probably
an academic one at the present time; although, it could raise
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problems in the future if any nation chooses to raise the
question when the United States and Micronesia attempt to
terminate the Strategic Trusteeship. The Soviet Union and
the Afro-Asian members of the United Nations might, indeed,
raise the question- -depending on which methods the United
States uses in the attempt to terminate the Strategic Trustee-
ship and on the degree of Micronesian self-government achieved
at the time. The Soviet Union might also use the question of
sovereignty as a pretext for opposing the termination of the
trusteeship in order to put a colonial albatross around the
neck of the United States.
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When I say that officers today must go far
beyond the official curriculum, I say it,
not because I do not believe in the tradi-
tional relationship between the civilian
and the military, but you must be more
than the servants of national policy. You
must be prepared to play a constructive
role in the development of national policy,
John F. Kennedy: To
the graduating class,
U. S. Naval Academy,
June 1961
The pathway of man's journey through the
ages is littered with the wreckage of nations,
which, in their hour of glory, forgot their
dependence on the sea.
Brig. Gen. J. D. Hittle USMC
Speech in Philadelphia,
October 28, 1961
Control of the seas means security. Control
of the seas means peace. Control of the
seas can mean victory. The United States
must control the sea if it is to protect
our security,
John F. Kennedy: To all





The decision-making process within the American Govern-
ment that led to the placing of the former mandated islands
under a United Nations strategic trusteeship with the United
States as the sole administering authority, and to the selec-
tion of the Interior Department as the agency responsible for
the administration of the islands, has been traced. An attempt
has been made to let the facts speak for themselves and to pre-
sent them objectively. Conclusions concerning these facts,
however, depend on one's proclivities, background, and philos-
ophy. On this issue, as on many other problems of national
policy and operations, "where one stands depends on where
one sits. H
Every Secretary of State and every scholar now recognizes
that foreign policy and military policy are interwoven and must
becoordinated in order to effectively achieve national policy.
In fact, it is now very difficult to isolate the field of
"foreign policy" and "military policy" because so many policy
problems contain overlapping and intertwining military and
political policy aspects. This recognition was lacking, par-
ticularly by the State Department, at the commencement of this
particular issue in 1942.
Flowing from the premise that military considerations
must be taken into account in formulating foreign policy, is
the premise that the military establishment must, therefore, be




committees as well as by informal consultations. Such ar-
rangements have developed over the past twenty-five years.
There is currently a great degree of collaboration between
the military establishment and the State Department. Such
collaboration was very limited in 1942,
The planning within the State Department on a trusteeship
plan was never coordinated with the military point of view
until President Roosevelt, on December 15, 1944, directed the
State Department to work with the military agencies in formu-
lating a policy acceptable to the Departments of the Navy, War,
and State. Prior to this time, the military agencies, chiefly
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, had merely commented from the side-
lines or resorted to blocking tactics such as the Joint Chiefs
of Staff's actions just prior ;to the Dumbarton Oaks Conver-
sations.
The Service Secretaries were unaware of what was hap-
pening on this issue until early 1945, Not until the spring
of 1945, when SWNCC and the Three Secretaries* Meetings were
effectively in operation, did Forrestal see a trusteeship plan;
and, then, he could not believe that it was a serious document.
Civilian control and influence by the Service Secretaries on
this issue, as well as on most matters of strategy, were
virtually non-existent until after the death of President
Roosevelt. President Roosevelt thrust the Joint Chiefs of Staff
into the decision-making arena and limited the Service Secre-
taries to dealing only with administrative matters. Thus, until
the spring of 1945, an effective civil-military relationship
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within the Executive Branch on this issue was non-existent.
However, after the spring of 1945, the Service Secretaries as-
serted themselves via the SWNCC machinery on the question of
the postwar disposition of the mandated islands; and the Joint
Chiefs of Staff's role in the decision-making process dwindled.
In fact, when the question of which governmental agency should
administer the Trust Territory came under active consideration,
the Service Secretaries were the sole representatives of the
military establishment in the decision-making process.
Several conclusions can be reached concerning the first
phase of the decision-making dealing with the postwar disposi-
tion of the mandated islands. This phase concerned the question
of whether the islands should be annexed or included in some
form of trusteeship system. This policy debate was clearly a
case of conflicting concepts about the correct way to promote
world peace and security. On one side, which could be labeled
as the liberal or "internationalist" side, were President Roose-
velt, Cordell Hull, Harold Ickes, Leo Pasvolsky, Benjamin Gerig,
and others, who sincerely believed that the only possibility
for world peace after World War II would be by great-power
collaboration and a strong world organization. They also
believed in rapid independence for all dependent people and
were determined that the war would bring no territorial spoils.
The State Department planners concerned with drafting a
trusteeship plan were "internationalists." They had two orig-
inal objectives in mind: (l; to develop a trusteeship system
guaranteeing eventual self-government to all dependent peoples
and to encourage the colonial powers to place their colonies
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within that systemj and (2) to set an example for emulation
by the other powers of: (a) no territorial aggrandizement as
a result of the war (with the Soviet Union particularly in
mind)
,
(b) faith in and support for the new international
organization, and (c) placing of dependent territories within
the trusteeship system. To achieve these political objectives,
the "internationalists" in general and the State Department
international organization experts (Pasvolsky, Gerig, and
associates) in particular strongly believed that the former
Japanese mandated islands should be included within the pro-
posed trusteeship system.
Self-determination was not at issue in regard to the
mandated islands. All participants in the decision-making
process agreed that the Micronesians would not be ready for
any form of political self-determination for the foreseeable
future. When any estimate was given of the time required for
the Micronesians to become prepared for self-government, the
phrase "not in the foreseeable future" was utilized. The
"internationalists" desired that the islands be placed within
the trusteeship system, not for any regard for the islanders'
future self-government, but to achieve the political goals
described above.
The welfare of the Micronesians was, of course, con-
sidered to some extent. Yet, there is a disturbing lack of
consideration by any of the participants--on both sides of
the issue--for the interests of the Micronesians. There is
no mention, until the Department of the Interior entered the
issue, of any emphasis being placed on Micronesian interests.
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None of the participants, including the Department of the
Interior, ever expressed any desire to consult with the
Micronesians.
On the other side of the first phase of dec is ion-making
were those individuals who could be labeled conservative or
"pragmatic. •' The "pragmatists" consisting of some State Depart-
ment officials as well as the military services and their civil-
ian leaders, such as Forrestal, Stimson, Matthews, and McCloy,
had quite a different concept of the means for promoting
world peace and security. They had seen the failure of the
League of Nations, and they could see the weakness of relying
on such a fragile thing as great-power collaboration in the
maintenance of international peace and security. They would
be willing to give an international organization a chance but
not at the cost of any impairment to American national security,
Forrestal expressed the "pragmatic" viewpoint when he
stated that if the United States was expected to maintain
international peace and security in the Pacific Ocean area
after the war, the military services should have the means
with which to exercise its authority- -namely exclusive con-
trol of the strategically located islands.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff only entered into the deci-
sion-making process concerning the drafting of the trustee-
ship system after it was learned that the State Department
trusteeship planners intended to include the former mandated
islands within the system. As long as the State Department
trusteeship planners continued to advocate that the islands
be placed within the proposed trusteeship system, the Joint
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Chiefs of Staff continued to pressure for changes to the proposed
system that would weaken the international supervisory aspects
of it. The category of strategic trusteeship was specifically
developed and included within the United Nations trusteeship
system with the mandated islands in mind. Unfortunately, the
idea for this separate category which gave almost unlimited
authority to the administrating state was developed after the
basic trusteeship plan had been watered down in an attempt to
obtain the Joint Chiefs of Staff's acquiescence to the placing
of the mandated islands within the trusteeship system.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff were assisted in their efforts
by the British Government, but the conclusion is reached that
the main influence on this matter was exerted by the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, Therefore, mainly as a result of the contro-
versy over the disposition of the mandated islands, the trus-
teeship system now embodied within the United Nations Charter
shows little resemblance to the early trusteeship plans in
the^matter of international supervision and authority.
The record seems to indicate that the State Department trus-
teeship planners misled the Service Secretaries when the State
Department on December 30, 1944, stated that because of the other
states* interest, it was "inescapable" that the question of inter-
national trusteeships would be discussed at the San Francisco Con-
ference and that M in all likelihood" a trusteeship chapter would
be included in the United Nations Charter. The record shows that
the United States was the initiator and pusher of the trustee-
ship idea. Great Britain, France, and the Soviet Union showed
little or no interest in the trusteeship proposals and dependent-
area declarations which Secretary Hull repeatedly circulated. If
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the United States had stated, as proposed by Stimson and For-
restal, that the question of trusteeships would not be con-
i
sidered at the San Francisco Conference but would be one of
the first matters considered by the United Nations, the other
nations would surely have acquiesced.
President Roosevelt's long-held position, however, was
that a trusteeship system and effective machinery for such a
system should be established. He approved the trusteeship
plan "in principle" on April 10, 1945, only two days before
his death. Even if Forres tal and Stimson had been able to
present their views to him on April 19, his decision would
more than likely have been the same, i.e., not to postpone
any discussion of trusteeships at the charter drafting confer-
ence. This conclusion is based on his long-held views, on his
approval of the trusteeship plan on the tenth, and on the fact
that the Secretary of State had provided the President with a
summary of Stimson' s and Forres tal *s views in his letter sub-
mitting the trusteeship plan.
Stimson and Forrestal, as well as the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, feared that any discussion of trusteeships prior to
the end of the war would necessarily involve questions of
specific postwar dispositions of territories and, therefore,
possibly produce conflicts between the allies which would
hinder the war effort. These fears were proved unfounded.
After the trusteeship system was included in the United
Nations Charter, the question whether the mandated islands
should be annexed or placed under either a regular trustee-
ship or a strategic trusteeship had to be settled. With the
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political objectives described above in mind, the "inter-
nationalists" advocated that the mandated islanr s be placed
under the trusteeship system. They were willing to accept a
strategic trusteeship.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff, reassured that any develop-
ment of a possible trusteeship agreement would not prejudice
their annexationist position, submitted various conditions
which they felt should be included in any contemplated trus-
teeship agreement. Interdepartmental discussions within the
framework of SWNCC proceeded on this basis. The Department
of the Interior was deliberately left out of any discussions
concerning the drafting of a possible trusteeship agreement,
as well as the final decision-making Presidential conference
on the question. This was, in the opinion of the Author, a
pure power play on trie part of the other interested depart-
ments. The War and Navy Departments were attempting to obtain
the administrative authority of the islands, and the State
Department did not want any interdepartmental discussions on
the question of civil administration prior to the formaliza-
tion of the status of the islands. Additionally, personal
conflicts (between Byrnes and Ickes) evidently played a part
in the isolation of the Interior Department. It is unfortun-
ate that the agency which eventually received the adminis-
trating authority did not participate in the drafting of the
trusteeship agreement.
The final decision was made by President Truman on
October 22, 1946, under the pressure ot the convening of the
United Nations General Assembly the next day. The written
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views of the various participants in the drafting of the
trusteeship agreement were not ready in time for the confer-
ence. However, both sides (annexation versus strategic trus-
teeship) were presented orally during the Presidential con-
ference.
It is believed that Stimson's argument that the United
States could annex the islands with no major opposition and
that such approved annexation would not be a case of imperialism
because of the economic liability of the islands was never
adequately countered by the "internationalists." Stimson's
contention has been supported by the fact that the American
Army administered the Ryukyus Islands (Okinawa) from 1945-1972
and the Bonin-Volcano Islands (Iwo-Jima) from 1945-1968 with-
out any international supervision and with no domestic or
international opposition except from the Japanese public, who
would not have been stirred in the case of the former mandated
islands. The United States never even transmitted informa-
tional reports on these non- self-governing territories to the
United Nations nor was the United States ever asked to do so
by any member of the United Nations. The American public and
world opinion (except for the Japanese) showed no interest in
the fact that the United States governed these islands with
unlimited control amounting to annexation.
The original objectives of the "internationalists" were
not achieved by the placing of the islands under the trustee-
ship system. No example was set for emulation by the other
powers of any faith in and support for the new international
organization. The watering down of the trusteeship system
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and the inclusion of the islands in the strategic trusteeship
category, which gave almost unlimited authority to the admin-
istrating state, certainly did not demonstrate a high degree of
confidence in the international organization.
Another "internationalist" objective- -that of setting an
example by having no territorial aggrandizement as a result of
the war--had been lost when the United States Government agreed
at Yalta to support the Soviet Union in the Soviet annexation
of Southern Sakhalin and the Kuriles. This action by Presi-
dent Roosevelt contravened all of his grand announcements of
"no territorial aggrandizement." Certainly no example was
set for the Russians when they saw the United States condoning
Soviet territorial aggrandizement while publicly professing
non-aggrandizement and denying itself sovereignty over the
former Japanese mandated islands.
It is believed that the statement of Admiral Leahy in
his unpublished account of the October 22, 1946, conference
reflected the actual reasoning for the decision not to annex
the mandated islands. Admiral Leahy believed that the war-
time propaganda statements concerning "no territorial aggran-
dizement" had closed off the annexation option. The United
States Government had boxed itself into a corner. Addition-
ally, the United States had initiated and pushed the trustee-
ship system against its reluctant allies and had, therefore,
boxed itself into a corner in that respect. After pushing
the trusteeship idea so hard, it would appear hypocritical
for the United States to refuse to utilize it.
This is how the President probably saw the issue during

316
the conference of October 22, 1946. However, it Is still
believed that with the proper groundwork laid as proposed by
Stimson in the spring of 1945 the United States could have
annexed the islands without major opposition.
Another original objective of the "internationalists" was
to develop a trusteeship system guaranteeing eventual self-
government to all dependent peoples and to encourage the colo-
nial powers to place their colonies within that system. This
objective had effectively been lost when Secretary Hull early
in the planning state restricted, because of "obvious reasons
of political feasibility," the trusteeship plan to former enemy
areas, former mandates, and to dependent territories voluntarily
placed under the system by the colonial power. Additionally,
the trusteeship system was so watered down there was no guarantee
of eventual self-government for all dependent peoples.
The United Nations Charter does include a chapter (Chap-
ter XI) concerning non- self-governing territories in general.
Article 73 of that Chapter, however, mentions only that the
colonial powers should "develop self-government ... according
to the particular circumstances of each territory and its
peoples and their varying stages of advancement." There is
1
no guarantee of eventual full self-government.
1. There is little international supervision of depen-
dent areas in general, i.e., only informational reports sub-
mitted voluntarily by the governing powers. Various members
of the United Nations are attempting to widen the area of
international authority in these matters with little practical
success. The provisions of Chapter XI, ironically, were not
proposed by the United States at San Francisco, although the
idea for a general declaration on dependent territories had
been originated and pushed by the United States. This partic-
ular proposal had been forgotten by the United States Govern-
ment when it became embroiled in the controversy over the
drafting of a trusteeship system plan.
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In regard to the other mandated territories, by the time
the United States announced that the Pacific Islands Mandate
would be placed under the strategic trusteeship system, trus-
teeship agreements for most of the other mandates (eventually
all of the Class M B" and "C" mandates became trusteeships with
the exception of South-West Africa) had already been submitted
to the United Nations or at least circulated for inter-govern-
mental comment. Therefore, the placing of the Pacific Islands
Mandate under the trusteeship plan did not encourage the placing
of other mandates within the trusteeship system. Additionally,
no administrating power power has yet to place a non- self-
governing territory (other than mandates and the former enemy
2
territory of Italian Somaliland; within the trusteeship system.
In summary, the original ^objectives of the "international-
ists" in regard to the trusteeship system were not obtained.
The controversy over the disposition of the mandated islands
contributed to the failure to obtain them. The placing of the
islands within the trusteeship system, rather than annexing
them, did not substantially further the attainment of these
objectives.
2. Eleven territories have been placed under trustee-
ship. Ten of these were former mandated territories; and one
(Somaliland) was detached from Italy by the terms of the Ital-
ian peace treaty and placed under trusteeship by an United
Nations General Assembly resolution which the parties to the
Italian peace treaty had agreed in advance to accept. For
special reasons, Australia has administered its dependent ter-
ritory of Papua and its trust territory of New Guinea jointly.
This policy was adopted when it was decided that the two ter-
ritories would have the same future political status as a
single entity. Currently, only two trusteeships remaint the
United States administered Trust Territory of the Pacific Is-
lands (Micronesia;, the only strategic trusteeship ever in exis^
tence, and Australia's Trust Territory of New Guinea.
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The second phase of decision-making over t! e postwar dis-
position of the mandated islands concerned the i election of the
agency to administer the islands. This phase of decision-
making was also influenced by the motivations of the " inter-
nationalists" and the "pragmatists" as described above. The
"pragmatists" desired that the security considerations in-
volved in the strategic location of the islands receive proper
attention in the civil administration. Accordingly, the prin-
ciple of "unity of command" was advocated. The "pragmatists"
believed that the administrating agency would need the full
authority in dealing with both civil and military matters.
There should be, in their opinion, no system of "split-control"
by which one agency would handle the civil matters and another
agency handle military matters'. The "pragmatists" also recog-
nized that the military agencies, particularly the Navy, had
more adequate funds, logistic materiel, and trained personnel
than any civilian agency which were needed to govern effectively
the Trust Territory.
The "internationalists" in this phase were mainly located
within the Interior Department. One individual, Erail J. Sady,
was a transplant from the State Department's Dependent Areas
Office. The "internationalists" believed that any civil govern-
ment administered by a military agency would inhibit the poli-
tical development of the peoples. Their connotation of "military"
government was a pejorative one. Commander L. G. Findley, a
naval officer concerned with the Trust Territory, described in
his report of February 4, 1953 (mentioned in the Epilogue
Chapter;, what this Author believes was the decisive factor
that led to the selection of a civilian agency to administer
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the Trust Territory. Commander Find ley's report stated:
The concept of government by a m .11-
tary clique is rightly repugnant to the Amer-
ican people. We accept martial lav; only as a
matter or urgent necessity. There is not, nor
has there ever been, any similarity between
the Navy administration of Pacific islands and
the type of military rule which this country
abhors. Yet a certain confusion existed about
the Navy administration. It was not generally
understood that administration by the Navy was
truly a civil administration. The personnel
engaged in administering the native people were
themselves civilians whose wearing of a uniform
had begun only a short time before and was a
temporary matter. They were especially fitted
both by their civilian background and by Navy
School training for civil government. Uniforms
were only incidental.
Numerous groups investigating island
affairs found that the Navy was a benign admin-
istrator. No single valid complaint of the
violation of civil rights was ever found.
Nevertheless, the factor which influenced post-
war decisions on Pacific Island administration
was the misconception that an administrator in
uniform was ipso facto less acceptable than one
clad in a civilian suit.
3
It is interesting to note that, regardless of all the talk
during this policy debate on the part of the Interior Department,
the civil rights of the Micronesians have yet to be firmly es-
tablished by any Congressional Act. Their civil rights are
completely dependent upon various administrative orders issued
by the Interior Department. Even the Congress of Micronesia was
established by merely an Interior Department order which, pre-
sumably, could be modified or cancelled at will by any Secretary
of the Interior.
The Interior Department participants in the controversy
3. U. S. Department of the Navy, Office of Naval Opera-
tions, L. G. Findley to Admiral Radford, "A Review of U. S.
Administration in the Pacific," February 4, 1953, OP-61 files.
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over the selection of the administrative agency stressed the
fact that the islanders' civil rights should be firmly estab-
lished by Congressional Organic Act. They protested the fact
that the civil government administered by the Navy was "arbi-
trary," with the inhabitants having no guaranteed civil rights.
The reason that Forrestal agreed to the selection of a
"civilian agency" at the May 16, 1947, meeting, or soon there-
after, is unknown. He was occupied by more important matters
at the time? yet, he had held definite views on the matter.
Commander Find ley's report stated that some naval officers,
believing that the postwar Pacific area would be peaceful,
felt that it was time for the Navy to get out of the business
of governing the various Pacific islands. Unfortunately, the
report did not mention them by, name. Certainly, at the time
of this decision (May 1947,), Forrestal did not think that the
Pacific area would be peaceful.
Mention should be made of President Roosevelt's and Presi-
dent Truman's roles in the issue of the postwar disposition of
the mandated islands. President Roosevelt held anti-colonial
attitudes and felt that the best means of obtaining freedom
for dependent peoples would be via a strong trusteeship system.
He also believed in the idea of a postwar global string of inter-
nationalized bases. Neither a strong trusteeship system nor a
global string of internationalized bases evolved.
Whether by design or by circumstance, President Roosevelt
by-passed his Service Secretaries ana ignored his Department
of State during the war, while relying heavily on the Joint
Chiefs of Staff and personal advisers- -notably Harry Hopkins.
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This situation resulted in a break-down of proper civil-military
relations during the war. Not until the spring of 1945, after
the Service Secretaries and the Secretary of State, on their
own initiative, had established some form of permanent machinery
for effective coordination of policies, were they able to
reassert themselves in relation to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
President Roosevelt never made a clear decision on the
trusteeship matters brought to his attention. When the Joint
Chiefs of Staff recommended annexation of the islands, the Presi-
dent always answered in equivocal terms such as, "we are think-
ing of doing such and so" or "we intend to do such and so."
Even when the final trusteeship plan was presented to him, he
approved it "in principle" and did not specifically state that
it should be presented at the San Francisco Conference. He
read Secretary of State Stettinius' letter detailing the argu-
ments of Secretary Forrestal and Secretary Stimson against dis-
cussing the trusteeship question at the San Francisco Conference.
However, he did not state definitely whether he rejected those
arguments. He merely stated, "I will see your [Stettinius*]
representative and that of the Army and Navy on the 19th, That
will be time enough."
President Roosevelt's anti-colonial outlook helped to
create the controversy. The failure of President Roosevelt to
make decisive decisions helped to prolong the controversy. His
administrative style of by-passing the Service Secretaries and
the Secretary of State, while working mainly with the Joint




Much needless time and effort were spent en the problem
of the postwar disposition of the mandated islaids. It should
have been decided quickly and decisively. Instead, thanks to
President Roosevelt's lack of an effective orderly adminis-
tration, the issue dragged on for years; bitterness developed
between State, War, Navy, and Interior Department personnel.
President Truman, on the other hand, believed in making
quick decisions. In regard to this issue, his decisions were
often too quick! His decision of August 1945 to give the Navy
authority to govern the Mariana Islands was hasty and without
prior consultations. That decision, moreover, was not dis-
seminated to any agency except the Navy. His next decision
to have Navy's authority considered "interim" and to have the
Secretaries of State, War, and' Navy consider the problem was
also made without his consulting those concerned. Interior,
in fact, was ignored completely, even though Secretary Ickes
sent a letter to the President on the subject the very next
day. Both of these decisions were made within a day of the
request. Most of President Truman's other decisions concern-
ing the postwar disposition of the mandated islands were just
as decisive and quick, often made without prior consultation
with all interested parties (see Appendix A for a summary of
the decisions). The dissemination of most of the decisions
was also faulty.
The prime example of President Truman's decision-making
method in matters concerning this particular issue was the
January 1946 "debacle" at the time of the First Session of
the United Nations General Assembly in London. This was when
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the President approved, and later recinded, authorization for
Secretary of State Byrnes to state that the man lated islands
would be offered as a trusteeship--either strategic or non-
strategic. In this "debacle," neither President Truman nor
Acting Secretary of State Dean Acheson followed the "orderly
procedure" by which all interested parties were present before
the court and by which all decisions were immediately reduced
to writing, which Acheson later ascribed so glowingly to Presi-
dent Truman. Also, this "orderly procedure" was not followed
in many of the other Presidential decisions concerning this
issue.
One matter that should be touched upon is the decision
of Admiral King and Admiral Nimitz to take the issue to the
public and to their sympathizers in Congress in April 1945.
These Admirals spoke out in public for retention of the is-
lands. These were the first public statements on the contro-
versy by American uniformed officers. Prior to this time,
the uniformed officers had refrained from making public state-
ments concerning the postwar disposition of the mandated is-
lands. They had previously argued their position solely
within the Executive Branch.
The decision of these Admirals to take the issue to the
public and to their sympathizers in Congress may be considered
by some to have been beyond the limits of responsible military
professionalism. This question is often debated in the theo-
retics of military professionalism, politico-military relations
in a democracy, and the proper role of the military in the






down into two components: the question of access to the Con-
[
gress and the question of public campaigning.
Under the American constitutional system, the legisla-
tive branch must have access to information and testimony from
the military leaders. This right has been insisted upon by
Congress, and it has been successfully protected. For example,
the National Security Act of 1947 states that the Joint Chiefs
of Staff have the right to go to members of the Congress with
their viewpoint. It is interesting to note in this regard that
the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not attempt to set forth their
real feelings during the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
hearings on the adoption of the United Nations Charter and,
later, on the adoption of the trusteeship agreement. Instead,
noncommittal statements were offered to the Senate Committee.
The decisions had already been made by the Executive Branch,
and the Joint Chiefs of Staff probably felt that it was water
over the dam and that events had outrun them.
It is believed that the Admirals were justified in taking
their views to the Congress and that they were also justified
in making their public statements, although the justification
for the latter is not as conclusive as that for the former.
The Admirals spoke out in the absence of any policy deci-
sion. This is an entirely different matter than speaking out
after a policy decision has been made by the responsible civil-
ian officials as General MacArthur did during the Korean conflict.
The public certainly has a right to know the facts, unless
the interests of national security dictate otherwise. In this
particular situation, the question was already a matter of
public speculation and debate. Additionally, all of the inter-
ested foreign governments (especially the United Kingdom and
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the Soviet Union) had already been officially notified (at the
I
Dumbarton Oaks Conversations and during the months prior to
the San Francisco Conference) by the State Department that this
policy debate was occurring within the American Government; and
for that reason, no American trusteeship paper was ready for
discussion.
National security interests certainly did not dictate with-
holding the facts surrounding this policy debate from the public.
More informed Congressional and public debates could have been
developed as an aid in formulating the policy as well as pre-
paring the public for the probable outcome. Instead, the
debates were often based on speculation and steeped in polemics.
The Admiral's public statements attempted to present some of
the facts concerning the question of the postwar disposition
of the mandated islands to the Congress and to the public.
In Chapter One, a speech by Admiral King was quoted in
which he listed the national policies in effect at that time.
These policies can be summarized as follows*
(1) Maintenance of the territorial integ-
rity and security of the United States,
its territories, possessions, leased
areas, and trustee territories.
(2) Maintenance of the territorial integ-
rity and sovereignty of other American
states.
(3) Maintenance of the territorial integ-
rity, security, and political indepen-
dence of the Philippine Islands.
(4) Participation in, and full support of,
the United Nations.
(5) Enforcement, in collaboration with our




(6) Maintenance of the United States in
the best possible relative position
with respect to potential enemy powers,
ready when necessary to take military
action abroad to maintain the security
and integrity of the United States at
home.
Utilizing these national policies (or national security
policies) as a yardstick, it is possible to evaluate the wisdom
of the decisions made concerning the postwar disposition of the
mandated islands. The three main decisions, of course, were
(l) to draft and include a trusteeship system in the United
Nations Charter? (2) to place the former Japanese mandated is-
lands under a United Nations strategic trusteeship; and (3) to
have the Trust Territory administered by the Department of the
Interior.
These decisions definitely furthered the national policy
of supporting the United Nations; although, not to the extent
that the "internationalists" desired. The controversy over
the disposition of the mandated islands caused the resultant
trusteeship system to be a weak one in terms of international
supervision.
However, the matter of priorities is involved. The other
national policies stressed the maintenance of the maximum na-
tional security position for the United States and for its
commitments to other states. If the original concepts of trus-
teeship had been included in the United Nations Charter, and
if the mandated islands had been included under such a trustee-
ship system, the policy concerning the support for the United
Nations would have been more closely followed to the detriment
of the other national policies. The trusteeship system that
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evolved from this policy controversy was a compromise which
supported all of the national policies to some < xtent. In this
respect, the decisions to draft and include a trusteeship system
in the United Nations Charter and to place the mandated islands
under a strategic trusteeship could be described as wise ones.
Balancing this evaluation, however, is the view from the
Micronesians* side of the coin. The welfare of the Micronesians,
in the opinion of this Author, could have been advanced far
more if the islands had been annexed by the United States.
As a trust territory, the islands are neither fish nor fowl.
They are neither "foreign" territory nor "American" territory,
in respect of American laws as well as American interest. They
are too "foreign" to benefit from certain domestic programs,
yet not "foreign" enough to share in American foreign aid
efforts. For example, import-export duties are exacted for
all materials going between the islands and the United States,
thus, hindering the islands* development. Psychologically,
there has been a lack of attention placed on the islands 1 eco-
nomic development since their future political status is un-
known. Only with the advent of the Nixon Administration have
the Micronesians been implicitly told that the United States
desires a closer association with them in the future. Annex-
ation would have solved the question of the future political
status, permitted American investment, eliminated trade bar-
riers and permitted the application of several governmental
domestic aid programs.
Another consideration in evaluating the wisdom of the
decision to place the islands under a strategic trusteeship

328
is the face that the future political status of the islands
is once again in question. The islands still h<- ve strategic
value to the United States. The United States la in danger
of losing this strategic asset just at a time when the islands
may be required for military bases. If the islands had been
annexed just after World War II, this current problem would
not exist. However, at the time of the decision, no one
realized that the Micronesians would become ripe for self-
government in only twenty-five years. The policy-makers
could not have foreseen the rapid postwar movement toward de-
colonialization, much less the rapid advancement toward a
capability for self-government by the Micronesians. The
policy-makers thought that the question of terminating the
trusteeship agreement would not arise "in the foreseeable
future," They may be criticized for this lack of foresight,
but it must be remembered that everyone at that time felt
the same way.
The decision to select the Department of the Interior as
the administrating agency for the Trust Territory was, in the
opinion of this Author, unwise. The administrative arrange-
ments did not remain intact for very long. The security prob-
lems of the Pacific area were evident to many of the policy-
makers at the time that the decision was made. They should
have foreseen the conflicts arising from the "split-control"
arrangements as a result of the international tensions in the
Pacific area. They soon were forced to re-transfer the North-
ern Mariana Islands from Interior to the Navy, probably be-
cause of the need for clandestine projects derived from the
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international security problems of the region.
The naval administration of the islands from the time they
were conquered until they were transferred to Interior was a
credit to the United States and to the advancement of civil and
political rights for the Micronesians. The inhabitants of the
Northern Mariana Islands, under naval administration until July
1962 (except for a brief period in the early 1950*3 when they
were under Interior administration), made rapid economic, edu-
cational, and political progress. The naval administration was
4
progressive, orderly and made a good impression. The Navy
also had the personnel and materiel resources necessary for
the effective administration and development of the Trust
4. After a protracted period of learning by bitter
experience, the Army's administration of the Ryukyus (Okinawa)
became exemplary in providing for the civil rights and internal
self-government of the inhabitants. The civil government estab-
lished by Presidential Executive Order is under the jurisdiction
of the Secretary of Defense. The High Commissioner (who has
always been an active-service Army officer) is designated by
the Secretary of Defense after consultation with the Secretary
of State and with the approval of the President. The govern-
ment system is quasi-parliamentary. The legislative power is
vested in a popularly elected body. Its authority extends to
all subjects of legislation of domestic application. The ex-
ecutive power of the government is vested in a chief executive
who is a Ryukyuan appointed by the High Commissioner after con-
sultation with representatives of the legislative body (from
the majority party or parties). The chief executive has general
supervision and control of all executive agencies and instrumen-
talities of the government. In fact, this governmental system
which was established by the Department of Defense was recom-
mended by one former State Department official, David W. Wain-
house, as a possible model for the ultimate constitutional
status for Micronesia, Seei David W. Wainhouse, Remnants of
Empiret The United Nations and the End of Colonialism (New~~
Yorki Harper and Row, Inc., 1964), p. 128-129.
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Territory. The Interior Department has always had to scramble
for the bare minimum of resources.
One myth that has been accepted by many as true is that
the "military" had "undue influence" in the decision-making
process concerned with the postwar disposition of the mandated
islands. The facts brought out in this study demonstrate that
there was no "undue influence" either by the military services
or by the military establishment. The issue was not one be-
tween the military services or the military establishment and
the civilian agencies. There were many officers in the State
Department who were "pragmatists." Evidently, there were some
naval officers who favored transferring the islands' civil
government to a civilian agency. The civilian leaders of the
military agencies were "pragmatists." The issue was not one
between the "military" and the "civilians."
Furthermore, the "pragmatists" did not have "undue influ-
ence" in the decision-making process on this issue. The "prag-
matist" positions and views did not predominate. They were
considered, and they influenced greatly the formulation of the
trusteeship system, but they did not predominate. The "prag-
matists" lost on the major decisions. A trusteeship system
was discussed at San Francisco, although such discussions had
been blocked from the Dumbarton Oaks Conversations. A trus-
teeship system, albeit considerably different from the orig-
inal conceptions of the "internationalists," was included with-
in the United Nations Charter. The former mandated islands
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were not annexed. Instead, the islands were placed under a
strategic trusteeship- -a goal which had been accepted by the
"internationalists" as early as February 1945. Finally, the
civil government of the Trust Territory was transferred from
the Navy to a civilian agency- -the Department of the Interior.
Neither the "pragmatists" nor the uniformed military ser-
vices nor the military establishment had "undue influence."
In fact, just as good a case could be presented to the effect
that the "internationalists" had "undue influence" in this
decision-making process. However, while the "internationalists"
may have predominated when the major decisions are considered,
this is not the same as their having "undue influence." They
certainly did not achieve their original goals.
This Author believes that the final outcome represented
a compromise between the "pragmatists" and the "international-
ists." All positions presented by all of the participants
(both "pragmatists" and "internationalists") were critically




The Departments of State and Defense are the
Cabinet departments most concerned for the require-
ments of national safety and survival. And today,
perhaps the most important issues of national se-
curity are joint State-Defense issues, requiring
joint action by the two departments. These range
from the overriding need to properly relate mili-
tary means to foreign policy ends, through the
development and execution of military aid projects,
and arms control planning and negotiation.
Senator Henry Jackson,
statement on the State-
Defense Officer Exchange
Program, 1969.
Over the last two decades our increased recog-
nition of the close connection between diplomacy
and military power has brought our two Departments
into daily contact and has made our officers ever
more mindful of the problems of their allied pro-
fession. There are now few activities in the De-
partment of State which in one way or another do
not involve working with the Department of Defense.
Overall, these relationships have become increas-
ingly effective, and yet^at the very heart of our
national security concerns where military affairs
and foreign affairs combine to make our grand stra-
te8y» there is more to be done. The central prob-
lems of national security require the attention of
men experienced in both diplomatic and military
affairs.
Secretary of State Christian
A. Herter, letter to Secre-
tary of Defense Artemus L.
Gates, June 21, 1960.
The function of the Council shall be to advise
the President with respect to the integration of
domestic, foreign, and military policies relating
to the national security so as to enable the mili-
tary services and the other departments and agen-
cies of the Government to cooperate more effec-





CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF MAJOR EVENTS
1522 - Magellan discovers Guam and the Intrusion of Euro-
peans begins,
1899 - Spain sells the Marianas (less Guam), Marshalls, and
Carolines to Germany. Guam is ceded to the United
States.
1916 - Japan occupies the islands as a result of World War I.
1920 - Japan obtains the islands as a Class "C" Mandate
under the League of Nations.
1938 - Establishment of the first coordination machinery




1941 - December 7:
Attack on Pearl Harbor.
1942 - January 1, 2:
United Nations Declaration signed.
February:
Joint Chiefs of Staff organized.
January-July:
State Department Advisory Committee on Postwar
Foreign Policy works out the framework for studies
of various postwar problems. State Department
planning commences on a postwar international
organization and an international trusteeship
system.
September 15:
Joint Chiefs of Staff inform the State Department
of the necessity of depriving Japan of the Marshall,
Caroline, and Mariana Islands (the Mandate).
November: „ , .
State Department plan formulated for a trusteeship
svstem which would include all dependent areas.
Secretary Hull restricts it to only those depen-
dent territories taken from the Axis and the man-
dates of the League of Nations. President Roosevelt
approves the tentative plan as modified by null.






Roosevelt tells British Foreign Secretary Eden
that the Japanese mandated islands should be inter-
nationalized.
August:
Quebec Conference : State Department draft on
dependent areas discussed. Draft includes point
that peoples liberated from Japanese rule and
unprepared for autonomy should be placed under
some form of international trusteeship.
October:
Foreign Ministers' Conference, Moscow: Hull brings
up the proposal again. Roosevelt mentions his
idea of an internationalized string of bases
encircling the globe. The mandated islands to
be included in this category.
November:
President approves the policy that the Japanese
mandated islands are required for the direct
defense of the United States.
December:
Cairo Declaration: United States, United Kingdom,
and China declare that they "covet no gain for
themselves and have no thought of territorial
expansion. It is their purpose that Japan shall
be stripped of all the islands in the Pacific
which she has seized or occupied since the begin-
ning of the first World V/ar in 1914 M• • •
1944 - January:
Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend to the Secretary
of State that "no action should be taken which
directly or indirectly would prejudice the ulti-
mate disposition of these islands."
Spring:
State Department produces a revised trusteeship
plan. Provision included which would give the
international organization's Executive Council
authority over any trust territories where forti-
fications were to be established under the appli-
cation of international security measures. This
was the beginning of the subsequent strategic
areas concept in the United Nations Charter.
March
:
Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox speaks out for
annexation of the Japanese mandated islands.
Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that the "Japan-
ese Mandated Islands should be placed under the





Gallup poll indicates 69 percent of the American
public desires to "keep" Micronesia (the Mandate).
June:
Joint Chiefs of Staff repeat their position (stated
in January and March) to the State Department. They
also recommend annexation of the islands to the
President.
July 6:
State Department radically revises the trusteeship
plan, downgrading the powers of the Trusteeship
Council.
July 10:
President informs the Joint Chiefs of Staff that
he is working on the idea that the United Nations
will ask the United States to act as Trustee for
the Japanese mandated islands. "With this will go
the civil authority ... and also the military
authority to protect them, i.e., fortifications,
etc. It does not necessarily involve a decision
on permanent sovereignty."
July 15:
President approves the State Department trusteeship
plan of July 6.
July 13:
Joint Chiefs of Staff representatives block any




Dumbarton Oaks Conversations: No official discussion
of trusteeship plans occurs.
August 3:
Joint Chiefs of Staff's views formally sent to the
Secretary of State by General Marshall. Joint Chiefs
of Staff desire, from a military point of view, that
discussions concerning the related subjects of terri-
torial trusteeships and territorial settlements be
delayed until after the defeat of Japan.
November 15:
Stettinius, Hackworth, and Pasvolsky see the Presi-
dent. The President tells them that the principle
of international trusteeship should be firmly estab-
lished with adequate machinery for this purpose.
He also directs the State Department, "in consulta-
tion with the military and naval authorities, to






The Three Secretaries (State, War, and Navy) Com-
mittee and SJtfNCC established. SWNCC's purpose is
to "reconcile and coordinate the action to be taken
by the -State, War, and Navy Departments on matters
of common interest and, under the guidance of the
Secretaries of State, War, and Navy, establish




Interior Department becomes interested in obtaining
the role of administrator of the islands. Officers
in the Navy Department begin to plan for postwar
naval administration of the islands.
December 30:
Secretary of State Stettinius writes to Forrestal
and Stimson requesting consultation on the trustee-
ship issue. He invites the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
War, and Navy Departments to participate with State
in the preparation of a draft proposal on trustee-
ships. He concedes that it will be possible to
separate "the formulation of general principles
and of provisions for machinery from consideration
of specific territories, the latter subject to be
left for future determination."
1945 - January 19:
Joint Chiefs of Staff set forth certain conditions
for their participation in discussions of interna-
tional trusteeships.
February 2i
Ad hoc Inter- departmental Committee on Dependent
Area Aspects of International Organization meets.
Committee includes representatives of the State,
War, Navy, and Interior Departments. The mili-
tary services are represented by officers of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff.
February 8j
Second meeting of the ad hoc committee. Principle
of certain essential differentiations between stra-
tegic and non-strategic areas for trust purposes
developed.
February 4-9»
Yalta Conference; Churchill incident. He obtains
the agreement that no discussions of specific terri-




Ad hoc committee produces a trusteeship plan accept-





1945 - March 30*
Stimson, Forrestal and McCloy discuss their fears
over the trend of thinking on trusteeships and




At Three Secretaries Meeting, Stettinius agrees
with Stimson and Forrestal to try to get a post-
ponement of the whole subject of trusteeships at
the San Francisco Conference. Stettinius is dis-
satisfied with the proposed trusteeship plan which,
he says, was developed by the ad hoc committee
while he was out of Washington.
April 5
i
Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes writes to
Roosevelt urgently recommending against any post-
ponement of the discussions at San Francisco. The
President, at a press conference, indicates he wants
the islands to be placed under a trusteeship.
Admiral King speaks out in public for retention of
the islands. This is the first public statement on
the controversy by an American military leader.
April 9:
At Three Secretaries Meeting, Stettinius changes his
decision; refuses to propose a postponement. States
he will inform the President of the War and Navy
views and that he reserved judgment. He tells
Forrestal and Stimson that, while his private views
accorded with theirs, "he was under orders to the
contrary."
Stettinius sends letter to the President describing
War and Navy views and enclosing the trusteeship
plan. Stimson and Forrestal decide to submit their
views directly to the President.
April 10:
Roosevelt cables Stettinius approving the proposed
trusteeship plan in principle and setting a date of
the nineteenth to meet with State, War, and Navy





Stettinius briefs President Truman on this matter





1945 - April 16:
High-level State, War, Navy conference: Joint
Chiefs of Staff are not represented. Decision
is made that the subject of international trustee-




Meeting of Secretaries of State, War, and Navy
with the full United States delegation to San
Francisco Conference. Decisions of the previous
day discussed,
April-June:
San Francisco Conference on International Organi-
zation. Trusteeship provisions, almost identical
to the United States proposal (developed by the
ad hoc Committee), included in the United Nations
Charter.
June 23:
Joint Chiefs of Staff and the service Secretaries
endorse the draft of the United Nations Charter.
July 20:
Truman states enroute to Potsdam that the United
States is not fighting for conquest and does not
want one piece of territory or one thing of mone-
tary value out of the war.
August 9
Truman states that the United States, while not
wanting territory or profit out of the war, will
"maintain the military bases necessary for the
complete protection of our interests and world
peace."
August 14:
Truman approves naval administration of the
Marianas. No consultation was held with the




Subcommittee of the House Naval Affairs Committee
reports that the United States should "take out-
right" the Japanese mandated islands.
September 2:
Japan surrenders. World War II ends.
September 11
i
Truman approves War Department request that his
approval for naval administration of the Marianas
be considered as granting "interim authority" and




1945 - (September 11: continued)
directed to study and submit joint recommendations
on the type of government to be established on the
various Pacific islands.
September 12:
Ickes writes to the President advocating civilian
administration of inhabited areas adjacent to
strategic bases. He states that in developing
plans for the conduct of civil affairs in the new
territories, the Departments of State, War, and
Navy would be consulted.
September 2(3:
Acting Secretary of Interior Abe Fortas writes to
Truman referring to Interior's discovery that
Truman had referred this subject to the Secre-
taries of State, War, and Navy. He desires that
Interior be included in any such discussions.
October 18:
Ickes writes to Truman suggesting the establish-
ment of a State, War, Navy, Interior group to
devise "a detailed plan for interim administra-
tion, pending decisions and agreements concern-
ing future disposition and administration of the
islands."
October 20:
President appoints the Secretaries of State, War,
Navy, and Interior as a committee to study "the
problem arising from the Administration of the
Pacific Islands. This should be done without
delay and we should outline a policy which is
satisfactory to all four departments." No con-
sultation is made with the Secretaries of State,
War, and Navy prior to appointing this committee.
October 25:
Representatives of the four Secretaries meet;
appoint a sub-committee to handle the problem.
October-February (1946):
Low point in relations between State and Interior
on this issue. State Department delays meeting of
the sub-committee. State believes that the politi-
cal status of the islands should be settled prior
to discussions on their civil government.
1946 - January:
"Debacle" revolving around the First Session of the
United Nations General Assembly in London. Presi-
dent Truman approves and, later recinds, authori-
zation for Secretary of State Byrnes to state that
the mandated islands will be offered as a trustee-
ship, either strategic or non-strategic. Incident





1946 - January 30:
Sub- committee meets for first time af er Presi-
dential letter to Secretary of State >n the ninth
urging the Four Secretaries to start consideration
of the problem. Interior representative at the
meeting is presented with a solid front by State,
War, and Navy representatives against any con-
sideration of the problem until after the political
status of the Pacific islands is settled.
February 20:
Interior presents a proposal for civilian adminis-
tration of the Pacific islands under American
control to the other three Departments.
March 6:
Secretaries of State, War, and Navy forward the
Interior proposal to the President without endors-
ing it and unanimously recommend to the President
that no action be taken "until such time as the
status and title of the Pacific Islands concerned
should be determined." Interior not informed of
this action until June 8.
June 20
«
Secretary of the Interior Krug indicates to his
officers that this was not "the proper time for
pushing civilian control of the Pacific islands."
June 28:
Joint Chiefs of Staff decide to report to the
President that they had concluded, after a review
of the situation, that "United States sovereignty
over the Japanese Mandated Islands is, from the
military point of view, necessary to the national
defense. ..."
August 20:
SWNCC agrees to appoint an ad hoc sub-committee
to "prepare trusteeship agreements to cover terri-
tories formerly mandated to Japan and pre-war
Japanese territory." The decision had been pre-
ceded by SWNCC studies since March on the impli-
cations of various interpretations of articles in
the United Nations Charter that pertained to
trusteeships. Also, the Joint Chiefs of Staff
agreed to the development of a draft trusteeship
plan for the mandated islands on several condi-
tions. Mainly, it was to be without prejudice to
the Joint Chief's of Staff's position (annexation)
and without prejudice to the ultimate decision on
what to do with the islands. Additionally, the
Joint Chiefs of Staff set forth several essential
points that should be included in any contemplated
trusteeship agreement in order to maximize American
security. State, War, and Navy Departments desire




1946 - (August 20s continued)
meeting of the First Session of the United Nations
General Assembly in November.
October:
Draft trusteeship agreement developed by the SWNCC
ad noc sub-committee which includes the points
desired by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
October 22:
Presidential conference: Based on oral reports, the
President decides to submit the mandated islands to
strategic trusteeship under terms acceptable to the
United States.
November 6t
President Truman announces the decision and makes
public the draft trusteeship agreement that had
been developed by the SWNCC ad hoc sub-committee.
1947 - February 17:
United States Representative on the Security
Council forwards the draft trusteeship agreement
to Secretary-General Trygve Lie and requests that
it be placed on the Security Council agenda.
February 26: ^
Draft trusteeship agreement formally submitted to
the Security Council.
April 2:
Security Council accepts the trusteeship agreement
which had been modified in minor ways from the
original draft submitted by the United States.
May 3:
Secretary Krug writes to Secretary of State Marshall
requesting, now that the status of the former Japan-
ese mandated islands had been determined, that the
President's Four Secretarial Committee meet to work
our a mutually satisfactory policy for the adminis-
tration of all the Pacific islands. Interior had
learned about May 1 that SWNCC had been considering
the issue for some time.
May 7 :
The President writes to Marshall concerning a
Guamanian petition and recalls his appointment of
the Four Secretarial Committee.
May 12:
Krug writes to the President on the issue after
receiving no reply from Marshall.
May 14
:
Presidential memorandum to the Secretaries of State,




1947 - (May 14: continued;
Marshall writes to Krug suggesting May 16 as a
meeting date after clearing the date with the
other Secretaries.
May 16:
First meeting of the President's Four Secretaries'
Committee. Administration of the trust territory
by a "civilian agency" accepted either at this
meeting or shortly thereafter (depending on
participant ' s interpretation)
.
June 18:
Marshall reports the results of the May 16 and sub-
sequent meetings to the President. The report
includes the decision for "civilian agency" admin-
istration of Guam, American Samoa, and the Trust
Territory of the Pacific Islands.
June 19:
President Truman sends Marshall's report to the
Senate and states his approval of it. He does not
notify the four Secretaries directly that he approved
it.
July 7:
Nimitz, before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
supports approval of the trusteeship agreement.
Forrestal, by means of a statement submitted to the
Committee, also gives his assent to the agreement.
July 18:
Congress, by Joint Resolution, authorizes the Presi-
dent to approve the trusteeship agreement. The
President approves the agreement on the same day.
Also, military government of the Trust Territory is
terminated and replaced by civil government under
interim naval administration by Executive Order,
1948 - February 11
i
President, in a letter to the Secretary of the
Interior, states that it is his intention to desig-




Draft legislation for an organic act for the Trust
Territory is introduced in Congress (S.J. RES. 221).
It is referred to committees. Congress has yet to
pass an organic act for the Trust Territory.
1949 - May 14:
President Truman, in a letter to the Secretary of
the Interior (with a copy to the Secretary of the
Navy), directs that the transfer proceed regardless
of the status of pending legislation. He also




1949 - (May 14: continued)
submitted by September 1, 1949, and that the
transfer should take place "within two or three
years."
August 31 j
Memorandum of understanding between Navy and
Interior on the transfer is submitted to the Presi-
dent. July 1, 1951, selected as the transfer date.
September 23:
The President approves the memorandum of under-
standing.
1951 - January 3:
Former Senator Elbert D. Thomas of Utah is appointed
High Commissioner of the Trust Territory. By the
memorandum of understanding, this position was to
have been filled by Interior on July 1, 1950. The
delay by Interior in nominating a High Commissioner
had retarded transfer planning.
July 1:
Responsibility for the administration of the civil
government of the Trust Territory is transferred
from the Navy to Interior by Executive Order. The
detailed transfer agreement between Navy and Interior
also, becomes effective.
September 8:
Japan, in signing the Peace Treaty, renounces any
rights to her former mandated islands.
1952 - November 10:
President Truman, by Executive Order, retransfers
Saipan and Tinian from Interior to the Navy for
\ security reasons. The retransfer takes effect on
January 1, 1953.
1953 - President Eisenhower retransfers the rest of the
Northern Mariana Islands (less Rota) from Interior
to Navy effective immediately.
1954 - Congress passes an act providing for Presidential
control of the government of the Trust Territory,
formalizing what had been the de facto situation
since the islands had been captured.
1961 - June:
The High Commissioner informs the United Nations
Trusteeship Council that plans are being worked
on to unify the administration of the Trust Terri-
tory. The Trusteeship Council had been critical





1962 - May 7:
President Kennedy, by Executive Order, transfers
the civil administration of the Northern Mariana
Islands back to the Department of the Interior.
Transfer is effective on July 1, 1962.
July 2
j
Interior/Navy agreement to relax Trust Territory
entry controls for alien nationals and ships.
Agreement is effective on July 1, 1963.
1968 - August li
Interior/Navy agreement to relax further the Trust
Territory entry controls for alien nationals, ships,
and aircraft.
1969 - June:
First thirteen-man construction teams are sent by
the Navy to the Trust Territory. In the Spring of
1969, the Secretary of the Interior had requested
the Department of Defense to assign mobile construc-
tion teams to the Trust Territory to assist in local
projects and training goals. As of September 1970,
seven teams are in the Trust Territory; one each
from the Army and Air Force, and five from the Navy.
Julyi
Future Political Status Commission of the Congress
of Micronesia submits its report which recommends a
status of "free association" with the United States.
1970 - May
«
The United States Government offers the Trust Terri-
tory commonwealth status, similar to Puerto Rico, in
negotiations with the Political Status Delegation
of the Congress of Micronesia.
July:
The Political Status Delegation of the Congress of
Micronesia submits a report of its negotiations with
the United States Government, The report indicates
that the Political Status Delegation considers
certain conditions and points inherent to the status
of "free association" that are unacceptable to the
United States Government.
1969 - 1970:
The Department of Defense begins to provide increased
assistance to the Department of the Interior in the
Trust Territory. Besides the mobile construction
teams, surplus military equipment suitable for civil-
ian use, landing craft, formal construction training,
sealift and airlift services, and scientific assis-
tance are being provided by the Department of Defense
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STATS-VAR-NAVY CO'JRDIlfoTIHQ- C01-aQTTE£
IINTERNATIONAL TRUSTEESHIPS
• Mote by the Secreta ries
The enclosure, a paper submitted by the Assistant
Secre-









INTERNATIONAL TRUSTEESHIPS APPENDIX C
TKS PROBLEM-
1. To recommend to the Secretaries of Mar and Navy the
form of reply to be made Jointly to Identical letters, dated
December 30, 1944, addrccood to thorn by the Secretory of State
with respect to international trusteeships.
FACTS B5AKIN0 014 THE PROBLEM
2. On December 30, 1944, the Secretary of State Gent
identical lettere to the Secretaries of War and Navy out-
lining the procedure proposed to do followed in the immediate .
future with respect to the question of international trusteeships.
A copy of that letter was sent to this Committee end
is appended
hereto as Appendix A.
3. Appendix A was referred by the War and Navy Secre-
taries to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The comments of the
latter were presented in the form of a recommended draft reply
attached to Admiral Leahy's memorandum of January 19, 1945
(Appendix B)
.
4. It is understood that the Assistant Secretary of
VJar
has tentatively determined to recommend to the Secretary
of War
and Secretary of the Navy that they as!< the Joint
Chiefs of
Staff to reconsider the conclusions represented by
Appendix B.
For this purpose the Assistant Secretary of War
has informally
presented to the Secretary of the Navy for consideration
o
proposed Joint letter to Admiral Leahy (appendix C).
The Sec-
retary of the Navy has, contrarily, tentatively
determined
that the uior* desirable course to follow mi b
ht be to reply to
the secretary of State but that the matter
eight appropriate 1>






Navy member of this Confuted accordingly submits for considera-





5. Both A-:oendix B and Aopendix C adores? themselves rjrif- g
narily to the- matter of initiating a discussion of the subject £
of internatior.pl trusteeships in a general conference of all
of the United Nations. The Joint Chiefs cay th'-t there is
no
.objection to this, provided certain specific reservations as
to particular territories are made at the outset. The
Secre-
tary of War is believed to be of the viev; that discussion
of
the" Batter in a general conference/ especially with
preliminary
reservations bj the United States, will only engender contro-
versies harmful to the immediate prosecution of the
war. Ac-
cordingly, ho- would have the Joint Chiefs re-examine
their
conclusions in the light of this consider.-- tion.
6. While the Secretary of State's letter Uppendix a)
is
prompted by the probability of the discussion of
international
•
trusteeships in a general conf.r.nce, its more
immediate con-
cerns are (a) the drafting of proposals which
can be agreed
upon within this Government prior to any
discussion, at all,
end (b) the preliminary discussion' of such
proposals, when
and if arrived at, not in a general conference,
but rather
with those thr_e or four of our larger
allies whose real
responsibility it will be to maintain the peace
of the world
in the fore seer, ole future.
?. Appendix D points out that the
first of these concerns
lf of tne Ire immediate significance r
no. -fast it is premature
to endeavor to d.cide finally what
to do ,cmt initiating ex-
ternal fli,cu. 8 lon. of any kind





formulated with' reasonable care and precision. ^ ^b" »*-»\
the work of drafting oroposols satisfactory to ourselves
be
proceeded v/ith as expeditiously as possible, pnd that the
drafts be submitted to the War and Navy Secretaries
and, through
them, to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for comment. With
respect
to the matter of discussions after satisfactory
proposals have
been formulated, it incorcorates the War Department's
view that
a general conference of the United Nations is
not a desirable
forum for such discussions at this point. It suggests
instead
that any discussions of this nature be at first
confined to our-
selves, the British, the Soviets and the Chinese;
and that the
matter be introduced in a general conference only
after general
agreement has been reached among the Great Powers.
8. inasmuch as the Joint Chiefs have indicated
their
. approval of the introduction. of the subject of/trusteeships
into a general conference, it is.manifest
that they would have
no objection to the more limited discussions tentatively
en-
visaged by Appendix D. In any event, Appendix
D in effect re-
serves even the question of embarking upon the
restricted dis-
cussions until after the task of formulating
orooos«ls satis-
factory to this Government has been completed.
Under these
• circumstances there seems to be no occasion
to as!: the Joint
Chiefs to reconsider their conclusion at
this time.
r£coi-ike;;d,.tions
9. It is recommended:
(a) That the Secretaries of War ana
Navy jointly
fddress a Ictt.r to the Secretary




(b) That a cop, of such letter
be forwarded to the
•
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My dear Mr.- Secretary; •••;-.- »?', ..vv'.vi : "- »'- '"'- '.'
I refer to e. letter to no of AugSet 3, 1944, from, BeiiiififtHj \*#
Marshall and to my reply, of August 5 #
r












In deference to the wiehes of the Joint Chiofo of Otnff,







/conversations. However, the' topic was raised at Dumbarton ^> ../;'_
Oaks on a number- of occaoidno by the other participants. .,^
Briefly summarized, those, occasions were substantially as '"'"[?..
follows: .' - -. iVj
,
The Soviet delegation asked why the subject was not bofng.
discussed, expressed* their desire to discuss, it, arid, when
-J
I informed that we considered it wiser to leave the subject for ^
•
future consideration, asked whether it would be discuseefi
at
••the general conference or "made -the subject of a prior exchange
I of views. They expressed a desire for the latter procedure.'
The .British delegation raised the question and were
told that
«e had under consideration' the possibility of exchanging
papera A
I en the subject. They said that they were prepared to
participate
I in such an exchange. The Chinese delegation al.CO
raised the
question, and they, too, expressed" n £ecire to;exchanS
e papers
"on the subject. In none of the above instances" was any
ques-












involved. The emphasis was exclusively upon general principles
and particularly upon the kind of machinery which might effec-
tively and appropriately be established in conjunction with
the international organization.
The question has also been raised many times in public
discussion about the Dumbarton Oaks proposals both here and
abroad. There has been a considerable amount of criticism
that the subject of international trusteeships was ommitted
from the proposals.
the
It is clear, therefore, that we are confronted with/need
of re-examining the whole matter from the viewpoint of further
procedure. In such consideration as we have so far given it,
we have come to the follox^ing Conclusions:
1. It is inescapable that the question of inter-
national trusteeships will have to be discussed at
least at the general conference, and that in all
likelihood a chapter on general principles and
machinery will have to be included in the final
charter of the United Nations.
2, It is entirely possible, in dealing with this
subject, to separate the formulation of general prin-
ciples and of provisions for machinery from considera-
tion of specific territories, the latter subject to be
left for future determination.
We are now working on a draft proposal for incorporation
in the final charter of the United Nations which will be drawn






up at the general conference to be called for that purpose.
'
This proposal will be limited to expressions of general prin-
ciples and to provision of appropriate machinery of an inter-
national nature. We are giving consideration to the possi-
bility of discussing our proposal with the British, Soviet
and Chinese Governments prior to the general conference.
We would very much like to have the Joint Chiefs of Staff
and the War and Navy Departments participate with us in the
preparation of this proposal, and we hope that you will designate
representatives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for that purpose.
As we are hopeful that the general conference can be held
sometime this winter we naturally wish to formulate the
proposal as promptly as possible,
I am sending a similar letter to Secretary Stimson.
Sincerely yours,
E. R. STETTINIUS, JR. (Signed)
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-Subject : International/trusteeships-. ,*V ,; * '] ^;^-- ; v
-
"^ ; ^
The Joint Chief e of Staff recommend that
the attached . ^u--^
Uft letter be dispatched to the Btmt&g'.p* State lfl/*c£ly -, ££j£
6 hip similar letters to the Secretary
' ofplSr ond tho^ecre- . .
^/ •££
fe^tf of the Navy, dated 30 ' Da o ember.' 1944. ,- . ,. ,. ./ - #S






WILLUK Dv L.SAHY, . 'J
"'
."
Fleet Admiral, U.S. RBVy, .;
/• - • Chief of Staff to the
Commander in Chief of the Army and NaVy,
. . >
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I have received your lotter of '30 December 1944 on the
subject of International Trusteeship©, setting forth develop— .
merits concerning this subject since the letters exchanged last
August, t«t'ween the Joint Chiefs of Staff ana the Secretary of
State.
In their letter of 3 August 1944, the Joint Chiefs of
Staff expressed the opinion that:
"From the military point of view, it 1b highly desir-
able that discussions concerning the related subjects of
territorial trusteeships and territorial settlements,
particularly as they may- adversely affect our relations
with Russia, be delayed until after the defeat of Japan,"
The Department of State now proposes that preparations
be made to discuss the general "principles of International
Trusteeships and the appropriate machinery therefor, leaving
for future discussions all questions of specific territories.
In support of this proposal it is stated: ,
'
a. That the Soviets, British and Chinese desire and
will press for such discussions.
b. That the question will have to be discussed at
the general conference, and that in all likelihood a.
chapter on general principles end. machinery will have to
be included in the final charter of the United Nations.
c. That it is entirely possible in dealing with this
subject, to separate the formulation of general principles
and of Drovisions for machinery from consideration of
specific territories, the latter suoject to be left for
future determination.







In view of the above, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with whom
I am in agreement, find no objection, from the military point
of view, to the proposed discussion of International Trustee-
ships, provided such discussions:
a. Give full consideration to the future defense
needs of the United States.
b. Exclude direct or indirect discussion of the dis-
position of any territory under the sovereignty of the
United States, or any Japanese territory occupied by
United States forces
.
c. Consider no agreement that may eventually give to
any foreign nation claim A:o any control of the "Japanese
Mandated Islands" north of the Equator.
In this connection, it is desired to emphasize that all
studies and discussions of this subject should give full con-
sideration to the policy approved by the President 23 November
1943, that the Bonins and all Japanese Mandated Islands lie
in the "Blue Area" described as "Required for the direct defense
of the United States "
The usual military representatives, who are working with
the Department of State in connection with the establishment
of the International Organization, will be available for work
in connection with these discussion.




> c . vs >:\
^Mn^on^D T *"" < : ^ : ^^s&MSecretary .if War to 'the /Washington, u. u. . ^ f ,. |^ s^^r^f the Navy for: consideration
'- *
/•-"•
-f';K- ;::V-as • a. S'ebretary of War. apd JSfaV.y.joint
'
Bear' Admiral Leahy;' 'VV:.
.let^tp^dmlral, Leah|3 V
;^.
I have received the propose^ foS,ot;3,c-Ucr
to tho |s§^T^ ^ \
Uary. of State on international" true
tebehi^
'
by 'the Joint Chief e of Otaff'for ny- SJ$^W. ='*•; ^|>/f . > ;|}r*^
I am convinced of t?he great Importance
of the cubject
^^^|j§
view of our military interest in certain
Pacific arcao_ ti-at.^.^^ . _'
-Bight bo considered for international
truetee chip, and oocaucp-' -^y--
of that importance, I have given careful
thought to % proposal
^
,
and to the poesible Oanger.o of presently
fiiacuBBing ttfl pattc?
j - * >
at a general assembly. •• ''.-s'".. :.
: Vo have net yet any understanding
with the major powers'^' /\ v ;..
ae to the role each 1. to play In
guaranteeing the maintenance . .
of.poaoe, that is to say, ao to the
nature of the responsibility .
which is implicit in the vara "trusteeship*.
I do not tfeaa
. that «e Shouldpoetpone all discussion
of the svbjeet, until arte*
ell nations have agreed on peaeo
guarantees, but at least a ,tenta~
'
tlvo understanding on the part of
the three or four principal ....; :,
nations would appear to be a necessary
preliminary, one that
• Wuld bo normal In preparing for an Important meeting
In business .
I or political life. If we bring up the question
of trusteeships
;| .vltnout sueh preliminary discussion,
we will open the door to ...
- the broadest kind ef claims on the
part of o6:ae powers and wo
will incur the hostility of others,
to who* our Interest in
'
the subject a0y, appear- suspect. On








subject of trusteeship is introduced in the context of an
agreed responsibility to maintain peace, I believe it will
be welcomed by many small nations who might oppose it at the
present stage.
I am also extremely doubtful of the possibility of dis-
cussing trusteeships without discussing the particular areas
for which they are intended, and of the advisability of attempt-
ing to do so. It does not appear practicable to consider the
machinery or organization of a trust without taking into account
the nature of the subject matter. I could readily understand a
contention that a form of organization that we favored for a
Pacific Island might be entirely inappropriate for areas in
other parts of the world. Moreover, as soon as the subject is
introduced in a general meeting, each country will naturally
consider the problem in the light of the areas in which it is
interested; and I think the Joint Chiefs of Staff agree with
me that discussion of particular areas at this stage might lead
to controversies that would divert us from a united prosecution
of the war.
I fear that the difficulties mentioned above will be aggra-
vated if our introduction of the subject is accompanied by a
proviso that we will not discuss certain areas in which we are
particularly interested. That would in my judgment start the
discussions off in an atmosphere of distrust and suspicion that
might well endanger our objective, which would be almost as
clearly revealed by this proviso as by a policy of disclosure.
For these reasons I think our Government should not pro-
pose a discussion of trusteeship at present and should in fact
SWNCC 27 3&T APPENDIX G
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attention of the Joint Chiefs of staff or considered by them.
, .
•:-.•"*:'
Nevertheless, these considerations bear, in my opinion, co . .' '*. ** "
directly on the possibility of attaining objectives Of prime' -:
military importance that' 1 believe the State Department would
be greatly aided by a full expression of opinion by the Joint
Chiefs of Staff on these points.
I have therefore come to the 'conclusion that I should re-
quest the Joint Chiefs of Btnff to consider the subject further
in the light of the considerations stated in this letter and . /
accordingly I return the proposed letter to the Beoretary of
State for that purpose.







[Proposed letter submitted by the Navy representative on
SWNCG for consideration as a joint letter from the Secre-
taries of War and Navy to the Secretary of State]
DRAFT
My dear Mr. Secretary:
I have your letter of 30 December 1944 on the subject
of international trusteeships, setting forth developments in
this regard since the letters exchanged last August between
the Joint Chiefs of Staff and yourself.
In their letter of 3 August 1944, the Joint Chiefs of
Staff expressed the opinion that:
"From the military point of view, it is highly
desirable that discussions concerning the related
subjects of territorial trusteeships and territorial
settlements, particularly as they may adversely
affect our relations with Russia, be delayed until
after the defeat of Japan."
The Department of State now proposes that preparations be
made to discuss the general principles of international trustee-
ships and the appropriate machinery therefor, leaving for
future discussions all questions of specific territories. In
support of this proposal it is stated:
a. That the Soviets, British and Chinese desire
and will press for such discussions.






b. That the question will have to be discussed at
the general conference, and that in all likeli-
hood a chapter on general principles and machin-
ery will have to be included in the final charter
of the United Nations.
c. That it is entirely possible in dealing with this
subject, to separate the formulation of general
principles and of provisions for machinery from
consideration of specific territories, the latter
subject to be left for future determination.
SWNCC 27 -13- APPENDIX D
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to the Joint Chiefs of Staff by the Secretary of War end myself.
The Joint Chiefs have again considered the matter end have ex-
pressed the opinion that there is no objection, from the military
point of view, to the proposed discussion of international
trusteeships, provided such discussions:
a. Give full consideration to the future defense
needs of the United States.
b. Exclude direct or indirect discussion of the dis-
position of any territory under the sovereignty
of the United States, or any Japanese territory
occupied by United States forces.
c. Consider no agreement that nay eventually give to
any foreign nation claim to any control of the
"Japanese Mandated Islands" north of the Equator.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff further emphasize the fact
that
all studies and discussions of this subject should give full
consideration to the volley, acproved by the President 23
Novem-
ber 1943, that the Bonins and all Japanese Mandated
Islands lie
in the "Blue Area" described as "Required for the
direct defense
of the United States "
I am advised that, since the receipt of your
letter, there
has taken place within your Department consideration
of draft
proposals, for possible discussion by the United
States, Great
Britain, Russia and China, relating to the general
principles
of international trusteeships and the machinery
for their ef-
fectuation. I further understand that appropriate
military
and navel representatives are taking part
therein.
I am in accord with the deslr: bility
of ende- vorlng to
formulate at the earliest possible moment
proposals of this
character wr.ich will recognize the oasic
military and political
• «~ or>t\qfactory to this Government as afactors Involved ann arc sa. isiaci.ui








"u point outVW\s not unlikely that we shall De oo.igeu, • . ^;
.
",oner or later, to enter Into a discussion of
this matter with. ^ :
Aov nations, and It Is Imperative that this
Government explore ,'._
M subje ot thoroughly among ourselves before
considering It
1th others. 1 hop*, therefore, that
this work will proceed, \^r
xpeditlouely, and this Department stands ready
to be of any. .;
eeletance ttot It can. I assure you
that,' when It has reached
point where there Is a draft-or perhapo
alternative drafts--
oltable for submission as a basis for
discussion within thjo •
*vernment, the Navy Department and, I am
sttre, the War ftepart-
,ent and the Joint Chiefs of; Btaff will
behind to supply their
jommente and recommendations. . '_
..•' Until this project has advanced to. a stage
where it la .-,-.': ;h
. ;




position in reasonable detail, It seems
to me to be p-emature ... .. . ;
* attempt to decide finally whether,
or not we shall Institute
.
discussions with other nations in this regard.
If we are able ..
to agree within our own Oovernment
upon proposals which we., ;: '-•.
^
would bo willing to discuss with .other
nations, then mm, .•
opinion such discussions should be limited^ thef«^ .
which took part In the Dumbarton Oaks
conversation*, and only r
.
-;
after full examination and complete
agreement among the** powers
feJ
should the subject be opens* for consideration
by a general f'^f'
conferenoe of the United Nations. V > '- '&.*? '- X-' :V
'
ln accordance with the views expressed
above. It -li>^ew^4 :.
ttat the State Department proceed a s
promptly a* may ?*%*§ J« .'.
drafting of its proposed paper on territorial
trusteeship ft*
..
possible discussion with the British, the
WletS. and the Chinee, ,
and request comment thereon from the
Secretary of Var. the SecrS-^
tary of the Navy, and the Joint Chiefs






The Honorable .: ,.'-
The Secretary of 9tate 367 ____

_^ appendix c ;.' ;
26 February 19 45




Reference:" a. SWNCC 2?
Note by the Secretaries
By Informal action the Committee agreed to forward the
attached letter to the Secretary of State in lieu of the one











• eppptprnAcv of STaTF. [from the Chairman of the State,
-
KBX-.-.i»;.-DUK FOR: .HE SECREiARY Oh buua L^ ^^ Coordinatin8 Committee
Subject: International Trusteeships
Reference ic :r.ade to your identical letter
cf 30 December
1944 to the secretaries of War and Navy on
the subject of
international trusteeships, setting forth
developments in this
.
regard since the letters exchanged last
August between the
joint Chiefs of Staff and yourself.
in their letter of 3 August 1944, the
Joint Chiefs of
Staff expressed the opinion that:
"From the military point of view, it is highly
de-
siraole that discussions concerning the related
subjects of territorial trusteeships and territorial
settlements, particularly as they may adversely
affect our relations with Russia, be delayed
until
after the defeat of Japan." .
The Department of State nov: proposes that
preparations be
made to discuss the general principles of
international trustee-
ships and the aopronriate machinery therefor,
leaving for
future discussions all questions of specific
territories. In
support of this proposal it is stated:
a. That the Soviets, 3ritlsh and Chinese
desire
and will press for such discussions.
b. That the question will have to be discussed
at
the general conference, and that in all likeli-
hood e chapter on general principles and machinery
will have to be included in the final charter of
the United Nations.





c. That It Is entirely possible in dealing with
thiP
0&-Lii\k subject, to separate the formulation of general
principles and of provisions for machinery from 5
consideration of specific territories, the latter
subject to be left for future determination.
Upon receipt of your letter, the proposal was
submitted
to the Joint Chiefs of Staff by the Secretary of
War and the
Secretary of the Navy. The Joint Chiefs have again
considered
the matter and have expressed the opinion that
there is no ob-
jection, from the military point of view, to the proposed
dis-
cussion of international trusteeships, provided such
discussions:
a. Give -full consideration to the future
defense
needs of the United States.
b. Exclude direct or indirect discussion of the
dis-
position of any territory under the sovereignty
of the United States, or any Japanese territory
occupied by United States forces.
c. Consider no agreement that may eventually
give to
any foreign nation claim to any control of the
"Japanese Mandated Islands" north of the Equator.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff further emphasize the
fact that
11 studies and discussions of this subject should give full
consideration to the policy, approved by the President 25
Novem-
ber 1943, that the Bonins and all Japanese Mandated
Islands 'lie
in the "Blue Area" describee as "Required for the
direct defense
of the United States "
It is understood that, since the receipt of your
letter,
there ha? taken dace within the State Department consideration
of draft proposals, for possible discussion oy the
United States,
SWWCC 2?/l rl?- Enclosure
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OGreaH^Eritain, Russia aria uiurm,' rci?n llB *u — *w*»w »*
ciples of international trusteeships and the
machinery for tlieJ:
effectuation. It is further understood that
appropriate mill-
o
tary and naval representatives are taking part
therein. m
The Secretaries of War and Navy are in accord
with the
desirability of endeavoring to formulate at the
earliest
possible moment proposals of this character which
will recognize
the basic military and political 'factors
involved and are satis-
factory to this Government as a oasis for
discussion with the
other Dumbarton Oaks powers. If there are to be
no direct acqui-
sitions of security outposts by the United States
or the other
principal powers, such proposals should Include a
type of trus-
teeship, in respect to all or any part of these
areas, which will
assure the security interests of the several agreeing
nations.
As you point out, it is not unlikely that we
shall be obliged,
.sooner or later, to enter into a discussion of this
matter with'
other nations, and it is imperative that this
Government explore
the subject thoroughly among ourselves before considering
it
with others. It is
-
hoped, therefore, that this work will
proceed expeditiously, and the War and Navy Departments
stand
ready to be of any assistance that they can. You are
assured
that, when it has reached a point where there is a
draft--or
perhaps alternative drafts— suitable for submission as a basis
for discussion within this Government, the War and Navy
Depart-
ments and the Joint Chiefs of staff will promptly supply
their




Until this croject has advanced to a stage where it is
possible to say that this Government has formulated its
own





"^t to decide^ finally whether or not we shall lr.atltu.te
discussions vith other nations In this regard. If
we are able
to agree within our own Government upon proposals
which v;e
would be willing to discuss with other nations, tt
en in the
.
opinion of the Secretary of War and the Secretary of
the Navy
euch discussions should be limited to the principal
powers
which took part in the Dumbarton Oaks conversations,
and only
after full examination and complete agreement anions
those powers
Bhould the subject be opened for consideration by a general
conference of the United Nations.
In accordance with the views expressed above,
it Is sug-
gested that the State Department proceed as promptly
ao may be
possible with the drafting of its proposed parser on
territorial
trusteeships for possible discussion with the principal
powers.
As soon as this oarer Is received, arrangements
will oromptly
be made whereby you will receive" the views of the
Secretary of













DRAFT STATE DEPARTMENT April 2, 1945
File No. A14-7/EF
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
[Draft memorandum from the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy]
At a meeting on April 2 the Secretaries of State, War and Navy
agreed that it was not possible to arrive at agreement with
respect to any satisfactory draft paper on the subject of trus-
teeship with a view of presentation for discussion of the subject
with sponsoring powers before the San Francisco Conference. The
Secretaries of War and Navy feel strongly that the position of
this Government with respect to the necessity for retaining com-
plete control over certain strategic areas in the Pacific should
be made known unequivocably to other nations and to the world
before any discussion even of machinery of principles with respect
to a trusteeship system could be entered into. This position was
based upon the following considerations:
The United States has always been the champion of peace
and freedom in the Pacific Ocean. This war has been
fought and is being fought -in that cause against the
aggressions of Japan who sought to enslave in her empire
the Western and South Western Pacific. Our country is
now liberating that ocean from this attack, not only for
our own interests, but for the interests of all peace
loving nations who are situated or have interest in the
Pacific. In this cause, with great loss of American
lives and expenditure of American treasure, we have
taken from Japan and now have possession of certain
islands and atols and still more will shortly be in our
hands.
Strategic rights in a certain number of these islands and
atols j_sic"] are vital to any effective military guaranty
of peace in the Pacific. Harbor and air fields are as
much an integral part of necessary military power as war
ships and planes. In order to discharge its responsi-
bilities as a champion of peace and freedom in the Paci-
fic, it will be necessary for the United States to have
these strategic rights. The United States policy will
be to hold any reserved strategic rights in the interests
of the same cause for which we are now fighting -- the
cause of international peace and freedom in the Pacific,
a cause in which all law-abiding nations in that area
have a vital interest.
As you recall, agreement was reached at Yalta that a discussion
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limited to an exchange of views as to principles and machinery
for dealing with the trusteeship question; that the territories
which might be included in such a system should be restricted
to certain categories and that there should be no discussion of
specific territories or areas either at the San Francisco Con-
ference or in the consultations previous to that conference.
Preparations for porposals as to a trusteeship system for dis-
cussion at the San Francisco Conference were to be conducted in
consultation with the other sponsors and the provisional govern-
ment of France,
I now find it necessary to recommend that the representatives of
the other sponsors and the provisional government of France enter
into the discussions and consultations already arranged to take
place in Washington, When the consultations have begun I feel
that we should then inform them that the state of our prepara-
tions has not advanced to the point where we are ready to present
any definite ideas as to machinery and procedures for a trustee-
ship system and that we feel that it would very likely not be
possible for us to develop this question sufficiently before
the opening date of the San Francisco Conference to have agreed
proposals ready to lay before that Conference for consideration.
We feel that in the event that the agreed proposals have not
been arrived at it would be advisable for the nations convened
at the Conference to agree that the study and development of this
whole question of a trusteeship system should be made one of the




The indented paragraphs" have been
added to the State Department draft












[Proposed Joint letter to the President from the Secretary
of War and the Secretary of the Navy]
9 April 45
Dear Mr. President:
The War and Navy Departments are greatly interested in
the strategic importance of certain islands in the Pacific
and the application thereto of "Arrangements for International
Trusteeship:" in the charter of the proposed International
Organization. The Secretary of State has conferred with the
Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy about this
matter but is not in complete agreement with their views of
the action to be taken. In the first place, we urge a post-
ponement of the whole question of trusteeships and our views
are stated to you on this point in a separate letter. On the
principal question of dealing with these strategic areas, our
views are as follows:
The United States has always been the champion of peace
and freedom in the Pacific Ocean. It has fought this war in
that cause against Japan who has been the aggressor seeking
to enslave into its nev; empire the Southwestern Pacific. We
are now liberating that Ocean from this attack, not only for
our own selfish interest, but for the interest of all peace-





In this cause, with great loss of American lives, we
have conquered and seized and have possession of certain
islands and atolls in the Pacific. Japan had taken them
originally, partly by fraud. Now that these islands and
atolls are passing into our hands, we should through their
possession firmly establish our position as an effective
champion of the freedom of the Pacific Ocean. In order to
discharge its responsibility in respect to freedom in the
Pacific, it will be absolutely necessary that the United
States have strategic rights in these atolls.
It is, therefore, with misgivings that the Secretary of
V/ar and the Secretary of the Navy have contemplated the estab-
lishment of international trusteeships in respect to these
islands. They believe it is desirable to retain full control,
at least with respect to certain former Japanese-held islands
and former Japanese Mandated Islands, accompanied by a declara-
tion on the part of the United States that it will hold these
areas in the interests of the same cause for which we are now
fighting, the cause of freedom of all law-abiding nations in
the Pacific Ocean. We believe that a Declaration of Policy
should be made public promptly and before any discussions





[Memorandum from. Major Correa to Secretary Forrestall '
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This afternoon there was a conference at the State- uepartnent. The
following were present: "* •*" ~
?" ft SC t. : •
'
:: S ' cv?"" VJITS "1
Edward R. Stettinius, Jr. - Secretary of State j_
"v-,I v '.f\ry
Henry L. Stimson - Secretary of Y.'ar
\ >/x ' ' ' "'
*"
James Forrestal - Secretary of the Navy l^*'iSo AUGi i,:c "'
Joseph C. Grew - Under Secretary of State / / {
Jamo£ C. Dunn - Assistant Secretary of 'State
{ V"* j •-> :•.>. J/J /lt'7/^'<
Karvey H. Pundy - Special Assistant to Secretary of Y/ar. • ., „ |







G; Hayden Raynor - Special Assistant to Secretary of Ste'ee* ~'; ''' l ' v"" — -^
~-*"- \
LSathias F. Correa, J.!ajor, USMCR - Special Assistant to titof;-' ^°*__ -~-~--~-"'~)
Secretary of Navy.
At the outset of the meeting it was agreed that thore v;ouid be no
postponement of the discussion of international trusteeships scheduled
to take place at the San Francisco Conference.
Next discussed was the question of whether or not the declaration of
policy, which is annexed to draft letter of Secretary of State'end
Secretary of War to the President dated 13 April 1945, should be
promulgated at this time as representing the stand of the United States
on this question.
Mr. Stettinius urged that it ought not be at this time because of the
effect it would have on the other nations participating in the confer-
ence. Mr. StJrnson indicated that he was Inclined to agree with this.-
It was finally agreed that the declaration of policy would not be
put forth 8t this time but at some future date such a declaration
would be promulgated.
A discussion was then had concerning the State Departments proposed
alternate statement. It was agreed that such a statement should be -
promulgated after it had been approved by the President. Considerable
discussion was had of the specific language which would be included
in such a statement' and a drnft was finally agreed upon. Mr. Eundy
and Mr. Dunn were delegated to set this drt.'ft up in proper form for
presentation to the President as the recommendation of the State, War
and the Navy for his approval. It was not agreed 8S to how the state-
ment should be promulgated. A suggestion was made that it should be
put out in answer to a "planted" question at the press conference of
the Secretary of State.





The Secretary of the Navy asked the Secretary of State whether or not
in the view of the Secretary of State it would embarrass him if the
Secretaries of War and Navy v.ero to send to the President the expression
of their views contained in the draft joint letter of 13 April 1945
.
The Secretary of State replied that it would at this time and arked
that the sending of such a statement bo deferred "for a few days." Tho
implication of his statement, although it was not entirely clear, was
that he did not wish such a statement to go forward to the President
until the San Francisco Conference was finished or at least until it
was well under way. Tho Secretaries of War and Navy indicated that
they acquiesced in his request.
The question was raised as to whether or not the draft on the chapter
of trusteeships be proposed by the United States at the San Francisco
Confercnco nonld include language which would rake it clear that tho
United States by agreeing to the draft or by proposing it did not
commit itself to placo under trusteeship arrangements any particular
territories and that this would be a matter of subsequent agreement.
It was agreed by all present that there would bo included in Titlo I,
Section B 1. cf the State Department draft, the following language:
"It shall be a natter for subsequent agreement as to which specific
territories within the foregoing categories chould be brought under
the trusteeship system and upon what terms."
The Secretary of the Navy raised the question as to whether or not
the United States draft of the chapter on trusteeships should include
provisions similar to those contained in the Secretary of War and
the Secretary of the Navy revision of the Stato Department draft which
would placo the initial negotiation of trusteeship arrangements with
respect to strategic areas in the Security Counsel rather than tho
General Assembly. The Socretary of War indicated that he concurred
in the Secretary of the Navy's view that initial negotiations for
trusteeship arrangements be made with the Security Counsel. Dr t
|
Pasvolsky indicated dissent - stated that in his view all negotiations '
should be had with the General Assembly, but finally it was agreed
that tho negotiations of the original trusteeship arrangements
with respect to strategic areas should be made with tho Security
Counsel rather than tho General Assurrbly, that any alterations of
such trusteeship arrangements should not be made without the concur-.
renco of the Security Counsel but that other arrangements concerning
strategic areas which had to do sololy with welfare could be negotiated







[Short memoranda attached to memorandum
on meeting held at the State Department
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DECLASSIFIED
[Draft for statement of United States policy prepared by
Mr. Henry H. Bundyl
HHB in - 4/16/45.
DECLARATION OF UNITED STATES POLICY.
The Conference of the United Nations will soon commence
at San Francisco. During this conference a possible system
of international trusteeships will be discussed and it is of
great importance that this country clearly understand the
nature of these discussions. It is not proposed at San Fran-
Cisco to determine the placing of any particular territory
under a trusteeship system. All that will be discussed there
will be the possible machinery of such a system.
In entering upon these discussions, the United States
Government desires to make clear its attitude with respect to
certain areas and to recall certain facts of history. The
United States has always been the champion of peace and free-
dom in the Pacific Ocean area. This war has been fought and
is being fought in that cause against the aggressions of
Japan who sought to enslave in their empire the Western and
Southwestern Pacific. Our country is now liberating that
Ocean from this attack, not only for ourselves but for the
interests of all peaceful nations who are situated or have






American lives and expenditure of American treasure, we have
taken from Japan and now have possession of certain islands
and atolls and still more will shortly be in our hands.
The United States does not seek annexation of territory
or economic wealth but strategic rights in a certain number
of these islands and atolls are vital to any effective mili-
tary guaranty of peace in the Pacific. Harbors and airfields
are as much an integral part of necessary military power as
war ships or planes. In order to discharge its responsibility
as a champion of peace and freedom in the Pacific, it will be
necessary for the United States to have these strategic rights
and such rights will involve complete control in the case of
certain atolls in the Pacific. The United States policy will
be to hold any such reserved strategic rights in the interests
of the same cause for which we are now fighting -- the cause
of international peace and freedom in the Pacific, a cause
in which all law-abiding nations in that area have a vital
interest.
It will not be the policy of the United States to hold
any strategic rights for selfish advantage and the United
States will cooperate with the United Nations through such
arrangements as may be appropriate to assure the economic
and social advancement of the inhabitants of these territories,
many of which are very sparsely populated and contain little





The United States Government considers that it would be
entirely practicable under a trusteeship system to provide,
by agreements, for the maintenance of such United States mili-
tary and strategic rights and control as will be necessary to




^ APPENDIX H !
UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR I
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
DIVISION OF TERRITORIES AMD ISLAND POSSESSIONS j
Washington
\
September 10, 1?2£ [
Pacific Islancs ; viy?-^^w-ru-i5 >.. ^-^en |
KA21DU!.! for th3 Secretary* [of the Interior from Edwin G. Arnold, Director of
the Division of Territories and. Is.land Possessions]
1. Vfe shr.ll greatly strengthen cur cs.sc for retention of
strategic bases
1 • cc~it ourselves at or:ce to the principle of civil government of *hs ac-*
t ^vbit^ areas. This colicy would be in line with enlightened inter- ,
•.rc-inicao Civil government of the indigenous people- would support. ;
/>,-,--: nG . thft activities of the defense service- o Neither -he security i
fci^Vst^-c of the United States would be served by a policy of naUxasy -j ,
forhic^. wouTd seen more militaristic than that of the old colonial
powers, i
rjmcre* militaristic than that of the Japanese themselves, whose
South Seas
m-XL was staffed largely by regular civil service personnel* i
."r'i
2 c F-- %o- the Navy's point of view, there should be a
distinct auva
tittir^" civilian agencies assume responsibility for the conduct of c~
W. ~It would then be much freer from harassment by the public, whose in-
ference to the islands it could no longer count upon as it eoula
an &.ie
bb of Guam and Samoa befcre the vrar*
3. P^ov-ded the interest of the Army and 2fevy in military
security and in
hB=vecvtion of their olans is safeguarded in any civil system ^aaa is e&v^o-
ls*a t-ey should be able to secure better public supper* for
tneir c^ense
DcecVicing function if they are relieved of the eomple:aities of ami aJiairs^
i burning control of civil affairs in what is no.; a fecal area oi
an'er^a^o^a
Bbic interest, they would find themselves under a constant stream
of eraoicisn
essctin- activities cutside of their main responsibility.
t. The safeguards for our security end for the
policing function are.;
aYi** '^v and £aw should control the base areas ; as on the aanuar-aj ^/
fc should have liaison with any civilian effice en any aomnistraoi^ L*^
fcte '.cint effort is recuired: and (c; in tne xinal resort, one c.»u >.«.
,*«-o-
| an appeal to YTashingtcn for decision at the
Cabinet or .:nave aoasa pv*-o
5„ -The conmuratively small native population in the Japansse-^:ndat 3-2
is-
La:s (rcssibly 63,000 to 70,000, exclusive of Japunese), dees no i yustat. a.,
tion to the principle of civil government. The asanas oz .he. ^c^a.
^lj_
. ;.ct world attention far out of proportion to one number* Oi -nej_- i^--- --^;





oa.rs: (b) soae are inter-continental shopping stones for influential
;rav^
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i i
urJ.sU, bu:.J.-i'::.:J win, collectors, wrltora, phobogrnphero, and honoywoonora;
i) their V.1-Y separ.itcncas and variety vrill make thorn objects of great interest
| bisaioruuuooj anthropologists, administrators and traders. Putting the mat-
iv in wore positive torcis, the many small and varied population groups will .
vovic'o cxanolos of corsmunity organization' h/ivin ; an importance and influence
Jr beyond the numbers of inhabitants. Accordingly, it is necessary
-co pay
irWcula" attention to the character of administration established in «ne is-
*nds.
I
6 The recess-* ty for coordination in economic and other civil affairs
loner ail pacific areas makes it essential to have a single civilian agency
•isoonsibls for these affairs. This will make for economy and for interchange
\ technical a"d administrative experience* For military purposes, certain ,
Las mav be *iven much -ore Importance than others; but this makes it
all the
pre Lnoortant to link these closed 'with the other American-administered
areas
id with the mainland, in strong and, if possible, prosperous economic
and cul-
iral relations. This is a single civilian job. If it is well done, at will
Esist the defense forces in creating and maintaining the conditions 01
peace.
7 It ma* be necessary to enter into regional arrangements with other
-.
wers for a&inisterine the affairs of some islands or island groups. This j
ry have to be done, for example, in the Phoenix group, where we alreaay
nave
Snt soverei-ntv rith the British over two of the islands (Canton ana Enaeroury);
ossibly in Samoa, v.here we have orobloms in common with New Zealand^ or m the
ist-alian mandated area, the Solomons -and the New Hebrides, -here we may be
ili^ed to continue sharing, as during the war, in the responsibilities Ox as-
Possibly some regional agreement will be needed for the entire :
Ka. It is too scon to have any clear idea of the scope of such senemesj and
hey nay not be found necessary or feasible for a long time If they
should
- undertaken; however, we" must be prepared to match the steady and persistent
ffo^ts that v;ould certainly be made by the other cooperating powers whose
ivilian representatives would have a trained and more or less permanent in-
test in the problems of the area, (
I
8. A special problem may arise in the case of the Byukyu Islands* This
fcse3y-ponu3 ated grouc will undoubtedly be regarded as of great importance
a Far Eastern military and political strategy- by (a) the United States defense
tvices, who will undoubtedly continue to regard Okinawa as a site or, pivotal
Elue as a base for air operations; (b) the Chinese for the same reasons--
ecause their security would be profoundly affected oy the disposition maae c?
vj.Ti^ra and on account of ancient historical associations: (c; the innaoicanws
Cselves. -ho nimbered, in 19lOs 839,Ws9 (including 5?H,579 in the Okinavra
tefecture),- and (d) every nation having an interest in the maintenance oi peace
n the Far East. Under these circumstances, it will not be surprising if bne
Lkvus, like Korea, are nlaced for a time under some kind of international
rastecshio. If the United States should claim and secure responsibm-&y, >
- full or oartial, for administration of the Syukyus, the n^idjjinz oi civil ,itr.
Ifairs would be a large end complex undertaking. All of the above-nosed reaso
'or establishing a strictly civilian administration of civil affairs woulc cer-
ainiy apply in the case of this thicks-populated area.
Q. It must be recognised that a civilian agency of the United States









as agencies of the defense services. Sone occasional friction between military
and civilian agencies is bound to arise in the normal course of- business.
During the v.'ar period, it arose very ssldeii between the armed and "jriar.r.ed repre-
sentatives of the United States abroad. It nay occasion surprise in the minds
of our allies if wo out-do, say, the British, in militarizing our territorial
government. The British armed services have not only worked v.dth civilian
governors but have tolerated a large measure of local self-rule in such vital
outposts as Ceylonj Singapore, the Fiji Islands and the Northwest Frontier of
India. Cur own experience with the loyalty arid cooperation of the Filipinos is
a testimonial to tho far-sightedness of ?,!cKinlcy, P.oot 3 Theodore Roosovolt and
Taft who wasted little tiino in establishing civil coverrancnt after the conquest
of the islands. V.o one is likely to accuse these statesmen of a lack of realism.
They were dealing with a population of which a part "were still in revolt. Yet,
they accepted the recommendation of the Philippine Coordssion to the President,
1^00, which read as follows:
(
"Considering the varieties of the peoples and the friendliness
of most of them to the United States, it would be both unjust and
impolitic to treat them all alike as unworthy of civil government;
and looking to the pacification of those still hostile, the commis-
sion believes that no instrumentality would be so effective to that
end as the establishment of civil government in the communities
which are already £riendly. ,: (Report of the Philippine Ccmmission3






Eight years later, the beneficial results of civil rule were eloquently
reviewed in the Special Report to the President "oj the Secretary of VJar, '









)$ dear Mr. President:
SEP 12 1945
.
administration ^ nfT^;!?^ c?At.«s. It Trould be in keeping Trithcivil in "^^rr
w
:T -q+ „ e i
t n
'SSr the supervision of the
United Sta s,
.
1* foms of civil
^traditions of the American people
to ^£s° =^eace_tlras government
^station, -^r civili^P^^^si'on being made to protect
of nesr overseas
territories, mth «»«?*£* d t ^le this Nation to
though I recede that£jgX b. «^S£SS^S2T5?*SSl.
be .aado concerning either
the
*JE£?rf Territories and Island Posses-
territories, I have asked the
^vision or is Pacificjs^ar£s_and




Aw or Navy administration ddvll^^^^LxUf»d
toes^the Philippines Alaska, Puerto
Race and £•£*», to the De_
In all of these cases the
responsibility iras x
„> Snt of the Interior. IVwas «£**£«£ taWS, President Hoover
retained complete control. By ^ ^°^^ds fr0H the Navy Department
to
transferred the control of the
Vi^™S^ecutive toder of Resident .
the Department of the
Interior. In xy%> ^ ^ Islana Possessions
Roosevelt established the Division
of territories
Division from
in the Department of the
^erior and transferled ^^ ^
to Vfar Department the function of <g™g**J* of the Interior vas
Executive Orders of 1936 and 1938,
the ^P^
t and anbury
given jurisdiction oyer Baker,
HOTl^d,^arv ' ^lor,.v^^-arbBT
Islands in the Pacific Ocean. fi^JgESKNj***«*"«*,«» tr^s7
?^1939,--the,.Bi«^









ictha 1930's appear.*». ^'*:^^ *?-,,,,,> ?.^cnoy.
V*ri teriei affairs .under p.:*issx<fc.«aMJ,
=a .*»w J
/£.*-
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There is every reason to believe that the sound
conduct of
inanistration in inhabited areas adjacent to strategic bases
«
^rt^fc,:handi»^
or^the security nor the prestige of the United
States would b
a policy of military rule; for such a
policy would appear bo
Ustic than that of the old colonial powers, even more milita
A trat of the Jjnanese themselves whose South Seas Bureau v,a
^ly by civilian personnel. The British Army and Navy have
£ked with civilian administrators but have
tolerated a large
f local self-rule in such vital outposts
as Ceylon, Singapore,
iji Islands, and the Northwest Frontier of
India.
'
Differences of opinion and method may arise in
the normal course




aards can be provided for our military security
and for the policing
Teflon These safeguards, I believe, are: (a)
strict control of
So actual base areas by the defense services,
as on the *ainla«i,
I) close liaison and representation of the Army
and Navy in any civil-
an office on W administrative level, where joint effort is required,
Siting decisions either as to the time required to comp
^e the^asks
"f military government or as to the particular
geographic areas to be
dministerod by the United States.
^r-i-fescibler-iJn the preparation of such a report, dealing
with
to wndSc? of civU affairs in no* territories, I assume
that the
SpartSonSs of State, War, and Navy should bo
consulted regarding any
lans or program which they may have developed.
Sincerely yours,
Secretary of tho Interim
lie President,
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lljdear l!r. Presidents, ? '* J
THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
' WASHINGTON
SEP 28 1945
After the Secretary wrote his letter to you on September 12 and received your
rely of September 13 concerning the conduct of civil affairs in Pac3J\ic areas whic
remain under United States supervision, I have been informed that you have re-
ared this subject to the Secretaries of State, War, and the Navy.
h
1
In considering the future administrat5.on of such areas as the Pacific Islands,
I a sure it is your intention to draw upon the long experience of the Government
of the United States in handling the problems of indigenous peoples, both on the
Ea aland and in overseas areas* The Department of the Interior has dealt with Indian
afairs for over one hundred years and is also the Federal Department responsible
fo the administration of affairs in nearly all inhabited overseas territories of
th United States.
By maintaining naval administration of Samoa and Guam, the United States has
ha the dubious distinction of being tho only Pacific power -which governs an inhabited
comial area as a mere appurtene.nce of a' military base. This is not, I believe, a
diiinction which tho American people will justify at a time when enlightened opin-
io:, at home and abroad, demands expert attention to the progress of dependent peoples,
I recognize tho vital interests of the Department of State and the defense
Bodices 3ji determining policies and methods of administration in all areas having
Btuteglc importance in international affail's. Indeed, in working out methods of
go-'.rnment for such areas, it is advisable to treat the matter as a single United
Sttes problem; and I believe that, in the interest of American prestige, Tre should
tali into account tho fact that world attention vdll be focused on the dependent i
ivi.s of the Pacific. If tre commit ourselves to the principle of civil government,
wo trengthen tho already strong case tre have for retention and control of strategic
baiis.
The Department of the Interior would like to assist in assuring expert civil
go^rnment with a view to the ultimate attainment of democratic institutions and
:comic stability in dependent areas. Vfe should like to contribute fully out of
^Department's experience in territorial matters in order to assist 5,n establich-
inewhatever new organization and methods may be needed to protect the over-all
nt rests of the United States and to fulfill the obligations of this Government
"air tho United Nations Charter.
I hops that you will advise tho Secretaries of State, Yfar, and the Navy and
Socotary Icke3 that you wish tho Interior Department to participate in the dis-
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o v<V 4 '
• THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR °
WASHINGTON *&$
\<&®T 1 8 1945
Ity dear Mr. President:
.
_
Jfthilelwas in London, the Acting Secretary wrote a letter to tyou, dated Si^e^her 2a, 1945, referring again to the problem of Ji-acj£3j3isL^3_a^inistration and proposing that the Department //
-parti^^e m discussion of this problem with the Departments of
State,- War and Navy. •
For tho reasons outlined in that letter, as well as in myletter of September 12, I hope that the proposal has your approval.Believing that you vd.ll wish to secure all that the various Depart-
ments can contribute to a. single United States policy, I offer the
suggestion that a joint expert group representing the four Depart-
ments visit the Pacific islands for the purpose of preparing for you
a detailed plan for interim administration, pending decisions and
agreements c^oncernijig^^ure^dimposition and_administration of theislands. The joint group, I feel, should also submit"to you general
recommendations looking toward the later administration of thoseislands which may remain, or be placed, under United States' super-
vision. r
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* UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
01-jcl \ COMMANDER MARIANAS
L-. 003059 21I10V 1945.
S3! H310BSR-IEira on
IeCon C-UiM Sec. Serial
007780, feted 8 Uovenbor
1945.
Iron: . Goosander Marianas.
2o: • ." Sh3 Secretary of tho Havy.
Via; (l) Cossiander in Chief, U.S.Pacific Hoot sad Pacific Ocean Jpc&Q*
(2) The Chief of ITaval Operations.
Subject: Adnini strati on of Gnan and other Pacific Islands.
1. . Forwarded, concurring idth tho opinions and reeGssaenda-tlons of
basic letter.
2. Because of tho inporten.ee of this subject, the following obser-
vations aro submitted. Easy arc believed to be sufficiently conprehenoivo to
bo read independently of the treatment accorded this subject in the basic letter*
^-
™
• (a) £ho primary inportance of the Islands of the irestern Pacific now
jr^controlled by the United Statoo lies in their strategic location and vol.no.
£hoy constitute not only an outer bastion in our defence systsa, -but, by
thoir military occupation, their value lies in preserving irorld peace, and
preventiDs the rice of forces v;hich night conspire to upoot that peace.
. 5?h© responsibility for control of those I elands rests trlth the United States
alono. ~ : ._"..*
(b) Co efficiently discharge this responsibility, control of the postern
Paeifio Area on the sea £&&. in the air is required. Eho oall else of fcks
land rascoo involved and their Separation by lon^ stretches of .ocean not
only fecca one another, but frcn the Mainland, reduces the problem of thoir .-' .
defense and logistic support to that vhich may be likened to the support •
needed by an inr.obilo supply and repair chip to support air and surface
forcoD based thereon.
(0) 2o inplenent the c&osions of air and surface forces, the Navy has
paramount responsibility, Ehereforo, to efficiently ciochar^o this recpone*
sibility, tho I-avy nust have overall control of the area since sea potrer
guarantee d tho logistic rapport of all fcrcos involved*
(d) Military control of these islands is essential as thoir 1J.IJ.t0ry
valuo far outvoighs their ccononic valuo, Ens tsonsoilc development and
sdnini strati or. of relatively fey native inhabitants should bo subordinate \L
to thD real purpose for vhich these islands are hold. f ..
''
• - •
•.•."" ?" 1\ <








UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
COMMANDER MARIANAS
. i






Subject; Administration of Gu&a and other Pacific Islands.
(o) The commercial' and/or industrial value end resources of
tho islands is of little or no relative Importance to the? welfare
of the United States. ,* "-.
(f) She character! sties end nature of tho cajority of
Inhabitants on those i elands is such that artificial or forced raising
of their standard of living to one approaching that of 'the United
• States would ho detrimental to their host interests and would
contribute littlo to tho safety and welfare of the United States*
For tho most part, thoy are sir,plo people, requiring few of ou?
modern luxuries for their' welfare and happiness. -."-•..:
{g) The JTavy' o pro-war record in administering island areas t as
exemplified hy its administration of Guam end American Su^oa,, has lean
efficient and economical. ITaval Administration has long undorctoefi
the value of carefully considered advancement of the civilian popula-
tion. From tho Military standpoint a contented, healthy, end loyal
. .tive population contributes a strong link in the strongth of those
-.ado as haces. This has hecn demonstrated hy the loyalty of tho
- ....aniano in the recent war.-
(h) The accompli shmcats of the llavy Military Government in Guam
ing tho period of a littlo over a year, cineo recapture hy cur
. /cos, is ably sot forth hy tho Island Commander in cacic letter.
I'avy civil administration does not preclude harmonious functioning
./ of other government agencies under Navy overall cognizance. An
example of such an arrangement ie the present operation of tho U. S»
Commercial Company (formerly tho F.JJ.A.) in tho crea, engaged in tho
development of agriculture, live stoc!:, fisharics, and trade with
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Subject: Administration of Guea end other Pacific I el cads.
(i) The introduction of another independent administrative
agency would he uneconomical, necessitating duplication of effort,
". personnel and added crponce to the government.
3. I therefore strongly recommend that Uaval control he












20 January %Wj /




report of ttooting or the fresi&entiai &d boa
Subcommittee on civil e&n.inlstratic-u or tao
Pacific XsXas&u ".'.'
5no subject seating ^ss hsX6 in &?o.«3 207p Btats v
I;cp£rtn^iit # at icoo £'odnej;6nya 20 Jactiaty X9£6* Present at. tha
ftootiag t;o?e the- fcllo-.ur^e .
,
Brigadier GonoraX G* &» fcincoXs^ V&r &3p&$&&6&t
CoicncX Ro/noXdo^ ^ar 3feaar$a$2
'





»•'«» CU Arnold, x&tsrlop Dspart&ost #
Hr* Beceroffcj Interior- Dop&rfc&ont
2* Kr« SfiarXfl opened the siting by stating £hafc in
viov; of the Deparinant of Xnterips»*3 desire to bo RGaaix4,fed Oov-
error of the Cannibal Inland 9 * it secs&d appropriate £o? tho r«p-
roscnt&tivo of the interior Dspartcsont to state ih© position of
that Dopartsi&nt*
3«. 8r« Arnold 9 representing Interior^ stated fcfcfct tas
Department of Interior felt that the responsibility To? civil a*!*-
&iaiot ration of dependent poodles wos properly & function of that
cop:;rtnent» *s to tho Pacific islands * the Erspartaaent of Interior
desired to assume fcnat responsibility for tho- good of the peopled
of those areas &J6d desired to ta&o over civil a&sinistratlon in
those cross as soon as possible. Bo arose-stcd a rourjh, plan of ne>
uinistration by Interior for tks collideration of the fafeoerraltteo
but pointed out tnat tjio plan was only a pougfc dr&rt ana* votilti rs**
*iuiro considerable polishing
4-* Tnc Cubeoa'/dtteo taoatjors rci*;.u over tho j>Xan« Kp»
BearXa observed that, in his opinion^ tho pXan vaa j;o?e of an aoV
isiulstrative procedure ey the. P^partxont or Interior than it v?as
'
6 reeoa&on^ation on tae basic question before. th*3 SuboO?£fiitfcOQt
iie etat£3 tust the Utato £epartaent $ouXd not (and he asscrjcil
that neither would tho War or liavy Dcpartsi^ats) precipe to toll
the L»c^>rtr.erii or lut&riai* nos it choeia adoiniotcr any clv^ for
Khlch teoy Etifjht hum tne rosporisiyility. Therefore, it did^not




dure tsta within tho turns of reference or tho Subcommittee*




L st page ©i" the plan, and only tho first page. Bare a fe?/ ct~to~ i
fenfca thich raigat oe considered sortlnent to the Question hefore the
6, ^r. Arnold said that he thought that the interests
\
of tho United States could best bo served by having o definite pic-.iv
of civil adrtinisi res t;.on ay anion vc could let the tforld tsaow that
tho United {jtates had token stops to properly care for its dppspd*
cat peoples*
7, . X inquired fro.* &r. Arnold fcfcethor the Bap&rtoe&t
of Interior wantad to ta&e over civil administration immediately* i
lie answered in- the affirmative* I then ashed if fee didnH thirds
there vould be le^al &cd political objeotions to this in vicv? of
tho fact that taost of tho territory under discussion tola nov being
jDd&lftlstered by ailitary government as & result of lallitary opera-*
tlons end that if tho United 8tatos instituted civil government
under a civilian agency in areas to vhlch *;o had not yet. received
liny lc0iil title, viouid it not he e&harrassing to our negotiations
or, tho international political level* . .
£v Kr« Arnold sold tout ho van not a lawyer but in his
opinion there r?oro no local difficulties and politically it %?ould
co helpful* '•
\i\
io Mr. Arnold again stressed v/hat ho considered tho iu>
port^r.ao of properly taHlns care of the people and having c definite
plan for civil adainistration. Ho setid it s?as only natural for tho
l.rby and Navy to favor their own interests in areas of military ia-
porter.co and as « result tho people were c:>t to suffer*
11
«
ilr« Searls then stated that as Chaxv;_on of the Suo-/






Lcr.se i« civil adatnlotration unless consrota ^*f^ J**}* L /
tensity *itn specific areas &na instances could bo »ro*™e*< Ba /,
r:r;V •*£ ^ridif he couI<l saeeify any area or areas in the /
ifi;v o the eVecent civil atfaiaitMUon had rosulted in /. :
E&^btd conation of fed poorta tot »>«dteti nee* of a ./ ;,
change of • administration existed* ; :,.• \ '- . ' •:• " .' % . -
t? Ytt Arnold paid that ho »aa-w>t CriUciaing 'tift g»*r
'
* r^^^fr^fioi b t^o Any and Haw knit Ito-TOWthclocc co^lO >cat rx^inic oration 0/ u ****-* ; \. * m?> «~* v-**** iM»r«A«tall9 of con*
Kti^a oS* t^po »r did ho boUwo that Otto©* civilian agcz»*c*
wSiatnSll'a* liwSSiS b.eauoo of the dimities of (pttUft tiUa
Information at firsthand. .. ;> . • : -^ '
•«•. X stated that free aceons iuri.bcen given to jfe: •,' ,
Beccrofl several ml* aSo to the record, of nv otxico in^t.Ao.A'vt ^™i- that the Havy eould 00 glad to &a£o avaixaD^e ?*3r -7 Hs .
for
P
mtiofwith ressrd tooup civil &i»l«tmtt« to jsy eiviU&a <S
°
n
i said I wa csjaally sure that ««. Bar Dofcwtwwt voalsacgency«
do likewise*
U. General Lincoln said that the Sar kpytecnj 'cc*r
tfitaly voula do equally open to any such request* Ra added
that
bfSilinU uu4or3tan/tho oucdon interest iV^^dto^Sw '
r"^ ir. thrt Pacific Ocean areas ehon noooay had ofiorca w rsiit/a s
tho wEt^SpaSSirt of responsibility for Bil^iu and aOUons of
people m other oocupioa energy territories.
15. 2v> ArnoXd then stated, in response to a Question *
froa £0! that ho thought tho record of the Bavy In Civil adninis-
t£ti£u of 5u*o *ne Ca-oa hod not boon good and sold that there '
has not teen any organic act passed by tho Congress nscvidenoo
of progressive government in those areas*
16. I replied tact 1 could rot o-?eo that tho Sfavyjs ll
record had not teen* good in Guaa end &ai&ca and that, in «y opin~
ion, the record would shor that it had bsen very good* .
17 . Mr. Snarls then asfced General Uneoin and &z nttethcr
^c kno« of mv oalaUiathistPation in tho Peciric areeo at toe
pjefl-
cat tlao rnich roquived iKaedint* chan-e for the. ^ood of the
iiat*i?.d
pco.ols^4
1^. ^o both replied in tho negative, i mentioned bfiofly
nov, mel-. Che lot of tho natives h^d boon iaprovoa under :^ya,
^li~
tary rovorn>cnt, citing an a fc^7 e;;a-alca haaltAj particip^aon-ay
natives in IochI government, schools and education, personal h/cleuef





19, il!\ Arnold said that tho Department o ' interior
had never interfered with tho military in eny area u icier its Jur-
isdiction and asked j;.o 5 off the record, If J, could e:,to ojio single
instance of such interference,
20. I replied in tho affinitive and cited tho caoa of
fralzryra* .
21 • Kr» Arnold asked sio then if tho lb,7y f s position rcas I
that it desired to continue responsibility for civil- administration /
during tho postwar period rather than turn it over to tho Depart*
sent of Interior*
I Gno'?orcd that the Havy recognized tho Interest and
the responsibility of tho Eeaartcaont of Interior in the go?er&£$n£
of dependent peoples in certain areas of comparatively large land I
•nana and large populations* Hovev&r* the situation In tne Pacific
f
islands in different* S&o areas of the atolls and islands v?ere ft ln :
eo:«o cases » only a fev; square nileo and the populations czttfcsQly
-
s.a:ai<, Military installations os islands of strategic value could
pot. be isolatod to one sstall section of tho area as they pornapa
could in largo land masses* and 1 felt tnat in these ss&ll aretis^
questions of strategic consideration and civil adrAni atnation v-oro
indivisible* i stated that the? tar end E&Vf Sspasfcsontg i*oro cer-
tainly interested in retaining tfesponsinillty for civil &daini0ti?a~
tion in tho island areas during the'aoat~^ai> period*
.
2/>9 &r* Soarls then stated that tho chair irould cnteiv
tain ti Motion to tho effect that the repreformative of the Sopart-
f»ont of interior could ct&alt his plan £.,?": :slly to the Subcecalttcb
for traneniission to the Gcs^ittoe of tho Tour Cooretarios cut that
tae Subserjiittce vould reeo&tsend that no action bo iaisca on it us*
tli r.ueh tiso a a a final sottlo&ont on the international level t;ore
cade a a to Clio status of the Islands* .
?.$* She ration v;as rado a?;d seconded* It i?as carried
pith cna dissenting vote on tho part of tho ibpari&tenfc of Interior*
Tho representative of the Department of Xnv^ricr stated that ho






26, Tno sscGtIn£ adJ ourood tfifch the unaorstar^in^ that
the representative of the Department of Interior v-ould proSoufe fcisfinished pi>;n to tlio Subeoisalttoo in »bout u cockj at which Una
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Attached herewith Is the proposal of the Ibpar-traent of
.the Interior concerning administration of the Pacific islands.
It is i::j understanding that, in accordance vrith the subcoo-
jnittce's resolution of January 33.> this proposal will be turned
over at once to the Co::^ittee consisting of the Secretaries of
State, 7far, the Ilavy and the Interior, which was appointed by
the President on October 20, 1°I£.
. Sincerely yours,
,
" • \ X85d.)Ei!.v!n G. Arnold
Bdwin G. Arnold,
JMLrector,
("Director of the Division of
Enclosure i3> Territories and Island
EB:hrd Possessions, Department of







MEMORANDUM for Hon. James F. Byrnes, Secretary of State
Hon. Robert P. Patterson, Secretary of War
Hon. James Forres tal, Secretary of the Navy
Hon. Oscar L. Chapman, Acting Secretary of Interior
The following proposal of the Department of the Interior for
administration of the Facific islands is submitted in accordance
with the resolution adopted on January 30 by the subcommittee
of the committee of four Secretaries which was appointed by the
President on October 20, 1945.
1. It is proposed that military government should be
replaced by civil government in all Pacific islands under the
control of the armed services of the United States, with the
exception of islands or parts of islands which may be desig-
nated as military reservations, subject to any future interna-
tional agreement as to the status of these islands. The pro-
posal will apply to Guam and American Samoa and to the other
islands which are already under United States sovereignty; to
all of the Micronesian islands which were formerly under Japan-
ese mandate, including the Marianas, the Palaus, the Carolines
and the Marshalls; and to the Ryukyus, the Volcanos [sic"], the
Izus and the Bonins. It will also apply to any additional
Pacific islands which may from time to time be brought under
United States administration.
2. The administrative agency for the islands will be the
Department of the Interior. Through its Division of Territories
and Island possessions, the Department of the Interior is al-
ready responsible for administration in nearly all overseas
territories of the United States. For over 100 years, the De-
partment has dealt with the problems of indigenous peoples, both
on the mainland and overseas. Under its jurisdiction, the
Philippine Commonwealth is preparing for independence; Hawaii
and Alaska for statehood; Puerto Rico (under the bill supported
by the President and the Department) for such status as its
voters may choose; and the Virgin Islands for a rapidly increas-
ing measure of self-government. By maintaining Navy rule in
Guam and American Samoa for the past 45 years, the United States
has had the distinction of being the only power in the Pacific
which treats an inhabited area as a mere appurtenance of a
military base. This is not a distinction which the American
people will justify at a time when enlightened opinion, at home






3. The Department of the Interior recommends that, even
if some delay in transferring jurisdiction is anticipated, the
decision to employ civil administration in islands under United
States control should be made and announced at once. Such a
decision would correct a belief which is prevalent, both at
home and abroad, that our military interest in this area tends
to ignore the civil rights and the economic welfare of the is-
land inhabitants. The announced intention of this Government
to employ civil administration in areas under its supervision
will stregthen, not prejudice, our claims for military or ad-
ministrative responsibility in the Pacific, and it will place
this Government in a sound position to insist upon the adoption
and maintenance of proper standards of civil administration in
areas under the control of other powers.
4. The decision and announcement concerning civil admin-
istration will permit immediate steps to be taken by the Depart-
ment of the Interior to prepare the necessary plans. The trans-
fer from military to civil administration should be made, as an
interim arrangement, as soon as the necessary preparations can
be completed. Such an arrangement would, of course, be subject
to subsequent international agreements. Nothing done under an
interim civil administration i^ould stand in the way of sound
decisions concerning military use or concerning the future dis-
position of the Pacific islands or concerning trusteeship or
other terms under which the islands are to be governed,
5. An immediate decision to replace military by civil
government at an early date and to begin planning to that end
will have the further advantage of easing the necessary final
adjjstment which will have to be made by the Departments and the
personnel concerned. It would help to remove the impression
that exists among civil affairs personnel and island peoples
alike that the present island program is a temporary one. It
would also help to give a sense of continuing responsibility to
those concerned with carrying out the administration of island
affairs.
6. American experience in the Micronesian area already
strongly suggests that any division of the islands for admin-
istrative purposes would multiply the difficulties in the way
of economical and efficient government. If the taxpayers of
the United States (or those of some other administering power)
are to be relieved largely of cost in connection with island
affairs and if the islanders are to have the benefit of an
adequate control of conditions affecting their welfare, it would
be essential to regard Micronesia, including Guam, as a single
administrative unit, subdivided only for purposes of local ad-
ministration. Some of the islands have agricultural, mineral
and fish resources which may be used for the maintenance of the





Other islands may be deficit areas which, if left to their
own resources, might become a charge upon the budget of the
administering power. To treat the whole region as a single
unit for the purpose of dealing with the practical and difficult
problems of transportation, communication, food distribution,
public health, and public finance will provide a sound basis
for economical administration.
Summary of Recommendations
1, Military government should be replaced by civil government,
with the Department of the Interior as the administering
agency, in all Pacific islands under the control of the
armed services, with the exception of islands or parts of
islands which may be designated as military reservations,
2. The decision to adopt civil government should be made and
announced at once. The Department of the Interior should
then proceed accordingly, with the assistance of other
departments concerned, to prepare plans of administration.
3. The transfer from military to civil administration should
be made, as an interim arrangement, as soon as the neces-
sary preparations can be completed. Such an arrangement
would, of course, be subject to subsequent international
agencies,
4, In the interest of economical and effective administration,
the Micronesian area, including Guam, should be regarded







TRUSTEESHIP AGKOBViEOT FOR TliC POKIER JAPANESE MANDATED
ISLANDS
Draft nrorosed by the United States on 17 February 1047
with change, nade by the
Security Council, when it annroved the agreement on 2 April
1047 .on !s added
by the Council arc in italics; omitted words are in
brackets. Adapted fror.
SCOR, II, Supp. 0; 3 ON Treaty Series, p. 190.
Uhere&s Article 7S of the Charter of the United Nations
provides for ttfc
establisSent of an international trusteeship systen for the
^ninistrntion and
su^rvision of such territories as nay be nlaced thereunder by
subsequent arrce-
Dents; and
Whereas under Article 77 of the said Charter the trusteeship
system nay be
applied to territories now held under nandate; and
Whereas on 17 Oecenber 1020 the Council of the League of
Nations eonfirned^a
nandate for the forner Goman islands north of the equator to
Janan to be adminis
tered in accordance with Article 22 of the Covenant of the
League of Nations, and
Whereas Janan, as a result of the Second l/orld War, has
ceased to exercise any
authority in these islands;
,
Now therefore, the Security Council of the United Nations,
^vinn satisfied
itself that the relevant Articles of the Charter hove
been conplied with, hercb
y
resolves to approve the following terms of trusteeship for
the Pacific islands
fornerly under nandate to Janan. *
ARTICLE 1. The territory of the Pacific islands ^"'^M^jfofth^Covenant
fornerly held by Janan under nandate in accordance with
Article 22 of th~ Covenant
of the Lea2ue or Nations, is hereby designated
as »
"f^.fStSL Tto
the trustecshin systen established in the Charter of the
nuteiAUW. ™°.
.
territory of the Pacific islands is hereinafter referred to
as the Trus. lemtory.
ARTICLE 2. The United States of Anerica is designated as
the Administering
Authority of the Trust Territory.
ARTICLE 3. The Administering Authority shall have full
powers of ^ministra-
tion legislation, and jurisdiction over the territory subject to
the piovisions
Vf t'iis Aarcenent [as an intearal part of the United States], and
nay annly to the
?r« Territory subject to any notifications which the Adninisterinp Authority
Z; consider desirable! such of the laws of the United States as
it nay deen aporo-
rriato to local conditions and reouirenents.
ARTICLE 4. The Administering Authority, in discharging ^:. "^!^r°Jf
trusteeship in the Trust Territory, shall act in accordance
x.ith the Cnartero




in Article S3, paragraph 2, of the Charter, a.My the
objectives of the interna
tional trusteeship system, as set forth in Article 7G of
the Charter,
people- of the Trust Territory.
ARTICLE 5. In discharn.inr it, obligations unJ,^r Article
76a and £ticlc *! o'
ch« CVir^er the Wninisterinp Authority shall ens :re that the
Trust lemtory
< all ol.v its nartin accordance with the Charter of theUnited
Nations in the
nainlenance of international peace and security. I'o this
end the Admnistermr





1. To establish naval , military and air bases and to erect fortifications
in the Trust Territory;
2. To station and employ armed forces in the Territory; and
3. ' To make use of volunteer forces, facilities and assistance from the trust
Territory in carrying out the obligations towards the Security Council undertaken
in this regard by the Administering Authority, as well as for the local defence
and the maintenance of law and order within the Trust Territory.
ARTICLE 6. In discharging its obligations under Article 76b of the Charter,
the Administering Authority shall:
1. Foster the development of such political institutions as are suited to the
Trust Territory, and shall promote the development of the inhabitants of the Trust
Territory towards self-government or independence, as may be appropriate to the
particular circumstances of the Trust Territory and its peoples and the free ly cx-
prsss ed wishes of the peonies concerned ; and to this end shall give to the inhabi-
tants of the Trust Territory a progressively increasing share in the administrative
services in the Territory; shall develop their participation in [local] government;
shall give due recognition to the customs of the inhabitants in providing a system
of law for the Territory; and shall take other appropriate measures towards these
ends;
2. Promote the economic advancement ari3 self-sufficiency of the inhabitants,
ar.d to this end shall regulate the use of natural resources; encourape the develop-
ment of fisheries, agriculture, and industries; protect the inhabitants against the
loss of their lands and resources; and improve the means of transportation and
communication;
3. Promote the social advancement of the inhabitants, and to this end shall
nrotect the rights and fundamental freedoms of all elements of the population with-
out discrimination; nrotect the health of the inhabitants; control the traffic in
arm:; and ammunition, onium and other dangerous drugs, and alcohol and other spiri-
tuous beverages; and institute such other "regulations as may be necessary to nro-
tect the inhabitants against social abuses; and
4. Promote the educational advancement of the inhabitants, and to this end
sh<':?: take steps toward the establishment of a general system, of elementary educa-
tion; facilitate the vocational and cultural advancement of the population; and
shaT.3 encourage nualificd students to pursue higher education, including training
on ire -professional level.
ARTICLE 7. [In discharging its obligations under -Article 76c of the Charter,
the Administering Authority, subject only to the requirements of public order and
socv-vity, shall guarantee to the inhabitants of the Trust Territory freedom of
. speech, of the press, and of assembly; freedom of conscience, of worship, and of
religious teaching; and freedom of migration and movement.]
In discharging its obligations qnder Artiel VCg -. f the Char t er, th e _ Adminis-





ce, and, sub ject only to th e require ) w.n t >:- .
j
f public order and s ecurity
.
fre • /•om or speech, or the nre ss and of assembly; freedom of worship and of re ligi ous
I




ARTICLE 3.-1. In discharging its obligations under Articli 76d of the Charter,
as defined by Article 33, naraqraph 2, of the Charter, the Administering
Authority,
subject to the requirements of -security and the obligation to 'promote the advance-
dent of the inhabitants, shall accord to nationals of each .ienber Ox the United
Nations and to connanics and associations organized in conformity with the laws
of such lombers, treatment in the Trust Territory no less favourable than that
accorded therein to nationals, companies and associations of any other United
Nation except the Administering Authority.
2. The Administering Authority shall ensure equal treatment to the Members
of the United Nations and their nationals in the administration of justice.
3. Nothing in this article shall be so construed as to -accord traffic rights
to aircraft flying into and out of the Trust Territory. Such rights shall be
subject to agreement between the Administering Authority and the State whose
nationality such aircraft possesses.
4. The Administering Authority may negotiate and conclude commercial and
other treaties and agreements with Members of the United Nations and other States,
designed to attain for the inhabitants of the Trust Territory treatment by the
Members of the United Nations and other States no less favourable than that
granted
by them to the nationals of other States. The Security Council may recommend,
or
invite other organs of the United Nations to consider and recommend, what rights
the inhabitants of the Trust Territory should acouire in consideration of the
rights obtained by Members of the United 'Nations in the Trust Territory.
ARTICLE 9. The Administering Authority shall be entitled to constitute the^
Trust Territory into a customs, fiscal, or administrative union or federation with
other territories under United States jurisdiction and to establish common services
between such territories and the Trust Territory where such measures are not in-
consistent with the basic objectives of the international trusteeship system and
with the terms of this agreement.
ARTICLE 10. The Administering Authority, acting under the provisions of Avti-
cle 3 o^ this Agreement, "may accent membership in any regional advisory commission,
regional authority, or technical organization, or other voluntary association of
States, may co-onerate with specialized international bodies, public or private,
and may engage in other forms of international co-operation.
ARTICLE 11. -1. The Administering Authority shall take the necessary steps to
provide the status of citizenship of the Trust Territory for the inhabitants of
the Trust Territory.
2. The Administering Authority shall afford diplomatic and consular orotcc-
tion to inhabitants of the Trust Territory when outside the territorial limits
of the Trust Territory or of the Territory of the Administering Authority.
ARTICLE 12. The Administering Authority shall enact such legislation as may be







ARTICLE 13. The provisions of Articles C7 and !}ll of the Charter shall be
applicable to the Trust Territory, provided that the Administering Authority nay
deternine the extent of their applicability to any areas which may fron tine to
time be specified by it as closed for security reasons.
ARTICLE 14. The Adninisterinp Authority undertakes to apply in the Trust
Territory the provisions of any international conventions and recommendations
which nay be appropriate to the particular circumstances of the Trust Territory
and which v/ould be conducive to the achievement of the basic objectives of article
6 of this agreement.
ARTICLE 15. The terns of the present Agreement shall not be altered, amended
or tcrninated without the consent of the Administering Authority.
ARTICLE 16. The present Agreement shall come into force when approved by the
Security Council of the United Nations and by the Government of the United States





V' ^i.iT"-T-rT;' ,>"' r
iiay 11;, ;i£[#
•
. I have today informed the Director of the Bureau or the Budget thai inn
drafts of organic legislation for Qua-:- and Anerican Samoa, prepared br uhe
na-wvH-.nppi. .->.r ;.>.- Interior, have my asersval. The Der-artren.:- of the I iteric:Department of the
Y.'liL
:'hav
•i:.e res osasasiiiov oj ^Co;::;i,..i so measures tc ;.^ .scngre.
ha e asked the Secretary; of the Navy 'to assist you and i enclose a; copy 01
ny letter to hin. - : .'.. -.-,. . •' '•",, .• '..-
.
• I indicated ir. my letter of February 11, I9kS, to the Secretaries of
State, Ar.r/, 3avy and the Inter"
of organic acts for :he Pacific
•Interior as the civilian agency
tratior of -these islands.
was sr«" intension, ur
'lands., to designate the Deoartinent ei th
general supervision over Civi^. aaainis-
"Tkm.ne j. snss .in that such a deS;r rnsiic-
be without" prejudice tc future' consideration based upon further study of leng-
raroe plans for administration of United States territories and possessions/
.it is ay desire that realistic, plsnnins be undertaken immediately "to effectu-
-ate orderly transfer of the aforementioned islands from naval to civilian
administration." Accordingly, I request that you take the lead, in coos -..rat: on
•with the Secretary of the -fevy, in developing 'a specific tins schedule u'ithin
•.which the desired transfers nay be effected, regardless of the status o£
.
pending legislation. Preferably, under such a schedule, the island of Guars
should be transferred tc civilian administratis:: within the next year, and
'American Samoa and the Trust Territories nithin the next two to three yens-.
Plans devised under these tine arrangements can then be integrated' v;ith -ihat^s
«"l f.T fiar.fi !v snsnT.flr
.ever legisaa ".lye proposals-, are unTim ueiy e
V . I further request"'that' yon advise r.ie by September'!^ I?b9,'-cf the
recommended under the aforementioned procedure,' .
-•- ^- *~ A a '. To
. v - no announceci im 01 mis uovernmens nc aco'
:f its Pacific
territories. The accomplishment of this objective will be furthered by the
transfer of these territories to civilian administration 'and the enactment
of organic legislation at the "earliest Practicable date. N












HH-IOHAIIDUM 0?^UI^RSqAKDING ST^ri^T gH3 NAVY V&KSSSXEBT AffD TH3
D3PAP.TM5NT 0? THE INTrlRIOP. REGARDING- TH*J TRAN5?SR 0? MHINISTEATI7E
RESPONSIBILITY FOR SHE TRUSS TERRITORY 0? THE PACIFIC "ISLA3DS
1« The President should designate the future civilian Hi rj\ Commissioner
of the Trust Territory. Interior's selection for civilian High Com-
missioner should "be nominated hy the Secrotary of the Navy through
the Secretary of Defense,
2. The civilian High Commissioner should assume office on or about
July l, 1550, and should ho responsible to the Secretary of the
Navy from the date he assumes office until the transfer date.
3. Responsibility for the Government of the Trust Territory should he
transferred from Navy to Interior on July 1, I95^r anc* from that
. date forv/ard the High Commissioner should be responsible to the
Secretary of the Interior.
U, The civilian High Commissioner, with Interior's assistance, should
immediately after his designation commence recur iting civilians
to replace naval personnel. The llavy Department will process the
appointments and arrange for the transportation of civilian replace-
ments until the transfer date.
5» The Navy Department will, after consultation with the Department
of the Interior, include in its 1951 budget estimates the amounts
required to cover costs incidental to the transfer, including the
salaries and transportation of civilian replacements,
6, Naval military personnel on duty with the Government of the Trust
Territory on July 1, 1951 1 will, except as otherwise agreed upon
• in individual cases, bo detached from that duty on tho transfer
date, or earlier if requested by tho High Commissioner, provided
that the foregoing shall not affect normal rotation of duty in
- individual cases. If any services are required to he performed
. by naval units to the Government of the Trust Territory after
July 1, 1951 » such services will be the subject of separate
agreements.
7. Naval civilian 'personnel whom the High Commissioner docs not wish
to retain will, by July 1, 1951 . he reassigned to other duty or




8.. Specific arrangements with respect to the transfer of property now
owned "by the United States and used "by the Government of the Trust
Territory will be the subject of separate agreemen s, These arrange-
ments will he consistent with policies relating to property transfer
set forth in the draft organic acts for Guam and American Samoa
jecommended by the Interior and ITavy Departments to the 81st
Congress.
9. The two Departments v/ill cooperate closely v/ith each other at each
stage of the transfer process, making available to one another
information, facilities, and personal and other services to the
fullest extent practicable in order to ensure an orderly transfer*
10. The transfer date referred to in paragraph 3 above has been selected
. on the assumption that regular air and sea transportation services,
other than naval, will be available after the transfer date to meet
essential civilian and governmental requirements in the Trust Terri-
tory. The ITavy and Interior Departments will commence immediately
to work out, in cooperation with other interested agencies, arrange-
ments for such services and will submit plans by May 1, 1950, for








TRANSFER OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE
,
TRUST TERRITORY OF THE PACIFIC ISLANDS FROM THE
SECRETnRY OF THE NAVY TO THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
WHEREAS the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (hereinafter referred
to as the trust territory) was placed under the trusteeship system established
by the Charter of the United Nations by means of a trusteeship agreement ap-
proved by the Security Council of the United Nations on April 2, 1957, and by
the United States Government on July 18, 1947, after due constitutional process;
and
WHEREAS the United States, under the terms of the trusteeship agreement,
was designated as the administering authority of the trust territory, and
has
assumed obligations for the government thereof; and
WHEREAS Executive Order No. 9875 of. July 18, 1947, delegated authority
and responsibility for the civil administration of the trust territory to the
Secretary of the Navy on an interim basis; and
WHEREAS a committee of the Secretaries of State, War, the Navy, and the
Interior recommended on June 18, 1947, that administrative responsibility for
the trust territory be transferred to a civilian agency of the Government at
•the earliest practicable date; and
WHEREAS plans for the orderly transfer of administrative responsibility
for the trust territory from the Secretary of the Navy to the Secretary of
the Interior are embodied in a memorandum of understanding between the Depart-
ment of the Navy and the Department of the Interior, approved by me on September
23 1949, and it is the view of the two departments, as expressed in
that
memorandum, that such transfer should. take effect on July 1, 1951; and
WHEREAS the transfer of administration of the trust territory from the
Secretary of the Navy to the Secretary of the Interior, effective July 1, 1951,
appears to be in the public interest: ..','.-
NOW THEREFORE, by virtue of the authority vosted in me as President of
the United States, it is ordered as follows:
1. • The administration of the trust territory is hereby transferred from
the Secretary of the Navy to the Secretary of the Interior, such transfer to
become effective on July 1, 1951
•
2. The Department of the Navy and the Department of Interior shall
proceed with the plans for the transfer of administration of the trust territory





' When the transfer of administration made by this order becomes effec-
tive, the Secretary of the Interior shall take such action as may be necessary






civil government in the trust territory and shall, subject to such policies ao
the President may from time to time proscribe and, when appropriate, in collab-
oration v;ith other departments or agencies of the Government, carry out the
obligations assigned by the United States as the administering authority of the
trust territory under the terms of the trusteeship agreement approved by the
United States on July 18, 194-7, and under the Charter of the United Nations?
PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that the authority to specify parts or all of the trust
territory as closed for security reasons and to determine the extent to which
Articles 87 and 83 of the Charter of the Unfed Nations shall be applicable
to such closed areas, in accordance with Article 13 of the trusteeship agree-
ment, shall bo exercised by the President: AND PROVIDED FURTHER, that the
Secretary of the Interior shall keep the Secretary of State currently informed
of activities in the trust territory affecting the foreign policy of the United
States and shall consult the Secretary of State on questions of policy concern-
ing the trust territory which relate to the foreign policy of the United States,
and that all relations between' departments or agencies of the Government and
appropriate organs of the United Nations with respect to the trust territory
shall be conducted through the Secretary of State,
4-e The executive departments and agencies of the Government are authorized
and directed to cooperate with the Departments of the Navy and Interior in the
effectuation of the provisions of this order,
5. The said Executive Order No. 9875 of July 18, 1947, is revoked, effec-
tive July 1, 1951,
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